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I 
ABSTRACT 
Industrial Relations theory presents a dualism of 
approaches to explanation, that is of Subjective and 
Objective paradigms of explanation. Utilising 
- ' 
Giddensian Structuration theory, a Structuration 
theory of industrial relations is developed and 
utilised to bridge the epistemological divide. 
Structuration theory is then utilised to establish the 
ontological character of collective bargaining for 
three regions of the South African Garment 
Manufact~ring Industry. This 'charact~r' is shown to 
be encapsulated in the notion of maintaining a high 
level of managerial prerogative. The managerial 
prerogative has been maintained and perpetuated by the 
lack of militancy on the part of the U~ions, and an 
explanation of the observed lack of militancy is 
provided by the examination of action around the 
bargaining in the respective industrial councils. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"The theoretical and ontological assumptions 
of the system and ethnomethodological approaches 
are unbridgeable in any conventional industrial 
relations paradigm" (1) 
Explanatioh in the social sciences presents an epistemological 
divide, a dualism of subjective-objective explanatory 
systems. Industrial Relations pS a field of study identified 
with the social sciences presents a similar epistemological 
.divide; this thesis suggests a 'Structuration' theory of 
industrial relations, based on the work of Anthony Giddens, 
aimed at bridging the epistemological divide. 
The first chapter reviews explanation in industrial relations, 
identifies consensus of the existence of the 'epistemological 
divide', the dominance of Dunlopian systems theory, and 
provides a critique of Dunlop whilst at the same time 
suggesting the retention of aspects of Dunlap's model of 
explanation. 
Chapter Two introduces the reader to collective bargaining in 
South Africa. A review of the historical conditions of 
I 
collective bargaining is provided and particular attention is 
paid to the Industrial Concilliation Act and its various 
amendments. The political context is supplemented with a 
description of the economic context and the growth of the 
garment industry is also provided. This allows for a 
discussion of collective bargaining in the garment_ industry 
and the issue of an observed lack of militancy is established. 
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Chapter Three is devoted to the explanation and development of 
a 'Structuration' theory. Structure is reformulated to be 
prior to 'Form' and is out of time and space, and is 
characterised as Rules and Resources. Rules can be classified 
as rules of Signification and rules of Legitimation, and 
resources by way of facilities of Domination. The 
identification of Structure - in terms of Signification, 
Domination and Legitimation provide a cross-sectional 
description of an action context, the longitudinal 
understanding is to be found in the modalities of 
structuration. These are identifi~d as the individual's 
'interpretive scheme', the 'facility' through which control 
over resources is exercised and norms which are exhibited in 
interaction, power and sanctions respectively. Structure, as 
reformulated, is a core feature of the knowledge of social 
action held by the social actor. At the same time it is 
external to the actor and as will be argued, represents a 
duality thus bridging the epistemological divide. An 
evaluation/critique of structuration theory is also provided 
and the point is made that (at very least), it provides a 
means of describing the ontological character of social 
action, in this case of collective bargaining in the clothing 
industry. 
The presentation of a duality of structure will have 
methodological issues and these are dealt with in Chapter 
Four. In the development of a structuration theory of 
industrial relations, Giddens' psychology of the social actor 
is argued to present epistemological problems which 
structuration theory wishes to overcome. In attempting to 
maintain the integrity of the duality at the psychological 
level, Kelly's Personal Construct theory is substituted. 
Construct theory fits in easily to the other principles of' 
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structuration theory and provides a ready mechanism for 
classifying the interpretive scheme of the actor. Structure 
can then be identified from 'form' of social action as well as 
the interpretive scheme (constructs) of the actors; it must be 
empha~ized, however, that this separation is for analytical 
' purposes only. The duality of structure requires such a 
proviso but also means that structure deduced from these 
sources must be identical. 
In introducing Personal Construct theory as a psychological 
mechanism which contributes to the understanding of the 
reasons for the lack of militancy, it became necessary to 
review social psychological contributions to the understanding 
of collective bargaining. Such a review is also provided in 
Chapter Four. 
The purpose of Chapters Five, Six and Seven is to present data 
which are utilised to describe the structure of each region. 
The identification of such structure then represents an 
explanation of action in each region. Each chapter has two 
major sections, that of Part A, which presents data on 'Form', 
and Part B, which presents data utilised to establish the 
'interpretive scheme' of _the social actors; structure - as 
reformulated - is described in the concluding section of each 
of the regional chapters. 
Chapters Five, Six· and Seven establish the ontological 
character of collective bargaining in each region. This 
character is then examined and an explanation of the lack of 
militancy is arrived at from regional data. Each chapter also 
contains a structuration theory explanation of the lack of 
militancy in the regional union(s} and addresses (again in 
structuration theory terms) how such behaviour was sustained 
over the review period of this thesis. 
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_In Chapter Eight the threads of the debates as found in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six and Seven are drawn together and 
an explanation of action in the Garment Manufacturing Industry 
of South Africa is provided. 
The thesis, it is suggested, contributes in three significant 
ways. Firstly, it proposes a modei of explanation aimed at 
making one of the dualism of explanatory positions found in 
industrial relations theory, and allows the establishing of 
the ontological character of social action, and secondlyJ it 
presents recent data on action in the Garment Manufacturing 
industry of South Africa which has n.ot previously been 
available; and finally, it provides an explanation of the 
'essential nature' of collective bargaining in the Garmen~ 
Manufacturing industry, i.e. the maintenance of a high level 
of managerial prerogative and the .concomitant lack of 
militancy on the part of the regional unions. 
Reference 
1. Poole, Michael Theories of Trade Unionism, a Sociology 
of Industrial Relations, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London, 1984 (Revised 
edition), p.40. 
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1. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE DUALISM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
1. 1 INDUSTRr:AL RELATIQN.§._::__TH~ BEGJN.NINGS 
The treatment of labour by classical economists can be 
viewed as the spur that laid the foundations to what 
is today ref erred to as the discipline of industrial 
relations. Labour was conceptualised as 'merely' one 
of the factors of production and is subject to the 
general laws of economics as any of the other f aciors 
( 1) . 
The first major critique of this approach came from 
Marx who argued against what he called "commodity 
fetishism" (2). Kochan (3) argues that Marxism 
"provided an entirely different set of normative 
assumptions". Firstly, labour should not "be expected 
to live with the consequences of the market economy", 
secondly, within capitalist society conflicts of 
interest were class based, thirdly, negotiations 
between labour and management_ were but short term 
ameliorations and fourthly; it was only with the 
revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system and 
the substitution with a socialist society that the 
conflict would be resolved. Marx also gave a 
centrality of importance to labour in the historical 
analysis of societies and in so doing elevated it from 
'merely' another commodity. In addition, as Keat and 
Urry (4) clarify, Marx noted the interrelatedness of 
social phenomena as well as "things", thus "It is the 
relations between the central social constituents that 
determine the functions that things perform within 
that mode". Keat and Urry further point to Marx's 
rejection of the argument for "natural economic laws 
which are applicable to all societies" (5). There are 
no general laws of economic life which are independent 
of given historical structures. 
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Unlike Marx, Sidney and Beatrice Webb (6a & 6b) did 
not see the revolutionary breakdown of capitalist 
society as a necessary condition to the problems of 
labour, rather, the formation of trade unions was 
viewed as an appropriate and desirable mechanism to 
redress the power imbalance with employers. The 
publications of "A History of Trade Unionism" and 
"Industrial Democracy" in 1896 and 1897 respectively. 
have, particularly in Britain, been widely praised. 
Allen· (7) says "There was in a sense no trade union 
history until they wrote it"; Bain and Clegg (8) -
referring to the latter publication - call it 
industrial relation's "major and perhaps only 
classic". 
The contribution by the Webbs lies in at least three 
areas (9), firstly - like Marx.- their normative 
framework helped "challenge the arguments of the 
classical economic theorists", secondly "they were the 
first to develop a theory of trade unionism and 
collective bargaining as rational strategies for 
dealing with the unequal bargaining powers between 
workers and employers" and thirdly, "they emphasised 
the importance of empirical research". It can be 
added that the Webbs in their advocacy of labour laws 
to ease the plight of 19th century British labour, 
adopted a social activist position. 
In America, the challenge to the deterministic 
economics of the classicists took the form of 
institutionalist economics led largely by J.R. Commons 
and the so-called "Wisconsin Idea" (10). American 
institutionalists maintained the inductive empiricism 
of the Webbs and equally carried their research 
activities into policy. Like Marx and the Webbs, 
Commons and his followers believed that the workforce 
were unfairly placed in relation to employers and that 
special treatment was required. Unlike Marx, however, 
the institutionalists did not see the cause of this 
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imbalance in the capitalist system but rather in an 
inherent conflict of interest between workers and 
employers. The solution therefore lay in 
"union-management accommodation and periodic conflict 
resolution, all strategies for working within the 
capitalist system" (11). 
The empiricist tradition of the Webbs was also 
maintained and pursued in Britain. Jackson (12) 
comments that "much of the early writing" placed 
"considerable emphasis on 'institutional' and 
'factual' recordings of industrial relations' issues, 
"in the main they produced 'guide books' to current 
practice rather than theories and explanations" (13). 
The "empirical temper" (14) of British academia is 
well represented in industrial relations and easily 
identified in what is referred to as the "Oxford 
Group" (15). Turner (16) says of them, 
"The 'oxford Line' might be described as combining an 
industrious extension of established avenues of 
enquiry and particularly a meticulous pursuit of 
institutional detail, a preference for the short-term 
rule of thumb over the broader generalisation, a 
rather low awareness of those disciplines - in 
ascending order, of sociology, statistics and 
economics - which may illuminate the field with 
normative observations, and a variety of propagandist 
mini-reformism which insists partly in leading people 
boldly in the direction they appear to be going 
anyway". 
The implied criticism of a lack of theorising is, as 
Jackson notes "a little unfair" as Clegg, Flanp.ers 
and Fox have all made "important contributions_ to 
industrial relations theory (17); Clegg on industrial 
democracy, Fox's unitarist and pluralist frames of 
reference and Flanders has extended the debate on 
systems theory to the British condition. 
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Whilst the institutionalist theme represents a major 
contribution to the origins of industr{al relations, 
an additional and equally important theme is to be 
found in the writings on trade unionism. Perlman (18) 
identified five approaches to the theory of trade 
unions; 
(i) As moral institutions 
(ii) Part of a revolutionary tradition 
(iii) Psychological interpretations 
(iv) Economic institutions 
(v) Political institutions 
Each of these approaches had, in turn, a particular 
academic discipline that could account for their 
perspective on the growth, function and purpose of 
unions, these were (respectively) the Protestant 
Christian Socialist and Roman Catholic Christian 
social movements, the Marxian social movement, the 
environmental psychology discipline, neo-classical 
economics and lastly, a jurisprudential history 
discipline ( 19). 
The content, then of early industrial relations 
investigations was therefore centred on trade unionism 
and the dominant methodological approach was that of 
induction with a strong empiricist flavour. For this 
reason, if no other, the arrival of Dunlap's syst_ems 
theory of industrial relations has been categorised as 
a "watershed" · ( 20). For Jackson ( 21) , __ ___:~unlap.:...?. work 
has had a tremendous impact. It has dominated 
industrial relations research for the past decade and 
has been used-as- a-starting point by most influential 
r ----
commentators". 
Dunlop (22) in criticising the institution~~~ 
- ~-- - - ~-
positions, says --'~Facts have outrun ideas. Integrating 
theory has lagged f~r behind expanding experience. 
The many worlds of industrial relations have been 
changing more rapidly than the ideas to interpret, to 
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explain and to relate them". Whilst not denigrating 
the role of "detailed studies", Dunlop states that his 
"present interest is in a level of generality greater 
than that achieved in studies of particular industries 
or countries. But it is not nearly so broad as a 
general theory of all social action" (23). 
In the preface to "Industrial Relations Systems", 
' - - - 0 - - - ~ --- - - - A ... 
Dunlop says that the 2urpose _ _s>f the_ text_i~ _ 
(i) To present "a general theory of ind~st:_ria}. 
r_:lations; it ~==~~-to provid~ ~~<?ls ot 
analysis to interpret and to gain understanding 
of the widest possible range of industrial 
r~lations facts and practices". 
(ii) "to illustrate a type of research and inquiry 
which may well provide a basis for a number of 
further volumes of comparative studies of 
industrial relations among different countries 
and industries" 
(iii) "an attempt to make one world of direct 
experience in industrial relations and the 
realm of ideas" (24) 
Whilst accepting the ambitious nature of the project, 
subsequent commentators have credited Dunlop with 
(i) "It provided a way of broadening the subject 
area previously considered by industrial 
relations writ~rs~ (25) 
(ii) "It gave commentators the opportunity to claim 
that industrial relations was a discipline in 
its own right" (26) 
(iii) "by virtue of being so set apart from the 
dominant concerns (empiricism), his ideas were 
inevitably to be acclaimed when attention 
ultimately quickened in the theoretical 
analysis of the contours of trade union and 
labour movements" (27) 
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(iv) Providing, at very least, an "heuristic device" 
(28) 
(v) Focusihg attention on the generation of a body 
of theory specific to industrial relations (29) 
Wh~le D~nlop's systems theory of industrial relations 
has had a major .impa.ct_, ~t has_ also been subjected to 
close scrutiny which has generated much criticism, yet 
as Jackson (30) notes "it would be fair to argue that 
the systems approach probably remains the most 
influential in industrial relations". 
1.2 DUNLOP'S SYSTEMS THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Dunlop (31) identifies the explanandum of industrial 
relations' systems, "The central task of a theory of 
industrial relations is to explain why particular 
rules are established in particular industrial 
relations systems and how and why they change in 
response to changes affecting ~he system". The focus 
of the theory is the "complex rules to govern the work 
place and work community" (32). 
Dunlop identifies "three groups of actors: 
(i) Workers and their organisations 
(ii) Managers and their organisations 
(iii) Governmental agencies concerned with the work 
place and the work community" (33) 
These actors, Dunlop says, "are regarded as 
confronting an environmental context at any one time. 
The environment is comprised of three interrelated 
contexts: the technology,,the ma~ket or budgetry 
constraints and the power relations and statuses of 
the actors". Dunlop continues, "The system is bound 
'together by an ideology or understandings shared by 
all the actors"(34). 
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Prior to addressing the criticisms and 'renovations' 
of systems theory the following points, drawn from 
Dunlop, need to be made -
1) "The generalised framework" is, according to 
Dunlop, applicable ~o "three broad areas of 
industrial relations experience", 
(a) "industrial relations within an enterprise 
industry or other segment of a country and to 
comparisons among such sectors" 
(b) "Industrial relations within a country as a 
whole and to comparisons among countries", and 
(c) "industrial relations in the course of economic 
development"(35) 
In making the above points Dunlop is suggesting 
that his schema is an appropriate analytical tool 
at a variety of levels of analysis and also that it 
is appropriate in terms of longitudinal 
investigations. 
2) Dunlop acknowledges his Parsonian foundations by 
referring to Parsons & Smelser's (36) depiction of 
the economic system as a subsystem of the more 
general total social system. Dunlop says, 
"Nonetheless, the analogy of economics, an 
economic system, and the relations between the 
economic aspects of behaviour and the totality 
of social action is suggestive for organising 
insights and observations about industrial 
relations aspect~ of behaviour in industrial 
society" ( 37) 
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3) Causation for the emergence of "a distinctive group 
of workers and managers" is firmly rooted in the 
existence of "industrial society" irrespective of 
the "pofi-t-i-ca-1-fonn"u-suc!l_industriar: societies may 
represent. The "more traditional Marxian and 
Webbsian versions of the structural origins of 
trade unions" (38) are supplanteq by a notion of 
systemic necessity. 
4) Dunlop(39) in clarifying what is meant by an 
industrial relations systems (IRS) notes the 
following characteristics:-
(a) The IRS "is to be viewed as an analytical 
subsystem of an industrial society on the same 
logical plane as an economic system". It (th~ 
IRS) is not "coterminus" with the economic 
system but a degree of "overlap" is possible. 
' - ~---
(b) The IRS is also not a "subsidiary part~ of-an 
' -
economic system and therefore the analytical 
tools of economics are "not likely to be 
entirely suitable to another different 
analytical subsystem of society". 
(c) There are relationships and boundaries between 
the wider society and an IRS, as s~ch an 
analysis of an IRS must "make some assumptions 
about the ~est of the social system". 
(d) The IRS is a logical abstraction. "Neither an 
economic system nor an industrial relations 
system is designed simply to describe in 
factual terms the real world of time and 
space. Both are abstractions designed to 
highlight relationships and to focus attention 
upon critical variables and to formulate 
propositions for historical inquiry and 
statistical testing". 
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(e) Furthermore, Dunlop's conceptualisation of the 
IRS means that a distinctive subject matter has 
been delineated and that (for Dunlop) the 
seperate analytical problems can be identified 
as, 
(i) "the relation of the industrial relations 
system to the society as a !Yhole" 
(ii) "the relation of the industrial relations 
system to the subsystem known as the economic 
system" , and 
. (iii)" the inner structure and characteristics 
of the industrial relations subsystem itself". 
5) Dunlop's(41) analysis of power, li~e his 
understanding of the emergence of "group(s) of 
workers and managers", is considerably different to 
earlier labour t~eory. Dunlop views power as being 
both external and internal to the IRS. In 
discussing the II locus and distribution of power Ii he 
specifically excludes from the discussion the 
"distribution of power within the industrial 
relations system" which is represented by "the 
relative bargaining powers among the actors, or 
their controls over the processes of interaction or 
rule setting". 
Power as in the wider society does not determine 
the behaviour of the actors, rather "it is a 
context which helps to structure the industrial 
relations system itself". 
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6) For Dunlop the "network or web or rules" refers to 
(a) "procedures for establishing rules" 
(b) their substantive character, and 
(c) "procedures for deciding their application to 
particular situations" 
The above, in turn, are "the centre of attention in 
an industrial relations system". Further, these 
rules are not arrived at in isolation but "in the 
context of the industrial relations system taken as 
a whole", consequently some "rules will be more 
closely related to the technical and market or 
budgetry constraints, while other rules will be 
more directly related to the distribution of power 
in the larger society". 
7) Dunlop also envisages the emergence of a "Special 
group of experts or professionals" due to the 
complexity of the "rules required in the operation 
of an industrial society". In fact the emergence 
of this group (in any of the hierarchies) may 
generate a communication problem between such 
experts and "the lay members of their own 
hierarchy". It is also possible that these experts 
will play a stabilising role "and bind the actors 
closer together. The resort to a study by experts 
is an established method of reducing, at least for 
a period, tensions that arise among the 
actors"(41). 
8) In dealing with "an ideology or a set of ideas and 
beliefs commonly held by the actors that helps to 
bind or to integrate the system together as an 
entity", Dunlop(42) makes the following points 
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(a) Because the ideology "defines the ideas which 
each actor holds towards the place and function 
of the others, it is necessary, for a stable 
system, that ther~ be some "congruence or 
compatability among these views and the rest of 
the system". 
(b) "The ideology of an industrial relations system 
must be distinguished from the ideology of the 
larger society. It is, however, to be expected 
that "it will be similar or at least compatible 
in the developed industrial society". During 
the process of industrialisation, "there may be 
marked differences" between the actors of the 
industrial relations system and "other segments 
of the larger society". Change in the 
ideologies or other aspects of the subsystem 
can be sourced in the process of 
industrialisation. 
(c) Dunlop warns against viewing the term ideology 
as a formalised, highly articulated "body of 
ideas", the actors, he says, "may hold ideas 
that are to a degre~ inconsistent _or lack 
precision". Against this Dunlop suggests, that 
the actors "tend to develop or adopt 
intellectuals, publicists, or other specialists 
co cerned with articulating systematically and 
making some form of order out of the discrete 
ideas of the principal actors". 
9) As noted in point (1) above Dunlop believes that 
analysis by systems theory can take place at a 
number of levels, national, regional, industrial, 
enterprise and so on, and in so doing he points out 
the following(43) 
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(a) "The smaller the unit to which the term is 
applied, the larger the context, and in general 
the larger the influence of givens outside the 
system". 
(b) Industrial relations systems that are part of a 
national industrial relations system may not 
reflect "the features that are ordinarily 
regarded as distinctive to a national system". 
Such national features "do not all enter 
equally into each industrial relations system 
within its borders". 
(c) Thus "interriational comparisons may be 
less fruitful, or even misleading, if confined 
solely to countrywide systems. It is essential 
to examine for comparable sectors and 
industries the component industrial relations 
system in the various countries". 
1.3 SYSTEMS THEORY - A CRITIQUE 
1. 3 .1 
Poole (44) presents a comprehensive review of the 
critical literature, which he classifies into (i) 
Substantive and (ii) Theoretical Criticisms. Poole's 
(slightly revised) approach will be pursued in the 
following section. 
Substantive Issues 
1.3.1.1 The.completeness of the Elements of the System 
Banks (45) suggests that there exists a critical 
weakness in systems theory in that Dunlop has omitted 
from the category of actors the owners of industrial 
property. As such, Dunlop "fails to recognise the 
importance of profits for negotiations" (46) and "what 
happens to profit is related to who owns the 
enterprise" (47) .. Flowing from this criticism Banks 
argues firstly the amendment of "managers" as a 
category of actors, to directors and their 
representatives in supervision. Secondly, the 
contexts should be enlarged to four in number so as to 
be able to include "the system of property ownership 
which decides who is to direct operations" (48). 
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In addition it would seem logical that, particularly 
as the level of analysis moves from National to 
En~erprise, the actors will increasingly iook to 
events in comparable units for guidance in their 
interactions. The post World War II experiences of 
Germany and Japan highlight this point at a national 
level whilst the experience of the British 
steelworkers in 1980 and the later coalminers' strike 
would doubtless have had an influence on the 
activities of other British unions. Associations of 
Unions disseminate information which is likely to 
influence member unions. These networks (including 
those of managers/owners and the state) should, 
logically, also be included in the structure of 
systems theory. 
( 
Banks (49) implies an additional criticism when he 
argues ''Dunlap's actors are not persons", the actors 
are dealt with ''as a 'class' of role players". 
1.3.i.2 The sub-institutional level of analysis 
·Poole (50) suggests that this class of criticism can 
be further categorised into (a) Behavioural variables 
(lack of), (b) Personality and (c) Unstructured 
relationships. 
(a)Behavioural variables 
Bain and Clegg (51) argue that if Dunlop is 
attempting a full explanation of industrial 
relations behaviour and it's causes, then the 
behavioural variables cannot be excluded. Banks' 
call for greater attention to be given to 
behavioural variables is further support for Bain 
and Clegg's position. 
Margerison (52) proposed a rejection of a 
structuralist-functionalist approach in favour of a 
behavioural science appraisal of industrial 
relations. In fact Margerison feels that the 
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conservative implications of systems theory are 
such that the theory cannot be amended without 
significant changes to the theory itself. However, 
Jackson (53) notes "such views are not widespread 
and have been condemned by the majority of 
writers". 
Bain and Clegg (54) whilst agreeing that 
behavioural variables are lacking in systems 
theory, believe that such variables can be 
incorporated into the theory, arguing, "If these 
f ac~ors are formally introduced into the systems 
concept, then there is no reason why it should 
emphasize structural variables at the expense of 
behavioural variables, structured relationships at 
the expense of unstructured relationships, the 
institutions and rules of job' regulation at the 
expense of the process of job regulation, or 
conflict res'olution at the _expense of conflict 
generation. In short, if these refinements are 
made to the Dunlop-Flanders approach, then the 
subject of industrial relations may be defined as 
the study of all aspects of job regulation - the 
making and administering of the rules which 
regulate employment relationships.- regardless of 
whether these are seen as being formal or informal, 
structured or unstructured". 
(b)Personality 
Poole (55) refers specifically to the work of 
Shimmin and Singh (56) who, in identifying the 
issue, say "personality, motivation status and 
small group interaction have no place in the Dunlop 
system". Blain and Gennard (57) are however 
credited with a proposition which would overcome 
this objection, thus Blain and Gennard suggest that 
personality can influence rules through its effect 
on the process whereby rules are established. 
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(c)Unstructured Relationships 
Poole (58) in reviewing the work of Bain and Clegg, 
Brown, Flanders, and Goodman notes that "the lack 
of an adequate conceptual analysis of unstructured 
relationships remains a problem". The issue 
revolves around the "mechanistic propositions which 
underpin structural functionalist models" and an 
examination of interpretive and reflexive 
procedures in interaction processes". Poole (59) 
concludes, "the theoretical. and ontological 
assumptions of the system and ethnomethodological 
approaches are unbridgeable in any conventional 
industrial relations paradigm". This thesis hopes 
to address just that issue. 
1.3.1.3 Rule Making and Rule Interpretation 
Poole (60) says that "scholars have introduced several 
valuable refinements which have particularly revolved 
around the distinction between rule making and rule 
interpretation". The role of power "in the 
formulation and implementation of rules has been 
explicitly acknowledged rather than being lodged in 
the wider environmental context". This 'class' of 
criticism is more a response to the lack of a full 
expose by Dunlop than errors of omission and/or 
rejection. 
1.3.1.4 Processes in the Industrial Relations System 
The lack of emphasis on process in labour/management 
relationships can be seen to be rooted in the 
structuralist/functionalist approach to social 
phenomena; the behavioural variables (as noted above) 
get little or no attention, as Poole (61) points 9ut, 
"the inadequate treatment of process in 
union/management relationships has been one of the 
traditional objections to the model of the industrial 
relations system". 
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Nevertheless, as Wood et al. (62) argue, a distinction 
must be drawn between changes in the rule-making 
process and movements in the other independent 
. variables. Poole (63) draws attention to a potential 
pitfall in the possible exclusive utilisation of the 
process variable to the exclusion of "structural 
exigencies" and warns that, while its identification 
has been a valuable contribution, it "should not 
signal an equally 'one-sided' examination in which the 
role of social structure in shaping the ~contexts' is 
omitted entirely". 
1.3.1.5 Conflict, change, ideology, instability and power 
Hymen (64) focusses much of his criticism on the 
conservative nature of systems theory, equally, 
defining the subject matter in terms of rules and 
regulations is problematic. "T!J.e implication is that 
what industrial relations is all about is the 
maintenance of stability and regularity in industry". 
( 6 5) . 
Dunlop (66) avoids, rather than dismisses, the notion 
of power within the industrial relations system, "the 
concern is not with the distribution of power within 
the industrial relations system, the relative 
bargaini g powers among the actors, or their controls 
over the processes of interaction or rule setting" 
(67). The implication being that Dunlop acknowledges 
the existence of power within the system but does not 
allocate to such a variable a degree of explanatory 
force as the critics would have, Eldridge (68) does 
have a point, however, when he suggests, ""in 
sociology, the sources of conflict and co-operation, 
order and instability must have an equally valid claim 
to problem status". The emphasis in Dunlap's work has 
been on stability rather than giving like attention to 
conflict and change, the "conservative implications" 
are unacceptable to Bain and Clegg (69). Poole (70) 
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c.omments "it was still the continuation ·of harmonious 
relationships which had problematic status in the 
Dunlopian and Parsonian formulations". 
While power is dealt with as external, as part of the 
context, ideology is seen to be internal but "can be 
expected to be similar or at least compatible (to the 
"ideology of the larger society) in developed 
industrial society'' (71) .. It is in this relationship 
that Dunlop sees possibilities for change, "in the 
absence of a general consistency of the two 
ideologies, changes may be expected in the ideologies 
or in the other facets of the industrial relations 
system''(72). Dunlop does not, however, enlarge on 
this observation, and thus the criticism of an over 
emphasis on the issue of, stability. 
Poole observes that an adequate treatment of ideology 
must go beyond the restricted role - to "bind the 
system together" - and should "explicitly countenance 
its role as both the reflection and harbinger, of 
change and be traced explicitly to the patterning of 
outlook and perception amongst actors in the ~larger 
society' as well as in the workplace itself" (73). 
Theoretical Critigues 
Poole (74) in his review of the critical literature 
points out that the "structuralist-functionalist 
interpretation of social systems" has been subjected 
to wide ranging criticism, and that such criticism can 
be categorised as 
(1) "the teleological nature of explanation 
(2) "the generation of untestable hypotheses" 
(3) "the demand for a level of scientific enquiry 
which has not yet emerged in the social sciences" 
(4) "the problems entailed in the comparison of 
diverse institutional types" (75) 
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1.3.2.1 The Teleological Nature of Explanation 
The Functionalist approach to society is charged with 
explaining social phenomena such that effects become 
causes, thus in Dunlap's- work the object~ve of the 
industrial relations system was the "survival and/or 
the stability of the system itself" (76). Various 
attempts to 'res~ue' the thesis can be found in Craig 
(77) and Singh (78) both of whom introduce the notion 
of open systems, "To this end a dynamic open system 
model was adopted to isolate the main environmental 
systems (social, political, economic and legal) and to 
incorporate a 'feedback loop' to accommodate 
multi-causal processes of change" (79). However, the 
issue of "indiscriminate multi-causality" (80) still 
~remains a theoretical problem. _ 
Blain and Gennard (81) suggest that primacy of system 
stability as explanatory focus be supplanted by a 
focus on the "rules of the industrial relations 
system" as the prime dependent variable, which is to 
be·- explained in terms of the actors, technology, 
inarket factors, power and status, and ideology. 
Poole (82) notes a continuing difficulty with Dunlap's 
thesis which relates to the claim of equal status to_ 
that of the economic system. In accepting a Parsonian 
theoretical position it is difficult to accept 
Dunlap's argument that the industrial relations system 
is on the same logical plane as the economic system, 
as Parsons (83) argues that any social system is made 
up of only four functional subsystems, viz. Economic, 
Political, Integrative and Pattern-maintenance. 
1.3.2.2 The Generation of Testable Hypotheses 
Poole (84) supports the argument that adequate models 
depend upon the specification of input and output 
variables (or independent and dependent variables), 
and the tracing of interrelat~onships between the 
relevant variables. Heneman (85) has argued the 
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necessity for a more structured approach to theorising 
in indu~trial relations and suggests the model of 
science as found in the natural sciences. Blain and 
Gennard (86) believe that with some alterations, 
hypotheses can be generated from Dunlops approach and 
present a series of formulae to support their 
contention. 
1.3.2.3 Levels and Modes of Theorising 
Debate surrounding the level of theory that the 
Dunlopian model can claim has been substantial. 
Several. authors - "Gill, Hill & Thurley, Hyman, Singh 
and even up to a point Bain & Clegg", (87) - allocate 
taxonomic status. Wood et. al. argue that the theory 
should be seen as a "categorical system" which is at a 
more advanced level of theorising· than "ad hoc 
classificatory systems" (88). 
Following Heneman's (89) suggestions on different 
levels of theorising Wood et. al. (90) believe that 
the Dunlopian model can be seen as "a conceptual 
system·or logical abstraction" but not as a 
"theoretical system" (i.e. generating laws) or an 
"empirical ·theoretical system" (which allows for 
empirical predictions). 
Poole (91) refers to a suggestion by Goodman et. al. 
(92) _that if the definition of the industrial 
relations system was amended to be "a rule-making 
action system in relation to behaviour in the 
production system" then it would be possible to 
generate "a central core for conceptual and empirical 
analysis, rather than simply an ad hoc and unconnected 
schema as with the taxonomic or heuristic device"(93). 
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1.3.2.4 Comparisons of diverse types of Institutions 
1. 3. 3 
Poole's classification of the critical literature ends 
with a discussion of the charge that the Dunlopian 
framework inhibits "adequate comparison of diverse 
trade union movements". This, Poole (94) argues, is a 
position "not easy to s'Ustain" as both the Dunlop 
formulation and "the many refinements" can accommodate 
such analyses. 
Social Action Approaches 
The response to the functionalist approach is to be 
found in the Social Action_approach (95). This 
-------- -response has in fact been a reaction to three central 
criticisms of the functionalist aproach, viz. the role 
----·----of structure, the lack of attention'to behavioural 
-----~--- -
variables and the question of change or systemic 
} s~a-bility. If anything, the Socral -Action 
\J p~otagonists have committed a similar error in 
J fo~using exclusively on the actor-, - ignorln-g-fhe 
- --
possible influence of the stage setting. 
Silverman (96) has contrasted the two approaches, the 
systems approach, he says, treats "behaviour as a 
reflection-of the characteristics of a social system 
containing a series of impersonal processes which are 
external to actors and constrain them", on the other 
hand the social action approach focuses on the impact 
of human behaviour on society's structures. Social 
action, for Goldthorpe et. al. (97) attends to the 
meaning that actors associate with work activity. 
Jackson (98) notes that the social action approach can 
be seen as "_the opposite side of the c"in to the 
systems approach" and "at one extreme the emphasis 
placed on individual meaning can be such that the 
approach moves very close to ethnomethodology and 
phenomenology". 
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Banks suggests that a solution to this dichotomy is to 
develop a step-by-step or incremental model, in which 
the environment is s~en as a constraint to behaviour 
but that actors will exerc"ise their behaviour which 
will affect the environment, which will change and 
will consequently influence the views held by the 
actors whose interpretations will lead subsequently to 
different behavioural responses, thus over time change 
will occur that is a function of both the structure 
and the actor. The problem, "in brief, is to devise a 
theory which will indicate just how much of history is 
determined by processes beyond human control and how 
much is consciously willed"(103). 
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CHAPTER 2 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The Nature·of Collective Bargaining 
The term collective bargaining was first utilised by 
the Webbs (1) and was directed at describing the 
negotiations conducted by trade unions and management 
which dealt with pay and conditions of ,employment. In 
addition they identified two further categories of 
trade union activity: those of (a) mutual insurance 
and (b) political lobbying for legislation beneficial 
to their members interests. 
Collective bargaining was seen by the Webbs as an 
acceptable, albeit t~ansitory (2) mechanism whereby 
the power of employers could be contained. Over time, 
\ 
however, the trade union and the working class would 
become more influential and their terms and conditions 
qf employment would be attained more from a social 
setting which supported these rights than from their 
industrial power to force such issues from 
management. Collective bargaining and the redressing 
of the balance of power were then seen as legitimate, 
but rather than requiring the overthrow of the social . 
order there would be a natural development in which 
the wider social fabric would adjust to accommodate 
the working classes' legitimate needs. 
Flanders (3) has taken issue with the Webbs' view of 
the nature of collective bargaining, arguing that the 
Webbs' viewed collective bargaining as an aggregation 
of individual bargaining, whereas Flanders' view of 
collective bargaining is that it regulates but d_oes 
not replace individual bargaining. The differences 
between individual and collective bargaining are said 
to be the following (4) 
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(a) Individual ba~gaining concerns the buying and 
selling of a commodity. Collective bargaining, 
however, does not involve any exchange, rather 
the conditions under which such exchanges can 
take place are delineated. 
(b) Collective bargaining deals in broad terms and 
individual bargaining in specifics, thus 
collective bargaining sets minimum conditions 
but individual ~dentifies specific conditions. 
(c) Collective bargaining is argued to be more of a 
political activity and individual that of 
economic or market activity. Flanders argues 
that because of th~ continuity of the 
relationship, a strike or lockout can be viewed 
as "a diplomatic use of power" (5) and as such 
this describes a political character of 
collective bargaining not to be found in the 
buying and selling of labour characteristic of 
individual bargaining. 
(d) Again collective b~rgaining in accepting the 
continuity of the relationship and its 
political character will involve factors not 
found in individual bargaining, thus collective 
bargaining often involves the use of 
professional negotiators. 
(e) Lastly, Flanders argues that collective 
bargaining as opposed to individual bargaining 
is not restricted to purely economic issues.· 
Fox (6) has criticised Flanders' position. Firstly, 
Fox argues that Flanders' definition of individual 
bargaining assumes an "act of exchange" (7), and to 
attempt a differentiation because one activity ends in 
a contract and the other in rule making is erroneous 
as neither bargain necessarily ends in agreement. 
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Secondly, conceiving collective bargaining as a 
political activity and therefore dissi.milar to 
individual bargaining ignores the "disparity of power" 
(8) between the two activities. Thirdly, the 
distinction Flanders offers in terms of individual and 
collective refusal to conclude a contract revolves 
again around the 'disparity of power'; whilst on the 
individual level the reaction of leaving an employer 
is the only practical response to the problem whereas 
the collective refusal might have the expectation that 
the deployment of sufficient power might realise their 
expectations, this is not a necessary result of the 
exercise of such power and might lead to a similar 
reaction as witnessed with an individual refusal to 
finalise a contract. 
Lastly, Fox argues that Flanders has not sufficiently 
argued his depiction of collective bargaining and 
trade unionism as political rather than an economic 
activity. The reasoning is that the workforce is just 
as interested in management issues as they are in 
economic issues. Fox ( 9), however, suggests· "that the 
intensity of conviction many trade unionists appear to 
invest in pay claims" means that the issue of 
downgrading the economic role should at very least be 
left open. 
Chamberlain and Kuhn (10) argue that three functions 
of collective bargaining may be identified. Firstly, 
a market or economic function which delineates the 
terms and conditions under which current and future 
employees "will continue to be supplied to a'company" 
(11). Secondly, there is a governmental function 
which reflects the political dimension of collective 
bargaining, thus (12) "The content of collective 
bargaining is concerned as much with procedural issues 
and the distribution of power and authority as it is 
with substantive issues and the distribution of 
money". 
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Lastly, Chamberlain and Kuhn (13) argue a decision 
making function, "which allows workers, through their 
union representatives, to participate in the 
determination of policies which guide and rule their 
working lives". 
These conceptions of collective bargaining recognise, 
at least implicitly, the existence of industrial 
conflict, and understanding the nature of collective 
bargaining in relation to industrial conflict adds a 
further dimension to understanding the function of 
collective bargaining. 
_Interpretations of conflict present the range of 
theoretical approaches to industrial relations. 
Conflict from a radical/Marxist perspective is 
inherent in the productive process found in capitalist 
society. Allen (14) describes industrial relations as 
occurring "within a dynamic conflict situation which 
is permanent and unalterable so long as the structure 
of society remains unaltered". Further, capital and 
labour are "engaged in a perpetual con~lict over the 
distribution of revenue" (15). 
Jackson argues that one of the major problems facing· 
the radical perspective of industrial conflict "is not 
" 
why it occurs but why it occurs so infrequently" 
(16). Part of the explanation is sourced in the 
depiction of structural arrangements· which constrain 
social action. Additionally, the notion of 
'consciousness' is of great importance to understand 
(the lack of) industrial conflict. Hyman (17) argues 
that what is needed is to bring these two streams of 
thought together, 
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"A s~atic or a one-way analysis necessarily 
distorts social reality, and is therefore an 
inadequate basis for understanding industrial 
behaviour or predicting its development. The 
greatest potential for further progress in the 
sociology of industrial conflict (and the same is 
indeed true of sociology in general) must be in the 
elaboration of a dialectical approach". 
Whilst a dialectical approach may hold promise for the 
understanding of industrial conflict the notion of the 
'institutionalisation of conflict' has received much 
attention. Collective bargaining mechanisms can be 
viewed as a means to institutionalise conflict and can 
be interpreted as maintaining the interests of a 
dominant elite class or as a legitimate means of 
dealing with competing inter~sts. C. Wright Mills 
(18) dealing with American unions contributions to the 
institutionalising of conflict, makes the following 
points, firstly, unions were formed as an 
organisational counter balance to the development of· 
the business corporation. The next ftevelopment phase 
saw employers forming trade associations over large 
geographical areas forcing national bargaining by the 
unions. Qv,er time this led to the centralisation of 
employer and employee organisations. The third phase 
w~s characterised by the entry of the state into 
disputes between capital and labour. The final phase 
is arrived at as union leaders now face having to 
address political questions whilst being really only 
prepared for short term pragmatic labour/management 
questions. Consequently, 
"the labour leaders allow their unions to evolve 
into institutions which integrate the industrial 
worker into a political economy that is changing 
from laissez faire to monopoly and to state 
capitalism ~ith many corporate features" (19). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
33. 
A question remains as to why the rank-and-file 
membership allow such institutionalisation to proceed, 
and much of the answer lies in the explanation of the 
formation of states of consciousness which accept the 
legitimacy of the relationship. In Marxist terms this 
would be a false conscidusriess. Allen (20) describes 
British trade unions as capable of a more militant 
posture after 'resocialisation', but currently "though 
many pay lip-service to socialist aims, they accept 
the capitalist system largely for what it is". 
In contrast, Fox (21) has suggested that authority is 
seen as legitimated power, the employee accepts the 
legitimacy of command in the employer. Coser (22) 
argues that conflict can be functional - as opposed to 
the Human· Relations School which sees conflict as an 
aberration - it can assist in developing group 
cohesiveness, it can act as a safety valve allowing 
stress to be channelled and thereby contributing to 
the survival of the group. Lastly, it may have a 
boundary making function which sets margins to 
behaviour. 
Jackson (23) argues that collective bargaining 
provides a mechanism which keeps industrial conflict 
within acceptable limits and as such reflects a 
"normative system". Harbison's (24) view that 
collective bargaining provides a drainage channel for 
worker frustrations adds to the characterisation of 
collective bargaining as a mechanism which provides an 
avenue of dealing with issues which might disrupt the 
social fabric.· Again Dubin (25) suggests, 
"As collective bargaining becomes an established 
feature of our society, both sides come to 
recognise that each conflict-created disorder is 
inevitably succeeded by a re-established order and 
that permamently disruptive disorder may materially 
impede the resolution of the conflict". 
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On a similar theme Dahrendorf (26) argues that through 
collective bargaining "the frozen fruits of industrial 
conflict are thawed" and because of regular management 
and labour negotiations "gradual.chan~es of social 
structure replace the tendency toward revolutionary 
explosions and civil war". 
The Forms of Collective Bargaining 
The variety of guises taken by collective bargaining 
in industrial society suggest to many authors (Hyman 
(27), Clegg (28)) that their explanation must be 
sourced in the context in which the machinery 
operates. Blanpain (29) says, "The phenomena of 
collective bargaining cannot be fully appreciated 
without taking into account the cultural and 
historical environment in which the- system has its 
roots". 
The variations observed across national boundaries do 
not stop there. Salamon (30) shows that the variety 
of collective bargaining arrangements in Britain can 
be derived from four -aspec_ts: 
(i) Collective bargaining may be conducted at 
different levels, "ranging from national or 
industry level, through regional or district 
level to the organisational level" (31) 
(ii) There is "variation in the coverage of 
bargaining units" (32) 
(iii) There may be varying degrees of formality 
associated with the bargaining activity, from 
highly specific written agreements to informal 
understandings. 
(iv) There may also be variations in terms of the 
scope of matters dealt with by the agreement, 
from wages to "managerial issues" (33) 
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Beal and Wickersham's (34) 1967 review of variations 
in national bargaining arrangements adopts a systems 
perspective, arguing that such machinery was largely 
the product of the industrial relations system, itself 
in turn a product of the wider social system. 
Jackson (35) comments "that collective bargaining can 
best be viewed in a historical perspective as the 
outcome of the interaction of social and economic 
conditions and the motives and perceptions of 
individuals. Social and economic conditions limit the 
action and influence the attitude and perceptions of 
individuals at any particular point in time. However, 
the individual retains a degree of 'non-determinancy' 
through which he contributes uniquely to the creation 
of social conditions of the future which will in turn 
limit but not completely constrain the action of 
others". 
The preceding review of collective bargaining provides 
a framework within which an understanding of the South 
African experience can be placed. The multiplicity of 
types of bargaining relationships - particularly post-
Wiehahn - and the context within which such relation-
ships are started, develop and change, ~rovide 
direction for any understanding of the phenomena of 
collective bargaining in South Africa. 
Collective Bargaining in South Africa 
The Industrial Conciliation Act (I.C.A.) of 1924 was 
the key structural feature of South African industrial 
relations until the changes to the act based on the 
Wiehahn Commission's report. Jones (36) observes that 
while the Acts 'formal' intention was that of "making 
provision for the prevention and settlement of 
disputes between workers and employers" it also had 
two political objectives. Firstly, that of "providing 
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preferential employment opportunities to white workers 
as opposed to blacks", and secondly, to "appease white 
workers and muster electoral support for the Smuts 
Government". 
Williams (37) suggests that the I.C.A. follows 
logically from the obje~tives of craft unions, 
specifically those on the Rand gold mines. Trade 
Unionism in South Africa grew "among the industrial 
craft workers with common interests'' (38), and whilst 
there were unions in the Cape and Natal, the ~merging 
dominance of the mining industry meant that "the form 
of trade unionism on the Rand become the dominant 
force in trade union politics and leadership in the 
<?Oun try" ( 3 9) . 
Craft unions were able to secur  the economic 
privilege for their members by control of access to 
craft-skills. However, unions "embracing more complex 
occupational mixtures'' (40) were less able to control 
competition and as these were composed of white 
workers the maintenance of their "socio-~conomic 
privilege, their elite skills and income" was to be 
achieved by the exclusion of the black worker. 
Lever (41) shows that the I.C.A. was essentially a 
compromise between organised business and organised 
labour imposed by the state which had representatives 
of both groups in the government of the day. The 
solution to the industrial unrest lay in the 
"encouragement of joint monopolies of employers and 
employees to regulate wage competition and to 
institutionalise collective bargaining" (42). 
The racial nature of industrial relations was further 
entrenched with the passing of the Wage Act (1925) to 
provide a measure of protection for 'civilised labour' 
not covered by the Industrial Conciliation Act 
(I.C.A.). Williams, however, notes that economic 
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conditions had changed and unionism amongst whites had 
increased rapidly so that by the "late 1930' s ·the 
greatest needs for white semi-skilled labour had been 
taken care of" to such an extent that the Wage Act 
could be amended in 1937 to remove the requirement 
that a Wage Board should "recommend a 'civilised' wage 
in its determinations" (43). 
Davies (44) then arrives at the conclusion that the 
I.C.A. "is, like all labour legislation in South 
Africa an instrument of the classes of property owners 
in the society". Lewis (45) argues 
"The_ I.C.A. did no more than draw the ring within 
which the registered unions (largely white) and 
employers (representing national manufacturing 
capital) could fight it out without resorting to 
strike action", 
Notirig the change in the industrial infrastructure -
i.e. the growth of secondary industry by 1930, Lewis 
( 46) argues that it was "bound to influence the. 
working class response"; this heralds the phase of 
'New Unionism' . 
Lewis (47) shows that the new unions had an industrial 
rather than craft nature and were typically 
representative of unsk~lled (poor) white workers. 
They were not racially biased, "the incidence of joint 
strike action by black and white workers seemed to 
substantiate this view". Furthermore, Lewis (48) 
argues 
"Despite the backwardness of white workers there is 
evidence of genuine inter-racial solidarity. This 
showed itself in terms of trade union organisation 
when garment, leather, furniture, and canvas unions 
dropped their colour bar against coloured and 
indians". 
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The exclusion of Africans from the official bargaining 
mechanisms led to the start of 'parallel' unions 
(Lewis, 49), an intermittant feature of South African 
industrial relations for many decades. The rise of 
the new unions "revived the technique of industrial 
militancy". In-addition, these industrial unions - at 
this time in their history - were greatly influenced 
by 'the Left'. Lewis {50) shows that "These unions 
were to provide the backbone of the Left within the 
trade union movement". 
In the 1930's then one can observe the collective 
bargaining arrangements d~veloping a character which 
was to dominate South African industrial relations. 
The Industrial Council system operated with white 
organised (some 'mixed' unions) labour, excluded black 
unions, and participants reflected the 
conservative-radical political continuum although this 
aspect was soon to be repressed by state action. 
State action in turn attempted to limit the role of 
black unions (Maree, 51). 
The racial character of the Industrial system was 
further entrenched with the coming to power of the 
National Party in 1948. Webster (52)· argues that the 
Smuts government's attempt in 1947 to provide some 
recognition to African trade unions "drew only 
lukewarm support from industry and no support at all 
from other fractions in the power bloc". The National 
Party took a far more 'offensive' approach which, 
whilst not prohibiting African unions, set up a three 
tier system which led the Minister of Labour to 
observe, "If that machinery is effective and 
successful, the Natives will have no interest in trade 
unions and trade unions will probably die a natural 
death" ( 53). 
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The three tier system consisted of works committees 
elected by workers (i.e. black) to conduct 'in plant' 
bargaining; the second level was represented by 
regional labour committees staffed by employees of the 
Department of Labour, and finally, the Central Native 
Labour Board. 
The Works Committee system does not appear to have 
been _taken seriously by either employees, employers or 
the state. Horner (54) shows that there were only 24 
such committees by 1965 in the whole of South Africa. 
This observation applies just as much to the 2nd and 
3rd tier arrangements as to the works committee 
system. 
In further attempts to protect white workers, the 
government r~stricted the formation of any further 
'mixed unions'. Again, further restrictions were 
placed on existing 'mixed unions' which would affect 
. the organising ability of these unions, thus separate 
branches and meetings had to be created for 'white' 
and 'coloured' members. The National Executive had to 
be white and other than office bearers "no one could 
attend a branch meeting other than his own" (55). A 
further attack took the form of the extension of job 
reservation. 
The direction of industrial relations by the state 
(56) took the form of direct intervention through the 
amendments to the I.C. Act (1956) but also through 
less obviously direct legislation. Acts such as the 
Suppression of Communism, the.Black Labour Act, the 
Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act and the Physical 
Planning and Resources Acts all contributed to the 
difficulties experienced by Africans in their attempts 
to organise. Jones (57), quoting the Wiehahn 
Commission (Part 1, 1979~ p.15), shows that in early 
1978 there were only 27 black unions representing some 
70,000 black workers. 
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The suppressiorr of unionism amongst A~ricans in the 
1950 and 1960 decades, whilst intended to secure the 
position of the white worker, could not be sustained. 
Crankshaw (58) argues that "dramatic shifts in the 
nature of the labour market coupled with aggres~ive 
state policies that undermined the mixed unions began 
to erode the basis of craft union strategies of 
exclusion during the 1950's". The wages of skilled 
white workers were undercut and the erosion of their 
position was continued in the 1960's "by the economic 
boom" (59). ·The state now found itself in a dilemma 
in that their white (skilled) labour constituency 
required further exclusion of cheap black labour, but 
at the same time the state was under pressure from 
capital to.ease restrictions on black employment. 
Davies (60) shows how employers began to view the 
exclusion politics as a threat to their productive 
capacity, thus job reservation was for industrialists 
a mechanism which would "seriously impede the 
mechanisation of production and thereby the process of 
capital accummulation" (61). 
Nattras and Ardington (62) show that whilst National 
Party legislation as well as "the racial divisions 
within labour and the influx control measures creating 
a docile labour supply served the objectives of 
private enterprise", the economic development meant 
unacceptable restrictions on business to meet its 
objectives. The support by capital of the state began 
then not to serve the interests of employers. 
Pressure from capital was then exerted on both the 
state and white artisan trade unions for the removal 
of restrictions on the training and employment of 
African labour (63). 
The progression of collective bargaining at the 
industrial council level continued. Nattras and 
Ardington (64) show that in 1970 there were some 102 
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industrial.councils which generated 898 agreements, 
covering some 934,000 employees of all races, and 
labour relations were essentially non-confrontational. 
The Durban strikes of 1973 can be seen as the spur to 
the eventual opening up of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act in that African trade unions were allowed to enter 
_the official (i.e. Industrial Council) bargaining 
system. The Works and Liaison Committee system (as 
introduced through the Bantu Labour Relations 
Amendment Act of 1974) can best be viewed as a partial 
and transitory amelioration of African trade union 
requirements, which were met by the 1979 amendments to 
the I.C; Act and more fully by the 1981 Labour 
Relations Act. This introduced a new era in 
collective bargaining arrangemerits in Sotith Africa. 
Collective bargaining now reflected a (p6tentially) 
non-racial character and the start of (effective) 
plant-level bargaining. 
The new bargainirig arrangements led, according to 
Bendix (65), to "a more forthright questioning of the 
relevance and role of industrial councils. Further, 
he suggests 
''For the first time the realisation has dawned that 
numerous councils had assumed the role more of 
administrative bodies than hard and tough 
negotiating parties, that they had developed into 
not only employee, but also employer-protective 
bodies and that above all, councils were not 
representative" (66). 
In contrast, plant-level negotiations seems "to be 
progressing. No fewer than 50 new agreements 
(reported in 1983) .... and if the established figure 
of 300 agreements at the end of 1982 is accepted" 
(67), then some 350 agreements are in operation 
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covering an estimated 100,000 workers. Horwitz (68) 
writing in 1987 is able to show 800 recognition 
agreements and a union membership of 1.9 million 
workers in 1985. 
The preference for plant level bargaining is to be 
gleaned from the objections levelled at industrial 
councils. Bonner and Webster (69) argue that the 
Wiehahn Commission was "faced with three broad 
dilemmas". Firstly, the failure of the "state's and 
managements' alternative to trade unions for Africans 
- the Committee System". Secondly, "growing 
international pressure" against the apartheid policy 
and lastly, white labour's "growing awareness that the 
future lies with the black labour force". These 
factors, Bonner and Webster argue, meant that 
Wiehahn's task was "to restructure industrial 
relations with a view to incorporating and controlling 
the African worker. Industrial councils were 
perceived by 'militant' unions "with scepticism and 
feared co-option into the statutory bargaining system" 
(70). Morris (71) suggests seven aqditional reasons 
for the rejection of industrial councils, all of which 
can be subsumed "into three principles which became 
the hallmark of the new independent trade union 
movement: 
Non-racialism 
Worker control 
shopfloor, plant-based organisation" 
The reasons Morris puts forward are as follows: 
(i) The industrial council system was perceived as 
"fundamentally racist and bureaucratic" 
(ii) The system contained the "twin dangers of 
potentially co-opting them and alienating them 
from their worker constituency" 
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(iii) The "white racist craft unions" were "locked in 
a cosy relationship with the state (via the 
labour department) at the economic and 
political expense of the unskilled black 
workers" 
(iv) Industrial councils were perceived to support 
"despotic labour practices" and as such led to 
"undermining their own rank-and-file 
plant-based disciplinary and grievance 
procedures" 
(v) "Workers saw the industrial councils as 
management dominated" 
(vi) There was a perceived unfairness in having 
deductions made from wages "with seemingly 
little benefit to them" 
(vii) Lastly, Morris argues that at this stage these 
unions were "numerically small, regionally 
based and by no means representative (even at 
the regional level) of the industry they were 
operating in". 
Much of these criticisms could be levelled at the 
clothing industry's industrial councils. The labour 
force was (by 1980) essentially drawn from the 
politically disenfranchised, was semi-skilled at best 
and female on top of it, yet labour relations had 
(till 1986) been very 'stable'. Nicol (72) quotes the 
Cape Underwear strike as the first successful strike 
in the clothing industry in 67 years. What accounts 
for this apparent calm, and what reasons can be 
identified to explain the collective bargaining 
activities pre- and post-Wiehahn? 
Some of the answers may be gleaned from the reasons 
given by militant unions for registering and joining 
industrial councils. Toerien (73) suggests two 
reasons for an apparent reversal of a non-registration 
policy. Firstly, it is suggested that "employers and 
the state are pushing for deregulation of large 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
44. 
sectors of the economy". This means "the removal of 
legislation which guarantees minimum wages, benefits 
and working conditions". Deregulation also implies 
different wage levels in different parts of the 
country. Furthermore, "where several industrial 
councils.exist in the same industry bosses have used 
this to pay different wage rates". In response then 
the unions are seeking to "establish or entrench 
n~tional industrial bargaining and thus secure uniform 
regulation of wages and conditions nationally:. 
Secondly, "The struggle for industrial councils is 
also a consequence of the consolidation of COSATU 
affiliates into thirteen industrial unions and similar 
initiatives by some NACTU affiliates and independent 
unions". ·The mergers now mean that-unions can widen 
their action and can "engage the employers in the 
battle over conditions and wages in whole sectors and 
industries". Morris (74) in his discussion of the 
policy change by the Metal and Allied Workers Union 
(MAWU) suggests tliat the "membership grew 
phenomenally" which "threw up new organisational 
p~iorities which in turn led to.a strategic shift on 
the issue of participation in the industrial council". 
The problem facing MAWU was "to devise a new strategy 
which maintained the organisational strengths of shop 
floor unionism while still confronting the new 
problems being encountered" (i.e. the need for "a 
sense of national organisational and structural 
unity"). 
Morris shows how after further mergers MAWU became 
NUMSA (National Union of Metal Workers of S.A.). The 
increased 'size and dominant (union) position now held 
on the industrial council led to a reformulation of 
policy in regard to the council system and' the 
~aintenance of the system was adopted as policy. 
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Morris suggests th~t a three tier strategy can be 
detected, thus the industrial council will be used 
"for national industrial wage bargaining", plant level 
bargaining to resolve local issues and therefore 
maintaining shop steward structures, and thirdly, 
"company level bargaining will be used for issues 
other than wages, to strengthen the centralised unity 
of the union, ensure a coherence and uniformity 
between ~lants of the same company and deflect factory 
demands for wage bargaining at plant level onto 
company level bargaining over other substantive 
issues. 
The observations of Morris and Toerien suggest that 
organisational growth is causally related to the 
participation on industrial councils and that various 
negotiating benefits exist. It is then difficult to 
understand criticisms of older unions (specifically in 
the clothing industry) for joining industrial councils 
for much the same reasons albeit under different 
historical conditions. Criticism of the negotiating 
behaviour and/or the outcomes of bargaining in 
established industries is not necessarily then 
exempted from critique merely because they joined 
industrial councils (in some cases) decades before the 
Labour Relations Act and the policy revisions reported 
above. There is as Lewis (75) suggests "a marked lack 
of analysis of registered trade unions in contemporary 
literature in South Africa". An analysis of 
collective bargaining in the clothing industry of 
South Africa will make a contribution to limiting this 
position. 
In an article entitled "Garment and Textile Giant" 
(76) the South African Labour Bulletin correspondent 
(unnamed) reports on the merging of the Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWUSA) -
affiliated to COSATU and the independent Garment and 
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Allied Workers Union (GAWU). It is suggested in the 
article that a "new militancy among coloure·d and 
indian workers "has been achieved". GAWU should not 
be c:;ategorised as "conservative because of its dormant 
past". Reference is made to GAWU's Living Wage 
Campaign and a strike at the Rex Trueform factory 
"where 2000 downed tools for three weeks. This was 
the first major strike in the Western Cape .. ". 'rhe 
article also identifies "a militant shop-steward 
leadership" which has been able to "mobilise the 
latent militancy of its constituency more effectiv~ly 
than most would have expected, given its conservative 
past". In Natal GAWU "has succeeded in mobilising 
indian women workers into militant struggles". 
ACTWUSA, the other element in the merger "also had 
conservative traditions". 
Explanation of the reasons for the apparent lack of 
militancy are varied, but certainly one of the 
problems facing any analysis of action in industrial 
councils has been the difficulty of getting access to 
data.. The lack of industry data has meant that those 
analyses of the industry which do exist are based on 
limited information, and whilst such data might be 
necessary to arriving at an explanation (typically of 
the 'lack of militancy') but, as shown earlier, (Hyman 
(77), Jackson (78)) must (logically) mean that such 
data is not sufficient to the explanation. Nicol's 
(79) thesis is something of an exception in that he 
focuses on the leadership role of the Union secretary 
to account (amongst other things) for the lack of 
militancy, thus 
"There is a striking continuity in leadership 
style ... The leaders are remote from their 
membership, are protected in office by a rigid and 
undemocratic constitution and are intolerant of 
dissent. They rely on the employers' aid in 
stiffling opposition. They retain an aversion to 
any involvement in politics". 
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Nicol's study, however'· stops in 1939 and since then 
there has been little in the way of explanation of the 
lack of militancy in the clothing industry. Maree 
(80) describes attempts by an Action Committee to 
unseat the union secretary and argues that the union's 
constitution represents 'democracy' problems which 
complicate the dismissing of a union official Ji.e. 
the secretary) which in turn must increase his 
influence on the decision-making process in the union. 
Gool (81) suggests that the failure of a strike (Cape 
Underwear) and the failure of CLOWU (Clothing Workers 
Union) is related to the issue of trade union 
democracy and in this case "the answer lies in the 
atomisation of the productive process". 
-
It is n9t sufficient, Gool argues, to explain the 
relationship between the union and its members "by a 
'lack of militancy' or controls imposed by the 
'hierarchical' and 'patriarchal' structures of 
families reproduced in the workplace'', rather "The 
ability of the Garment Workers Union to exercise 
political control over its membership rests on the 
nature of the industry". The nature of the industry 
refers to the size and geographical distribution of 
factories, which being small and widely distributed 
impedes the formation of worker solidarity which 
allows the union to "permeate the industry with an 
ideology of benefits a'nd economism" (82). 
The charge of a 'lack of militancy' on the part of 
unions in the clothing industry needs to be 
specified. Maree argues "liberal pluralism ascribes a 
valid and justifiable role to trade unions 
participating in decision making with management over 
their own working lives, thereby curtailing managerial 
prerogatives" (83). Whilst the "frontier of control 
has only partially been advanced for workers" it is 
wrong "to interpret this as only being advantageous to 
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management" as it in fact "represents a retreat for 
management to safer grounds given the advance of 
working class strength in the workplace'' (84). 
In its most absolute form the managerial prerogative 
would mean maintaining all decision making authority 
over all aspects of employment. Collective bargaining 
which then achieves some limits to such authority may 
be-the result of the parties agreeing the 
reasonableness of the issue - i.e. not requiring 
distributive bargaining, or may well be the result of 
distributive bargaining. In this sense militancy then 
deals not only with the pushing back of the 'frontiers 
of control', but also the nature of the bargaining 
over issues which both parties bargain over. 
Militandy can be reflected in the issues bargained 
over and the level of conflict the parties are willing 
to exercise in the achievement of new objectives. In 
a sense then, militancy has a substantive and 
procedural character. It is this view of militancy 
wbich will be utilised in addressing its character in 
the clothing industry of South Africa for the review 
period. 
This thesis describes the ontological character ·of 
collective bargaining in the clothing industry of 
South Africa for the period 1968 to 1986. 
Structuration theory is described by Cohen (85) as a 
theory which "illuminates the constitution of social 
life". The nature of collective bargaining in the 
clothing industry will be shown as one in which the 
managerial prerogative is not influenced in terms of 
any widening of issues to bargain about. The 
bargaining issues are restricted to wage levels and 
contributions to funds. This is not to say that gains 
in these areas were not achieved by the unions 
concerned, even though these elements did not keep 
pace with inflation. Phelps Brown (86) in a major 
r 
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study of the economic consequences of collective 
bargaining argues two conditions under which 
collective bargaining can have positive results. 
Firstly, what he refers to as the 'impact effect' 
which is when a newly formed union (operating in a 
context in which it can control the supply of labour 
and there is a demand for such labour) is able to 
achieve an initial advantage which they may be able to 
protect thereafter; and, secondly, what he refers to 
as the 'ratchet effect', which refers to the unionised 
workers ability to more readily resist wage cuts than 
the non-unionised workers. It is then possible that 
the regional unions involved in collective bargaining 
in the clothing industry did, in effect, achieve some 
control over managerial decision making in r~spect of 
wages and benefits derived from funds. Certainly it 
will be shown that a great deal of "conviction, effort 
and feeling" (87) went into the negotiations dealing 
with these items, albeit a narrow and static range of 
bargaining issues. 
The identification of the nature of collective 
bargaining rai es the question of how and why this 
characterisation was perpetuated. It will be shown 
that the arguments developed by Maree, Gool and Nicol 
(discussed earlier) are all relevant. However, what 
needs to be added is a discussion on the value placed 
on the industrial council system by the parties to it, 
an understanding of the importance attached by union 
leaders to the objective of insuring stable and 
growing employment and, lastly, the apparent lack of 
any pressure being exerted on union officials by the 
rank and file membership. It will be argued that 
there is evidence to suggest an instrumental 
orientation on the part of the mass membership, 
although care is exercised in ascribing the direction 
of causality generating the behaviour patterns used to 
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arrive at that conclusion. In this way a 
multi-factorial explanation provides the understanding 
to the question of the 'lack of militancy' in the 
clothing industry. 
A feature of the wider South African industrial 
relations system which is of particular importance 
relates to the role adopted by (especially) emerging 
black trade unions. The contrast with the more 
established unions, such as those dealt with in this 
thesis is marked and the apparent continuity of these 
differences - over the review period of this thesis -
further emphasises the criticism levelled at the 
Vrarious garment industry unions, i.e. their lack of 
militancy. 
In discussing the road to political liberation Cohen 
and Cobbett (88) identify a number of "Struggles", one 
of which is to be found in the labour arena. 
Lambert and Webster (89), writing in 1988 argue that 
the high levels of social conflict experienced in 
South Africa "during the past three years" reflects 
the mobilisation of "oppressed classes around the 
common goal of a non-racial democratic state" in which 
the "working class has begun to play a central and, at 
times, leading role in these struggles" (90). 
The working class, however, reflects fissures in terms 
of their perception of their role in relationship to 
the goal of a 'non-racial democratic state', thus 
Webster (91) and Lambert and Webster (92) show three 
forms of unionism in South Africa (i.e. in the 
non-racial trade union movement). There are the 
"orthodox or collective bargaining unions" and the 
"political or social movement unionism" (93), the. 
latter grouping can be further characterised in terms 
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of their shop floor activity, thus 'political' 
unionism which links. "factory based production 
politics" with "community and state power issues" (94) 
can be contrasted with 'populist' unions which 
downplay factory floor issues and "places in its stead 
a political-engagement that only serves to dissipate 
shop floor struggle.s" (95). 
The analysis provided by Lambert and Webster is 
important to this thesis in that the garment 
manufacturing unions can be firmly placed in what hav~ 
been described as the orthodox unions. Their 
affiliation to TUCSA further reinforces their 
conservative image and contributes to understanding 
their activities. It will become evident in this 
thesis that the unions' perception of their role was 
restricted to a narrow range of economic benefdts and 
the maintenance of employment (and, where possible, 
the growth of employ~ent opportunities). There are, 
in fact, a number of instances in which the leadership 
of the unions are recorded rejecting any political 
engagement. This non-engagement then represents one 
dimension of the apparent lack of militancy on the 
part of the regional unions. Other dimensions include 
the narrow range of bargaining issues with which the 
garment unions concerned themselves. 
This is not to say that the garment unions were 
unaware of the activities of the 'populist' or 
'political' unions. Evidence of this awareness will 
be found in all the regions dealt with_in this 
thesis. In the Transvaal an attempt is made to 
utilise activities by 'militant' unions to obtain 
better conditions of employment, and in both the Cape 
and Natal newer and more militant unions are seen as a 
threat to the continued existence of those 
(established) regional unions. In structuration 
theory terms 'reflexive monitoring' is a very evident 
feature of this aspect of regional bargaining in the 
garment industry. 
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The political context whilst significant to the 
understanding of South African collective bargaining 
cannot fully account for the nature of such 
bargaining. A further contextual variable, that of 
the economic context, needs to be understood in terms 
of its likely influence on collective bargaining. 
2.3 THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
'l'he Nedbank Group suggests that "Economic statistics 
are usually easier to interpret if placed in the 
context of shorter and longer-term trends and helps in 
the "development of a moving picture''(96). In 
examining post second world war South Africa they 
segment the economic history into 5 periods. 
a) 1946 - 1954 
Consumer demand was strong and derived from war 
time savings, demobilisation, a flow of capital 
from Britain, the devaluation of stirling and the 
S.A. unit and finally the effect of the Korean War. 
On joining G.A.T.T. South Africa introduced 
"selective import controls ... as part of the 
package''. The opening of new goldfi~lds and public 
sector investment in iron and steel production and 
the initiation of the petrol from coal project 
(SASOL) further augmented "consumption demand". 
G.D.P. expanded "in real terms by 4.7 per cent On 
average per year" (97). 
b) 1955 - 1962 
This period reflects a slowing of the pace of 
economic growth, consumer spending "increased by 
only 2.9 per cent" (98). Private and public sector 
fixed investment also reflected the slowing down of 
economic activity. This phase is also marked by 
low inflation - prices increased by only 1.5% per 
annum on average and "the average annual gain in 
real gross domestic product of 4.6% clearly was 
below the potential of the country" (99). 
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Political tensions led to an erosion of economic 
confidence which "was expressed from 1959 onwards 
in large capital outflows. The Sharpeville shock, 
for which the period is generally remembered, was a 
culmination and crystallization of events rather 
than their cause" (100). 
c) 1963 - 1970 
This phase was one of boom conditions, South 
Africa's external political position had been 
clarified - no longer a member of the commonwealth 
- and internally the Government's determination and 
ability to maintain control had been clearly 
shown. Controls over capital movement were 
introduced (in 1961) but non-resident investors had 
mech~nisms to allow the movement of their capital. 
Real fixed investment in public corporations (17.1% 
aver.), the private sector ( 11. 2% av,er.) and public 
authorities ( 9. 8% aver.) showed mark!ed levels of 
growth and over this period real gross domestic 
product increased by 6% on average each year. 
The devaluation of stirling in 1967 led to 
"widespread currency uncertainty" which "triggered 
a demand for gold'' (101) which in turn led to the 
(effective) end of a fixed price for an ounce of 
gold and in.so doing led to "a huge net capital 
inflow into South Africa" (102). This inflow was 
"held largely in financial circulation and fuelled 
the great share market (boom)" (103). 
d) 1970 - 1976 
The Nedbank Group argue that whilst initially in 
this period the economy continued to boom, the 
period was marked by sharply rising imports and 
weakening exports resulting in the (then) largest 
deficit on the current account of the balance of 
payments (in relation to gross domestic product). 
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Inflation was the highest it had been in some 20 
years, "it was also a period of rapid relative 
growth in public sector spending and investment, 
large budget deficits and inflationary financing of 
those deficits" (104). Private sector financing 
was just less than half what it had been in the 
1960's and even a brief boom i~ 1973 and part of. 
1974 did not stop the economy entering ''its first 
real post-war recession" (105). 
e) 1976 - 1982 
For the Nedbank Group it is the "reappraisal of the 
role of government and the public sector" and the 
"tightening of economic policy" that provide the 
logic for selecting 1976 as the start of the fifth 
phase. The government now began 'withdrawing' from 
the economy and "the reliance on bank credit and 
foreign borrowings to finance budget deficits was 
broken and 'financial discipline' became the 
watchword". 
The period 1977-82 is characterised by the Nedbank 
Group as "the longest post-::war boom" derived 
largely from private sector investment, culminating 
"in real growth rates of almost eight and five 
percent in 1980 and 1981". Whilst the observation 
about Government economic policy may be tenable, a 
number of economic statistics do not support the 
contention of a boom over the whole of this period, 
thus 
Gross Domestic fixed Investment fell from Rl4817m 
in 1976 to Rl3830 (1977), to Rl3440 (1978) before 
.increasing to Rl3945m (1979), Rl6378m (1980), 
Rl7757m (1981); in fact 1982 shows a marginal 
decrease (to Rl7238) but the beginning of a 
downturn in fixed investment. 
indicates the downward trend. 
Table 1 below 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
TABLE 1 
55. 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment - at constant prices 
(1980), Average Figs. Rm 
1982 17238 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
16417 
16102 
15142 
12470 
(106) 
Whilst Government expenditure as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic-Product decreased from 29.52% in 1978 to 
22.79% in 1981, it has shown an upward trend from 
24.19% (1982) to 28.22% in 1986. 
Real Gross Domestic Product at factor incomes at 
constant (1980) prices shows a -0.8% change in 1982 
over 1981 and a -2.4% change 1983 over 1982. The 
G.D.P. for 1984 showed a +5.1% change over 1983 before 
falling in 1985 by -0.6% over 1984, (107). The South 
African Reserve Bank Quarterly Review (108) states 
"the modest economic recovery'that had commenced in 
the third quarter of 1985 ... faltered in the first 
quarter of 1986 (and) regained upward momentum in the 
third quarter of 1986". 
The National Manpower Commission's 1986 report on 
"Certain aspects of strikes in the R.S.A." (RP 
113/1986) suggests that "Downswing" phases of the 
Trade Cycle (from 1960 to 1984) occurred during 
(i) 1960-1962 (v) 1974-1978 
(ii) 1965 
(iii) 1967 
(iv) 1970-1972 
(vi) 1982 
(vii) 1984 
(109) 
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If we combine the analyses of (i) The Nedbank Group 
(ii) Central Statistical Services (iii) the National 
Manpower Commission and the S.A. Reserve Bank, the 
following table can be constructed in an attempt to 
establish levels of consensus of the economic cycles 
for South Africa over the review period, i.e. 1968 -
1986. 
The Standard Bank Data Base provides an ''Employment 
Index" (1980=100) which reinforces the picture 
presented in the previous table, thus 
1975 = 216.4 
1976 = 153.1 
1977 = 76.2 
1978 = 69.8 
1979 = 
1980 
76.4 
= 100.0 
1981 = 135.9 
1982 = 104.0 
1983 = 61.0 
1984 = 67.6 
1985 = 35.7 
1986 = 27.7 
Whilst many additional economic activity indicators 
could be referenced, the purpose of providing a broad 
description of economic activity in South Africa for 
the period 1968-86 has been met from the above 
statistics. Thus (in broad terms) it can be taken 
that 1968/69/70/71 were largely years of strong 
economic activity, 1972/73 reflected less activity 
with 1974 reflecting an increase in activity over the 
previous year. The period 1975-1978 is to be taken as 
a down-swing in economic activity with increased 
activity in 1979 arid the boom ending in 1981. 
Negative changes in 1982/83 reflect something of a 
recession with 1984 showing more positive levels of 
activity in comparison with 1983. The years 1985/6 
tend to reflect dormant/declining economic activity. 
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TABLE 3 
58. 
STRIKES 
This section is included to provide some understanding 
of strike activity in South Africa over the review 
period of this thesis. Strikes are an extreme 
representation of conflict in industrial relations and 
can be taken as a measure of militancy, be that for 
what Lambert and Webster (110) have called orthodox or 
political union objectives. These macro statistics 
~ga~n re-inforce the depiction of the garment unions 
as non-militant .. Further, the State's response -
particularly in the declaration of a State of 
Emergency - will be 'reflexively monitored' and may 
well contribute to the continuity of the garment 
unions' bargaining behaviou~, i.e. the obs~rved lack 
of militancy. 
In a National Manpower Commission report (111) certain 
statistics on strikes in S.A. are presented: 
Year No. of Strikes No. of Employees 
1968 56 1953 
1969 78 4439 
1970 76 4168 
1971 69 4451 
1772 71 9224 
1973 370 98378 
1974 384 59244 
1975 274 23323 
1976 245 28013 
1977 90 15304 
1978 106 14160 
1979 101 22803 
1980 207 61785 
1981 342 92842 
1982 394 141571 
1983 336 64469 
1984 469 181942 
1985 389 239816 
1986 793 424390 
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TABLE 5 
' 
• 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
60. 
Two periods stand out, viz. 1973/76 and 1980 to date. 
The 1973 period started in Natal and culminated in 
1976 with riots in Soweto. The current phase is due 
primarily to the legalisation of Black trade unions 
and the increase in their activities. Table 4 below 
provides a racial breakdown of striking employees and 
numbers of economically active (excluding Transkei, 
Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei on their being 
classified as Independent States), for the years 
1980-86. 
Table 4 reflects not only the .racial breakdown of 
strike participation but as proportions of the 
economically active it is evident just what a dominant 
position is taken by Blacks in strikes over the 
period. 
An N.M.C. report (114) on geographical regions and 
strike activity is presented in Table 5 below for the 
years 1980-85. 
Cape Peninsula Durban Rand Total 
Strikes No. of Strikes No. of Strikes No. of Strikes No. of 
Emes. Emes. Emes. 
21 3432 39 8729 19 11027 207 
5 2628 57 12702 52 13718 342 
5 1170 46 11153 189 45631 394 
10 1034 60 10990 116 22108 336 
31 6254 83 21600 136 46550 469 
11 27.55 53 15619 102 56517 389 
The Durban and Witwatersrand are geographical areas 
that reflect (relatively) high strike activity and 
that such activity is largely to be found amongst 
black employees. The garment manufacturing industry 
in the Western Cape (i.e. Cape Peninsula) is 
Emes. 
61785 
92842 
141571 
64469 
181942 
239816 
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overwhelmingly coloured and in Natal it is largely 
asian, the Transvaal region (i.~. Witwatersrand) is 
predominantly black. These regional characteristics 
will influence the behaviour of unions 1 irrespective 
of colour, and even strikes in different regions are 
likely to influence the behaviour of members and 
officials of employee groups, employer groups and the 
state. 
THE GROWTH OF THE GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
It will be shown that a major concern expressed by the 
leadership of the r~gional unions is the stability and 
growth of employment in the garment industry and 
whilst employment costs will be one factor influencing 
such growth and stability, other factors over which 
labour has little control also ·need explication. In 
structuration theory terms 'distant' contexts can 
constrain action which can be seen in the garment 
industry in terms of (at least) the State's action in 
terms of tariff protection af fordea the textile 
industry. 
In addition, the garment uniohs dealt with in this 
thesis have a long history of dealing with management 
and the growth in employment over this period is 
likely to affirm their commitment to such a goal and 
so, again, in structuration theory terms display the 
continuity of action. 
In April 1982 the Director of the National Clothing 
Federation of South Africa (N.C.F.) submitted a 
"Memorandum of Reply"(M.o.R.) to the Steenkamp 
Committee of Enquiry into the Clothing and Textile 
Industries, in which reference is made to the 
beginnings of the Industry. 
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The memorandum quotes Dr. H.A.F. Barker's text, "The 
Economics of the Wholesale Clothing Industry of South 
Africa" which dates the start of the Industry as 
1907. In dealing with the industry Barker covers the 
years ·1907-57 and divides the 50 years "into four main 
periods of development: 1907 to 1929/32, 1932 to 
1939, 1939 to 1948 and 1948 to 1957". 
While no statistics were available "for (the) clothing 
industry as distinct from tailoring and 
dressmaking"(ll5) prior to 1933/4, employers in the 
Cape and Transvaal had formed employer associations.· 
Unions equally had emerged and together with the 
provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act the 
necessary ingredients for an 'organised' industry 
existed. 
In 1933/34 there were 14276 employees in the clothing 
industry "mainly engaged in men's and boy's outerware, 
shirts, pyjamas and underware" (116). By 1938/39 
employment levels had moved up to 18,250 but "only 
about 10% by value of the production W?lS women's wear" 
(117). The 2nd World War saw a 50% rise in employment 
levels (to 27,383) and women's wear now accounted for 
some 30% of production. 
In analysing the role of tariff protection on the 
growth of the industry the 'Memorandum' says that 
"whether the growth of the men's wear industry during 
the inter-war years was due to the increase in the 
duty on such garments or whether the industry grew and 
because it existed, had to be protected against 
foreign competition is impossible to say"(ll8). 
However, the M.o.R. notes that "by 1945/46 employment 
in the clothing industry had risen to 30 321 and the 
women's wear industry was well established''(ll9). In 
1945 the National Co-ordinating Council for the 
Clothing Industry (forerunner of the N.C.F.) was 
founded "expressly for the purpose of applying for 
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increased duties on clothing to protect the progress 
which had been made during the war period"(l20). 
Following representations to the Board of Trade and 
Industries, "the clothing industry entered the three 
year period between the end of the war and the 
imposition of import control with protective duties of 
25% on men's wear and shirts and 15% on other clothing 
supplemented by alternative specific duties on certain 
garments"(l21). (Note: It took some 3 years for the 
tariff applied for to be approved - and in some cases 
such as duty on women's woven dresses only implemented 
in 1955). The industry continued to grow and by 
1948/49 there were 40,625 employees in the industry. 
Tariff protection has been a major concern to the 
Employer in the clothing industry, as can be seen in 
the statement that "material costs comprises some 55% 
of average clothing industry selling prices compared 
to 20% in the case of labour"(l22). Import control was 
introduced in 1948 and the "irregular sequence o_f 
measures of restriction and relaxation tended to bring 
about disturbances in both production and demand, 
frustration of management and losses in manufacturing 
efficiency"(l23). Relations with the Textile Industry 
have been strained. in the past though the M.o.R. notes 
"that the quality of local textiles has improved in 
recent years"(l24). These three elements take up a 
great deal of attention by employers and their 
association. A review of the N.C.F's Ahnual Reports 
gives a good guide to the degree of concern. The 
M.o.R. observes that neither import substitution nor 
export sales made significant contributions to the 
growth of the industry which by 1954 had "87% of the 
local market for clothing". Furthermor~, growth was 
"almost entirely due to the expansion of the local 
market which was reserved for the industry by import 
control"(l25). 
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Table 6 presents a comparison of various growth rates 
between clothing and manufacturing and highlights the 
comparatively slower (and more volatile) growth of the 
clothing industry .. 
TABLE 6 
GROWTH RATES - CLOTHING AND MANUFACTURING 
- Percentage Change 
1970- 1975- 1978- 1980- 1984-
Clothing 1975 1978 1981 1985 1985 
Unit Labour Costs 
' 
10.6 5.6 1. 3 9.3 22.2 
Real Earnings Per 
Employee 1.0 -2.3 -0. 8 - -0.1 -8.9 
Earnings per 
employee 10 •. 5 8.6 13.1 12.1 5.9 
Labour Productivity -0.1 2.8 11. 7 2.5 -13.4 
Number of Employees 4.9 0.2 2.3 1.8 -.o 
Real Output 4.8 3.0 14.3 4.4 -13.4 
Manufacturing 
Real Output 6.1 1.5 8.3 3.6 -5.2 
Number of Employees 4.2 o.o 3.5 1. 7 -3.2 
Labour Productivity 1. 9 1.4 4.6 1. 9 ·-2. 2 
I 
Earnings per 
Employee 11.8 12.3 17.4 14.4 11.7 
Real Earnings per 
Employee 2.3 1.1 2.9 2.0 -3.9 
Unit Labour Costs 9.8 10.8 12.l 12.3 14.l 
(126) 
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Production prices for clothing (1980=100) increased 
from 70.9 in 1975 to 195.2 in 1986 representing an 
increase of 2.75 times (127) whereas production prices 
for consumer goods rose from 55.3 to 216.6 for the 
same period representing an increase of 3.9 times. 
The consumer price index for the same period rose from 
56.6 to 228.4 representing a 4.04 times increase 
(128). While this performance is admirable the M.o.R. 
suggests that the growth has not been smooth, "in the 
boom period between 1963 and 1969 growth averaged 8.2% 
per annum, whereas from 1969 to 1975 it was only 1.8% 
and in 1977 there was actually a contraction instead 
of growth"(l29). It was only by the end of 1978 that 
the production index regained its 1976 level (M.o.R. 
uses 1975 = 100). Rapid growth i~ again evident in 
the period 1979-81 with a decline in production from 
1982 to 1986. Th~ Standard Bank Data Base (1980 = 
100) also reflec~s this decline in clothing 
production, thus the 1986 index is 79.1 which is just 
above 1978 (76.4) but below 1979 (85.l). 
EARNINGS PATTERNS 
Unions do not operate in isolation of their 
environment and will be acutely aware of employment 
conditions in other sectors of the economy, 
particularly those in their geographical area of 
operation. This is confirmed in the regional analyses 
provided later in this thesis and this section is 
included to provide some empirical substance showing 
the relationship of earnings between 'clothing' and 
'manufacturing'. 
The N.P.L provide data on "Earnings Per Employee -
Rands per annum" and a comparison is made below 
between the clothing industry and the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. The inflation rates are calculated 
from the Standard Bank Data Base. 
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TABLE 7 
EARNINGS PER EMPLOYEE (ALL EMPLOYEES) 
Year Clothing Manufacturing Rates of Inflation ( % ) 
% In~r. % Iner. Nat. C.T. W'Rand Dbn 
1968 811 -0.15 1238 7.0 1. 5 N/A N/A N/A 
1969 813 0.2 1270 2.58 3 N/A N/A N/A 
1970 864 6.3 1385 9.06 5.2 N/A N/A N/A 
1971 931 7.75 1515 9.39 6.1 N/A N/A N/A 
1972 1026 10.2 1601 5.68 6.5 N/A N/A N/A 
1973 1153 12.4 1807 12.87 9.6 N/A N/A N/A 
1974 1255 8.85 2089 15.61 11.7 N/A N/A N/A 
1975 1417 12.9 2439 16.75 13.5 N/A N/A N/A 
1976 1605 13.27 2804 14.97 11.1 6.45 6.9 6.09 
1977 1716 6.92 3110 10.91 11. 3 10.87 11.3 11. 48 
1978 1823 6.24 3470 11. 58 10 .. 9 10.49 11. 76 10.73 
1979 1992 9.33 3959 14.09 13.2 12.41 13.64 13.18 
1980 2282 14.56 4683 18.29 13.8 12.61 14.29 14.16 
1981 2627 15.12 5594 19.45 .15. 2 14.80 16.2 14.4 
1982 3257 23.98 6651 18.90 14.7 11.74 13.86 16.08 
1983 3818 17.2 7527 13.17 12.3 11.91 12.17 12.88 
1984 4403 15.3 8535 13.39 11.7 12.0 11.32 12.03 
1985 4662 5.88 9531 11. 67 16.2 16.04 16.04 17.33 
1986 5566 19.39 11054 15.98 19.6 17.7 19.5 15.33 
(130} 
(Note 1986 figures for "Earnings Per Employee" were calculated from 
the Standard Bank Data ~ase) 
Before drawing any conclusions from the tables the 
following points need to be made 
l} That the method of compilation of the statistics 
has remained largely the same and that any error -
i.e. discrepancies with industrial council figures 
- is consistent. 
2} It is to be born in mind that Clothing Industry 
employees are overwhelmingly female and the degree 
of female employment in the manufacturing sector is 
likely to be much lower. Any remuneration 
discrimination based on sex may well represent part 
of the reason for differences in salary and wages 
of employees between 'Manufacturing' and 
'clothing'. 
3} In the M.o.R. (1982) it is estimated (based on 
Transvaal data} that skilled workers represent 9.6% 
of the workforce, semi-skilled represent 62.4% and 
unskilled 28%. This breakdown is unknown for the 
manufacturing sector. 
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The rather obvious conclusion is that earnings in the 
clothing industry are considerbly lower than that of 
the ~Manufacturing' industry. 
SUMMARY 
The review of action in the previous contexts provides 
macro data on events thought likely to influence 
activity in bargaining behaviour in the Cape, 
.Transvaal and Natal regions of the South African 
Clothing Industry. The review - to re-emphasize - is 
not meant to be exhaustive, but rather the intention 
is to provide a broad overview of the contexts thought 
to be of significance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In meeting the challenge of Banks (1) and in 
addressing Poole's (2) observation on the divide in 
industrial relations theory, it becomes necessary to 
amalgamate So~i~l Action and functional approa~hes to 
the subject matter. Thus it is in th~se two 
apparently divergent notions of societal phenomena 
that a new approach to their explication can be 
sought. Giddens's (3) structuration theory provides 
such a vehicle. 
Dunlop's Systems theory is destined by its 
functional~st nature to-specify-ari-expianandum - the 
"we-b-of rules" or "the rule ma:kfi1gsystem"--C4Y,--and a 
.. _ 
causal variable - (the interactiO-n- of the -actors in an-
environment) are identified. The positivist format_9f 
t·he theory has been influencial in terms of firstly -
outlining the territorial prerogatives of analysts and 
secondly, of suggesting the possibility of general 
laws of industrial relations. There can be little 
argument o er just what the subject matter of 
industrial relations is, provided it is accepted that, 
firstly, there can be, as Heneman (5) and others (6) 
. 
suggest different levels of analysis (i.e. National, 
Enterprise etc.); secondly, that the boundaries of the 
subject matter are logical abstractions; thirdly, 
that the contexts (social, political, technical and 
economic) avoid substantivist positions. The issue of 
the possibility of general laws-of- .social_pr_actice 
raises a core distinction between functionalist/ 
structuralist and hermeneutic approaches __ to_the_ 
-----
theorising about society. 
---------- --
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Hermeneutic (subjectivist, interpretive social action) 
' - ' -
approaches to social theory "are fdunded, as it were, 
on the imperialism of the subject" (7) and society is 
'me~ely' a product of the diversity of human nature. 
Human nature in turn is thought to be active, 
purposeful, self- and socially creative. It is in this 
depiction of human nature that the possibility of 
general laws a la positivism are rejected, together 
with methodological approaches originating in the 
n~tural sciences. 
Keat and Urry (8) distinguish what might be viewed as 
'strict' and 'loose' positivism (Positivism and 
Realism in their terms) in which the only real 
methodological difference lies in the degree of 
observability of the 'explanans' - apart from such an 
adjustment the overall methodological approach remains 
the same. An additional distinction lies in the 
purpose of establishing relationships identified by 
such a methodology. 'strict' positivism seeks to 
establish the regularity (and occurrence) of such 
relationships (only), whilst the Realist seeks to do 
just that they also seek an explanation of why those 
relationships are what they are. It is in this notion 
of the regularity of relationships, a mechanical 
repetitiveness, that sees the epistomological break 
with the social action approach to explanation in the 
Social Sciences. If man is viewed as "a purposive 
agent" who has "reasons for his or her activities" (9) 
then it is difficult to conceive of the subject matter 
in the same way as the subject matter of the natural 
sciences. Man is then nq_t~z:edi-G.tae-l-e-~i-n--the~s-ens.e~of 
the natural science_s~-in that_ t_he repeti"tiveness of 
re~ationships is not to be found in human action as it 
is in the natural sciences. The explanans in the 
natural sciences cannot 'decide' to change its 
relationships in the way that humans can decide to 
change their relationships. Equally important to the 
social action argument is the notion of 'a double 
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hermeneutic' - the act of studying natural phenomena 
does not change the_ phenomena under study, but the 
results of social studies are likely to effect change 
on the relationships under examination. It is in the 
diversity of behaviour and apparent lack of a 
mechanical repetitive form to such behaviour that 
social action theory rejects the possibility of 
establishing general laws of the nature of society. 
Structuration theory accepts a repetitiveness of human 
behaviour -'recursiveness' ~but adds to this the idea 
of feedback which is monitored by the agent and such 
monitoring, as .we shali see later, accounts for the 
possibility of behaviour change, a possibility not to 
be found in natural phenomena. Structuration theory 
does not accept the possibility of general laws of 
society. ''There are no universal laws in the social 
sciences and there will not be any"(lO). 
Neither the positivistic implications of functionalism 
nor its rejection by interpretive sociologies detracts 
or requires alteration to the focus of study in 
industrial relations, nor is it necessary to adjust 
the elements as identified by Dunlop. What is 
necessary is to incorporate both theoretical positions 
with differing emphasis and notions of explanation,it 
is necessary, as Giddens notes, to propose a "duality 
of structure" to supplant the dualism of subject and 
object inherent in these competing theoretical 
positions. "The constitution of agents and structures 
are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a 
dualism, but represent a duality" (11). 
In accepting the elements of Dunlap's thesis - if not 
the explanatory methodology - caution needs to be 
expressed firstly, about substantivist positions being 
taken in terms of his contextual depiction of the 
political, technical and economic environment and 
secondly, of the industrial relations arena as being 
"an analytical subsystem of an industrial society on 
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the same logical plane as an economic system'' (12). 
Societal totalities cannot be neatly demarcated nor is 
it necessary in "the illumination of concrete 
processes of social life" (13) to depict a hierarchy 
of contexts. In allocating the industrial relations 
subsystem the same (logical) status as the economic 
system, Dunlop is in fact implying that his thesis 
requires a non-subordinate position relative to the 
economic and in so doing removes a necessarily 
dominant role from the economic context in the 
understanding of industrial relations. Structuration 
theory utilises these contextual notions but without 
the presumption of "concrete institutional 
differentiation'' (14). Equally~ it places no 
hierarchical significance on any of these logical 
abstractions; they are dealt with as different 
threads in the societal backdrop, related, interwoven 
and interacting, and which can only be identified in 
abstraction. 
The substantivist notions implicit in such terms as 
the 'economic', 'political', 'social' environments 
must be understood as abstractions. The empirical 
data associated with these environments is often 
presented in reif ied form, as a constraint on human 
behaviour and with deterministic characteristics that 
ignores (or forgets) the fact that such data is no 
more than a numerical (and convenient) representation 
of human behaviour, an aggregation of what is taken to 
be similar behaviour. It is self-evident that these 
'environments' would not exist without interacting 
humans, where such interaction is similar over time 
and space it gives systemic form and can be classified 
as a particular system. 
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Dunlop (15) suggests that industrial relations as an 
action context should be viewed as on a similar plane 
as that of the other (major} contexts and that, as 
such, it is likely to require different tools and 
techniques of ~tudy to the other contexts. This 
argument is problematic in that the context focus is 
ill-defined and is taken as social action. The status 
of a particular action context vis-a-vis other action 
contexts is unlikely to determine the study methods; 
the subject matter is therefore more likely to 
influence methodological issues and since industrial 
relations is taken to be a form of social action, the 
study of such action will be influenced by the 
premises held by the researcher. No special status 
for the study of industrial relations can be claimed 
solely on the basis of its hierarchical relationship 
with other action contexts or because of its focus of 
attention. This is not to say that studying what is 
termed industrial relations is -of no importance; 
rather it is the results of studies and the interest 
of students of industrial relations and the wider 
society that-will award status. 
Industrial relations then is an action context whose 
focus of attention lies in "social practices ordered 
across space and time"(l6). These social practices 
revolve essentially around three 
actors/collectivities, i.e. Management, Unions and 
State, and can take place at different levels, thus 
( i ) Individual 
(ii} Group 
(iii) Organisation 
(iv) Sub-National 
(v) National 
(vi} Supra-National (17) 
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In identifying the action context of industrial 
relations it is of importance to make some 
observations as to the nature of such contexts. 
The social agent is taken to be 'knowledgeable' by 
which is meant that the actor has an understanding of 
his/her actions, and draws upon such knowledge in the 
exercise o~ every day activities. This 
"knowle'dgeabilityu is maintained by "monitoring 11 the 
world around, and as such action contexts such as 
industrial relations cannot be viewed in isolation of 
other - more distant - action contexts. This does not 
exclude the possibility that agents will reify such 
contexts over which they have little or no control. 
In fact "reification of social relations" forms an 
/ 
important role of ideology in social action (18). 
The action contexts of a social entity are integrated 
through relationships of reciprocity between actors or 
collectivities of the action contexts and extended 
through time-space. This negates the structuralists' 
deterministic view of context but also refutes 
interpretive positions that ignore the influence of 
reciprocal relationships. 
It is important here, not to conceive of the 
industrial relations system as, in a sense, isolated 
from other segments of a particular society. Such a 
characterisation would not be able to accept the 
multiple 'positioning' of the social agent; the roles 
that agents are associated with will have multiple 
interest areas, thus the factory worker might well 
have a concern with education for their children, 
taxation, sport and so on, they will participate in a 
number of systems within a social totality. 
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I~ introducing the notion of.'system', 'systemic' or 
'systemhess' into structuration theory, it is 
important to emphasize the different usage to that 
found in functionalist expositions. System (etc.) in 
structuration theory refers to similarities of 
behaviours over time in a given totality. It is the 
apparent fixity of social practices that is seen as 
systemness. System, in structuration theory; carries 
none of the causal force for explanation found in 
functionalist writings, as the social practices that 
produce systemness are constituted by knowledgeable 
actors who recursively monitor their and others' 
behaviour (expecting similar monitoring by other 
agents) and who draw on rules and resources 
(structure) in the production and reproduction of 
those actions which give rise to the systemic form of 
social practices - the duality of structure. 
System in structuration theory refers essentially to 
durable social practices. It is their continuity in 
discernably similar format that imbues such practices 
with systemness. It is then possible to say that 
those systems have structure, by which is meant that 
rules and resources are recursively implicated in 
their durability. Such rules and resources are "out 
of time-space" in its "instantiations and 
co-ordination as memory traces" (19). The rules and 
resources are u~ilised by (knowledgeable) agents who 
in their utilisation of such rules and resources 
produce and reproduce the structure, the durability 
and continuity of such practices, then giving a 
systemness to those practices. Of equal importance in 
the production and reproduction of social practices 
are the notions of firstly, 'knowledgeable' agents, 
secondly their ability to monitor their behaviour (and 
that of others)~ thirdly, the expectation that others 
monitor behaviour in a similar fashion, and fourthly, 
there is the notion of 'unintended' consequences. 
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The exclusion of these elements to the explication of 
social relations would inevitably lead to a static 
model, one which is patently untenable. The 
mechanisms for achieving systemness can be depicted 
in, firstly, "where interdependence is conceived of as 
a homeostatic process akin to mechanisms of 
self-regulation operating within an organism", 
provided "it is acknowledged that the 'looseness' of 
most social systems makes the organic parallel a very 
remote one and that this relatively mechanised mode of 
/ system reproduction is not the only one found in human 
societies". Secondly, Giddens suggests that 
'-- - integration ("reciprocity of practices [of autonomy 
and dependence"]) is a further mechanism involved in 
social reproduction and implicated in the "systemness" 
of sbcial practices, thus system integration is 
"reciprocity between actors or collectivities across 
extended time-space" (20). Institutions, in turn, are 
(particular) social practices that "have the greatest 
time-space extension" (21). Within social totalities, 
t;h.is quality of institutions, i.e. their continuity 
over time, also lends systemic form to societies. 
It is by way of the above conceptualisation of 
systemness that a reformulation of the Dunlop thesis 
can be arrived at, and in so doing bridge the 
functionalist/social action epistemological divide. 
3.2 A STRUCTURATION THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
A structuration theory of Industrial Relations in 
proposing a duality a.s opposed to form or experience 
in industrial relations requires clarification on 
(i) The Actor 
(ii) Structure and Structuration 
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It needs to be emphasized firstly that the explication 
of these aspects can only be separated for purposes of 
analysis, and secondly that any analyses must accept 
the continuity of social life. Thus analysis can be 
carried out on both a cross-sectional and longitudinal 
basis but such separation will most likely serve 
different purposes. 
The Actor 
In Giddens's psychology of the social actor two ideas 
are of crucial importance to the structuration thesis 
(a) The Stratification Model 
(b) Levels of Consciousness 
(a) The Stratification Model 
The actor has three "embedded" (i.e. innate) processes 
which are 
(i) Reflexive monitoring 
(ii) Rationalization of action 
(iii)Motivation of action 
~ The actor is conceived of as able to monitor his/her 
I 
I 
l 
I 
action, that of others and expects them to exercise 
similar behaviour. This monitoring of action allows 
the actor to "maintain a continuing 'theoretical 
understanding' of the grounds of their activity" - the 
Rationalisation of Action. 
In the process of experience the social agent acquires 
( knowledge about how -to be a competant social agent. 
This knowledge (essentially rules and resources, i.e. 
st~ucture) is drawn upon in the production and 
reproduction of social relations. Ho~ever, the agent 
monitors his/her behaviour and that of others -
expecting them to do likewise - and such monitoring 
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further contributes to the possibility of change to 
social relations, and therefore structure, although 
much of social life is conceptualized as routine and 
repetitive. 
In explaining the "dazzling variety of procedures and 
tactics" used by agents, Giddens suggests that those-
which are "probably particularly significant are those 
involved in the sustaining of ontological security" 
( 2 2) • 
Ontological security is dealt with by Giddens by 
reference to psychoanalytical theory and particularly 
the work of Erikson and Sullivan. Whilst recognising 
epistemological issues involved in psychoanalytical 
theory Giddens nevertheless pursues such a course in 
an attempt to relate the psychological level of 
explanation with the sociological level. Explanation 
in psychology reflects similar disputes as that found 
in sociology. Deterministic explanations of human 
behaviour can be contrasted against humanistic 
explanations; whilst not arguing the superiority of 
one ~tyle or argument over another, nor deprecating 
the pursuit of an ultimate explanation it is suggested 
that the presentation of an explanation of individual 
behaviour is so fraught with issues of faith. that 
progress at the sociological level may be distracted. 
George Kelly's construct theory (23) provides a model 
of individual behaviour that specifically attempts to 
avoid much of the epistemological debate referring to 
the essential nature of man. Construct theory in turn 
allows the analyst to conceive of the social agent 
.along (mostly) similar lines as those conceived of by 
Giddens, at the same time avoiding any ontological 
debate. 
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Construct theory holds that the individual anticipates 
events, thus the fundamental postulate is 
"A person's processes are psychologically 
channelized by the way in which he anticipates 
events" (24)-
In experiencing events in the world the individual 
will be aware of similarities and dissimilarities 
which will have meaning for the individual. In the 
construing of similarity and contrast, constructs are 
formed and this knowledge the individual utilises in 
construing future (similar) events and thus in 
orienting behaviour. 
Constructs exhibit certain characteristics. 
(i) Constructs have both a range of convenience and 
a focus of convenience; the range of 
convenience referring to all those events for 
which it would have use, and the focus of 
convenience refers to particular events in 
which it is applied. 
(ii) Constructs can be core - basic to the 
individual's functioning - or peripheral, those 
which are readily modifiable without modifying 
core constructs. 
(iii) They may be permeable or impermeable, this 
' 
referring to the ease with which new elements 
are admitted to the range of convenience. 
(iv) Some constructs are tight or loose referring 
here to the degree of unvarying expectations or 
construing of events. 
Giddens characteriz~s knowledge on differing levels of 
consciousness, of particular importance is that of 
practical consciousness which has similarities with 
.. 
the Freudian semi-consciousness and refers essentially 
to that knowledge (constructs) utilised in a routine 
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and 'unthinking' way, an element of habit is involved 
in understanding the practical unconscious. 
Discursive consciousness refers to that level of 
consciousness which is characterised by' the ease of 
giving reasons for action. Neither of these levels of 
consciousness detract from construct theory. 
Motivation in structuration theory refers to a 
"potential for action" and is only involved in action 
in ''relatively unusual circumstances, situations which 
in some way break with the routine" (25). 
It is possible then to conceive of the social agent as 
having a construct matrix developed in interaction and 
such knowledge is drawn upon in interaction. Jh~ 
ag~n."t rf?CU£S _i vely and reflexively monitors events and 
expects others to do the same, such monitoring allows 
for the possib_~e adjustment ~f the individual 
construct system and thus behaviour and the structure 
----- ----- - - ---·· -- -- -- -
of social~ystems.- The reality of unintended 
consequences of intentional acts will in turn be 
subject to monitoring and adjustments made. The 
choice.of behaviour (i.e. the adjust~ent) may well 
relate to Giddens's suggestion of maintaining 
ontological security, but as has been argued this 
level of explanation is fraught with a myriad of 
epistemological problems. 
The 'knowledge' (construct matrix) drawn upon by the 
actor in the production and reproduction of action has 
'Rules' as a central feature. Knowledge of 'rules' of 
- ··- ----·--- --
s99_ial §!_ction is ·a key aspect of the social agent a!!_d 
are essential to the ability of the actor ~o 'carry 
oi:' in any social c9_ntext. Rules are ~t t~-~e 
conceived of as somehow external to the individual and 
therefore as a determini~g force over which the actor 
has little or no control. All relationships have a 
degree of reciprocity, of autonomy and dependence and 
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the rules of these relationships - whilst varying in 
~~--· - ·~- ---- ~ . -
degrees of formality and direct actor control - is 
•C 
integral to the ability of the actor to maintain and 
change such relations}:lips. 
'Rules' can be viewed ~s 
"techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the 
en~ctment/reproduction of social practices'' (26) 
'Rules' as will be seen in the later discussion of 
'structure' form an integral part to a 
re-conceptualization of the idea of 'structure'. 
Rules are central to the constitution of meaning in 
social relations and in their legitimation by way of 
norms and sanctions. 
Rules "relevant to general questions of social 
analysis" (27) have the following main 
characteristics: 
Intensive 
Tacit 
Inf ormai 
Weakly sanctioned 
Shallow 
Discursive 
Formalised 
Strongly sanction~d 
By 'intensive' is meant those rules which are 
"constantly invoked in the course of day-to-day life" 
(28). The other characterizations of rules is 
self-explanatory. 
Industrial relations systems will reflect such rules 
.,-----.~~ -~ 
(and sanctions), from formalised rules of law such as 
"Mitbestimmung" in Germany or the -"Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act" of Britain in the mid-1970's. 
Equa~ly rules in the workpLace based on seniority may 
be formally agreed to by Management and Unions 
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although not passed as Law in a Parliament. Informal 
rules revolving around work allocation may in turn 
exist in varying degrees in different 
together with a variety of other rules 
degrees of formality. 
(b) Levels of Consciousness 
organisations, 
of varying 
The representation of the knowledge of social actors 
as a construct matrix is well suited to Giddens's 
presentation of different levels of consciousness.· 
Giddens argues 3 such levels. 
(i) Discursive consciousness 
(ii) Practical consciousness, and 
(iii) The Unconsciousness 
Discursive consciousness refers to that which can 
readily be talked about. There is indeed no barrier 
between it and 'Practical consciousness', the 
distinction simply being between "what can be said and 
what is characteristically simply done"(29). There is 
no rigid bar between these levels though such barriers 
(largely repression) do exist between the discursive 
level and the unconscious. 
The notion of practical consciousness is of central 
importance to a structuration theory of industrial 
relations as it introduces the notion of the 
'Routinization' of social action. 
Much of social action is recursive and routine. The 
knowledge actors draw upon is largely to be found at 
the level of practical consciousness and the 
repetitiveness of action has a routine representation. 
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Whilst much of social action is routine and recursive, 
action in one context may have unintended consequences 
in that context or other contexts somewhat removed in 
time and space, which in turn can be monitored and can 
constitute the conditions for further action in the 
original context. 
The routinization of action has further relevance in 
that it recreates the conditions in which the 
appropriate action will be reproduced, so providing a 
continuity of action with the appearance of, "form" so 
important to Structuralist-Functionalist understanding 
of social action. 
3.2.2 Structure and Structuration 
Structure ~efers to 'rules and resources' in 
Structuration Theory, but because 'rules' are 
inherently transformational, social entities can best 
be characterised as reflecting structuring properties, 
these properties in turn allow "the 'binding' of 
time-space in social systems", and "make it possible 
for discernably similar social practices to exist 
across varying spans of time and space which lend them 
'systemic' form" (30). The most enduring structural 
properties Giddens refers to as structural principles 
and enduring social practices are referred to as 
institutions. 
Giddens also distinguishes 'Structure' from 
'Structures'. Structures (plural) are "isolable sets 
of rules and resources" (31) and furthermore refers to 
"relations of transformation and mediation which are 
the 'circuit switches' underlying observed conditions 
of system reproduction" (32). Structure(s) is then 
reconceptualised in structuration theory and is prior 
to 'form'. It is also "out of time-space" in that 
structure now exists "only in its instantiations in 
such practices and as memory traces orienting the 
conduct of knowledgeable human agents" (33). 
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Structure, as formulated by Giddens, is the "very core 
of that 'knowledgeability' which specifically 
characterizes the human agent" (34); the structural 
properties ('rules and resources') are then both 
"medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organise" (35), and in this way the duality of 
structure (as reformulated) is achieved. 
Rules can be divided into those of signification and 
legitimation. Signification refers to rules of 
'meaning constitution' and is evident in communication 
in interaction. Communication as conceived of here is 
more than 'just' what is intended by the actor._ A 
theory of coding should focus on meaning generation as 
found in the "orderirig of social practices" (36). In 
institutionalised collective bargaining "modes of 
discourse" will be evident which are recursively 
implicated in the continuity of the institution, i.e. 
the production and reproduction of relations. This 
equally applies to unions, federations of unions, 
employer associations, shop steward committees and so 
on. The modes of discourse and symbolic order are "a 
major institutional locus of ideology"(37), though in 
structuration theory ideology is not of a particular 
type, rather ideology refers to the "asymetries of 
domination which connect signification to the 
legitimation of sectional interests" (38). 
Legitimation cannot be understood independently of 
signification and domination other than analytically 
and refers to the theory of normative regulation. 
Norms are to be understood in terms of reciprocal 
relations, as rights and obligations expected by 
participants. Interpretations of norms which 
emphasize an 'internalization' of societal norms are 
to be avoided as they do not account for a 
knowledgeable social actor, who in this 
characterization becomes a reflection of those norms, 
mechanical and determined. Such an interpretation 
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"masks the fact that the normative elements of social 
systems are contingent claims which have to be 
sustained and 'made to count' through the effective 
mobilization of sanctions in the contexts of actual 
encounters. "Normative sanctidns express structural 
asymetries of domination, and the relations of those 
nominally subject to them may be of various sorts 
other than expressions of -the commitments those norms 
supposedly engender"_ ( 39). 
Collective bargaining represents numerous instances of 
normative sanctions, of expectations of rights and 
obligations thus the notion of 'bargaining in good 
faith' has, for example, the impLj.cation of-a 
willingness to (at least) attempt the settlement of an 
issue or series of issues. Agreements arrived at are 
often couched in the languag~ of rights and 
obligations and consequences of breaches of such 
agreement. Even the individual 'contract of 
employment' has these features and while the examples 
given have a 'formalised' character this is not a 
necessary condition for their existence. 
Resources as conceived of in structuration theory are 
intimately involved in the structural feature known as 
domination. Domination is inherent in the social 
condition, in human action. Domination "depends on 
the mobilization of two distinguishable types of 
resource'' (40). Allocative resources refers to "forms 
of transformative capacity - generating command over 
objects, goods or material phenomena" (41). 
Authoritative resources, similarly, but "command over 
persons or actors" (42). 
Some authoritative resources do have a material 
existence which on the surface might be seen to be 
contradictory in that Structuration theory argues that 
structure,does not reflect such. However, the 
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transformational character of resources is only 
evident when linked to the "instantiation of that of 
codes and normatiye sanctions", (43) i.e. 
signification and legitimation. 
Power in this conceptualisation of social processes is 
not a resource, rather power characterizes all action 
and resources are "media through which power is 
exercised" (44). Giddens further argues, 
"Power within social systems which enjoy some 
continuity over time and space presumes regularized 
relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or 
collectivities in contexts of social interaction. But 
all forms of dependence of fer some resources whereby 
those who are subordinate can influence the activities 
of their superiors. This is what I call the dialectic 
of control ~n social systems" (45). 
The study of industrial relations can, as has been 
noted in Chapter 1, focus on different levels of 
j,nteraction and at each level relationships of 
autonomy and dependence will be observed, power is 
inherent~ in all these relationships and as such is 
not 'eiternal' to either agents or collectivities but 
rather ~s expressed in the usage of resources in 
sustaining these relationships. 
Collective bargaining in industrial relations can be 
conceived of as sets of transformative relations 
between collectivities which in themselves can (will) 
reflect institutional features. Institutionalised 
collective bargaining will reflect the structural 
features of signification, domination and 
legitimation, this structure can be identified by 
~holding still' the system and is a valid exercise in 
itself. What is of importance as well, is to examine 
the duree, the continuity of the system (or 
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institution) so as to explicate not only the pattern 
but the dynamic which sees changing patterns. It is 
in the nature of the agent and the modalities of 
structuration that the key to the dynamic (as well as 
the pattern) lies. 
In linking the agent to structural features Giddens 
uses what he refers to as "modalities of 
structuration" as depicted below: 
Structure Signification 1 Domination}.- -
I 
~Legitimation I 
- "' 
1-*---1 I 
Interpretive4- ~ 
Scheme 
_I_ 
- 1 
(Modality) Facility -~ Norm 
L-'f- J L - *° - - J L - ~- _J 
Interaction Communication 
J, J, 
~ ..... ___ P_o_w_e_r _ ___.~ _ ~ ..... _s_A_N_c_T_I_o_N___. 
(46) 
Interpretive schemes are, for Giddens, "modes of 
typification incorporated within ac~ors' stocks of 
kn~wledge (and are) applied reflexively in the 
-sustaining of communication" ( 4 7). 
The Modalities of Structuration 
Structuration refers to the "Conditions governing the 
continuity or transmutation of structures and 
therefore the reproduction of social systems" (48). 
The vehicles involved in structuration are as follows. 
What Giddens calls an "interpretive scheme" and what 
this thesis refers to as a construct matrix, is seen 
as the modality of signification which is evidenced in 
interaction by way of communication. In communication 
the ~ules of meaning are evidenced, in addition norms 
which are the modalities of the rules of legitimation 
will be expressed in interaction through appropriate 
sanctions. Signification and legitimation need to be 
seen, in a sense, as different sides to the same coin. 
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Control over resources (domination) will be exercised 
through a variety of facilities. Parliaments· can be 
viewed as one such facility exercising control over 
both kinds of resources. This thesis will identify a 
number of such facilities specific to the industrial 
relations context of the South African garment 
manufacturing industry. 
3.3 STRUCTURATION THEORY - A CRITIQUE 
· The presentation of a structuration theory of 
industrial relations to provide an analysis of 
collective bargaining in the South African garment 
manufacturing industry requires a review of critical 
commentary on structuration theory. 
In suggesting that social scientists are greatly 
concerned with the "rapid social, politiQal and 
economic change" evident in societies, Held and 
Thompson (49) argue that whilst aspects of past 
contributions "remain relevant today" other of their 
ideas have been "eclipsed both by intellectual 
criticism and by the course of events". It is thus 
necessary "for the ongoing renewal and imaginative 
reconstruction of concepts, assumptions and 
approaches". In this endeavour Held and Thompson 
refer to Giddens "as a figure of major significance" 
(50). Clark (51) in identifying Giddens's 
"international reputation - not just in the world of 
sociology, but in the world of social theory more 
generally" says that in "The Constitution of Society". 
(52) Giddens "has attempted to establish a new kind of 
social theory by synthesizing concepts, approaches and 
insights from a-wide range of social science and 
related disciplines" (53). To this could be added the 
observation that Giddens's reformulation of the notion 
of structure represents something of a paradigm shift 
in that the epistemological divide between objectivist 
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and subjectivist approaches is claimed to have been bridged. 
This descrip~ion of the significance of 'structuration theory' 
then presents difficulties in attempting any critical 
assessment· of 'structuration theory' largely due to the wide 
ranging nature of the debate around 'structuration theory'. 
Clark (54) in reviewing the critique offered in a text he 
(Clark 55) edited suggests that "the main criticisms tend to 
revolve around three interrelated iss~es: the low level of 
original primary empirical research reported in them; the 
general absence of quantitative data and techniques of social 
research (whether primary or secondary); the lack of 
systematic cross reference between theoretical debate and 
empirical research". Again, it should be noted that Giddens's 
theory "aims to shift the emphasis of social theory away from 
a focus on epistemological questions - can a theory be 
verified or falsified as a set of empirically tested 
explanatory propositions of a generalized kind? - to a focus 
on ontological questions - what is the nature of human being 
and doing?"(56). The ontological issue is also identified by 
Ira Cohen (57 and 58) as a major consideration in the 
evaluation of structuration theory. 
The attention to ontological issues does not mean that 
structuration theory therefore will "stand apart from 
the concerns of social science at large", rather, 
there is a reciprocal relationship between subject 
matter and methodological principles but "neitber 
domain can be reduced to the other without residuum, 
and each must be granted a degree of autonomy if 
imagination and insight are to thrive" (60). The main 
purpose of social theory is then "to inform theories 
of substantive structures and social processes and to 
serve the prosecution of empirical research" (61). 
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Stinchcombe (62) is not as convinced by structuration 
theory believing that it does not deal in empirically 
specified concepts. It has failed "to provide 
variables describing milieux that will explain such 
dependent variables as ..... (those required to deal 
with the example used in the critique of structuration 
theory) 11 • Stinchcombe is suggesting that the 
construction of theory should start with empirically 
identified concepts rather than - as he suggests of 
structuration theory - with ontological postulates" 
(63). Cohen rejects the criticism saying that it is 
understood that "ontology provides the concept~al 
resources for social enquiry, the end remains 
knowledge which manifests as much empirical fidelity 
as possible to social life" (64). 
Gregson (65) is also critical of the usefulness of 
structuration theory for em irical research. She 
argues that "we can label structuration theory a 
second-order the~ry: its concerns are not with 
theorizing the unique (i.e. with explaining the events 
or contingencies _of particular periods or places) but 
with conceptualizing the general constituents of human 
society (i.e. agency, structure, time, space,power 
... )" (66), and such 'conceptualisations' lack "the 
degree of specification required for empirical work" 
( 67). 
It can, however, be argued that there is the case to 
be made of "the relative autonomy of theory and 
research" (68), thus the development of theory can 
proceed "on its own terms and cannot be expected to be 
linked at eve.,:y point to empirical considerations" 
(69). It is accepted (~y Giddens) that structuration 
theory is "at a high level of abstraction. But even 
the most abstract concepts inte~lace or can be 
connected with more specific ones. This is true of 
the notions of structuration theory as of any other 
generalized standpoint in the social sciences" (70). 
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The issue of usefulness and research can also be seen 
in Bernstein's (71) review of structuration theory as 
critical theory, for Bernstein (72) "we discover not 
only ambiguity and vagueness but-conflicting and even 
contradictory claims" in Giddens!s treatment of social 
science as critique~ In his reply to Bernstein, 
Giddens (73) identifies four levels of critique. They 
are, "intellectual critique", "practical critique", 
"ideological critique" and."moral critique". 
Intellectual critique refers to the process/activity 
whereby "any and all theories, concepts and findings 
brought forward are open to critical dissection and 
assessment'' (74). Practical cri~ique in turn refers 
to a "technological view of social science knowledge" 
in that such knowledge can lead to "practical 
interventions in social life" (75). Nevertheless, for 
Giddens it is important to emphasize "the routine 
incorporation of social science theories, concepts and 
findings back into the universe of events they were 
developed to describe or explain" (76). 
Ideological critique refers to the analysis "of 
conditions under which modes of signification or 
discourse are incorporated with exploitive systems of 
domination" (77). 
This critique is largely analytical and will have some 
bearing on 'practical critique' in that ideology may 
well guide intervention strategies identified by 
various interest groups. Lastly, moral critique is a 
legitimate role for the social scientist; that is the 
making .of moral criticisms of states of affairs. 
However, such critique is only defensible if there is 
a merging of factual and evaluative claims. This 
Giddens describes as "contingent moral.rationalism" 
(78). It is thus evident that structuration theory is 
not in any way restricted in its critical role 
irrespective of the level of critique. 
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There are two further critiques directed at the 
'elements' of structuration theory (as opposed to what 
may be termed - and dealt with later - criticisms of 
application) thes~ relate to the observations of 
Bauman (79), Thompson (80) and Archer (81). Bauman 
questions the emphasis Giddens places on the social 
actor with the con~equent failure to deal with 
networks of interdependencies and as such 
structuration theory - at best - needs further 
treatment. Giddens suggests that he in fact does 
allow for 'interdependencies' in the way that 
structuration theory conceptualises the notion of 
system, pointing out that it refers "to the patterning 
of social interaction and social relationships across 
time and space" (82). 
Thompson directs his attention at struct~ration 
theory's reformulation of structure in terms of rules 
and resources. It is the notion of 'Rules' which is 
particularly troublesome to Thompson which he sees as 
being of a "loose and abstract character" (83). 
Thompson also suggests that in attempting to identify 
'rules', one first has to identify certa~n structural 
features, thus suggesting that their structural 
character goes beyond a description of rules. 
Giddens's reply to the criticism is to clarify 'rules' 
as 'formulae' which are drawn upon by social actors, 
"they specify 'generalizable procedures' or if one 
prefers, conventions, which agents follow" (84). The 
utilisation of Kelly's construct theory in this thesis 
is a means of identifying sets of 'rules' drawn upon 
in a particular action context. 
Archer argues, "The notion of duality transcends each 
dichotomy by making the two elements mutually 
constitutive, but the lightness of this mutual 
constitution prevents examination of the interplay" 
(85). Archer's critique argues for the maintainence 
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of the distinction of 'structure' and 'action' and 
misses the argumeht that Giddensian formulated 
'structure' is prior to form, i.e. structure in the 
serise that Archer uses the term. 
The range of crit~cism referred to thus far may be 
classed (broadly) as having been directed firstly at 
the "elements" of structuration theory and, secondly, 
to its relation to research and social critique. 
There is a third class of critique which for want of a 
better description will be referred to as 
'applications';· this classification of criticism is 
presented very tentatively and should be viewed more 
as a convenient way of presenting debates surrounding 
structuration theory than any attempt to draw 
conclusions from such a classification. Furthermo~e, 
the groupings should not be seen as mutually exclusive 
but rather as interlinked. The fourth ·class of 
critique can be viewed as defences of competing 
theoretical positions. 
The debate in terms of what is called 'applications' 
revolves around Giddens's explication of the nation 
state, and argue that the explanation given by Giddens 
is deficient in terms of his treatment of the 
significance of the 'middle class' (Urry (86)) 'gender 
relations' (Murgatroyd (87)) and 'violence' (Breuilly 
(88)). The debate around these concepts is more a 
call for their· greater status in the explication of 
change and the development of the 'nation state' than 
the rejection of structuration theory. 
There are in turn a number of 'defences' of 
theoretical positions which are threatened by 
structuration theory. Coser (89) believes that the 
most important contribution Giddens makes in relation 
to Marxism is distinction between allocative and 
authoritative resources, the former referring to 
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domination over material resources (largely the focus 
of Marxian analysis), and the latter referring to 
domination over people, an area neglected by Marx. 
Bottomore (90), however, remains unconvinced that a 
"heavily revised Marxist theory" would not match or be 
. . 
superior to structuration theory. 
Munch (91) in his defense of Parsonian sociology 
advocates ecclecticism but retains a positivist view 
of sociology which does not address the Giddensian 
critique of positivism, and in turn does not critique 
structuration theory. Hermeneutics is in t~rn 
defended. Hekman (92) claims that Giddens retains 
"the dichotomies on which Enlightenment thoug_ht rests" 
and will therefore be "unable to surmount the 
'problems' Of objectivity, subjectivity, critique and 
a host of others" (93). It is only in the 
"Gadamerian/post-modern transcendence of epistemology 
that those problems can be understood to be 
psuedo-problems" (94). 
In summary it can be stated that the critique of 
structuration theory is wide-ranging largely because 
it presents a closely argued radical shift in social 
theory, drawing on contributions from the three main 
explanatory perspectives in social theory, i.e. 
Positivist, 'Marxian' and Subjectivist mo~els of 
explanation. It is furthermore problematic in.that 
its focus is ontological rather than ep~stemological 
which draws criticism about its research, practical 
and critical contribution to social life. The 
criticisms dealt with in this section whilst not 
exhaustive are representative of the range of 
opposition. Support for structuration theory is in 
turn widespread (95), and the debate continues. 
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This thesis will utilise structuration theory as a 
mechanism for establishing the ontological character 
of collective bargaining.in the South African clothing 
industry, and utilise such a characterisation as the 
starting point for a critical analysis of the observed 
lack of militancy and the maintenance of a substantial 
level of managerial decision making over conditions of 
employment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 THE DUALITY OF STRUCTURE 
Structuration theory claims a duality emerges with the 
reconceptualization of the notion of ~Structure' and 
sudh a claim presents methodological issues. 
Burrell and Morgan (1) present an analytical scheme 
for "analysing assumptions .about the nature of social 
science". The subjectivist/objectivist approaches are 
seen to be identifiable in terms of assumptions made 
in relation to four criteria. Their scheme is 
presented below -
Subjectivist Approach 
to Social Science 
Objectivist Approach 
to Social Science 
Nominal ism 
Anti-Positivism-
Voluntarism 
Ideographic -
1. ONTOLOGY 
2. EPISTEMOLOGY 
3. HUMAN NATURE 
4. METHODOLOGY 
Re·alism 
Positivism 
Determinism 
Nomothetic 
Burrell and Morgan's de~cription of 
subjectivist/objectivist approaches can be 
encapsulated (simply) as follows; subjectivist 
approaches reject the proposition of an objective 
external reality which will constrain and determine 
- the actions of the individual, it rejects the 
possibility of causal relations and the possibility of 
general laws of social action all of which centres on 
the key assumption of the voluntarist nature of man. 
The voluntarist position has many facets but revolves 
essentially around the notion of 'free-will' or 
'non-determi~ed choice' as the central defining 
characteristic of the human being. Objectivist 
approaches are then the opposite of that which 
describes the subjectivist. One additional aspect of 
clarification of the objectivist position needs to be 
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made; in establishing the causes of action the 
objectivist may look to variables either external or 
internal to the social actor. Behaviourism suggests 
external causes whilst the Freudian Id can be viewed 
as an internal causal variable. 
The duality of structure as proposed by Giddens rests 
on the characterization of structure. Social systems 
have a duree, a continuity of.action that transcends 
the individual actor. Such social totalities - rather 
obviously - exist prior to the individual, during the 
individual's life-span and continue after the exiting 
of the individual. In this sense then structure is 
marked by the "absence of the subject" (2). Equally, 
the agent enters a social milieu and acquires 
knowledge of social life which in interaction is 
maintained tp.rough the process of "rationalization of 
action" and "reflexive monitoring" (3). The knowledge 
that the actor has and maintains is that of rule~ and 
resources - the structuring properties of a social 
eritity. Structure then is both internal and external 
but it exists only "in its instantiations .... and as 
memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable 
human agents" (4). Structure then does not have an 
~xistence that is independent of all actors of a given 
social entity and cannot be directly observed as can 
p~enomena in the natural sciences. Evidence of 
structure will therefore need to be sought in 
essentially surrogate measures. 
The possibility of establishing general laws of social 
science is rejected by Giddens, 
"There are no universal laws in the social sciences 
and there will not be any ... because the causal 
conditions about human social conduct are inherently 
unstable in respect of the very knowledge (or beliefs) 
that actors have about the circumstances of their own 
action" ( 5) . 
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The basis for the rejection of universal laws lies in 
Giddens's understanding of the human agent, thus the 
_ stratification model is such that a "h~rmeneutic 
starting point is accepted'' (6). The depiction -0f the 
social agent as having the embedded processes of 
'reflexive monitoring' and the 'rationalisation of 
action' and motivation-viewed as a "potential for 
action" (7), but with little "direct purchase on 
action" (8) but for unusual circumstances - is seen to 
be (by Giddens) a sufficient characterization of the 
individual to arrive at a hermeneutic conclusion. 
In addition to the stratification model Giddens 
introduces the notion of 'ontological security' which 
is the expression of "an autonomy of bodily control 
within predictable routines" (9). Giddens suggest 
that the psychological origins are to be found "in· 
basic anxiety-controlling mechanisms -~· 
hierarchically organised as components of personality" 
(10). The generation of trust in others represents 
the initial building block o~ the basic security 
system and "depends substantially upon predictable and 
caring routines established by parental figures" 
(11). This characterization of ontological security 
can be interpreted as environmentally determined and 
as such argues against the hermeneutic starting-point. 
Ontological security is also portrayed as being 
implicated in a "dazzling variety of procedures and 
tactics" (12); it is suggested that those 'procedures 
and tactics' which sustain ontological security have a 
particular significance for the "structuring qualities 
of rules" (13). The danger exists here that the 
notion of ontological security may be taken as a 
causal variable and as such the 'hermeneutic 
starting-point' can be questioned. 
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A key facet of a voluntarist position lies in the idea 
of individual uniqueness. The stratification model 
deals with embedded processes but not with individual 
differences, and whilst such processes can be viewed 
as a necessary condition they do not also represent a 
sufficient condition for a hermeneutic conclusion. In 
turn, the basic security system of Giddens's can be 
viewed as environmentally directed if not determined. 
The hermeneutic base (starting-point) has not been 
established beyond all doubt. 
Prediction is a central aspect of what are called 
general laws of science. Prediction in turn can be 
absolute or probabalistic, which are, in Keat and 
Urry's (1982) terms, sourced in the 
hypothetico-deductive and inductive~statistical modes 
of investigation in the natural sciences. Without 
entering the philosophical debate surrounding these 
methods, it can be argued that absolute predictions of 
social action present a range of problems on which 
social science has n t established any widespread 
consensus in terms of solutions~ 
Structuration theory suggests that much of social 
action is 'routine', 'recursive' and 'repetitive' but 
that such action is 'monitored' and 'rationalised'. 
In addition the introduction of unintended 
consequences of intentional acts being fed back to the 
actor for subsequent monitoring and rationalization of 
· that action, in a particular action context, may be 
influenced by more distant contexts complicates 
probabalistic prediction to the point of 
impossibility. Furthermore, the likelihood of varying 
valences being attached to events by the social actor 
make prediction an unattainable objective for social 
theory. The recursive nature of sticial action might 
well tempt the analyst into probabalistic predictions, 
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but the potentially vast array of conditional 
statements supporting such predictions will at very 
least limit the predictioris to narrow and closely 
defined action contexts, and thus dispensing with the 
possibility of general laws of social action. 
Giddens holds no objection to any method of analysis, 
"I do not believe that there is anything in either the 
logic or substance of structuration theory which would 
somehow prohibit the use of some specific research 
technique" ( 14) . 
In Burrell and Morgan's terms, nomothetic 
methodologies are designed to "focus upon the process 
of testing hypothesis in accordance with the canons of 
scientific rigour"(l5) and as such equates to the ends 
to which data collection is aimed; i.e. the 
establishment of general laws. Explanation for 
Giddens "is contextual, the clearing up of queries" 
(16). Furthermore, "Most 'why' questions do not need 
a generalisation to answer them, nor do the answers 
logically imply that there, must be some generalisation 
lurking around which could be invoked to back up the 
answers" (17). There can therefore be no restriction 
on the method of research given the proviso of the 
aims of the analyst. , 
Classifying structuration theory in terms of Burrell 
and Morgan's criteria suggests that the theory leans 
hea'vi·ly towards a subjectivist approach to .social 
science. The duality of structure essentially bridges 
only one of the subjectivist/objectivist 
distinguishing criteria - that of the 
nominalist/realist positions, the introduction of 
Kelly's personal construct theory allows the retention 
of the duality. 
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4.2 OPERATIONALISING STRUCTURATION THEORY 
In the foregoing discussion of the duality of 
structuration theory, the issue of 'methodology' 
raises the question of what data is to be collected as 
evidence of the duality and how that answers 'why' 
questions as related to the context of-analysis. The 
following discussion helps to clarify both the 
direction and kind of data to be collected in the 
explanation of social conduct. 
The contextual focus of explanation in this thesis is 
(broadly) the Garment Manufacturing Industry of South 
Africa (G.M.S.A.). In turn the G.M.S.A. consists of 
(formally) autonomous regions: those of the Cape, 
Transvaal and Natal. It is at these regions and by 
means of industrial councils that our attention can be 
focused on the activity referred to as collective 
bargaining. The industrial councils represent "sets 
of transformative relations organised as properties of 
social systems" (18). They can also be viewed as a 
system in that they represent ''reproduced relations 
between actors or collectivities organised as regular 
social pra6tices'' (19). The industrial councils 
referred to in this thesis have been in existence 
since the 1930's and have exhibited similar practices 
over the years, and can therefore be referred to as 
institutions. The ~imilarity of practices is readily 
observable in the activities undertaken by way of the 
industrial councils. A history of industrial council 
activities shows not only the continuity of collective 
bargaining in the minutes of the respective councils, 
but also in the formalisation of the results of such 
bargaining in their publication in government 
gazettes. Furthermore, publications by industrial 
councils and the minutes of various meetings of the 
collectivities lnvolved in the industrial councils, 
are further evidence of the continuity of practices. 
Industrial councils also manage aspects of the 
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agreements reached by management and union(s). Thus 
provident and medical benefit funds are (amongst 
others) evidence of a continuity of action. 
Similarly, the content of the negotiations - in the 
sense of categories of bargaining issues - have 
remained substantially the same, as can be evidenced 
in the'minutes of industrial councils and in 
government gazette publications. 
The similarity of action presupposes structure, thus, 
"Structure thus refers, in social analysis, to the 
structuring properties [rules and resources] allowing 
the 'binding' of time-space in social systems, the 
properties which make it possible for discernably 
similar social practices to exist across varying spans 
of time and space and which lend them 'systemic' form" 
( 20) • 
The identification of structure can be found in the 
knowledge held by the actor and in social practices. 
The knowledge held by actors is identifiable at two 
levels of consciousness, specifically that of 
,discursive and practical consciousness. 
"we can say that an awareness of social rules, 
expressed first and foremost in practical 
consciousness is the very core of that 
'knowledgeability' which specifically characterizes 
human agents" (21). 
Establishing the make~up of the practical conscious 
might, initially, suggest a restriction of 
methodological techniques to those involving some 
'interrogation' of the actor. However, it can be 
argued that 'what is said' (i.e. at the discursive 
level) can also be taken to be interpretable to 
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establish knowledge held at the level of practical 
consciousness. Also, that which is simply done can be 
seen as a reflection of knowledge held in the 
practical consciousness. 
Kelly's ~onstruct theory allows the analyst a 
mechanism for establishing constructs held by the 
individual. The original approach to construct 
elicitation involved person-to-person interrogative 
approaches, but knowledge of the nature of constructs 
allows for the analysis of recorded statements and the 
identification of appropriate constructs. Utilising 
construct theory it is then feasible to establish the 
structural properties held by the knowledgeable actor 
at the level of the practical conscious. Furthermore, 
constructs held by the actor make up the 'interpretive 
scheme' which in structuration theory .represents the 
modality of "signification" as found in interaction. 
The identification of constructs - relevant to a field 
of action - then allow for the establishing of the 
rules of which the actor is knowledgeable, and.so 
provides evidence of structure. 
The industrial councils of the Cape, Transvaal and 
~atal provided access to the minutes of all 
meetings. These minutes recorded the discussions 
between representatives of the respective union and 
management representatives. ·on occasions - i.e. where 
they occurred - statements from state representatives 
were also recorded. The minutes of meetings held by 
the union, e.g. shop steward meetings, annual general 
meetings and exco meetings were also made available. 
Similarly, equivalent management association minutes 
were also made available where they existed. Lastly, 
what may be termed official publications were also 
available for analysis. Thus in the Cape and 
Transvaal the industrial councils produced an annual 
report detailing services provided; the Natal union 
produced an annual report not only on Union activities 
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but also on services provided (to their members) by 
the industrial council of Natal. Additionally, the 
National Clothing Manufacturers Association (N.C.M.A.) 
made available their annual report as well as copies 
of a newsletter circulated to their membership. 
Given an 18 year review period, i.e. 1968 to 1986, the 
above sources of discursive knowledge represented a 
mass of data for which some focus was required. The 
focus of the thesis is the social practice of 
collective bargaining at the level of the industrial 
council - -and in the clothing industry of South 
Africa. For this reason analytical activity was 
focused on the minutes of the various councils dealing 
with bargaining activity and on the minutes of the 
collectivities participating in such bargaining and 
specifically the minutes of such meetings at which 
either preparatioris for negotiations we~e discussed, 
or where feedback on progress or results were given 
and/or discussed. The restriction of the field of 
analysis never-the-less presented difficulties in 
analysis and the presentation of evidence to support 
conclusions. 
Table 1 to this section of the thesis represents the 
method of summarising (and analysing) the minutes of 
the negotiations. The 'back' of the document was 
divided into two sections, that of 'management' and 
that of 'union'. Each line of the minutes of the 
negotiations (i.e. as recorded by the secretaries of 
the respective industrial councils) was analysed for 
underlying constructs and where found the relevant 
statement and line in which it could be found was 
recorded. Evidence supporting the constructs 
identified was also drawn from minutes of meetings of 
the collectivities dealing with negotiations. This 
evidence is not reflected in Table 1, but is fully 
referenced when presented in support of arguing a 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
! 
i 117. 
I 
! 
I 
I 
l 
' I 
I 
l 
I I 
I I I 
I l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
118. 
particular position - specifically in those parts of 
the thesis dealing with e~ch region's constitution of 
meaning. 
The practice of bargaining also relates to substantive 
issues and these in turn allow for interpretation to 
arrive at an understanding of the knowledge held by 
actors. Two sections on Table 1 were intended to 
capture these substantive issues. Firstly, that 
section headed 'Core Bargaining - Issue and Movement' 
was designed to summarise what was being negotiated, 
what the starting positions of the collectivities were 
and any changes in those positions with the progress 
of the bargaining .activity. Secondly, that section 
headed 'Bargaining Themes' was designed to capture the 
arguments presented by each party. The first section 
did not function particularly well as starting 
positions and movement were inadequately recorded for 
thesis purposes. The second section was able to 
capture the thrust of the respective party's argument 
and therefore lent support to the identification of 
constructs. 
A further section on Table 1 is headed 'Language (Kind 
and Frequency)' - this section, it was hoped, would 
reflect levels of intensity of emotion as associated 
with particular issues. However, the method of 
recording minutes did not allow such feelings to be 
clearly evidenced. 
The identification of constructs then is the means 
chosen to establish knowledge held by the actor at the 
level of Practical consciousness. It should be added 
that construct theory avoids any ontological debate 
about the 'nature of man' and as has been argued 
earlier is able to support the contention of a 
duality. 
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The second approach to identification of structure is 
by interpretation of social practices, thus Giddens 
states: 
"the structural properties of social systems are both 
medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organise" ( 22·). 
Further, 
"the rules and resources drawn upon in the production 
and reproduction of social action are at the same time 
the means of system reproduction" (23). 
Lastly, 
"Structure, as -recursively 01;ganised sets of rules and 
resources, is out of time and space, save in its 
instantiations and co-ordination ~as memory traces" 
( 24) . 
It is evident from the above that t~e identification 
of structure is possible by way of analysing social 
action. 
Social practices in the garment industry of the three 
regions were empirically established by analysis of 
documentation found largely within industrial 
councils, and the following description of research 
activity represents the mode of ideQtifying such 
practices which in turn after analysis will identify 
structure. It should be born in mind that the 
identification of structural properties is (finally) 
based on both an analysis of action and knowledge held · 
at the level of practical consciousness. The 
structural properties identified must (logically) be 
identical - the duality of structure. 
, 
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Social conduct in the different regions can be 
classified as the immediate context of collective 
bargaining as well as more 'distant' contexts. These 
contexts are not to be viewed as distinct other than 
analytically. There exist relations of autonomy and 
dependence which allows for systemic integration, nor 
should they be solely viewed as a constraint on action 
as structure must be viewed as "both cons·training and 
enabling" ( 25). 
4.3 BARGAINING ACTION 
Table 1 reflects an analysis of bargaining behaviour 
utilising Walton and McKersie's Behavioural Theory of 
Bargaining. Walton and McKersie focus on collective 
bargaining as a rule making process which is presented 
as a goal directed activity, "a set of instrumental 
acts which can be more or less intelligently conceived 
and more or less expertly executed~ (26). 
Walton and McKersie (27) suggest that bargaining 
behaviour can be classified four ways, i.e. there are 
four bargaining behaviours~ These are -
(a) Distributive 
(b) Integrative 
(c) Attitudinal Structuring 
(d) Intra-Organisational 
Each with its own "internal logics" and its "own 
identifiab1e set of instrumental acts or tactics" 
-c 2 8 ) • 
(a) Distributive Bargaining 
A hypothetical construct referring to those activities 
.instrumental to the attainment of one party's goals 
when they are in basic conflict with those of the 
other party. The function is to solve pure conflicts 
of interest - "bargaining" in the usual sense of the 
word. Goal conflict can be based around a variety of 
values and the allocation of various resources - thus, 
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the p~ocess is not concerned solely with economic 
conflict; it may relate to power or status problems 
also. In terms of game theory, distributive 
bargaining is a fixed-sum game - one party's gain is a 
loss to the other. 
(b) Integrative Bargaining 
Refers to those activities instrumental to the 
attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental 
conflict between the parties. These objectives define 
an area of common concern; a problem that by its 
nature permits solutions that benefit both parties, or 
at least, the gains of one side do not represent eqµal 
l 
sacrifices by the other. In game theory terms - a 
variable-sum game. 
(c) Attitudinal Structuring 
Another major function of negotiations is influencing 
the relationships between the parties - for example, 
friendliness or hostility, competitiveness or 
co-operation, trust and respect. Existing 
relationships are obviously influenced by enduring 
structural factors, (technology, market, basic 
ideologies etc.) but negotiators often seek to produce 
attitudinal change during the interaction. 
Attitudinal structuring refers to those activities 
instrumental to "the attainment of desired 
relationship patterns between parties''. Unlike 
distributive/integrative bargaining which are joint 
decision-making processes, attitudinal structuring is 
a socio-emotional interpersonal process. 
(d) Intra-organizational Bargaining 
Unlike the three processes already discussed, 
intra-organizational bargaining refers to the 
activities taking place within the parties and not 
between them. It refers to consensus-seeking 
behaviour - those activities that structure the 
relationships between negotiators and those they 
represent. 
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Table 1 reflects on the left hand side four management 
and four union squares. Each square was used to 
record behaviour as categorised by Walton and 
McKersie. Each line of the minutes of the 
negotiations was classified by behaviour type and by 
source, i.e. management or union. The behaviour was 
recorded by line so that the extent of particular 
behaviours could be measured. It was then a 
relatively simple matter to computerise .the 
information and different presentations/arrangements 
of the data could be made. This aspect of the 
analysis of action proved to be useful support for the 
contention that much of social practice is recursive -
patterns of bargaining behaviour could be established. 
Collective bargaining behaviour was also recorded in 
terms of the number of times it occurred, the number 
of meetings over which each bargaining process was 
carried. The length of time each me~ting took is 
reflected in the number of lines of minutes and lastly 
the results of each exercise can be s~en in chinge~ to 
what can globally be described as 'conditions of 
employment' . 
The changes in minimum wages, contributions and 
benefits of various (managed) funds (e.g. provident, 
medical benefits), training and qualification 
requirements and so on ar~ all to be found in 
industrial council documentation and/or government 
gazette publications, all of which acted as source 
material in establishing kind and quantify of 
bargaining conduct. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
123. 
4.4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
In utilising Walton & McKersie's behavioural theory of 
bargaining, the question is raised as to whether 
different 'psychologies' of collective bargaining 
might not provide a more fruitful mechanism. Walker 
(29) notes the importance attached by industrial 
relations p~actitioners on psychological factors and 
that they (the psychological factors) are "also often 
referred to in the scientific literature on industrial 
relations" · ( 3 O) • Nevertheless, whilst a "psychology 
of industrial relations exists" psychologists have 
"contributed very little". The result is that the 
treatment of psychological factors ..... consists 
mostly of ad hoc postulations almost at a common sense 
level, rather than operationally measurable concepts 
articulated with the body of psychological theory" 
( 31) . 
In an attempt to address this deficiency, Magenau and 
Pruitt (32) after reviewing the literature on 
negotiations argue that four questions "about the 
outcome of negotiations have dominated (past) 
research" ( 33). 
(i} What determines the likelihood of reaching 
agreement in negotiation? 
(ii) What determines the speed at which agreement 
will be reached? 
(iii) Under what circumstances will one party do 
substantially better than the other? 
(iv) Under what circumstances will the parties be 
able to find and adopt integrative solutions 
( 34) . 
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Magenau and Pruitt argue that their analysis of the 
literature shows that scholars "have attempted to 
account for the location of the average demand made 
during negotiation and the aspirations and limits 
underlying this demand" (35). 
In addition four strategies are identified, 
Strategy I, Break off negotiation 
Strategy II, Concede 
Strategy III, Persuade the other party to concede 
Strategy IV, Co-ordinated movement towards mutually 
satisfactory ends 
(It will be noted at this stage in the discussion the 
similarity Strategy III and IV have with Distributive 
and Integrative bargaining} 
The factors influencing the choice of strategies can 
be grouped "under three main variables" (36). These 
are, firstly, "the strength of one's current demand; 
secondly, "the motive to reach agreement" and lastly, 
"trust, which is the expectation of co-operation from 
the other bargainer"~ 
The concepts introduced above have subsequently been 
more fully developed by Pruitt and Rubin (37) who 
state, 
"There are few books on the psychology of social 
conflict - and still fewer that draw heavily, as we 
do, on the sophisticated theories about social 
conflict to be found in other fields of ~ocial 
science, such as sociology, economics, management, 
industrial relations and international relations" 
( 3 8} • 
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Pruitt and Rubin (39) propose a 'strategic choice 
model based on a perceptual understanding of conflict 
rather than from a behavioural standpoint, and argue 
that any conflict situation represents at least one 
strategy from a possible five strategies. 
Firstly, there is the strategy of 'Contending' which 
is the attempt to impose one's preferred solution on 
the other party. Secondly, there is 'Yielding' which 
as a strategic choice refers to the lowering of one 
party's aspirations. Thirdly, is a 'problem solving' 
strategy which is defined as "persuing an alternative 
that satisfies the aspirations on both sides" (40). 
The fourth strategy refers to 'Withdrawing' which is 
described as "choosing to leave the scene of conflict, 
either physically or psychologically" (41). Lastly, 
there is the st~ategy of 'inaction'. 
In addition to these strategic choices, the authors 
m_ake the following p ints. It has to be accepted that 
the strategies are likely to be exercised in 'various 
combinations in different conflict situations, and 
that a distinction must be made in terms of strategy 
and tactics. Strategy "constitutes a set of. 
(macroscopic) objectives and ends" and tactics "are 
the (relatively microscopic) means to these ends" 
(42). 
Thirdly, the authors offer a further classification/ 
grouping of the five strategies, viz. 'Contending', 
'Yieldin~' and 'Problem Solving' are seen to be 
'Coping' strategies "in the sense that each involves 
some relatively corisistent, coherent effort to settle 
conflict" (43). The remaining strategies of 
'Withdrawing' and 'Inaction' "are strategies of not 
coping but of pause or abandonment" (44). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
126. 
There are a number of observations about this model 
which can be made at this point. The first is that 
all the strategies presented have been described in 
behavioural, rather than identifying psychological 
variables associated with such classes of behaviour. 
The psychological aspects underlying the behaviour 
will be dealt with later but it is useful to note at 
this stage the doubtfulness of Pruitt and Rubin to · 
link their psychology of conflict to the strategic 
behaviours. 
Pruitt and Rubin's distinction between strategy and 
tactic is also problematic in that their 
classification presents strategy in behavioural terms 
rather than in terms of 'objectives' and 'ends', which 
then confounds their use of their own definition of 
'tactic'. Again, the strategies identified are very 
similar to those of Walton and McKersie. The 
difference appears to lie in the understanding in 
industrial relations (see Salamon (45), Chamberlain & 
Kuhn (46) and others) that the parties to collective 
bargaining accept the continuity of their 
relationship, thus, if - for industrial relations 
purposes - the 'wLthdrawing' strategy (and the 
'inaction' strategy, given time constraints for all 
parties in collective bargaining) are consequently not 
options, then the so-called coping strategies are 
essentially a reformulation of Walton and McKersie's 
'Behavioural theory of Bargaining' (47). 
The 'psychological' content of Pruitt and Rubin's 
model is to be found in their description of a party's 
understanding of 'conflict'. This they define as the 
"p~rceived divergence of interest or a belief that the 
parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved 
simultaneously'' (48). This clash of interest has its 
roots in the notion of 'aspirations', which in turn 
can be viewed as "goals and standards" (49). Goals 
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refer to some end objective conceived more or less 
precisely and a standard is a "minimum level of 
achievement below which one views one's outcomes as 
inadequate" (50). 
In linking the notion of aspirations to strategy the 
authors utilise 11 two theoretical notions about the 
determinants of choice of strategy, these are firstly, 
the 'dual concern model' which "traces strategic 
choice to the relative strength of concern about own 
and other's outcomes" and secondly, "the perceived 
feasibility perspective (which) attributes this choice 
to the perceived likelihood of success and the cost of 
enacting the various strategies" (51). 
Without disputing the existence of the theoretical 
entities introduced by Pruitt and Rubin, they do 
present methodological problems for any psychological 
analysis of collective bargaining. Where - as in this 
thesis - the investigation is historical and 
longitudinal, one can only infer from (recorded) 
-behaviours the psychological states referred to by 
Pruitt and Rubin. Furthermore, the 'two theoretical 
notions' are claimed to be related to the choice of 
strategy. It then becomes difficult from historical 
data to identify or distinguish these 'notions'. 
In summary, the 'strategic choice model' of Pruitt and 
Rubin identifies the behaviours utilised by Walton and 
McKersie, but do not provide as thorough definitional 
statements of their behaviours, thus utilising their 
descriptions becomes even more problematic than the 
Walton and McKersie classification. Again, inferring 
th~ psychological notions introduced by Pruitt and 
Rubin from historical behavioural data poses problems. 
This is not to deny the salience of these concepts, 
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but rather their relationship with behaviour requires 
- methodologically - that the research activity be 
conducted at the time and place of the conflict event. 
The (methodological) choice of Walton and McKersiers 
model and construct theory remain appropriate to the 
analysis embarked on in this thesis. 
4.5 'DISTANT' CONTEXTS 
The action context of collective bargaining can be 
seen to be related/integrated with other-action 
contexts and as has been shown this systemic 
integration reflects relations of autonomy and 
dependence. These relationships can be identified by 
way, firstly, of rules generated in one action context 
having application in another context - (and secondly) 
whilst this tends to give the impression of a position 
of dependence and constraint, those actors in the 
'sub9rdinate' position have "some resources" with 
which to "influence the.activities of their superiors" 
( 52). This Giddens refers to as the "dialectic .of 
control". Methodologically this observation is 
important in that it is founded on the contention that 
power "characterizes not specific types of conduct but 
all action" (53). Power is inherent in all 
relationships, and as such cannot be viewed as a 
phenomena in some way to be acquired and exercised in 
the attainment of sectional interests; "Resources are 
the media through which power is exercised" (54). 
Action in these distant contexts is also important as 
it is likely to be 'monitored' and incorporated into 
the body of knowledge held by the actor - again, this 
should not be construed as some form of environmental 
determinism as reciprocal relations of influence (the 
dialectic of contro~) negates such a contention. 
Nevertheless, as Giddens a~gues, 6ontrol over distant 
contexts may be beyond the individual actor, nor does 
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it "compromise the possibility that actors' own 
theories of social systems which they help to 
constitute and reconstitute in their activities may 
reify those systems" (55). 
The wider action context of collective bargaining in 
the garment industry can be destribed as the 
political, social and economic systems of the South 
African social totality, provided substantivist 
notions of these contexts are not interpreted too 
literally. In establishing both the rules generated 
(largely as canons of law) by these ~ontexts and 
relationships of influence, various texts were 
consulted. Legislative action is readily identifiable 
from industrial relations texts. Additionally, 
reference was made to the Standard Bank Data Base 
(computerised economic data), the Nedbank Economic 
Review and the Bureau of Statistical Servites. 
In terms of relationships of influence exercised by 
parties to the bargaining process on the wider 
political, social and economic contexts, reference was 
made to industrial council records of participation in 
various commissions of enquiry and Wage Board ~ 
enquiries. Equally independent (of the industrial 
councils) representations by management and unions to 
state bodies were also referenced. Both parties to 
industrial council agreements reflected membership of 
more encompassing b~dies. The unions were members of 
the Trade Union Council of South Africa (T.U.C.S.A.) -
for most of the review period - and Management were -
members of Chambers of Commerce as well as their own 
National body, i.e. the National Clothing Federation. 
These organisatioris would exercise influence on behalf 
of its members and, where available, reference was 
made to their documentation. 
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The action context over which the practice of 
collective bargaining appears to have more immediate 
control can be conceived of as the context in which 
their membership interact. It is the context of work 
with a specific focus on labour that is of importance 
to this thesis. 
4.6 THE GARMENT INDUSTRY DATA BASE 
Formal bureaucratic and legislative rules are easily 
identifiable by reference to industrial council 
documentation and government gazettes. The range of 
issues covered by these rules can be encapsulated in 
the notion of 'conditions of employment' and refer' to 
such issues as minimum wage, contributions and 
benefits to/from fund~ (e.g. provident and medical), 
engagement/termination procedures, training and 
qualification period stipulations and the policing· of 
agreements. 
Practices in this context were established by 
reference to industrial council records, and union and 
management documentation. 
The pattern of employment in the respective regions 
was established from provident fund records and 
records of employment, which had to be submitted by 
factories to their respective industrial councils. 
Industrial councils for the regions recorded gross 
employment figures as well as male/female breakdowns 
and the total number of factories active in their area 
of operation. The Councils, however, did not 
(readily) provide the following data: 
( i) Age 
(ii) Employment levels by job category 
(iii) Frequency of entrance or exit from the industry 
(labour turnover) 
(iv) Movement between job categories 
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In an attempt to establish points (i) to (iv) above, 
·detailed information was drawn from pension fund 
record cards of individual employees. A random sample 
of actual record cards were drawn and detail from them 
recorded. It is to be noted that all industrial 
councils kept two banks of records; firstly, those 
records of 'Active' workers, defined as either still 
employed in the industry or having worked in the 
industry in the past five years. A second bank 
reflected data on individuals who had worked in the 
industry but not in the last five years. (Note: the 
cut-off period of five years varied between regions 
but was never more than 5 years). 
In the Cape a sample of 1000 'Active' and 1000 
'Inactive' record cards were drawn and in Natal and 
the Transvaal 500 of each were drawn. Table 2 is the 
form used to extract data off the record cards. Such 
data was captured on computer and processed to provide 
the detail of employment patterns (over the review 
period) not readily available from council records. 
When examining the employment detail of each region 
drawn from these records it might appear that the 
~ 
samples given are small in relation to the total 
number of record cards drawn for that region; for 
example, in the Natal section, Table 11 depicts the 
male/female breakdown of machinists over the review 
period. The total sample for this table ranges 
between 82(1968) and 192(1984). The reason for this 
is that such a table can only be constructed for a 
particular moment of that year. It was decided to 
select the 1st November of any year as the time point 
to reflect such structure. This date was selected (a) 
to'provide comparative consistency and (b) as·a point 
where employment was likely to be unaffected by 
(i) Seasonal qemand for products 
(ii) Beginning of the year employment surges, and 
(iii) End of year decreases (for whatever reason) in 
employment 
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In addition, data recorded on the pension fund cards 
were unable to provide the raw material for certain 
analyses. The record cards reflected job title at 
employment, but did not record the individual's job 
title when leaving. This made it impossible to 
establish any promotional detail for the sample. 
Equally, whilst recording both the entry and exit wage 
rate, it became difficult to establish what proportion 
of the sample were paid more than the negotiated 
minimum wage (or less than). 
The pension fund records nevertheless allowed for the 
establishment of 
(i) Age distribution by sex 
(ii) Number of entrances to the industry by age and 
the number of exits 
(iii) Employment by job category 
Action in the garment industry cannot be confined to 
an analysis of employment patterns. The various funds 
which are administered by the industrial councils on 
behalf of the parties will also reflect action in the 
industry. For this reason reference was made. to 
documentation dealing with these funds which recorded 
the volume and nature of action. Particular use was 
made of balance sheets and income statements of these 
funds as the financial detail encapsulates both the 
volume and nature of action associated with these 
funds. The subsequent analyses of these funds widens 
the description of action in the industry and thus 
allows for increasing the specificity of evidence of 
structure as conceived of in this thesis. 
Further evidence of structure was obtained through an 
analysis of action in the collectivities represented 
in the context of collective bargaining. The minutes 
of meetings held by both union and management were 
analysed. In addition balance sheets and income 
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statements were referenced as (again) such 
documentation provides data on activities undertaken 
and measures of the volume of such activities. 
Financial statements referenced were solely drawn from 
Union organisations as no such (equivalent) 
documentation for the management associations existed. 
The discussion so far presents a cross-sectional view 
of structure and requires explication of the dynamic 
of social action, in this thesis's terms 
'Structuration'. The dynamic in structuration theory 
is to be found in the modalities of structuration 
which "serve to clarify the main dimensions of t:t:ie 
duality of structure in interaction, relating the 
knowledgeable capacities of agents to structural 
features" ( 56). 
Rules can be classified into, firstly, those of 
signification and secondly, those of legitimation and 
can be derived from - in Giddens's terms -
'interpretive scheme(s)' and from 'Norms'. The 
identification of the constructs utilised in 
interaction ~n collective bargaining (Kelly's 
range/focus of convenience) provide the basis for 
establishing the rules of signification and 
legitimation. The third structural principle, that df 
domination, can readily be identified in the 
mechanisms which control both 'Allocative' and 
'Authoritative' resources - "facility" in Giddens's 
terms. The data required to identify the structural 
principles in the garment industry is then drawn from 
the documentation already ref erred to and in the 
mechanisms of the industrial councils, as well as 
those mechanisms within these collectivities which 
form the parties to the negotiations. 
An important proposition in structuration theory is 
that much of social action is 'recursive' and that 
action also reproduces the conditions that give rise 
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to such action (this is not a fo~m of determinism 
because of the 'reflexive monitoring' of the 
'knowledgeable agent'). The recursive nature of 
social action will be es~ablished by reference to 
minutes of negotiations, industrial council 
publications, financial reports of managed funds and 
similar documentation - where available - from the 
collectivities who are parties to the negotiations. 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
The Minutes 
The Cape industrial council reflected 8 formal (in the 
sense of being in terms of the procedural requirements 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act) negotiations 
between 1969 and 1986, each negotiation usually 
consisted of 3 meetings and the number of lines (in 
total) of the minutes of these negotiations was 10 
021. For the Transvaal a total of 10 122 lines were 
analysed for 7 negotiations which usually ran to at 
least three meetings. rt· should be noted that the 
1974 negotiations were not recorded in the Transvaal 
minutes nor was the 1st meeting of the 1982 
negotiations. The Natal minutes of negotiations were 
only available from 1974 and are marked by being 
considerably briefer that those of the Cape and the 
Transvaal. The Natal minutes reflected a total of 
2 636 lines, 6 negotiations from 1974 to 1986 and 
usually with more meetings per negotiation that either 
the Transvaal or the Cape. Table 3 overpage reflects 
this detail. 
Table 3 apart from identifying recursive behaviour is 
also instructive in respect of the notions of 
'reflexive monitoring', the regionalization of action 
and the relationships with more distant action 
contexts. Negotiations in the different regions occur 
at different time points and are 'monitored' (as will 
be shown later) by actors, forms part of their 
'knowledgeability' and is drawn upon in interaction. 
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The minutes of the Cape and Transvaal negotiations 
were taken by one secretary (to each council) over the 
review period, and if any bias existed it should at 
least be consistent over the period. However, it must 
be noted that the minutes were circulated to all 
members of negotiating teams and there were never any 
objections (to aspects of the minutes) recorded. The 
Cape and Transvaal minutes also reflect verbatim 
quotations which provided a basis for establishing 
constructs held by the negotiating parties. 
The Natal minutes on the other hand, are much briefer 
and are generally a summary of the proceedings as 
conceived of by that council's secretary. Two 
secretaries were involved in keeping minutes over the 
review period. These minutes do at least provide 
detail on the substantive issu s and provide some 
direction to an understanding of the constructs held. 
It should also be noted that objections to the content 
of the minutes were not found, suggesting that the 
parties were satisfied with the completeness and 
accuracy of the minutes. 
Minimum Wages 
The minimum wages for each region were recorded from 
the Government Gazettes published after each 
negotiation. 
Job titles in each region changed over the review 
period, thus sex discrimination was abolishep 
(legislatively) in 1981, new-titles were added and 
others removed (over the review period). This then 
complicates the analyst's ability to compare minimum 
wages over the review period. It was nevertheless 
possible to compile wage curves for selected points 
over the review period and in so doing, show how the 
shape of the wage curve remained constant over the 
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period even though there was a widening of 
differentials within each curve-- this due to the 
negotiating procedure (generally adhered to) of 
agreeing a single percentage increase for all 
employees per agreement. 
Bargaining Behaviour(i.e. Walton and McKersie's model) 
Classifying the 22 779 lines of the negotiations along 
Walton and McKersie's dimensions of bargaining 
behaviour present a few analytical problems. 
Distributive bargaining is essentially reflective of 
saying ''no" to the other party's proposals. Eowever, 
the rejection of proposals can also be- seen to have an 
'attitudinal structuring' effect which complicates the 
process of classification. Subtle messages may be 
communicated in the manner in which -a proposal is 
rejected; such subtleties are difficult, if not 
impossible, to discern in the minutes of the 
negotiations. The procedure followed to classify 
behaviour was then that all rejections of proposals 
were classified as Distributive Bargaining. 
Where argument either for a party's proposals or for 
the rejection of the other side's proposals where 
given, these were classified as Attitudinal 
Structuring. Intra-organisational bargaining was only 
identifiable from the minutes in terms of recordings 
of breaks in the meetings for the parties to remove 
themselves for the purpose of 'caucasing', i.e. no 
content of such behaviour was recorded in the minutes 
of the negotiations. It will be seen in the 
discussions dealing with the specific regions that 
very little by way of Integrative Bargaining was 
readily identifiable, thus the essential character of 
bargaining in all three regions revolved around 
Distributive Bargaining and Attitudinal Structuring. 
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CONCLUSION 
The methodological problems referred to above revolve 
around procedures used to establish 'structure' in 
terms of the 'knowledge' held by the actor. It must 
be borne in mind that these sources are part of the 
evidence utilised, and that activities undertaken 
represent an additional source of evidence, the data 
for which is much more absolute. It is from the 
interpretation of both these sources that structure in 
the garment industry will be established. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
IN THE CAPE GARMENT MANUFACTURING REGION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this section evidence will be led in support of the 
argument of the duality of structure. Structure 
exists only in "its instantiations ...... and as 
memory traces" (1). This reformulation of the notion 
of structure provides the opportunity to present data 
- separated for the purpose of presentation only -
from observable patterns and from the "interpretive 
scheme" of the social actor. The research data drawn 
from the Cape region not only - it is argued -
supports structuration theory's main contention, i.e. 
the duality bf structure, but also supplies evidence 
in support of other propositions of the theory. 
The Cape industrial council was some 34 years old at 
the start of the review period (i.e. 1968.-1986) and 
had a history of bargaining and the administration of 
agreements. This pattern continued along recognizably 
similar lines and can be seen to represent 
institutio alised behaviour. The repitition or 
routinization of action is an important facet of 
structuration theory as "the moment of the product:i_on 
of action is also one of reproduction", also, "agents 
also reproduce the conditions that make such action 
possible" (2). Any suggestion in this depiction of a 
~closed system' should be rejected as structuration 
theory firstly conceives of the social agent as a 
~reflexively monitoring' being, and secondly "the flow 
of action dontinually produces consequences which are 
unintended by actors". 
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Observable action then is a readily identifiable 
indication of structure, the 'instantiations' of 
structure can then be collected and over a period of 
_time will provide evidence of the nature of structure 
in the system under investigation. The set of data 
will still need interpretation to be able to specify 
the kind of structure peculiar to the area of study, 
i.e. rules and resources (and/or sets of 
transformative relations) need to be identified. The 
interpretation of action to establish structure can be 
supported by reference to the knowledge held by the 
actor and drawn upon in action. 
The knowledge held by the actor provides an additional 
source of evidence for arguing a particular structure 
of a given action context. The identification of the 
kind of structure held by the knowledgeable agent 
should support interpretations of observable action. 
In structuration theory this would require some 
depiction of the individual's 'interpretive scheme'. 
This, it has been argued, can be profitably achieved 
by the a~plication of Kelly's construct theory. 
This section will then present data on 
"instantiations" and the "interpretive scheme" which 
will then be used to argue not only the duality of 
structure but also a particular kind of structure as 
well as supporting other propositions of structuration 
theory. Evidence will be provided under the headings 
of 
(1) The Growth of the Industrial Council 
(2) The Funds of the Council 
(3) The Parties to the Agreements 
(4) The Employment Form 
(5) The Wage Form 
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The evidence identifying structure by way of the 
knowledge held by the actor is drawn from statements 
made by actors. These statements are drawn from the 
minutes of the negotiations kept by the Council as 
well as from minutes of the respective collectivities 
when dealing with their membership. These statements 
are presented under the section headed "Interpretive 
Schemes" and are used to identify constructs drawn 
upon by the actors. 
The identification of constructs and action (i.e. 
parts (1) to (5) above) provide the basis for arguing 
the duality of structure and further will be utilised 
to specify the particular type of structure in the 
Cape industry. This will be found in the final part 
of each regional analysis. 
PART A - FORM 
The Industrial Council (See Table 1) 
In 1969 the Cape industrial council (C.I.C.) was 34 
yea~s old having been formed on the 28th May, 1935, 
and formally registered in terms of the Industrial 
Concilliation Act on the 24th February, 1936. At that 
time there wer  30 factories employing a mere 3500 
workers (chairman~s report 1985). Table 1 shows that 
by 1969 this had grown to 247 m~nufacturers and 35 200 
workers, and that Council income had grown from 1512 
(R3024) to R69 899 (Table 1 provides further detail). 
Since its inception 6 individuals had been chairman 7 
times and were always drawn from the ranks of the 
employer association. The vice-chairman in turn had 
always come from the union delegation. 
The number of manufacturers covered by the agreement 
increases from 247 (1969} to 325 (1976) then slips to 
308, 300, and 307 in 1977, 1978 and 1979 respectively 
before regaining (bettering) the 1976 position (332 in 
1980). The upward trend is miintained till 1982 
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(407), decreases in 1983 (404), increases in 1984 
(412). There is a substantial decrease in 1985 (9.5%) 
to 373 manufacturers but some optimism is r~flected in 
1986 with an increase to 390 employers although still 
below the peak of 1984. 
The growth pattern of the number of people employed in 
the Cape industry reflects (as might be expected) the 
change in the growth of manufacturers. From 1969 to 
1976 employment grew some 33% from 35200 to 46781, but 
then declined in 1977 and 1978 before rising to 48243 
employees in 1979 .. Employment then peaked in 1984 at. 
59324 (70% higher than 1968) with 1983 showing a 2.5% 
drop in employment. The years 1985 and 1986 show a 
large drop in employment from the peak year of 1984, 
although 1986 reflects a marginal increase over 1985. 
The decrease in employment, 1985 over 1984 was 14.3% 
and 1986 over 1984 was 12.9%. 
Table 1 also reflects changes (negotiated) in the 
contribution rate of the parties to the negotiations, 
moving from 2c per individual covered by the agreement 
and paid by both the employee and the employer, to llc 
per individual. It can be seen that when the 
council's expenses excede revenue the response of the 
parties is to increase the levy. In addition, the 
council provided protection to employees by.way of 
seeing that 'Arrear Wages' were not lost to wage 
earners - reporting on this item ceased in 1979. 
A 'Contingency Fund' was negotiated by the parties and 
implemented in 1976; this required of manufacturers a 
levy (per employee) which then acted as a reserve to 
ensure that employees of an insolvent company received 
the remuneration due to them. Table 1 also provides 
details on the number of insolvencies, the number of 
wage earners affected and the amount involved. 
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5.2.2 The Funds of the Industrial Council 
5.2.2.1 The Provident Fund (See Table 2) 
In May 1969 the provident fund was 16 years old and as 
·can be seen from Table 2 had assets of R2.375m, an 
income of R228,800 and claims against the fund had 
amounted to RllS 898,53. Contributions to the fund 
were determined as follows, equal contribution from 
both employer and employee, the size of the 
contribution being dependent on the wage 
paid/received, i.e. less than Rl3.18 per week meant a 
13c p.w. contribution (group I) and· a wage of greater 
than Rl3.18 (group II) necessitated a contribution of 
15c p.w. These weekly contributions ware the result 
of negotiations that took place in 1969 and were 
implemented in January of 1970. 
Not only were contributions to the fund increased, but 
increased benefits were also greed to by the parties 
to the agreement after the funds actuaries had 
concurred, thus the 'Death Benefit' was improved by 
the provision of a stipulation that the deceased's 
nominee receive an additional R200,00 immediately, "as 
many cases have occurred where there is not enough 
money in the family to bury the deceased" (1969 
"Report by th~ Chairman of the Provident Fund 
Management Committee"). In addition, "It has also 
been decided to reduce the waiting period before which 
Withdrawal Benefits can be paid from 2 years to 1 
year". 
The provident fund utilised its assets to 
providebenefits to contributors in the form of housing 
loans. The 'Home Ownership Scheme' was introduced in 
1958 and by 1969, "193 contributors had received 
financial assistance from the Fund to purchase or 
build their own homes" (1969 "Report by the Chairman 
of the Provident Fund Management Committee"). Table 2 
provides further details about the growth of this 
benefit. 
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The provident fund income is a reflection of the 
changes in the combinations of investment income, 
subscriptions and the growth in employment. The 
parties to the negotiations reflect a desire to 
maintain (at least) the assets of the fund. 
Contributions have increased between some 10 to 12 
times; the level of employment (whilst fluctuating) 
has increased around 1,48 times (1986 over 1969); and 
assets have grown some 18 times. 
In addition the fund has utilised (part of) its funds 
to the benefit of wage earners in that a 'Housing 
Loans Scheme' was introduced in 1~58. The amount 
available for such loans was controlled by the 
registrar of finances. A 'Voluntary Provident Fund' 
was introduced in 1979, and Table 2 reflects 
'Contribution~ Received', 'Investments' and 'Active 
Contributors'. 
5.2.2.2 Sick Fund (See Table 3) 
The sick fund "came of age" in 1969, having been 
formed on the 1st October 1948 with a panel of 11 
doctors. In 1969 the sick fund had a panel of 35 
doctors and provided benefits to members through (i) a 
Gynaecological Clinic (ii) an Ante-Natal clinic and 
(iii) an Opthalmic Clinic. By 1986 these services had 
been improved by the formation of Dental Clinics, and 
the appointment of a full-time doctor (1974). In 
addition the fund provided sick pay benefits, i.e. 
where an employee is off from work due to illness for 
more than a specified period of time, the subsequent 
loss of wages are (partially) made up from the sick 
fund. In 1970 (Table 4) the fund paid out Rl20 588 in 
sick pay benefits and by 1986 this figure had grown to 
R2 387 648. The quality of benefits had improved as 
well, thus in 1974 sick pay benefits had been 
increased by 101 and again in 1984 such benefits 
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154. 
were increased to 65% of wages. The fund had also on 
a number of occassions in conjunction with employers, 
carried out influenza vaccination programmes. Table 
3, provides further detail. 
In 1969 there was one panel doctor for every 1000 
employees. By 1985 this figure was 732 which 
represents an improvement in terms of accessibility. 
Panel doctors were consulted 136,864 times in 1970 
repres~nting 3602 consultations per doctor and 3.63 
consultations per employee. In 1986 these figures 
were 3328 consultations (using 1985 number of doctors) 
and some 4.5 consultations per employee. In addition 
Table 3 reflects an increasing usage of the council's 
full-time doctor. 
Sick-pay benefits in cash benefit and days are 
reflected in the table below. 
Year Cash Benefit Days Benefit Cash Benefit 
per day 
1970 120,588 99,939 Rl.21 
1971 116,403 89,163 1.31 
1972 126,450 91,790 1.38 
1973 160,850 106,420 1.51 
1974 198,175 113,970 1.74 
1975 202,060 108,132 1.87 
1976 248,400 117,800 2.11 
1977 240,270 98,270 2.45 
1978 235,217 111,782 2.10 
1979 293,000 118,159 2.48 
1980 358,477 131,183 2.73 
1981 433,876 140,150 3.10 
1982 666,808 198,198 3.36 
1983 695,218 156,145 4.45 
1984 1,258,689 195,625 6. 43. 
1985 1,989,814 224,211 8.87 
1986 2,387,648 239,332 9.98 
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Taking inf latibn into account the cash benefit per day 
should be R8.13 to remain equivalent to 1970, thus the 
per day cash benefit of the sick fund as at 1986 was 
22.7% above comparable 1970 figures"indicating an 
increase in real terms in respect of this benefit. In 
addition it needs to be born in mind that sick,pay 
benefits were amended in 1974 and 1984. 
5.2.2.3 Training Fund (Table 5) 
In the 1969 'chairman's Report' the labour position in 
the Cape is highlighted, "The scarcity of trained 
staff is the most serious limitation to the rate of 
development of the clothing industry in the Western 
Cape". The lack of skilled workers and the flow of 
school-leavers entering the labour market (inadequate) 
then repre·sent the reasons for the establishment of a 
training centre to address labour shortages, 
particularly machinists. To this end the 'Training 
Fund Agreement' was negotiated by the parties to the 
'Main Agreement' and.it was decided that a 
con~ribution of le per employee would be made by the 
parties to the agreement. 
In setting up the training centre the industrial 
council "has agreed to make a contribution to the 
cost" and from the Commissioner for Coloured Affairs 
"a grant of RlO 000 has been made available". Table-5 
provides data on the kind and quantity of training 
undertaken by the industry until the training centre 
was taken over by the National Clothing Federation -
an employers pody. 
The chairman's reports for the years 1970 to mid 1977 
reflect (also) efforts to attract _and hold trainees in 
the industry, thus the "subsistence grant" moves up 
from R6,00 per week to Rl3,81 per week (i.e. the 
minimum starting wage) by 1977, a deferred bonus 
scheme was also tried as a way to minimise 
terminations after training and by classifying the 
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payment to trainees as a '.'subsistence allowance" as 
opposed to "earnings" various deductions are avoided 
so making training more attractive to both employer 
and the trainee. Thus, "No Industrial Council L~vies 
need be paid while employees attend the Training 
Centre", "No Training Fund contributions need be paid 
while employees attend the Training Centre", and 
employers would have to contribute the employee's 
share of contributions to the sick fund. 
5.2.2.4 Exemption Committee 
This is the only committee chaired by a union 
representative and its purpose is largely to 
deliberate and approve or reject applications for 
exemption~ from the negotiated wage structure as per 
the agreement. 
In the "Report by the Chairman of the Exemption 
Committee" (1971) it is stated that while some 
applications are based on arguments of lower 
productivity due to mental or physical handicaps of 
the employee "the majority involve the question of 
experience". The chairman clarifies by saying that 
the experience of "for example, a Grade II employee, 
must be taken into consideration for wage purposes, if 
that employee is transferred to another operation in 
the same category" then it is such transfers that 
constitute the bulk of applications for exemption. 
Table 6 reflects the Committee's action over the 
analysis period. 
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TABLE 6 
Year 
1986 
1985 
1984 
1983 
1982 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1978 
1977 
1976 
1975 
1974 
1973 
1972 
1971 
1970 
1969 
5.2.3 
158. 
EXEMPTION COMMITTEE 
(Essentially Wage Exemption) 
Applications Approved Ref used 
as is 
-
151 145 4 
188 184 3 
155 152 l 
130 126 l 
111 108 l 
119 112 2 
127 127 0 
102 101 0 
132 124 2 
131 126 l 
85 81 2 
69 63 3 
77 68 5 
69 67 2 
89 87 2 
92 88 4 
92 87 5 
76 71 5 
The Parties to the Agreement 
Authorised at 
higher than 
proposed wage 
2 
l 
2 
3 
2 
5 
0 
l 
6 
4 
2 
3 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.2.3.l The Garment Workers Union of the Western Cape 
The Garment Workers Union of the Western Cape (G.W.U.) 
was registered in terms of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 1924 (now Labour Relations Act) in August of 
1927, making it 41 years old at the start of the 
review period and nearly 60 years old at the end of 
the period. 
Financial Data (see Table 7) 
An examination of the Financial Data shows that the 
surplus to income ratio starts a dramatic slide in 
1977, the explanation of which lies in the expenditure 
pattern of the union. Up to 1976 the relationship of 
income to expenditure was such that the surplus for a 
given year ranged between a low of 46% and a high of 
66%. With the exception of 1970 and 1973 (an increase 
in membership fees) the percentage increase in 
expenditure was consistently above the percentage 
increase in income. However, these changes were such 
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as to keep the surplus to income ratio within the 
range mentioned. From 1978 through to 1985 only two 
.years (1980/81) show an expenditure increase of less 
than 22% and in 5 of the 8 years the expenditure 
increased at a higher rate than did income which is 
reflected in the surplus to income ratio decline to a 
range of -4.5% to 12.8%. 
5.2.3.la 
5.2.3.lb 
5.2.3.lc 
An examination of the expenditure patterns for the 
years 1978 to 1985 reveals those expenditure items 
which contributed proportionately more to the annual 
increase in expenditure. 
The 37.9% increase in expenditure (1976 over 1975) 
was larg~ly due to the holding of a hallot and 
increased shop steward meetings (attendance fees 
rose from R3408 to Rll890) ~n addition funeral and 
distress assistance rose from R9610 to Rl7730. 
1978 expenditure-rose some 22% due to increases in 
pension fund contributions (76%), 'Meeting 
Expense~· (34%), ·conference Expenses' (194% -
includes an I.LwO. conference in Geneva and an 
International Garment Workers Federation conference 
in Israel for a total cost of Rl3982), 'Bursary 
Grants' (36% - about R2000) and 'Distress Payments' 
(25% - also R2000). 
The increase in expenditure for 1979 was largely 
due to the introduction of the union newspaper 
called "Clothesline", the nett cost for the year 
being R50,499. In addition a ballot was conducted 
at a cost of Rl2,025 which had not taken place the 
previous year. Affiliation to the International 
Garment Workers Union increased 90% to R7640 and 
·conference Expenses' rose to R20,743 (48%). 
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'Travelling and Motor' expenses rose 74% (to 
Rll,706) and 'Distress Payments' rose 44% to 
Rl4,488. Salaries and Contributions increased by 
17% to R203,009.50 (from Rl72,452). 
In 1982 the increase in expenditure can be ascribed 
to 
(1) Salaries and Contributions (27% to R382,480), 
(2) Clotheslin~ (90% to Rl09,131) 
(3) Meeting expenses (35% to R63,805) 
(4) TUCSA affiliation f.ees _(46% to R42,392) 
(5) Travelling and motor expenses (143% to R28,108) 
(6) Retirement benefit fund (58% to R20,500). 
It should be noted that conference costs were cut -
from R35,156 (1981) to R20,048. 
The 23.5% increase in total expenditure in 1983 is 
largely attributed to 
(1) Clothesline (52% to Rl65,699) 
(2) Salaries and contributions (27% to R485,068) 
(3) Conference fees (61% to R32,246) 
(4) Bursary grants (70% to Rl2,625) 
(5) Distress payments (90% to R29,275) 
and lastly an increase of 148% (from R20,500 to 
R50,900) to the retirement benefit fund. 
The major contributors to the 1984 expenditure 
increase of 27.6% can be found in the following 
items. 'Salaries and Contributions' 23% (to 
R598,284), 'Meeting Expenses' 34% (to R77,996), 
'Affiliation Fees' 44% (to R67,994) and 'conference 
Expenses' 132% (to R74,891). 
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5.2.3.lg The increase of 28.7% in 1985 expenditure can 
largely be ascribed to the following increases. 
'Salary and Contributions' 24% (to R739,806), 
'Pension and Provident Fund' 36% (to R42,470), 
'Meeting Expenses' 27% (to R99,286), 'Affiliation 
Fee~' 29% (t~ R87,991), 'Travelling and Motor 
Expenses' 44% (to R48,475). In addition 
'Bursaries' increased by 46% (to R24,140), 
'Distress Payments' 181% (to R98,466), 'Legal 
Expenses' 244% (to R24,855), 'Retirement Benefits' 
160% (to Rl40,285) and lastly shop steward training 
programmes were introduced at a cost of R25,7~1. 
5.2.3.2 The Cape Clothing Manufacturer's Association 
5.2.4 
No balance sheets or income statements were available 
but minutes to annual reports were available. These 
sources only occassionally referred to the financial 
status of the association arid as such no longitudinal 
analysis was possible. These sources will however be 
more fully utilised when dealing with the (later) 
section on the constitution of meaning in the Cape 
system of industrial relations. 
Employment Form 
As noted in Table 1 the gross level of employment in 
the Cape is essentially a picture of a growing 
industry, certainly up to 1984. Over the 18 year 
review period'total employment has increased some 45%. 
The following statistics are drawn from data taken 
from provident fund cards which were randomly selected 
(see Methodology section) and unless otherwise stated 
reflect the position as at the 30th November of any 
year. 
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5.2.4.1 By Sex 
TABLE 8 
Year Number Percentage 
Female Male Female Male 
1968 101 35 74.3 25.7 
1969 109 40 73.2 26.8 
1970 110 42 72.3 27.7 
1971 114 41 73.5 26.5 
1972 133 41 76.4 23.6 
1973 148 42 77.9 22.1 
1974 170 49 77.6 22.4 
1975 169 51 76.8 23.2 
1976 204 54 79.1 20.9 
1977 220 62 78.0 22.0 
1978 230 70 76.7 23.3 
1979 292 68 81.1 18.9 
1980 367 80 82.1 17.9 
1981 493 95 83~8 16.2 
1982 568 112 83.5 16.5 
1983 630 113 84.8 15.2 
1984 737 122 85.8 14.2 
1985 692 111 - 86. 2 13.8 
1986 780 118 91.9 8.1 
The pattern is evident, employment is increasig,gly 
female. 
5.2.4.2 Job Category 
An analysis of the job categories held by employees in 
the industry indicates that the single largest 
category is that of machinist and that it is occupied 
by females. 
Table 9 reflects the job category "Machinist" in 
relation to total employment and female employment. 
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1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 
Mach. as % of· 35.3 34.8 38.4 39.7 37.4 35.7 38.9 
total Empl. 
Mach. as % of 47.5 47.4 49.4 50.9 45.5 42.1 44.7 
female Empl. 
The next largest category of employment is initially 
that of "Clerk" but this changes to "Cleaner" by 1977 
and remains so over the balance of the review period. 
In neither case do the numbers in these categori~s 
represent more than 10% of _total employment. 
5.2.4.3Age 
TABLE lOa - FEMALE 
Year Age <20 % 21 % 31 % 41 % >50 % Total 
Un- <30 - <40 <SO 
known 
1968 2 16 15.8 41 40.6 23 22.8 14 13.9 5 5.0 101 
1971 2 36 31. 6 29 25.4 22 19.3 18 15.8 7 6.1 114 
1974 3 56 32.9 58 34.1 23 13.5 20 11.8 10 5.9 170 
1977 4- 50 22.7 86 39.1 47 21.4 22 10.0 11 5.0 220 
1980 4 109 29.7 155 42.2 62 16.9 23 6.3 14 3.8 367 
1983 3 180 28.6 264 41.9 112 17.8 47 7.5 24 3.8 630 
1986 5 81 10.4 419 53.7 166 21. 3 76 9.7 33 4.2 780 
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TABLE lOb - MALE 
Year 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
Age <20 % 21 % 31 % 41 % >50 % Total 
Un- <30 <40 <50 
known 
1 5 14.3 9 25.7 9 25.7 8 22.9 3 8.6 35 
0 8 19.5 13 31. 7 5 12.2 9 22.0 6 14.6 41 
1 8 16.3 15 30.6 10 20.4 8 16.3 7 14.3 49 
0 9 14.5 25 40.3 12 19.4 7 11. 3 9 14.5 62 
0 12 15.0 34 42.5 13 16.3 9 11.3 12 15.0 80 
0 22 19.5 34 30.1 31 27.4 13 11.5 13 11.5 113 
0 16 13.6 45 38.1 26 22.0 16 13.6 15 12.7 118 
The above tables represent a male/f~male age 
distribution over the review period. 
The female pattern of employment allows a number of 
observations. 
(a}It is essentially a 'young' female labour force. 
Over the review period only 1971 shows more than 
20% of female employment to be over 40 years of 
age, with that figure dropping to around 10% in the 
1980's. In addition it can be seen that around 60% 
of female labour is 30 years or younger. 
(b)The years 1977 and 1986 represent economic low 
points, and it can be seen how the "<20 years" 
group decreases suggesting that employers are not 
taking on 'learn~rs', but rather focus on trained 
workers, thus both "21<30" and "31<40" age groups 
show increases for 1977 and 1986. Because the 
total size of the sample from which these figures 
have been derived increases, it can be suggested 
that people not employed (but trained) were drawn _ 
back into the industry, for whatever reason, 
returning to work is a feature of those years. 
Trained, but unemployed females, then made 
themselves available to the opportunities offered. 
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The ~male' age patterns are reasonably constant from 
one year to the next and presents something of a 
normal distribution curve. Some 50% of males are 30 
or younger and about 30% are 41 or older. 
5.2.4.4 (a) Labour Turnove~ 
In the chairman's report of 1970 reference is made to 
a labour turnover survey conducted by the Industrial 
Council. Of the questionnaires mailed (253) 123 
responses were received (49% of all employers 
employing 61.6% of the labour force) which indicated 
that 50.4% of employers experienced labour turnover 
rates between 0% and 24%, 36% had a labour turnover 
figure of between 25% and 50% and the balance (13%) 
reported labour turnover as greater th~n 50%. No 
other factory specific detail was available. However, 
industry level patterns could be established by the 
use of provident fund data. 
One of the functions carried out by the administrators 
of the provident fund is to record the number of 
notifications of engagements and terminations tq the. 
fund, and to indicate the number of new entrants to 
the fund. Membership of the fund is a condition of 
employment and therefore reflects entry and exit 
levels in the industry. The table below is drawn up 
from industrial council documentation. Note ,it i~ not 
possible to tell from the documentation how many 
people left the industry in a particular year because 
"Engagements" could be made up from people who had 
left the industry in a prev~ous year as well as people 
moving from one manufacturer to another in the same 
year. The table does, however, show how many people 
as a percentage of the total labour force resigned 
from a (any) factory in a given year. It also 
reflects a similar percentage of "New Entrants", those 
never before employed in the industry. Given the 
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provisos mentioned it can be seen that the rate of 
terminations appears high - it can be stated that on 
average - with the exception of 1969, 1978, 1979 and 
1980 - 7 out of 10 employees left an employer in any 
one year. 
The engagement and termination numbers are also a 
·reflection of economic activity in the industry. The 
period 1977-79 shows lower terminations and 
enga~ements suggesting a slowing down of manufacturing 
activity and again an increase in activity starting in 
1980 and stopping in 1982, the increase in 
terminations might suggest increased competition for 
labour which might affect actual wages. The 
increases in new entrant$ also indicates increased 
activity during the years 1980-82. 
TABLE 11 
ENTRANCES AND EXITS 
Year Total No. of % No. of % New % 
Work Termin- Engage- Entrants 
Force at ions men ts 
1969 35200 22341 63.5 27091 77.0 4250 12.l 
1970 37743 27565 73.0 29887 79.2 6364 16.9 
1971 39811 32442 81. 5 32686 82.1 6809 17.1 
1972 40249 32875 81.7 34788 86.4 ,6760 16.8 
1973 40870 33200 81.2 34500 84.4 6948 17.0 
1974 43452 34600 79.6 37182 85.6 6905 15.9 
•1975 43568 37896 87.0 37366 85.8 7141 16.4 
1976 46781 37821 80.8 41680 89.1 7219 15.4 
1977 42326 32691 77.2 27453 64.9 7918 18.7 
1978 44600 27359 61. 3 30326 68.0 5620 12.6 
1979 48243 30216 62.6 33261 68.9 9493 19.7 
1980 53421 35378 66.2 41217 77.2 15318 28.7 
1981 58199 44401 76.3 49179 84.5 19222 33.0 
1982 59324 55566 93.7 56504 95.2 20392 34.4 
1983 '57866 44312 76.6 42586 73.6 11259 19.5 
1984 59825 44085 73.7 46164 77.2 12883 21.5 
1985 51286 40643 79.2 32416 63.2 7413 14.5 
1986 52105 24748 47.5 25854 49.6 5362 10.3 
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5.2.4.4 (b) N~. of Entrances/Engagements 
TABLE 12 
Year 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
Number of Entrances (all Employees) 
1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % >5 % Total 
~- ·-----... ·-·-·-
" 
58 42.6 33 24.3 22 16.2 16 11.8 2 1.5 5 3.7 136 
54 34.8 48 31. 0 25 16.1 15 9.7 7 4.5 6 3.9 155 
76 34.7 47 21. 5 42 19.2 26 11. 9 13 5.9 15 6.8 219 
77 27.3 65 23.1 61 21.6 33 11.7 16 5.7 30 10.6 282 
153 34.2 130 29.1 59 13.2 41 9.2 27 6.0 37 8.3 447 
204 27.5 216 29.l 147 19.8 68 9.2 45 6.1 63 8.5 743 
231 25.7 209 23.3 154 17.2 120 13.4 71 7.9 113 12.6 898 
Table 12 above is drawn from the provident fund record 
cards; all employees who were employed on the 30th 
November of a particular year were analysed in terms 
of the number of times they had been employed, where 
the period of unemployment (in the garment industry) 
was greater than one month. It was assumed that a 
period of more_ than one month represented a withdrawal 
from the industry and that less than one month meant a 
'factory cha~ge'. 
If the cases of 3 or more entrances are examined in 
Table 12, the following is evident 
1968 = 33.2% 
1971 = 34.2% 
1974 = 43.8% 
1977 = 49.6% 
1980 = 36.7% 
1983 = 43.6% 
1986 = 51.1% 
· It is thus evident that a large section of the labour 
force moves in and out of employment. The years 1974, 
1977, 1983 and 1986 are low points in the economic 
cycle suggesting that: 
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(a)More experienced workers (i.e. those with more 
exits and entrances) return to employment possibly 
to supplement household income which might be 
suffering because the main breadwinner is feeling 
the effects of an economic downturn. 
(b)Equally, employers are less likely to be willing to 
invest in training and would attempt firstly to 
retain experienced workers and secondly, if 
recruiting~ would be mdre likely to take on 
experienced workers. 
The above comments need to be reviewed (also) in 
relation to the age profile of the workforce as 
presented in Tables lOa and lOb. Both these sets of 
data suggest that the movement in and out of the 
industry happen over a (relativ·ely) short period, i.e. 
most (female) employees do not work after 40 years of 
age; therefore the entrances and exits take place 
over about 20 years. The data suggests an economic 
instrumentality on the part of the employers and 
employees. 
The Wage Form 
Wage rates were negotiated by employers and employees 
at industrial council level 9 times between 1969 and 
1986'. 
1969 
1972 
1975 
1978 
1981 
1981 
1982 
1984 
1986 
No. of Meetings 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 (Extra-Ordinary) 
1 
2 
3 
3 
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At each of these meetings wages were negotiated 
upwards (at least in nominal terms) and this section 
will focus on these changes. 
Reviewing the pattern of negotiated wages (i.e. 
minimum wages) presents a number of analytical 
problems - even though these problems are the result 
of negotiations by the parties. Over the rev1ew 
period 54 job titles can be identified (other than 
'Learner' sub categories) of which relatively few are 
retained in their original form which then complicates 
comparison over the review period. These problems may 
be classified as follows: 
5.2.5.1 De-Sexing of Jobs 
The negotiations indicate that sex discrimination was 
done away with in 1980, this due to legislation. Thus 
by 1983 the job title of "Grade I employee female" had 
disappeared. 
5.2.5.2 New-Jobs Created 
Other than new positions arising from point 5.2.5.1 
above, a variety of new posts enter into the 
negotiations over the review period, e.g. those of 
"Pattern maker", "Tracer" and "Clothing Machine 
Mechanic". 
5.2.5.3,The elimination of posts 
Apart from the de-sexing of jobs, some posts were 
eliminated from the bargaining, e.g. "Messenger and/or 
Errand Boy", both "Traveller" male and female. 
5.2.5.4 Possible Administrative Anomalies 
By this is meant that some jobs appear in Gazetted 
Agreements then subsequently disappear and are then to 
be found in later Gazettes, e.g. "Unskilled Labour" 
and "Despatch Packer" do not appear in the Gazettes of 
9/1/76 and 23/3/79 but do appear in previous as well 
as subsequent gazettes. 
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Given the above issues it is not possible to compare 
(many) jobs across the review period. However, the 
following analysis has been carried out. 
Wage rates were drawn from 6 time periods spanning the 
review period and are presented in Table 13. The 
Table reflects job titles that are numbered 1 to 54 
and their wage movement can be traced through the 6 
agreements. Bearing in mind that the wages are, 
arranged in descending order of value, the appropriate 
wage rate for a particular job title can be 
established by finding the job number which is 
recorded next to the relevant wage rate as negotiated 
for a given point in time. 
Reviewing Table 13 it can be noted that the ranking 
(by wage rate) of jbbs changes over the review period 
for some posts, for example a "Cutter" (Job No. 4) is 
ranked 7th at the first, second and third review 
point, drops to the 8th position at the fourth review 
point, then jumps to the fourth position at the fifth 
review point before dropping back to the 6th position 
at the sixth review point. However, when the 
negotiated wages are plotted on a graph the shape of 
the curve is retained although the differentials at 
the top end of the wage rates widens as is shown in 
Graph 1 presented on page 138, this being due to 
percentage increases being negotiated rather than 
absolute amounts. 
In terms of keeping pace with the consumer price index 
(index of inflation) the minimum wage rates indicate a 
decrease in purchasing power. The period 1976 to 1986 
(wage rates effective 6/2/87) have been used to 
compare changes in wage rates had they kept pace with 
inflation (to equate 1976 wages to those of 1986 - the 
1976 rates were inflated by the consumer price_ index, 
an inflator index of 4.069 was utilised). 
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17 3. 
Graph I - Cape Gazetted Rates 
(Minimum W~ges) 
Rand per week 
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This graph shows comparison of the 
gazetted rates for Cape workers 1967-86. 
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' Selecting a sample of jobs whose job title has 
remained the same (assuming similar job content), the 
following becomes apparent: 
TA.BLE 14 
Job Title 1976 Rate ,Actual 1986 
(From 1986 Rate Inflated 
15/1/76) (From Rate 
1/7/86) 
Head Cutter 56.30 176.00 229.08 (53.08) 
Pattern Maker 56.30 176.00 229.08 (53.08) 
Pattern Grader 43.50 139.00 177.00 (38.00) 
Interlining 
Cutter, Trimmer, 
Tie Cutter 26.50 91. 00 107.83 (16.83) 
Clicker 28.00 94.00 113.93 (19.93) 
Layer-Up 17.25 69.00 70.19 (1.19) 
The above calculation indicates that wages have not 
kept pace with inflation. Machinists represent the 
greatest employment category in the industry and were 
initially titled grade I female and grade I male. 
After de-sexing of jobs all machinists were titled 
grade B employees. In 1976 grade I females earned 
R20. 50 and by end December o.f 1986 the negotiated wage 
was R83~00 per week. Applying the inflater it can be 
seen that the 1986 equivalent should be R83.41, a loss 
of R0.43 per week. It would appear that machinists 
have kept pace with inflation, the reason for this 
comes from the de-sexing of jobs in the industry. The 
female machinist post has been merged with that of the 
male machinist, the new wage resulting in (female) 
machinists just staying in line with the rate of 
inflation. It will be noted that if the male 
machinist rate of 1976 were inflated by the C.P.I. the 
. 1986 equivalent would have been R44.76 higher than the 
negotiated (de-sexed) machinist rate of R83.00. It 
can then be argued that minimum wages for female 
machinists (only) have kept pace with inflation. 
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This is further substantiated by reference to Table 10 
in Chapter 4 on page 103. In this table the average 
earnings per employee are provided together with the 
average percentage increase. 
Average Wages - Clothing Industry 
(Real) 
Nominal 
1986 Equivalent 
Gain(Loss) 
.-------------~~------_,,,-- ... -·-----
1986 1976 1969 
5566 1605 813 
5566 1256 643 
0 (349) (170) 
(-21.7%) (-20.9%) 
Deflating the 1986 figure to 1976 and 1969 equivalents 
it is evident how poorly wages have done in relation 
to inflation. 
Examining similar figures for t~e manufacturing 
industry (see Table 10, Chapter 4, page 103) it can be 
seen that that industry's average earnings per 
employee have done considerably better than the 
clothing industry in terms of inflation, viz. 
Average Wages - Manufacturing 
1986 1976 1969 
Nominal 11054 2804 1270 
(Real) 1986 Equivalent 11054 2495 1276 
Gain(Loss) (309) +6 
(-11.0%) (+0.5%) 
The discussion so far has focussed on the wage form as 
negotiated, and it must be noted the wages refer to 
minimum wages. The possibility exists that wages 
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above the minimum rate are paid. Establishing the 
degree of such practices proved to be impossible. 
It was hoped that data collected from a random 
selection of provident cards would provide workable 
data. However, the only absolute wage figures 
recorded were those reflecting the engagement rate and 
the termination rate of individuals. 
To establish whether employees were paid more than the 
negotiated minimum from provident fund records it 
would require -
(a)The selection of a particular date 
(b)Collecting all engagements and terminations of 
that date 
(c)Comparing their engagement/termination rate for 
their job category against the minimum rate for 
that job category at that point in time. 
This approach was complicated by the possibility that 
the individuals might, during the course of employment 
~ ' 
have changed their job category without changing 
factory. Such a change would not have been recorded 
on the provident fund cards. Such a possibility 
requires the removal of 'Terminations' from any 
calculation and the balance of data (i.e. engagements) 
was deemed insufficient to arrive at arty certainty of 
conclusion. 
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5.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME 
Introduction 
Reporting on the 1969 negotiations the Chairman of the Cape 
-Clothing Manufacturers Association (C.C.M.A.) said in his 
Report for 1969/70, 
. "While the increases granted in the new Agreement 
constituted the largest percentage increase granted in 
the history of the Industrial Council, it was considered 
by the Association in general meeting that the 
negotiations had been carried out in a spirit of 
co-operation by both parties and had produced a result 
which was warranted and which could be of benefit to both 
employers and.employees." 
The 1969 negotiations began on the 15th October of that year 
and were spread over three meetings culminating in a new 
agreement being arrived at on the 29th October, 1969. In 
arguing their cases either for or against specific increases, 
the parties. adopt either a "Hardship" or a "Competitive" 
position, i.e. union argues hardship and employers argue 
Competitiveness. 
'Hardship' for the Unions takes the form of rises in the cost 
of living and reference is made to the Economic Development 
Plan (State originated), there is reference to wages paid in 
the Cape in other economic sectors, and the point is made that 
transport costs for workers have increased. 
'competitive' for employers means that if Cape employment 
costs largely excede other regions (i.e. Tvl. and Natal) the 
Cape industry will become uncompetitive and will not be able 
to supply jobs for a growing coloured population. In addition 
the argument is presented that increases (in employment costs) 
increase the attractiveness of relocating to 'Border' regions 
as a strategy to maintain competitivenes~. 
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The introduction of these two notions of ~Hardship' and 
~Competitiveness" can be seen as a simple means of classifying 
constructs utilised by the parties to the negotiating process. 
They represent a_ description of the construct matrix the 
actors draw upon (recursively as will be shown) during the 
negotiations. The negotiations in the Cape which constitute 
the review period begin on the 15th October 1969 and the last 
meeting takes place on the 7th November 1986, making a total 
of 19 meetings which, if the lines of the minutes recording 
the proceedings of the negotiations are added together, a 
total of 10,021 lines will be arrived at. It becomes 
impossible to record in this thesis all those lines and thus 
the substantiation of, firstly, the construct matrix and 
secondly, the constituent constructs can only be presented by 
selecting statements made by the parties to the agreement. 
Statements from the minutes will be supported by other 
statements drawn from the minutes of meetings restricted to 
members of a particular party's constituency in an attempt to 
substantiate the identification of the constructs utilised in 
negotiations. 
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5.3.l 1969 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 15TH OCTOBER 1969 - 580 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
118/120 
Quote 
"There was n6 doubt in his mind that some of these 
areas were expanding to a far greater extent than the 
Cape area and the reason for this was the lower wage 
structure". 
145/150 "The employers could not run their factories without 
327/8 
521/23 
UNION 
Line 
13/16 
282/87 
the labour force, but at the same time the workers 
could not earn their living without the Employers. 
This was a combination which his side did not want to 
see destroyed by asking for impossible conditions or 
rates of pay beyond the reach of the industry in 
comparison with conditions and pay rates applicable 
in other areas". 
"He was afraid that the industry might go there 
(Border areas) because the concessions offered by 
·the Government were tremendous". 
"If every other manufacturer throughout the country 
paid RlS.00 per week he would not be so concerned. 
However, inter-area competition could not be 
overlooked." 
Quote 
"The local industry had gone from strength to 
strength and enormous profits were being made by the 
manufacturers. The workers should therefore reap 
some benefit from the profits made by the industry" 
"he referred to the increase in the C.O.L. which he 
claimed had increased by 26.5% over the past 6 years 
and by 100% since 1950. He contended that the 
increases which had been granted over the past eleven 
years had not compensated the workers adequately for 
the rise in living costs. The cost of transport had 
increased considerably" 
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298/300 ''he said some qualified machinists had left the 
Clothin_g Industry to work as seamstresses in the 
Furniture Industry starting at Rl7.50 p.w. 
progressing to Rl8.20, Rl8.90 and finally to Rl9.60 
per week". 
418/421 "One of the w_orkers ·with four children pointed out 
that she earned R2.40 per day as a qualified 
machinist and after meeting her daily transport 
expenses and paying for the care of her children, the 
amount remaining for meat, vegetables etc. was only 
32 cents". 
542/45 "Workers wanted to give their children a decent 
education but this was not possible as they could not 
afford to do so". 
MEETING NO. 2 - 22ND OCTOBER 1969 - 372 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line Quote 
166/172 "In addition the Industry had to justify any increase 
to Government. If it applied for an increase in 
tariffs for instance, it would have a difficult task 
to explain to the Board of Trade that it required 
further protection when it had just conceded an 
increase in wages of over 10%. Such factors 
indirectly affected the Trade Union, as it was only 
by the employers keeping their factories going that 
employment could be supplied". 
322/28 "He asked the Union side to take heed that within a 
period of 5 years the Peninsula would have a surplus 
of coloured labour because there were very few 
industries beinq established in the Cape. If the 
Union put the Cape Clothing Industry at a 
disadvantage in relation to clothing manufacturers in 
other parts of S.A. it would result in some factories 
moving or in expansion ceasing in the Cape". 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
330/33 
UNION 
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"If every manufacturer in S.A. paid R20.00 p.w. it 
would be possible for Cape manufacturers to pay this 
rate. Inter-area competition had (increased) and 
wage rates obtaining .in other areas had t6be taken 
into account". 
Line Quote 
117/119 Thus the overall rise in wages necessary if the 
workers are to be compensated so as to retain tne 
standard of living' and to raise their standard of 
living by 2.6% p.a. comes to 13.8% up to December 
1969.". 
130/3"2 
308/09 
"considered in the light of current e~etits and 
profits made, the employees felt that they were not 
getting a fair share of the profits". 
"If the industry paid a decent wage, not a single 
machinist should be getting less than betweeri Rl4 and 
RlS per week". 
319 "it was very hard to come out on Rl2 per week". 
MEETING NO. 3 - 29TH OCTOBER 1969 - 212 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
42/44 
UNION 
Line 
19/21 
Quote 
"the Natal agreement would be revised in about 2 
years time when the wages prescribed would probably 
be raised for that area bringing them closer to 
parity with local wages". 
Quote 
"so as to retain their standard of living and to 
raise their standard of living by 2.6% per annum 
amounted to 13.8% for the next 3 years. Hence the 
Union's request was not unreasonable". 
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5.3.2 1972 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 29TH AUGUST 1972 - 637 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
92/3 
138/40 
167/70 
Quote 
"felt that the starting rate in the Industry was too 
low to attract the type of lab,our required in the 
Clothing Industry" 
"employers acknowledged the rise in C.O.L. - felt 
something should be done to compensate their workers 
in this respect". 
"Many factories were mbving to Border areas and wage 
differences between areas such as the Cape, the 
Transvaal and Natal and Border areas was becoming 
even greater". 
327/331 "employers had to be competitive in relation to 
457/58 
UNION 
Line 
353 
379/82 
395/96 
577/78 
clothing manufacturer~ elsewhere in South Africa 
in some cases the Cape was paying 15% to 20% higher 
than the Transvaal. This placed the Cape at a 
seri6us disadvantage". 
"because as [Union Reps] had said it was 'his job to 
see that we are both in business next year and the 
year after'". 
Quote 
"he wished to make it quite clear 'we are not here to 
kill the industry. Let us be honest with ourselves. 
We are here to preserve the industry'". 
" ... had stated that certain increases [C.O.L. 
related] were beyond the control of employers but the 
other side should appreciate 'that this was the only 
platform that we could come to'. The workers were 
going to be the ones to suffer ... ". 
"He drew attention to the high wages paid to female 
machinists in the furniture manufacturing industry". 
"in other industries workers belonging to provident 
funds 'received a far greater divident'". 
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MEETING NO. 2 - 19TH SEPTEMBER 1972 - 516 LINES 
No quotations. 
Supporting Statements 
(1) Employers 
In the "Report on the C.C.M.A. for the year 1971/72" 
no comment can be found that reflects employer 
constructs applicable to negotiations. However, at 
the annual general meeting of the 28th October, 1971, 
the chairman is critical of State actions which are 
seen to impact on labour productivity. Specifically, 
the chairman is critical of housing and transport. 
Wh.ite housing schemes get "pavements and drainage" 
but for "our workers" these facilities "come later, 
much later". Referring to the Minister's statement 
that "resettled" workers could or should be 
considered for transport subsidies, the chairman 
suggests that since government moved them, 
"Government should accordingly subsidise the 
transport arrangements". Further, the. Chairman 
argues, "There is thus a real connection between 
productivity and transportation and a real need.for 
Government and locai authorities to work closely to 
ensure the basic environmental and economic 
requirements are satisfactorily fulfilled so that 
workers get to work on time and in fact to ensure 
that they get to the factories at all". 
( 2) Union 
At a general meeting on the 12th June, 1972, the 
chairman presents the wage rates to be proposed to 
employers, these are "unanimously carried". A 
further series of meetings were held at which 
feedback on the progress of negotiations was provided 
and officials given a mandate to, "obtain the best 
possible offer for the workers". 
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At a general meeting held on the 23rd November, 
1972, the meeting was informed of the arguments 
presented by each side at the negotiations. A 
representative at the negotiations indicates the 
difficulty of the negotiations and compliments the 
union negotiator on his achievements. The meeting is 
told how the employers threatened to withdraw their 
offer which then would have necessitated an 
Industrial Tribunal to settle. Thus, had the union 
not accepted, "the workers would have lost everything 
and the agreement would have expired". The motion 
accepting the new agreement was "Unanimously Agreed". 
The meeting also agrees td support the Trades Union 
Council of South Africa (T.U.C.S.A.) in its efforts 
to get the government to "allow African workers to be 
organised into Trade Unions''·· In addition the 
chairman reports on the union's attendance at the 1st 
World Conference of the International Textile; 
Garment and Leather Workers Federation which is an 
affiliate of ·the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.). The chairman lists the 8 
objectives of the Federation one of which is "That 
Politics not interfere in Trade Union affairs". 
EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS (1973 and 1974) 
1973 
( 1 ) Employers 
In a circular to members the C.C.M.A. dated 7th May 
1973, the C.C.M.A. gives notice of a meeting to 
consider a letter (d.d. 26.4.73) from the union for a 
wage adjustment because increases granted at the 
previous negotiations, "have been surpassed by the 
increased cost of living of which increases in 
transport had taken a considerable share of the 
increase granted". The letter from the Union also 
quotes a recent Wage Board investigation into 
"unskilled workers". The letter states that "the 
speakers thereat quoted the low wages 
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paid in the Clothing Industry" and the union wants 
increases before wage board recommendations "are 
published as it may be embarrassing to the Clothing 
Employers for the wages paid to their wci"rkers in the 
Western Province". 
In the Report of the C.C.M.A. for the year 1972/3 it 
is stated, "The Association was not unsympathetic to 
the workers proposals and computed that the workers 
had had to face a 4.1% increase in the cost of living 
in the few months since the current Agreement had 
been negotiated". Further, "However, it was the 
opinion of the meeting ... that as a quid pro quo for 
a mid-term increase in wages the Trade Union should 
endeavour to assist in reducing the extremely high 
rate of absenteeism which the industry was currently 
facing". 
In addition it was recorded that, "On the question of 
labourers the Employers were particularly sympathetic 
and the opportunity was taken to eliminate some 
anomalous job classifications and to re-align others 
where duties were similar to those of labourers in 
the industry;,. 
(2) Union 
1974 
( 1) 
No reference to this mid-term bargaining was found in 
union documents. 
Employers 
Virtually a year later the employers call a general 
meeting for the 5th March 1974, to consider a request 
by the union for an increase. The minutes of that 
meeting record, "Considerable discussion then ensued 
with the concensus of opinion being that a special 
increase in minimum wage rates was warranted in view 
of the spiralling living cost and the need to 
maintain a satisfied and contented workforce". 
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Later that year in the 'Report of the C.C.M.A. for 
the year 1973/4' it states that even before the 
Union;s request for an increase "the Association of 
it~ own volition had been giving co~sideration to the 
question of the impact of the sharply increasing cost 
of living on worker's pay packets". 
In the chairman's address at the annual general 
meeting of the Association (20/11/74) he suggests 
that, "our workers compared very favourably" with 
what he had seen in Europe and the United Kingdom and 
that the problem of productivity was sourced in the 
"inadequate transport system, housing and education 
facilities available to our labour". In addition, 
"the transport expense that the worker has to bear in 
relation to her wage, is completely out .of proportion 
to that of her counterpart overseas". 
( 2) Union 
The letter the union sent to employers asks for a 
"substantial increase" because of the "spiralling 
cost of living''. The letter also suggest~ that i£ 
the increase is granted no further requests will be 
made during the current agreement and that this would 
"help Employers with their costings". 
At a meeting of shop stewards (19/3/74) advis~ng them 
of the successful outcome (a 10% increase) of the 
request for an increase, it is recorded that a member 
of the audience, "expressed thanks to the officials 
for the 'great work' on behalf of all the 
shop-stewards of the Trade Union. The chairman 
remarked that most of the thanks should go to the 
secretary for his endeavours. "The members present 
showed their appreciation by handclapping". 
At the same meeting it is pointed out that the 
agreement still has 15 months to run and that the 10% 
increase would be "eaten up", the secretary was then 
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188. 
asked "to help workers in thi~ respect". In addition 
the minutes record the secretary comparing aspects of 
conditions of employment between the Cape, Transvaal 
and Natal and suggests that the Cape is better off. 
1975 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 3RD SEPTEMBER 1975 - 517 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
213/14 
215/17 
301/4 
UNION 
Line 
21/22 
44/47 
48/49 
162/63 
271/84 
Quote 
The principle factor in his view was 'What are our 
competitors paying in other parts of the country?'". 
"Employers wanted the industry to remain in the 
Western Cape but 'we don't want to outsell ourselves 
by having wages at higher rates than those rates 
payable in other areas". 
"Local manufacturers had to face competition from 
manufacturers in Natal and elsewhere, and another 
aspect was the distance between the Cape and its main 
market in the North" 
Quote 
"It was common knowledge that the cost of living had 
risen considerably". 
"It was the moral duty of the Employers' 
Organisations and of the Trade Union to ensure that 
the drain of employees from the Clothing Industry did 
not occur". 
"'the garment workers are amoungst the lowest paid 
workers in the country'". 
"He emphasized that 'the real wages in the paypocket 
are of importance to us on the T.U. side'". 
"He mentioned that the Transvaal were due to 
negotiate next year and in this area the starting 
rate was already Rl2 p.w. His side was emphatic -
the Cape should not be less. 
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328/30 
374/5 
189. 
"the majority of employers in Natal started their new . 
entrants at Rl2 although the prescribed minimum was 
Rll.10 p.w. 
"workers were going all out to build up the 
industry and to increase the profits of the 
employers'. Employers were not in the industry to 
make a loss. They were in business to make profits. 
He maintained that if employers made profits, the 
·workers were entitled to get a fair share of such 
profits". 
"The Union.was trying to ~rote6t workers who had 
built up the industry". 
MEETING NO. 2 - 2ND OCTOBER 1975 - 509 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
252/3 
268/69 
310/11 
317/20 
UNION 
Line 
214/17 
Quote 
"'Why should we pay Rl2 when other areas get away 
with less'". 
"'anything that the other areas offer we shall 
offer. We shall not go below them'". 
"He appealed to the Union 'to keep the· Cape Clothing 
Industry going'. Manufacturers had to take into 
account inter-area competition". 
"He appealed to the Trade Union side 'to keep 
as many jobs as possible in the Cape. Don't push us 
out of Cape Town'. He claimed the manufacturers had 
been as fair as they possibly could be .. ". 
Quote 
II the minimum wage proposed for a machinist ... 
was identical to the wage proposed for a general 
worker. Machinists were adament that their duties 
were more strenuous and they should get more than a 
labourer". 
245 "in many ins~ances they [machinists] were the sole 
breadwinne.rs" . 
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MEETING NO. 3 -· 28TH OCTOBER 1975 - 250 LINES 
No quotations. 
Supporting Statements 
(1) Employers 
A joint meeting of C.C.M.A. and Cape Knitting 
Industry Association took place on 7th August 1975 at 
which the union proposals for the new agreement were 
discussed.. The minutes only record that 
"considerable discussion then took place" and that 
the "views of the meeting" were conveyed to the 
executive but no mention of what those views were is 
made. At the 50th annual general meeting (17/11/75} 
the agreement is "ratified and·accepted" . 
. ( 2} Union 
The union meetings are equally sparse in terms of 
statements dealing with the wage negotiations of 
1975. On the 8/10/75 at a meeting of shop stewards 
and 'Branch' and 'Central Executive' committees 
progress on wage negotiations is n~ted. At a later 
meeting (3/11/75} of this group, disappointment in 
the new agreement is expressed but it is understood 
that it must be ac9epted. 
Extra-ordinary Negotiations 
At the Slst annual general meeting of the C.C.M.A. 
unrecorded discussion and agreement took place on an 
interim 5% increase in wages. Equally sparsely 
recorded is notice of the increase in the minutes of 
a shop steward and 'Branch' and 'Central Executive' 
Committee meeting (8/11/76} of the union. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
I 
191. 
5.3.4 1978 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 12TH OCTOBER 1978 - 1045 LINES 
This meeting is largely taken up by the Union presenting the 
detail of its proposals and a rejection of the C.C.M.A.'s 
counter proposals. ~he union negotiator, however, says he 
takes exception to the (Mgt.) view that the union shows "a 
lack of appreciation" for the employer's position as he had 
been attacked after the last agreement and felt that "some 
support should have come from the Employers". 
From line 78 to 212 a variety of figures on the consumer price 
index are quoted together with 4% general sales tax, which it 
is argued, leads to increased worker hardship. From line 777 
to 887 hardship .issues relating to food, rent, transport and 
creche increases (in costs) are re-introduced. In this 
meeting 58% of all the lines of the minutes are taken up by 
the union argument and only some 24% by employers and revolves 
largely around the clarification of bargaining position. 
EMPLOYERS 
No quotes. 
UNION 
Lines 
412/13 
Quote 
11 85% of these people are one week away from 
starvation". 
474 "He contended that if wage increases had kept pace 
with the rise in the C.O.L. 'the average machinist 
today should have been receiving in the vicinity of 
R38 per week'". 
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MEETING NO. 2 - lST NOVEMBER 1978 - 794 LINES 
This meeting too is largely taken up with clarifying 
proposals/demands~ In addition a 'Black Labour Officer' 
(state official) and some black workers present their views on 
wage increases. Their views are recorded though not debated 
as they are not formally (cannot be) part of the industrial 
council. 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
625/8 
631/32 
UNION 
Lines 
323/7 
Quote 
"He then referred to the 2-3 year duration of the 
proposed agreement and said it was absolutely 
essential for the stability of the industry to know 
what the future wage_ rates were going to be for 
costing purposes" 
"it was desirable to have a stable industry, to have 
stable prices and in order to contract it was 
essential to have an agreement of 3 years duration". 
Quote 
"'Yet the people in the industry - the bulk of the 
workers sitting at the machines and who were the 
backbone of the industry, were not even considered 
for a pension fund' .. He thought it was a disgrace 
that workers were not considered for another Sc per 
week'". 
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MEETING NO. 3 - 13TH NOVEMBER 1978 - 490 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
161/4 
165 
Quote 
"The Cape Manufacturers paid higher wages ... than 
their counterparts in other areas of the Republic". 
1
'He mentioned the drop in employment in the 
'Transvaal". 
196/7 ''He expressed the opinion that manufacturers in the 
Cape. ·were pricing themselves out of business'". 
199/202 " prices quoted by a clothing manufacterer in the 
202/3 
UNION 
Border areas which were considerably lower than the 
prices which a leading local manufacturer could 
match". 
"He posed the question ·what are we trying to do - to 
kill the clothing industry in the Cape?". 
In this meeting the union strategy was to present their 
proposals and reject employer offers until they believed that 
they had got as much as they could get, therefore the 
constructs are implicit i.e. economic gains and the 
maintenance of the industrial council as an appropriate means 
of bargaining and achieving (economic) objectives. 
Supporting Statements 
(1) ~mployers 
No documents were found to contain construct related 
statements dealing with the 1978 negotiations. 
(2) Union 
Union proposals for the negotiations were discussed 
on the 21/8/78 at a shop steward and ·Branch' and 
·central Executive' committee meeting but no detail 
of such discussions were available. 
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5.3.5 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS (1979, 1980 AND 1981) 
1979 
The employers association received a letter from the union 
(d.d. 15/8/79) in which a request for an interim increase was 
made. The reasons given all relate to an increase in the cost 
of living. The union suggest that this increase has been in 
the order of 14-15%. Rentals, parafin and bus fares have all 
increased, "meat is now considered a luxury" and Saturday 
overtime has become "uneconomical" (to the workers). 
It is recorded in the Report of the C.C.M.A. for the year 
1978/79 that the meeting convened to discuss the union letter 
was."well attended" and that it was unanimously decided to 
view with sympathy the request of the union and to recognize 
the needs of t~e employees by bringing forward half of the 10% 
wage increase due in December to the first pay week in 
October''. It was also recorded that this decision "was warmly 
appreciated by the trad~ union as an indication of the concern 
of the employers for the well being of their employees". 
Furthermore, the union "expressed awareness" that the increase 
was an unplanned increase in employer costs and "a direct 
charge on employer profits for that period". 
1980 
A letter dated 28/4/1980 was received by the C.C.M.A. from the 
union asking for an interim increase. The 7% due in December 
(as per current agreement) to be brought forward and increased 
to at least 10% due to "the ever spiralling cost of living". 
The letter also refers to the Natal agreement where female 
machinists earn R28.75 vs. the Cape wage 6f R28.50. In 
addition Natal wages (for female machinists) are due to go up 
to R33.00 in July. The union want R33.00 for (Cape) female 
machinists and at least 10% for other categories. No record 
of the ensuing debate was available but reference was made to 
the event in the 'Report on the C.C.M.A. for the Year 
1979/80'. The 'Report' records a meeting on the 26th May 1980 
at which these proposals were discussed. It notes that 
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although the meeting was disrupted by reports of "work 
stoppages taking place at various factories", it was agreed 
that a special increase in wages of 10% would be introduced 
from 1/7/1980. 
It was also agreed that a further increase (no size mentioned) 
would be granted on 1/4/81 as a bridging increase between then 
and the end of the current agreement i.e. December 1981. 
Initially the Union accepted the bridging proposal but later 
advised that they wished to "hold out for more money and the 
increase payable from an earlier date". It is recorded that 
"after considerable discussion" and "albeit with some 
reluctance" the association agreed to bring forward the April 
increase (i.e. 1/4/81) to be included in the 1980/81 holiday 
pay (i.e. the industry closes for part of December and January 
of each year) and that female machinists move up to R34.50 per 
week and ''like percentage increase for other categories of 
workers". 
1981 
In the 'Report of the C.C.M.A. for the Year 1980/81 it is 
noted that whilst the union had agreed not to request any 
further interim increases in 1981, it had in fact done so. 
There had been "a large measure of sympathy for their approach 
in this regard arising from the continuing high level of 
inflation". This led to a 7.5% increase in July 1981~ 
In the chairman's report (25/11/81) he notes that the 
"Government has chosen a path of industrial enfranchise-
ment ... The initiative is praiseworthy''. Further, "But its 
natural result need no~ be inevitable confrontation. Sound 
industrial relations founded on good human relations need be 
the order of our day". 
The chairman also notes "Our industrial council here, and the 
parties to it, have an enviable reputation. We must strongly 
oppose any attempt to disrupt it and continue to give support 
to its constituent parts". 
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5.3.6 1981 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 7TH MAY 1981 - 114 LINES 
(1) Extra-Ordinary Negotiations 
In the minutes of the industrial council of 7th May 1981 
an extra-ordinary "plea for wage adjustments" is made by 
the union in the form of a letter to employers. The 
theme of the letter is one of worker hardship due to 
"spiralling costs". Employers had agreed to a 7.5% 
increase "across the board" after "deep consideration". 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
59/61 
84/91 
UNIONS 
Lines 
17/19 
71/72 
Quote 
" ... the manufacturers felt they had a duty to 
sustain the spirit of understanding and insight 
between the manufacturers and the Union". 
"He continued by saying that his association wished 
to express appreciation to the trade union for the 
role it had played in building the industry. In 
spite (sic) of interests which might con-flict from 
time to time and matters that had been discussed 
seriously ~we believe that we should- tackle the 
opportunities and the challenges of the future 
together'". 
"He said it was in that spirit, over and above all 
other considerations that the Union's request had 
been accepted and supported by the C.C.M.A.". 
Quote 
"I think that employers are fully aware of the 
plight of workers who find it hard to keep up with 
spiralling costs of all commodities such as 
rentals, food, -etc.". 
" ... no one more than I am more pleased to know 
that the manufacturers have captured the overseas 
markets"-. 
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"the Council was one of the largest councils in 
South Africa and 'we are proud of t~at'. It was 
not the Unions' policy to threaten and demand, nor 
'to_ call wild cat strikes'". 
108/109 "The Union was proud to work through the Industrial 
Council_ and firmly believed in the Industrial 
Council system." 
(2) ~egotiations for extension of Agreement 
The industrial council met on the 1st October 1981 to 
negotiate an extension of the current agre~ment so as to 
have enough time for the parties to "de-sex" the job 
categories in that agreement as required by recently 
promulgated legislation. The union are willing to agree 
to an extension provided certain adjustments are made to 
wage levels. It is to agree these that the council met. 
MEETING NO. 1 - lST OCTOBER 1981 - 248 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
51 
59/60 
62/66 
70/72 
Quote 
"There was 'strong competition from within our own 
country' ... " 
"It was the joint responsibility of employers and 
employees to ensure that 'we have a viable and 
stable industry here in Cape Town'". 
"Unless the local industry was in a position to 
compete fairly and effectively not only with 
imported products but more importantly with 
products manufactured in other areas within South 
Africa, 'our industry is going to stagnate with a 
resultant drop in employment opportunities and all 
the hardships ·that it is going to bring'". 
"It should be borne in mind what had happened in 
the ladies stocking industry in the Cape. The 
industry had dis~ppeared because of competition 
from the Border areas". 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
UNION 
Lines 
85/88 
89/90 
93/95 
198. 
Quote 
"His side 'wanted to keep the industry going in the 
Cape'. It was the objective of his Uni6n to 
preserve and strengthen the industry. On the other 
hand the Union considered that there should be a 
fair and decent reward for people that had 
contributed to building up the Industry". 
"He said that if he went to workers with the 
employers' present offer it would lead to 
disruption in the Industry". 
"His Union was subjected to criticism not only from 
the media but also other trade unions. He said 
'unless we get a reasonable wage we are going to be 
highly criticised by outside bodies'". 
Supporting Statements 
The chairman's report to union members for the year ending 
1981 provides no information on this set of negotiations and 
the 'Report of the C.C.M.A. for the Year 1980/81' tends to 
detail the results rather than providing evidence in support 
of various constructs. 
It is, however, recorded that the request for an interim 
increase was viewed with "a large measure of sympathy for 
their approach i  this regard arising from the continuing high 
level of inflation''. Also, in relation to the {continuing} 
problems of absenteeism and labour turnover, "It is hoped that 
the majority of employers are beginning to realise that it is 
not possible to build into the wage agreement punitive factors 
to reduce these vexing problems and that the reduction of the 
rate of labour turnover and absenteeism is wholly a matter 
with.in the control or otherwise of management of factories". 
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5.3.7 1982 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 28TH OCTOBER 1982 - 648 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
1i~s 
518 
526/30 
533/4 
547/8 
UNION 
Lines 
561 
578/80 
603/4 
28/31 
12/13 
Quote 
"The Industry was entering a period of decline". 
"It was a matter of pride and tradition that the 
Association anticipated and recognised the needs of 
the Industry's workforce. However, the Association 
(C.C.M.A.) would fail the Industry and all who were 
part of it if recognition was not taken of the 
negative changes in marketing conditions". 
" ... but he shared with many others a serious 
concern to maintain stability and growth in the 
Industry". 
"The Association would preserve the substance and 
spirit of the longstanding relationship between the 
G.W.U. of the Western Cape and the Association 
II 
. . . . 
Quote 
"The Union was mindful (sic} of the pressures from 
outside ... " . 
"There were many workers who had worked for years 
with an inadequate wage, and without the workers 
there would not be an industry". 
".~.making a serious appeal to prevent outsiders 
'from playing on something like this'". 
"The Union ... was not trying to put the Industry 
out of existence. The Industry was as beneficial 
to the worker as to the employer, and the employer 
had to rely on the workers to build the Industry". 
" ... the proposals were based on the conditions of 
the workers living in various areas, the cost of 
housing, increases in rentals, lighting and various 
other things". 
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MEETING NO. 2 - lOTH NOVEMBER 1982 - 420 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
13 
UNION 
Lines 
69/70 
. 76/7 
79/82 
Quote 
"Shrinkage in forward order books". 
Quote 
"He was alarmed by the number of people who were 
not entering the Industry 'because of wages'" . 
"There was the threat of outsiders causing 
agitation amoungst a certain section of the 
population and if this developed in the Cape there 
would be no end of trouble.". 
"A wage of RSO was reduced by expenses for 
transport, rent, lighting and other costs and 
workers entered supermarkets with only a proportion 
of the_RSO which did not buy very much". 
Supporting Statements 
Whilst not many statements are quoted above for these 
negotiations, a review 0£ the minutes of the negotiaiion~ 
indicates that the union's bargain~ng theme is one of 
"hardship" and "comparative equity". Lines 62 to 99 compare 
Durban (Natal) rates to those of the Cape and reference is 
made to cost of living increases. Management argue that the 
Cape is in. a different position to the Transvaal and Natal 
because of high absenteeism in the Cape. Management attempt 
to counter the unions comparative argument which suggests that 
the Cape is worse off. 
In the chairmam's Report to the C.C.M.A. (d.d. 2/12/82) it is 
reported, 
(a) "Bargaining was prolonged and arduous". 
(b) Association representatives "were seeking restraint 
in wage escalation while the G.w.u. strongly 
advanced claims for substantial increases". 
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(c) "It is necessary to mention that the Industrial 
Council was an acceptable and effective forum 
during recent and past negotiations". 
The union's chairman's address for 1982 was unavailable. 
5.3.8 1984 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 22ND AUGUST 1984 - 763 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
465/6 
500 
511/3 
524/6 ' 
535/7 
549/51 
598/9 
Quote 
"The growing problem now was clothing from other 
areas, e.g. imports and 'homelands'". [i.e. their 
relatively lower cost] 
"It was not possible to negotiate at an Industry 
level for problems in a particular factory". 
"said the real issue before the Council was 
whether, in present circumstances, the local 
manufacturers would be able to retain their markets 
and whether there would be growth". 
"The effect of that [Article 19 of GATT] was that 
we may not unreasonably control or prevent imports 
into this country ... That was a danger the 
Industry had not faced before". 
"They [retailers] were very tough and some came to 
manufacturers saying 'we can place an order but at 
last year's prices'". 
"He wanted to emphasise that Employers' 
Associations 'would not hide behind this or any 
other factors and would not be insensitive to the 
real needs and some of the problems that everybody 
in inflationary times faces'". 
"It was, therefore, clear that the parties had to 
negotiate on the basis of ability of the Industry 
to pay". 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
UNION 
Lines 
31/33 
40/42 
74/5 
413/6 
447/8 
464/5 
753/4 
202. 
Quote 
" ... he said it was not the Union's intention to 
disrupt or destroy the Industry. The Union had 
always negotiated in the full knowledge that the 
employees wanted an industry and secure 
employment". 
II the local Union realised that low Natal wages 
were a threat to the Industry in Cape Town". The 
Union ' working on the other areas we.11 in was as 
order to bring up the wage structures in those 
areas'". 
"Rentals had been increased and the rise in G.S.T. 
to 10% had affected the position of workers". 
"The main objective of the Union was to maintain 
the workforce in a healthy and happy state and this 
objective was to the benefit of the Industry as a 
whole". 
· "He said 'workers had not got their fair share of 
the productivity increase however low productivity 
in the industry might have been'". 
"The Union considered wages had to be increased 
drastically 'not 9nly to get even with the cost of 
living, but to get back to square one'". 
"A worker who had recently retired had received 
less than R2000, al'though she had completed over 40 
years service in the industry". [from the Provident 
Fund] 
/ 
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MEETING NO. 2 - 28TH AUGUST 1984 - 180 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
31/3 
34/8 
UNION 
Lines 
119 
. 124/5. 
Quote 
"The employers side had to bear in mind that what 
they gave by way of wage increases they would be 
able to get part of such increases back from their 
customers". 
"The Industry was moving into a situation 'where 
the demand in the Industry is going to drop'' ... 
everyone is worried about it'". 
Quote 
"In the Transvaal they got one day more than the 
Cape" [i.e. paid ho].iday] . 
"the Union felt 'the Proyident Fund is a moral 
obligation on the employer'". 
This meeting is only a record of Agreements reached by a 
"Negotiations Committee", the minutes of which do not appear 
in the Minute Book of the Industrial Council. It is, however, 
recorded that a request by the Union that there be no press 
release before it had had its "special report-back meeting", 
was agreed. 
Supporting Statements 
The 'Report on the c.t.M.A. for the year 1983/4' records that 
the negotiations were "protracted and tough''. It also records 
that employers had been asked to "bring forward and enhance" 
the automatic increase of July 1984, this "sparked, no doubt" 
by cost of living increases, -"and pamphlet pressure applied by 
the ?nited Democratic Front". The association had agreed to 
both the bringing forward and to giving an (additional} 
increase. 
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At a general meeting of the union (25/8/84) it was "proposed 
that the secretary proceed to negotiate for the best possible 
offer he can get from the employers". This, it is recorded, 
was "Unanimously adopted and overwhelmingly carried". 
5.3.9 1986 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 16TH OCTOBER 1986 - 768 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
47/51 
62/3 
480/1 
698/702 
740/l 
UNION 
Lines 
118/20 
412/15 
Quote 
"Sanctions meant loss of markets for exporters in 
South Africa and the TBVC countries. The local 
industry must expect competition as these 
manufacturers attempt to enter l cal domestic 
markets". 
"he said the negotiations should proceed from a 
platform of common interest". 
"The employers were faced with a situation [closed 
shop] where the closed shop was not in its 
interests". 
"said he took it that -the Union_ appreciated the _ 
fact that if one reduced the hours of work one 
reduced the throughput of the factory and therefore 
the ab lity of the Employer to pay". 
" ... the Union should bear in mind the cost 
factor". 
Quote 
"The Union, however, represented its members who 
were themselves experiencing difficult economic 
conditions and whose living standards were 
deteriorating". 
" ... stated that the Union saw the closed shop as 
another essential protection ... of its members 
benefits and services, which were of great benefit 
to employers as well". 
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Lines 
675/6 
695 
723/4 
205. 
Quote 
"said that employees wages had fallen 'a bit 
behind'. The inflation rate was in the region of 
20% II• 
"The lack of transport and the need to live far 
away ... were all contributing factors for a 
reduction in working hours". 
"He added that Labour Day had J::.>een granted to 
employees in the Clothing Industry in Durban". 
MEETING NO. 2 - 27TH OCTOBER 1986 - 557 LINES 
This meeting taken up with presenting and rejecting 
proposals/demands and therefore little in the way of construct 
supporting statements. 
MEETING NO. 3 - 7TH NOVEMBER 1986 - 455 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
171/2 
224/5 
228/9 
UNION 
Lines 
166 
Quote 
"The granting of maternity leave was not a 
universally accepted practice". 
"said employers were interested in the cost of 
employing labour". 
"so that ... the employers would know what the full 
implications would be regarding the cost of 
labour". 
Quote 
"that all it wanted was job protection for pregnant 
workers". 
Note - nowhere in this meeting are the traditional 
arguements about c.o.L. or competing recorded. The 
wage issue is settied very quickly in this 
meeting. The meeting is characterised by proposals 
accepted/r~jected or withdrawn. Sometimes an "if 
you withdraw A, I'll withdraw B", e.g. maternity 
leave, suspension without pay and the Labour Day 
issue which was not resolved in the minutes. 
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Supporting Statements 
Little by way of supporting statements can be found in either 
union or employer records. All that could be found was a 
statement in the 'Report of the C.C.M.A. for the year 1985/86 
saying, "The negotiations were more difficult and more 
protracted than they have tended tq be in the past". 
5.4 CONSTRUCTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS 
5.4.1 Management 
The more significant constructs drawn upon by management in 
the negotiation setting can be deduced by the statements 
presented in the previous section and are liste~ as follows: 
(a} Ability to compete - going out of business 
(b} High ·Cape wages - difficult to compete 
( c} Inability to compete· - decline in Cape industry 
(d} Fair wages - industry growt~ 
(e} Necessity for Industrial Council Bargaining - lack 
of stability in Industry 
The state~ents presented earlier can be summarised to argue 
that employers whilst accepting the role of the Union to 
achieve economic objectives for its members believes that they 
can only provide jobs and increased economic.benefits if they 
can compete against other·regional and international 
producers. A sympathy towards the workforce is often 
expressed particularly in relation to increased costs of 
living. This, however, is tempered with the perceived need to 
remain competitive and in the Cape. 
It is evident from the statements given and a review of the 
min~tes of the bargaining just how aware the employers 
association are of wage (employment) costs in Natal and 
Transvaal. The economic benefits offered to companies to 
relocate to 'Border areas' are also seen as a threat to. the 
Cape employers' ability to _compete in the local market. 
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Construct Commonality 
Both parties appear to agree that the industrial council is 
the appropriate mechanism for bargaining and for the 
management of the industry's provision of (additional to 
employer and union) services to the workforce (i.e. provident, 
sick fund, housing, etc.). It also represents a means of 
ensuring minimum standards (of benefits) to the workforce. 
There also appears to be agreement that profitable 
manufacturers are of importance for a stable and growing 
industry. Agreement exists too that the workforce should - as 
far as possible - be fairly remunerated and that they (the 
workforce) should not suffer cost of living increases. 
Routinization of Bargaining Behaviour 
An important part of structuration theory is the suggestion 
. t~at much of social behaviour is repetitive and routinized. 
The routinized behaviour is at a level of 'practical 
consciousness' and as such this is not wholely applicable to 
the bargaining context. However, it will be shown below that 
the bargaining behaviour in the Cape industry is repetitive in 
not only what is said (see previous section on Cqnstructs) but 
is also repetitive in how it is said. 
The minutes of the negotiations were classified in terms of 
Walton and McKersie's behavioural theory of bargaining (see 
Methodology Section) on a line by line basis. The pattern 
across the meetings that took place over the review period are 
now presented to illustrate the repetitive behaviour. 
Table 15 (on page 210) records the date of the meeting, the 
number of lines of minutes; then Management (M) and Union (N) 
behaviour - degree of, as a percentage - as per Walton and 
McKe.rsie, thus 
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Ml + Nl = Integrative bargaining 
M2 + N2 = Distributive bargaining 
M3 + N3 = Attitudinal structuring 
M4 + N4 = Intra-organisational bargaining 
Just scanning the table shows that in the 'first meetings' the 
Union presents its arguments for adjustments (i.e. mostly 
attitudinal structuring - 'Equity' and 'Hardship' themes) 
which are rejected by management ('distributive' bargaining) 
and their counter argument (competitiveness) is maintained. 
The 'second meetings' are characterised by nearly equivalent 
degrees of attitudinal structuring and distributive 
behaviour. The 'third meetings' indicate a return to 
attitudinal structuring by both parties. 
The three graphs presented (see Graphs 2, 3 and 4) are a 
pictorial representation of Table 15 and reinforce the 
recursive nature of bargaining behaviour in the Cape. 
Summary 
The union's prime concern can be described as one of a concern 
in 'direct' economic benefits, i.e. wages and fringe 
benefits. No attempt to attain 'job control' benefits was 
evidenced in the minutes of the negotiations, e.g. redundancy 
payments, regulation and control of job content training 
specifications. It would seem that the union accepted 
employers' right to ''hire and fire" and to make changes to job 
content without reference to the union other than adjusting 
pay rates. 
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TABLElS Percentages of Bargaining Behahviour - Cape 
Percentage of Total Lines I 
Meet Em plover Union I ! 
·ing Total I Ch:jj Date No Lines Ml M2 M3 M4 Nl N~-----~~--~~ 4 ~_E!.art , . 
sso I 
-15 10 69 1 1 16 27 0 0 2 31 o I 11 , 100 
29 8 72 1 637 3 7 32 0 0 1 36 0 I 20 99 
3 9 75 1 547 I 0 13 13 0 0 6 48 OI 20 100 
12 10 78 1 10451 0 11 13 0 0 20 38 oJ 18 1100 
1 10 81 1 248 2 19 24 0 0 7 17 ~I 31 I lQQ . 28 10 82 1 648 4 23 20 0 0 9 20 25 101 
22 8 84 1 763 2 1 34' 0 0 23 17 0 22 99 
16 10 86 1 768 0 1 37 0 0 9 21 0 32 100 
22 10 69 2 372 0 12 20 1 0 2 43 0 22 100 
19 9 72 2 546 0 10 8 0 0 15 23 0 44 100 
2 10 15 .2 509 0 25 16 0 0 12 17 0 30 100 
-
1 11 78 2 794 0 4 11 0 0 15 10 0 60 100 
10 11 82 2 420 1 26 11 0 0 13 17 0 31 99 
28 8 84 2 180 0 24 20 0 0 13 17 0 26 100 
27 10 86 2 557 6 15 26 0 0 15 17 0 22 101 
29 10 69 3 212 12 19 12 0 1 8 18 0 30 100 
28 10 75 3 250 2 6 9 0 0 5. 36 0 42 100 
13 11 78 3 490 0 9 13 0 0 5 4 0 "69 100 
7 11 86 3 455 0 3 37 0 0 6 '18 0 37 101 
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Graph 2 - Cape Industrial Council 
Percentages - First Meeting 
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Graph 3 - Cape Industrial Council 
Percentages - Second Meeting 
% of Lines 
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Graph 4 - Cape Industrial Council 
Percentages - Third Meeting 
% of Lines 
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It must,- howeve~, be pointed out that the Cape industry 
between 1968 and 1986 was essentially a growing industry and 
as such redundancy as an issue had not been much in evidence 
until around 1986. 
In addition, the minutes of the negotiations do not record any 
~political' issue as part of the negotiations. The union is 
a-political. 
5.5 THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE CAPE 
GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
An analysis of action in the Cape system of industrial 
relations (at the industrial council level) suggests that the 
prime rule of signification is bound up in the containment of 
employment costs· and the conseq1:1ent ability of employers to 
· remain competitive. Associated with. the ability to remain 
competitive is the rule of ensuring a growin~ level of 
employment. This in turn can be viewed as an implicit 
sanction in that if employment costs make employers 
uncompeti~ive, manufacturers will withdraw from the Cape 
region. 
Identification of rules of signification and legitimation 
cannot be isolated and presented as if they were unconnected 
with other (possible less prominent) rules. Thus, while 
suggesting the above prime rule of signification, it is as 
well to specify associated rules. The containment of 
employment costs also implies a growing - in terms of 
employment - industry, in that firstly it may well attract 
additional factors, and secondly will act as a disincentive to 
current manufacturers to relocate to other - lower labour cost 
- areas. Rules of signification can also be identified in the 
issues about which bargainin~ takes place. It will be noted 
that substantive issues focus solely on material rewards. A 
growing industry also needs to attract and hold labour and 
thus wages need to serve such purpose. The industrial council 
is also seen as the appropriate vehicle for managing labour 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
215. 
relations (the minimum benefits aspect). For employers an 
agreement provides a degree of cost certainty over the period 
of the agreement; in addition, it also means a common base 
from which all employers must operate. For the union it is 
important in that the agreement covers all it's members and 
the union does not have to bargain with individual 
manufacturers. The industrial council also administers funds 
on behalf of the parties and ensures contributions not just to 
the funds but also that union contributions are paid. The 
industrial council also enforces through its inspectors the 
conditions of the agreement. 
Rules of signification can also be identified in the type of 
funds administered by the industrial council, and in such 
activities undertaken by the exemptions committee. All can be 
taken as having meaning for the parties to the negotiations. 
In turn the mechanisms whereby these funds (and activities) 
are administered are facilities through which the rules of 
signification and legitimation are focused. 
Rules of legitimation are arrived at by identifying - in 
interaction - forms of sanctions exercised by the parties, 
more easily by interpretation of what action is likely when 
rules of signification are under siege. The most clearly 
identifiable rule of legitimation lies in the possibility of a 
declining industry either through the relocation of firms or 
general economic decline. The maintenance of the industry 
(and growth) requires norms which attempt to balance . 
increasing benefits for labour, the ability to attract new 
labour and the ability to compete. 
Action in support of this depiction of structure in the Cape 
region can be identified in terms of (i) Contributions to 
(a) the Industrial Council and (b) the negotiated funds, and 
(ii) Wage patterns and (iii) Negotiation behaviour. 
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Contributions to the administration of the industrial council 
increase from 2c to llc per employee for both-employers and 
employees over the review period, and remains below the rate 
of inflation over the period. The growing level of employment 
in the industry contributes to the containment of this cost as 
economics of scale are likely to have been realised. A review 
of Table l shows that the parties response to a deficit in the 
cost of administering the agreements was one of increasing the 
rate of contributions. This suggests that the parties view 
the functioning of the administration in a positive light. 
This can be interpreted as a rule of signification. The rule 
of legitimation is implicit in the effect on the parties 
abilities to achieve their collectively specific objectives. 
For employers, the industrial coun~il represents (amongst 
others) a means of controlling industry employment costs which 
has implications in terms of inter-firm and inter-regional 
competition. For the union, the industrial council means 
(amongst others) a way of ensuring (through a closed-shop 
mechanism) their subscription cash-flow and thereby funds 
needed for its activities. 
Contributions to the negotiated funds indicate that the 
provident fund contribut ons have in fact exceeded the rate of 
inflation over the review period. An analysis of Table 2 
suggests that the rate of increase has not been to the 
satisfaction of the Union. In 1980 the employee's 
contribution moves up disproportionately to that of employer's 
and remains so for 1981. Only after the economic boom year of 
1981 does the subscription pattern revert to the historical 
practice of like rates for both parties. In addition the 
launching of a voluntary scheme in 1979 (i.e. only employees 
contribute) is further evidence of union dissatisfaction with 
rates of subscription. It is interesting to note that 
proportionately few of the workforce participated in the 
scheme. 
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Whilst the contributions to the provident fund bettered the 
rate of inflatiori, as a proportion of wages (for female 
machinists) there has been an increase of just over 20%. 
Thus, in 1976 a female machinist's minimum wage was R20.SO and 
contributions by both parties were 20c each, i.e. some 1%. By 
1986 the minimum wage was R83.00 and the contribution Rl.00 or 
1.2% of the wage. As will be seen later the wage of the 
machinist has not quite kept up with inflation which 
contributes to the 20% (proportional) increase in contribution 
rates. · 
Contributions to the sick fund have also bettered the rate of 
inflation. Reviewing Table 3 it can be shown that had the 8c 
or 17c contribution rate (of 1969) just kept pace with 
inflation their 1986 equivalents would be RO.SS and Rl.18 
respectively. Actual 1986 contributions were Rl.OS moving up 
to Rl.35 at the end of 1986. 
Ttie training fund which was started in 1970 in response to a 
labour shortage has contributions by both parties at le each 
at the start of the fund, and moves up to 2c each until the 
fund is taken over by the National Clothing Federation and 
moves out of the ambit of the industrial council. The fact 
that both parties contribute to this fund indicates the 
importance associated with a growing industry. 
The wage pattern in the Cape region, unlike contributions to. 
funds, is such that wages generally have not kept pace with 
inflation and specifically the largest category of employment 
(female machinists) are marginally below the rate of inflation 
when comparing 1968 and 1986 figures (see Table 13). 
Th~ major element of employment costs will be the wage 
element. Action in the Cape region shows that employers have 
been able to contain minimum wages below the rate of 
inflation. Controlling the rate of increase to minimum wage 
rates can be seen in relation to the manufacturer's ability to 
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compete against other firms in the Cape region as well as 
against those in other producing regions. This is achieved by 
way of industrial council agreements, and represents structure 
in the Cape industry. 
Negotiations over the revi~w period occurred ~ormally 8 times 
and extra-ordinary adjustments to agreements occurred 6 times 
in 1973, 1974, 1975, 1979, 1980 and 1981, all of which were 
procedurally and substantively similar. Substantive issues 
negotiated revolve around allocative resources, specifically 
wages and fringe benefits. The analysis of bargaining 
behaviour utilising the Walton and McKersie model is a further 
indication of the similarity of bargaining from one 
negotiation to the next. The similarity of action is 
important not jus~ for the identification of 'systemness' but 
also in terms of the structuration thesis that the moment of 
action is also one of reproduction of the "conditions that 
make such action possible". This is simply demonstrated in 
the similarity of (repetitive) bargaining behaviour. 
The similarity of negotiation issues evident in action, should 
be complimented by examining what issues wer~ not negotiated 
by the parties as this too represents possible rules of 
signification and legitimation. The negotiated agreements 
reflect no issue which might suggest that the Union is 
attempting to curtail managerial authority over the workforce 
in the factory; there is evidence in the agreements of 
negotiation having taken place about the prescription of 
duties and responsibilities of specific jobs and the periods 
of traineeship required by different jobs, but managerial 
decision-making in terms of hiring, firing, redundancy and 
promotion are all left to the discretion of the manufacturer. 
This, together with negotiation of minimum wages, suggests 
that freedom of decisibn-making for the manufacturer can be 
viewed as a structural feature of the Cape industry (i.e. a 
rule of signification and by implication legitimation). 
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The portrayal of action as repetitive or recursive and as 
reproducing the conditions implicated in such action might be 
interpreted as a deterministic characterization of action. 
Structuration theory argues that 
(i) Reflexive monitoring 
(ii) Unintended consequences of intentional acts 
(iii)Significantly placed actors, and 
(iv) Events in other action contexts may constrain and 
. or enable action in the context under examination are 
integral aspects of understanding social action and 
therefore the logical impossibility of a 
deterministic portrayal of social action. 
The minutes of negotiations contain much evidence of reflexive 
monitoring on the part of employers. Manufacturers 
continually express an awareness of .economic and competitive 
conditions, but this concern dominates the knowledge they have 
of economic position of the workforce, expressed as "a 
sympathy with" on a number of occasions. The number of 
extra-ord.inary negotiations and their results (especially 
1979, 1980 and 1981) indicate employers ac~eptance of the 
workforce's (economic) difficulties, but it should be noted 
th~t employers' attempt to bring forward already negotiated 
wages rather than agreeing increases over and above the 
negotiated wages, although on occasions negotiated wage 
increases. were both brought forward and increased (see "Report 
on the C.C.M.A." 1983/4 and 1987 extra-ordinary negotiations). 
Employe·rs are also cognisant of labour turnover, absenteeism 
and labour shortages. In early negotiations manufacturers 
suggest that the Union has a role to play in minimising labour 
turnover and absenteeism, and whilst the chairman of the 
C.C.M.A. in his 1980/81 report argues that manufacturers have 
to address these problems in their factories, the issue of 
labour furnover and absenteeism is still presented (in 1982 
negotiations) as a reason why Cape wages cannot be the same as 
those of Natal and the Transvaal. 
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The introduction of a training fund is the result of employers 
experiencing labour shortages and is further evidence of 
'reflexive monitoring' and reflective of their 'need' to 
\ 
remain in the industry. ~n the 1971/72 C.C.M.A. report, the 
chairman is crit~cal of government policy of Group Areas and 
resettling workers. The State suggestion that ''resettled" 
workers should be considered for transport subsidies is 
rejected by employers sa~ing that the State moved them, 
therefore the State "should accordingly subsidise the 
transport arrangements". 
The Union reflects a continuing awareness of economic 
conditions particularly cost of living indicators, and these 
are recursively referred to in negotiations. In the 1980's, 
after amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act the union 
reflects an awa·reness of "outside bodies" ( s-ee meeting No~ 1, 
1981; also meeting No. 1, 1982). The union is also very 
aware of employment. condition.s in the Natal and Transvaal 
garment manufacturing regions as well as other industries. 
Information on their practices is used by the Union to justify 
their demands. 
The identification of issues involved in reflexive monitoring 
are also indicative of rules of signification. In turn these 
issues suggest that unions hold beliefs surrounding the 
equitableness of their remuneration by way of comparing their 
.position with that of other regions and industries. 
Similarly, employers hold dearly the equitableness of their 
ability to compete with other regions and importers. 
Legitimation is bound up with the equitableness as viewed by 
both parties. 
Given the intention of manufacturers to contain the employment 
costs in the Cape region, it can be argued that the employment 
patterns observed in the region are the-unintended 
consequences of such acts. Labour is essentially female, less 
than 40 years of age, reflecting high levels of labour 
turnover (only less than 60% p.a. in 1986 - see Table 11), 
with an increasing - and significant - proportion reflecting 3 
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or more employment periods in the industry. This volatility 
in the labour force will have a negative effect on 
productivity in the industry. Employer responses to these 
issues have largely been restricted to the introduction of 
attendance bonuses and trying to persuade the union to address 
the issue. The employment pattern is also suggestive of a 
different aspect of structuration theory, namely, the 
dialectic of control. 
Structuration theory argues that those in subordinate position 
always have some resources to influence the conduct, of their 
putative superiors. It is possible to interpret the 
employment patterns as evidence of employees adopting an 
instrumental approach to employment in the industry. 
Employees, it is suggested, view (in gener~l terms) employment 
as short-term and serving a specific purpose. The nature of 
the production process would support this approach as skills 
learnt (particularly those of the machinists) are stable over 
time, and readily picked up after absence from employment. 
The possibility of an instrumental view of employment further 
suggests that the influence of the rank and file membership of 
the Union is less likely to exert great influence on the 
actions of the shop stewards and union executive. This 
position is supported by reviewing the support the Executive 
Committee get from shop stewards when meetings dealing with 
negotiations are held. 
The role of "strategically placed actors [who] seek 
reflexively to regulate the overall conditions of system 
reproduction either to keep things as they are or to change 
them" (4) is evident in the Cape region. At a special general 
mee~ing of the union (29/5/1969), the secretary of the union 
states, "we must be realistic about our demands". At a 
general meeting held on t~e 23rd Nove.mber, 197 2, the meeting 
is told that had the union not accepted the agreement they 
would "have lost everything". At the same meeting the union's 
affiliation to the I.C.F~T.U. is referred to and the point is 
made, "that politics not interfere in Trade Union affairs"; 
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again this is indicative of rules of signification and 
legitimation. Further support for this aspect of 
structuration theory lies in the similarity (recursive action) 
of demands presented by the Union at each negotiation. This 
recursive behaviour is evidence of the Union executive keeping 
"things the same". 
An analysis of the union's financial statements also provides 
evidence of "strategically placed 0 actors keeping "things the 
same'', as well as the recursive natu~e of much of the union's 
activities. The union is reliant on its membership 
subscriptions (and investment income) as well as the 
administrative arm of the industrial council to secure the 
funds required by the activities it engages upon, and this 
dependence ~s likely to infiuence the actions of its 
leadership. This observation contributes also to 
understanding of union officials emphasizing the importance of 
a growing industry and the role of the industrial council. It 
is also then likely to temper union demands particularly with 
the acceptance of the linkage between employment costs and the 
state of employment. 
Direct evidence of the chairman and executive committee of the 
C.C.M.A. was not readily available, but it is reasonable to 
assume that in preparation for negotiations these actors would· 
influence decisions. Likewise, the employers response to 
"extra-ordinary" negotiations is likely to be influenced by 
these "strategically placed" actors. 
It can be observed that the elimination of wage discrimination 
based on gender is sourced in the political arena and has an 
impact on minimum wages. It has been argued that the 
de~sexing of jobs in the industry was a major factor in 
keeping female machinists' minimum wage virtually in line with 
the r~te of inflation, i.e. 1986 rates vs. 1969 rates. The 
Group Areas Act and the "resettling'' of much of the workforce 
in turn is seen to impact on the industry. Council in turn is 
not docile to these events, and through dealings with various 
State departments and participating commissions of enquiry 
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(see Wiehahn) seeks to influence actors in that action 
context. Furthermore, council through the provident fund 
seeks to assist in. the provision of housing for its workforce 
whilst securing the fund's investments. 
Structure in the Cape region has been 1dentif ied by analysis 
of behaviour and the 'interpretive schemes' of the actors. 
Structure can be described as serving the sectional interests 
of the employer group and reflects the prime rule (feature) of 
maintaining the competitive ability of employers. Implicated 
in the ability to compete is the understanding that labour 
needs to be attracted and kept, and that this issue is related 
to the overall cost of employment. There is agreement by the 
parties that a growing industry (in employment) is desirable 
and that the industrial council is an appropriate vehicle for 
both parties. These rules of signification and legitimation 
are focussed by way of the industrial council which is the 
facility th~ough which control over authoritative and 
allocative resources are exercised, i.e. domination. 
5.6 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CAPE REGION 
The foregoing analysis utilising structuration theory provides 
a mechanism for arriving at a comprehensive understanding of 
the ontological character of collective bargaining in the Cape 
region. The identification of rules of signification and 
legitimation provide direction in understanding the "lack of 
militancy"(S) in the bargaining activity which is supported by 
the identification of resources of domination. The question 
remains as to how this state of affairs was able to be 
perpetuated over the review period. 
The rules of signification (and legitimatiori) can be seen to 
support t.he maintenance. of the industrial council as an 
appropriate mechanism for the (at least partial) satisfaction 
of the goals of the participants. The G.W.U. bargainers 
repeatedly state that they wish to maintain the industrial 
council. The benefits of the council to the G.W.U. are 
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similar to the three tier strategy Moriis {6)"identifies in 
NUMSA's reversal of a policy ot rejecting participation on 
industrial councils, the difference being (partly) that the 
G.W.U. had established itself many decades prior.to NUMSA and 
under contextual conditions which were very different, at 
least to the extent that in the 1930's the unions had no other 
option other than the industrial council mechanism for 
(official/legal) collective bargaining activities. 
Morris's (7) ~nalysis of NUMSA also sugg~sts developmental 
phases leading to their participation on an industrial 
council. Firstly, the growth in union membership led to 
'organisational priorities' which could be served better by 
council membership. A contributing factor would be the 
geographical distribution of factories making the organising 
activities of un-ion officials more complex'. The G. W. U. in the 
1930's would have experienced simil~r problems which the 
establishment of an industrial council would have gone some 
way to alleviate. This is not to suggest as Allen (8) does 
that trade unions are a direct result of their environment, of 
which the labour market is the dominant factor, but with some 
influence being sourced in individual values and 
consciousness. Bain, Coates and Ellis (~) argue that union 
growth and its character should be viewed rather as a function 
of the unions ability to influence events particularly by way 
of influencing decisions which regulate work activities. For. 
both NUMSA and the G.W.U. the industrial councils are 
mechanisms for exerting such influence. The choice of issues 
to which attention is/was directed may well be different 
because of the different material conditions and consciousness 
of the respective leadership cadre. 
The Cape Industrial Council was 34 years old at the start of 
the review period of this thesis, and had by that time 
established through the Council a number of 'funds' which 
provided benefits to its membership, and had been established 
for some time and in so doing had built up financial reserves 
(particularly the Provident Fund) and routine expectations 
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about the usage·of the benefits flowing' from these funds. 
Whilst these funds are a benefit to the Union membership they 
are also something of a constraint on bargaining behaviour. 
Thus in the pre-Wiehahn era there was little choice in terms 
of official collective bargaining and the threat of closure 
would represent a major problem for (especially) the Union. 
After the amendments to the I.C. Act and the emergence of an 
'option' - i.e. plant level bargaining - the problem of the 
management of these funds would also emerge had the union 
decided to withdraw from industrial level bargaining. The 
funds then help to 'bind' the parties to the process of 
collective bargaining through the industrial council. 
The funds are in turn at least a partial reflection of issues 
of concern to the parties. It can be argued that the economic 
character of these benefits together with the Union's stated 
apolitical stance represent. a "business unionism" (10) in that 
"they concentrate on industrial and economic matters, and 
ignore broader political issues". The union not only 
expresse_s (repeatedly) its c ncern for the, industry but also 
participates in the funding of the Training Fund which can be 
seen to be in the Union's interest in terms of a growing 
industry. 
In terms of the Union's achievement of improvements to these 
funds, the earlier analysis suggests that there have been 
improvements. That these may not have been at the level 
desired by the Union is evidenced firstly in the degree of 
distributive bargaining and secondly in the specific case of 
introducing a voluntary contribution by union members to an 
adjunct fund to the Provident Fund. It should be noted also 
that a legal constraint existed over the amount of assets of 
the Provid~nt Fund which could be employed in the pro~ision of 
housing loans. A ceiling was stipulated by the Registrar of 
Financial Institutions, and there was a restriction on the 
fund in terms of where it could invest its assets, i.e. only 
in 'statutory investments'. 
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The funds then represent a benefit to the union membership but 
also act as a constraint in the sense that they are believed 
to be important, and their loss would complicate the Union's 
ability to function in what it considers an appropriate 
manner. The funds will contribute to building an awareness 
"of the collective bargaining relationship" itself "founded on 
their mutual dependence" (11). 
The funds in turn represent resources which both facilitate 
and constrain members of the management association. The 
ability to attract labour in competition with other industries 
is of obvious importance to a growing clothing industry. 
Within the industry competition for, firstly, labour is 
equivalent in respect of these benefits and, secondly, the 
costs to individual managements is the same and this impacts 
on product competition. There is also the additional benefit 
in that plant administration _is simplified as wage deductions 
are directed toward a single institution (i.e. the Council). 
Furthermore, the employers participate in the setting of the 
levels of contribution they make to council funds, thus with 
some funds (e.g. Provident and Medical) if their 
administration were independent of employers (i.e. not done by 
council) then the possibility exists that those fund 
administrators could prescribe contribution increases which 
may not be desirable from an employers perspective. The 
establishment of a voluntary contribution system in the 
Provident Fund is illustrative of this point. 
The constraint aspect of the fund as far as employers are 
concerned lies, firstly, in the necessity to make 
contributions to the fund. Secondly, contributions to funds 
are part of the negotiating agenda and as such represent a 
constraint in that employers do not have 'carte blanch' 
authority. over this aspect of the employment relationship. 
The existance too of the Contingency Fund and the 'Arrear 
Wages' arrangements can be seen as a constraint on employers 
in that such-arrangements will influence their cash flows and 
possibly their profitability. 
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This discussion of the funds makes it evident that both 
parties to the bargaining activity have an interest in the 
maintenance of the funds. This is not to suggest that these 
interests are similar. They are in fact compet{tive for 
employers increased costs represent a constraint on their 
ability to compete on a national basis whilst 'unsatisfactory' 
increases represent to the union an inability to meet the 
needs of their membership. The analysis of the minutes of the 
negotiations does not indicate a great deal of emphasis being 
placed on increases to the rates of contribution to the 
various funds (see Meeting No. 2 of 1984, Meeting No. 1 of 
1984 and Meeting No. 2 of 1979), but this cannot necessarily 
be interpreted as a lack of c~ncern on the part of the Union 
for this issue. The financial data on the funds provides 
evidence that there have been - albeit not necessarily at the 
level desired by the Union, or for that matter employers -
increases in contributions and benefits. The analysis of the 
funds are important for an additional reason, in that they are 
reflective of the parties conception of what it is 
'reasonable' to negotiate about, i.e. the purpose of funds 
reflect constructs held by the parties about what is and what 
is not the territory of (~ole) managerial authority, and again 
reflective of the constructs held by the Union as to its 
appropriate field of interest. 
Flanders (12) has argued that the main function of collective 
bargaining is political rather than economic, i.e. unions are 
more concerned with issues of management rather than with 
economic issues such as wages and benefits as generated by 
these funds. As will be seen in the discussion on wages, 
Fox's (13) observation that "the intensity of conviction, 
effort and feeling which many trade unionists appear to invest 
in pay claims" argues that Flanders's view cannot (in this 
case) be substantiated. 
A review of the minutes of the negotiations highlights the 
dominant position of wage increases as the major substantive 
issue. Again the analysis of bargaining behaviour utilising 
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the Walton and McKersie model indicates the degree of conflict 
surrounding the issue. Virtually all negotiation can be 
classified (on the part of both parties) as being either 
'attitudinal structuring' or 'distributive bargaining'. It is 
again difficult to describe the behaviour as 'posturing'; the 
number of meetings and their duration is suggestive of the· 
seriousness with which the parties embark on the resolution of 
their differing interests. 
That there are differing and competing interests is readily 
evident in the constructs utilised by the parties. Wage 
increases can influence the ability of Cape employers to 
compete with other production regions (nationally and 
internationally). At the same time the method of 'doing 
business' in the industry acts as an incentive to management 
to reach an agreement, particularly agreements which cover a 
period of more than one year. Production of garments is 
negotiated-with retailers for _future delivery, thus the 
establishment of certainty of (labour) costs at a future point 
will assist manufacturers in their negotiations with 
purchasers of their products. Point 5.2.5 of this chapter 
indicates the duration of the agreements, ar~und 2 to 3 years 
(where no 'extra-ordinary' meetings took place) each. Wage 
negotiations through the industrial council is therefore 
attractive to employers in terms of being able to predict · 
labour costs as well as providing a similar competitive base 
to employe_rs covered by the agreement. It is further 
important in that their exercise of at least partial control 
over wages allows thereby some control of their ability to 
compete with manufacturers in other regions. The maintenance 
of the relationship with the Union via the industrial council 
mechanism is therefore of value to manufacturers. 
The benefits of bargaining at the industrial council level 
(even though regional rather than national) as identified by 
both Toerien (14) and Morris (15) have relevance to the 
understanding of bargaining in the Cape clothing industry. 
Both identify the desirability (from a union perspective) of 
uniform wages and conditions of employment and the role of 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
229. 
industrial councils in achieving this objective. Whilst this 
objective is not recorded in the minutes of the Cape 
negotiations, it is reasonable to argue ·that such a lack of 
evidence in the minutes is the result of having achieved that 
objective many decades ago rather than the objective being of 
little relevance to the G.W.U. The union also has the benefit 
of being able to initiate wage demands on occasions other than 
at the formal re-negotiation of agreements (see e.g. the 
extra-ordinary negoti~tions of 1979, 1980 and 1981). This can 
be viewed as having administrative benefits to the Union in 
the sense that such action, in the absence of an industrial 
council would require additional union organisers, which would 
add to the costs of managing a union which in turn would limit 
the organisations efforts in other areas of importance to the 
union. 
The issue of wage bargaining can, like the bargairiing 
surrounding the funds of the Council, be seen to have benefits 
to both parties and thereby reinforcing perceptions of the 
mutual dependence of the relationship as identified earlier by 
Salamon (16). 
There is a further issue which also will influence the parties 
understanding of the relationship, and this refers to the 
often stated desire (by the Union) to ensure a growing and 
stable industry in the Cape region. Employers typically use 
this Union pqsition to argue the unreasonableness of wage (and 
other) demands suggesting that such demands will negatively 
influence their competitive ability and consequently make the 
option of relocating to 'border' areas that much more likely, 
with the result that employment opportunities will be 
adversely affected. This 'threat' has some substance in that 
the nature of production in the garment industry is reliant on 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour, and that training is 
relatively easily provided. Again, the Union, through the 
Consultative Committee (i.e. made up of the regional unions) 
will be aware of not only factories which have re-located 
(especially in the Transvaal), but also the incidence of new 
factories opening in the so-called 'border' areas. 
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The issue of a growing and stable industry is of impo~tance to 
the Union in that such an industry can provide em~loyment, an 
objective which has significance in terms of how the Union 
views its role. In addition a growing Union implies its 
increasing ability to meet not only wages and condition of 
employment objectives, but also to provide a greater and more 
substantive range of services to its members. 
The Union's envolvement in the establishment of a Training 
Fund - which is the most prominent example of integrative 
bargaining - can be seen as objective evidence of their 
concern for a growing industry; for employers the investment 
in such training is likely to provide more readily the supply 
of labour desired than the cost of relocation. Again, 
employers initiate changes to wage deducti_ons to attract 
'trainees' to the industry and for the same -reason increase 
the starting rate (see Table 5). 
The concept of the 'managerial prerogative' is also of 
relevance in understanding the interdependence of the 
collectiye bargaining relationship. In discussing the role of 
the state in different phases of industrial relations in 
Britain, Crouch (17) suggests that during the phase of 
"liberal collectivism'' industrial relations is characterised 
by an acceptance of a trade unions' role to represent, 
organise and bargain with management through the collective 
bargaining process. At the same time, however, the "dominant 
interests of management are prot~cted through the delineation 
of agreed rights and the maintenance of a boundary between the 
issues for collective bargaining and issues for determination 
by managerial prerogative" (18). The restricted nature of 
issues over which bargaining takes place in the Cape industry 
means that the scope for the exercise of managerial authority 
is hardly limited by the results of negotiations; the 
maintenance of these conditions has proved to be possible over 
the thesis review period through negotiations at the 
industrial council and is likely to be a further issue of 
value to employers, who would consequently protect the 
maintenance of the relationship. 
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The Union's view of its function as 'economic' rather than 
Flanders' (19) view of 'political' will then support the 
maintenance of bargaining which perpetuates the wide ranging 
authority of management over its members. In addition the 
history of collective bargaining in the industry is likely to 
contribute to this view of the Union, not only by the Union 
but also by employers. The limitations of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act would further have contributed to this view 
of the role and function of unions, i.e. one of a restricted 
economic bargaining function, i.e. its focus is not on plant 
level issues, and whilst not excluding 'political' issues does 
direct attention at 'economic' matters. It is important to 
note that the limited range of bargaining issues was a 
continuing feature of negotiations even after the amendment of 
the I.e. Act in 1979, and the very observable activities of 
other more militant unions also did not change this aspect of 
collective bargaining in the Cape industry.-
The restricted range of bargaining issues then lends credence 
to the depiction of bargaining in the Cape Industrial Council 
as ''conservative because of its dormant past" (20). The 
limited range of issues logically means that the likelihood of 
conflict is lessened. 
Wages represent the dominant bargaining issue in the Cape 
Council and the analysis of the movement of wages in real 
terms provided earlier in this chapter shows that with the 
exception of female machinists (the dominant job category), 
wages have not kept pace with inflation, i.e. in terms of 
minimum wages. The containment of labour costs (and 
maintaining their pre-eminence as a bargaining issue) is 
reflective of the dominance of employer ends in the 
negotiating process, and this might (simplistically) be 
- . 
ascribed to the Union placing a greater value on the 
relationship fostered and maintained through bargaining in the 
Industrial Council. However, the Union (bargainers) do not do 
so in isolation and must take their constituency into 
account. This constituency shows little or no hostility 
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towards the Union either over the limited range of issues 
bargained over or the decline of their wages in real terms. 
In fact, some meetings between the Union executive and shop 
stewards reflects satisfaction with the achievements of Union 
representatives bargained outcomes (see Meeting No. 2, 1972; 
Extra-ordinary negotiations 1974 and Meeting No. 2, 1984). 
There are a number of observations which contribute to the 
understanding of why these conditions existed and were 
perpetuated. It is then not sufficient to argue that 
managerial dominance in terms of the outcomes of bargaining is 
(solely) explicable in terms of the value placed on the 
relationship by the Union executive. 
Gool ( 21) and Maree ( 22) suggest that the issue of Unio-n 
democracy contributes to lack of militancy, though they differ 
on the causes of the lack of democracy in the decision-making 
process. Nicol (23) and Maree (24) focus on the leadership of 
the G.W.U. whilst Gool identifies the "atomised" (25) nature 
of the productive process, i.e. small and widely dispersed 
factories which allows the Union hierarchy "to exercise 
political control over its membership" (26). 
Evidence gleaned from (limited) minutes of meetings between 
shop stewards and the Union executive indicate support for the 
efforts of the Secretary both in formal negotiations and with 
the results of extra-ordinary negotiations. At the same time 
evidence exists to show that the Secretary does influence the 
expectations of shop stewards (see ''Supporting Statements" 
1969, 1972). However, there is little documentary evidence of 
the Secretary influencing (or not) the expectations and 
thereby controlling behaviour. It is evident, however, that 
even in the 1984 negotiations the shop stewards were prepared 
to ~elegate the authority to the Secretary to "negotiate the 
best. possible offer he can get from the employers" (see 
"Supporting Statements", 1984 Negotiations). 
In examining the financial statements of the Union it was 
noted that shop stewards are paid to attend meetings. Such 
payments could be seen as inducements to attend meetings, but 
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again could be seen as a means of constraining criticism. 
Data on the number of attendees and the number of meetings 
held in each financial year were not available, but it will be 
seen that the expenses involved in holding these meetings was 
considerable (by 1985 the represented nearly 6~% of annual 
expenditure). 
There is also no evidence of a formal process in which the 
rank and file membership or even the shop stewards play a· 
significant role in the formulation of (even a restricted set) 
demands to be negotiated with management. It is pos~ible that 
this state of affairs existed because of the dispersed nature 
of the productive process and because of the status of the 
Union Secretary. However, the centrality of the wage issue to 
the membership cannot be underestimated and the possibility 
that the membership might be satisfied with wages needs to be 
explored. 
The forthcoming argument has to be approached with great care 
as the evidence utilised to argue the significance of the 
~reposition is one-sided in that it deduces subjective states 
from observable data. The argument would be more complete if 
subjective data had been available. 
It can be argued that there i~ an instrumental approach to 
employment by labour in the clothing· industry in the Cape. 
Goldthorpe et. al. (27) have argued the existence of an 
''instrumental orientation" in certain workers, whilst the 
notion was associated with 'affluent workers', the core of the 
argument referred to a diminished concern about work other 
than its ability to meet non-work (material) requirements. 
Again care must be taken in ascribing the direction of 
causality, thus Brown (28) notes that the Goldthorpe et. al. 
argument fails to show how the workplace experience can 
infl~ence such orientations. 
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Given the above limitations, the following aspects, it is 
argued, lend support to an instrumental orientation in the 
rank-and-file being at least a contributory factor in the 
observed non-militancy of collective bargaining in the Cape 
Industrial Council. 
The first point to be made is that the labour force is 
overwhelm{ngly female. Table 8 of this chapter shows that 
females represented 74.3% of the labour force in 1968 and that 
by 1986 this figure was virtually 92%, of which just under 50% 
were machinists (i.e. semi-skilled). It needs also to be 
noted (secondly) that the production process utilised in the 
manufacture of garments has remained labour ·intensive, and one 
in which the quality and quantity of skill requirements has 
remained static. That is to say, that there has been 
relatively little change in the_process of manufacturing, 
·which means that employees can readi~y exit the industry and 
return with little or no disruption to their ability to do the 
job. 
Table lOa.(of this chapter) shows (thirdly) that the age 
pattern of female employees is such that the vast majority 
leave the industry by the age of 40 years. Only in 1971 did 
the percentage of workers older than 40 top the 20% mark, and 
by 1986 only some 14% were older than 40. In fact the table 
shows that since 1974 at least 60% of the labour force was 30 
years old.or younger. The male 'age' profile in Table lOb 
reflects a more even distribution of employment. 
Fourthly, the labour turnover statistics need to be read in 
conjunction with the age profile. Table 11 shows massive 
'terminations' in the industry and these figures reflect not 
only withdrawals from the industry, but factory to factory 
movement. In 1982 there was one termination for virtually 
(93.7%) every employee in the industry, and only in one year 
(1986 - weak economic conditions) were the terminations less 
than 60% of total employment. Table 12 shows that a very 
I 
large proportion (from a low of 33.2% in 1968 to ~ high of 
51.1% in 1986) had on 3 or more occasions returned to the 
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ipdustry. The Table also indicates a decreasing number of 
employees with only one entrance to the industry. Again there 
appears to be some relationship between low points in the 
economic cycle and 'returns' to the industry. Thus 1974, 1977 
and 1983 are low points economically but reflect the highest 
number of employees with 3 or more 'entrances' to the 
industry. The figures are also reflective of employer 
unwillingness to employ new entrants requiring training - see 
also Table 11. 
Interpreting these figures needs to be done with care in the 
sense that a number of competing interpretations can be 
reasonably presented. However, a tentative argument 
suggesting an instrumental orientation will be presented. 
The data tends to suggest that females join -the industry at 
around 20 years of age and leave the industry _(for good) at 
around 40 years of age. During this period a significant 
number of them reflect multiple entrances and there is a great 
deal of inter-factory movement of labour in any one year. 
This, together with the relative ease with which one can 
regain the skills learnt whilst irt employment suggest that 
employment is viewed as a means to supplement household 
income, whether it is the employee's household or some other 
household to which she contributes. 
It is also possible that the inter-factory labour movement is 
reflective of the workforce having learnt this behaviour as a 
means of increasing their wage packet. Again, this may have 
been learnt as a result of frustration with the Union's 
efforts to effect a wage level which is perceived to be 
appropriate. 
If the female employee does not view herself as the 
'breadwinne'r' , but rather as a 'homemaker', then the figures 
can be argued to make sense. 
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As suggested earlier by Brown, the direction of causality 
generating the instrumental orientation needs to be examined 
carefully. Thus, the work experience may (at least) 
contribute to such an orientation. Career opportunities in 
the sense of progression up a hierarchy of jobs - with a 
concommitant increase in benefits - is not a feature .of 
employment in the clothing industry, which can act as ~ 
disincentive to continuing employment in the industry. In 
addition, employment opportunities in the Cape economy are 
likely to be restricted, which would influence re-entry 
decisions. Finality around this question is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Nevertheless, the identification of these 
behaviours irrespective of their causes contributes to 
understanding the question of Union militancy. 
T~ese patterns of employment can readily be interpreted to 
mean that there is unlikely to be pressure from the 
rank-and~f ile membership on the Union executive to embark on 
activities which would reflect a more militant profile. This 
lack of pressure from below is in turn likely to be understood 
by the executive as approval of their actions, arid so 
perpetuate their bahaviour and understanding of their role in 
representing the Union. 
It has been argued that both parties have a significant 
interest in mai taining the Industrial Council, and that the 
relationship of inter-dependence is accepted and understood by 
both parties. Nevertheless, employer interests dominate in 
that the Union executive are concerned to ensure a stable and 
growing employment, and understand that employment costs can 
negatively affect their employment objective. This 
understanding of the bargaining relationship is also related 
to the restricted range of bargaining issues but does not mean 
that' bargaining was not intense (see the Walton and McKersie 
analysis). Again,"this state of affairs'will continue as 
there is little or no pressure from the rank-and-file to 
change past practices. This is not to deny, however, the 
salience of Gaol, Nicol and Maree's analysis, rather in 
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combination, a more comprehensive explanation of collective 
bargaining in the Cape industry can be arrived at. 
CONCLUSION 
In structuration theory 'structure' is prior to form and is 
characterised by rules of signification and legitimation and 
resources of domination. Knowledgeable actors draw on 
structure in the production and reproduction of action - in 
this thesis that of collective bargaining. Section 5.5 of 
this chapter ideritif ies the structure of collective bargaining 
in the Cape garment manufacturing industry and notes that the 
asymetries of signification, legitimation and domination 
favour the sectional interest of employers. It will be this 
structure which the union (and employer) representatives draw. 
on in the production and reproduction of collective bargaining 
action. It follows logically, that if the 'structure', which 
favours employers is utilised by the union leadership then 
their actions are unlikely to be 'militant'. 
The continuity of the lack of militancy is readily explicable 
in structuration theory terms. Knowledgeable agents have 
'interpretive schemes' - in which 'structure' c~n be found 
albeit at different levels of consciousness. These agents 
monitor the behaviour of others and can thereby adjust their 
own behaviour, and if this change is durable it then produces 
a different structure. A further source of change is to be 
found in the unintended consequences of intentional acts, a 
last possible source of change must also logically be found in 
any change in 'significantly placed actors', i.e. leadership 
of union (or employer) bodies. 
In section 5.6 of this chapter a range of factors are 
idantif ied as related to the observed continuity of a lack of 
militant action on the part of the union. They are all 
relev.ant. Their relevancy rests on the arguement that either 
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do not facilitate a change in the leadership's 'interpretive 
scheme' or they represent means whereby the union leadership 
can maintain their 'interpretive scheme' and in so doing 'keep 
things as they are', i.e. in action they will draw upon 
structure (which favours employer interests) in the production 
and reproduction of collective bargaining action. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
IN THE TRANSVAAL GARMENT MANUFACTURING REGION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
6.2 
6.2.1 
6 .. 2.2 
6.2.3 
6.2.4 
6.2.S 
6.3 
Evidence of structure particular to the Transvaal 
region will be presented below under the headings 
PART A - FORM 
The Industrial Council 
The Funds of the Council 
The Parties to the Agreement 
Employment Form 
Wage Form 
PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME 
The data presented under the above headings will then 
be arawn on to argue a particular description of 
structure in the Transvaal region. It will be shown 
that the nature of structure is inherent in all the 
data provided, which supports the contention of the 
duality of structure although argument on this 
particular issue will be left for the concluding 
chapter. Iri addition, the data will be used to 
highlight other aspects of structuration theory and in 
so doing its explanatory power. 
6.4 Constructs 
6.5 The Structure of Industrial Relations in the Transvaal 
Garment Manufacturing Industry 
6.6 Collective Bargaining in the Transvaal Region 
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PART A - "FORM" 
The Industrial Council 
The Industrial Council of the Transvaal (I.C.T.) has 
been in existence since 1933, although an initial 
attempt to establish a council was made in 1928. The 
Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers Association 
(T.C.M.A.) and the Garment Workers Union of South 
Africa (G.W.U. - S.A.) finalised negotiations on a 
"new constitution and agreement" and "the constitution 
was registered on the 29th November 1933 and the 
agreement was published in February 1934" (1983 Diary 
of I.C.T.). 
It is from the pa~ties to the agreement that funds are 
generated to administer the agreement artd to fund 
benefits negotiated by the parties. The I.C.T. -
receives funds from both parti s to the agreement and 
charges an administration fee for the management of 
the different funds of the council, and in addition 
will have interest revenue from accumulated funds. 
Table 1 reflects the changes in these elements as at 
the accounting year end for the review period, and it 
can be seen that with the exception of 1984/85 that 
the council has stayed largely within budget and has 
substantial accumulated funds. Contributions to 
council in 1968 are 4c and llc per employee for 
employees and employers respectively. These change to 
4c and 4c in 1972, move up to 7c each in 1978, to lOc 
each in 1982 and from 1983 to the end of the review 
period, the contribution was 14c each. 
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TABLE 1 
THE TRANSVAAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 
Year Subscr. Total Expenses Adm in Excess/ Accum. 
Income Income Fee (Loss) Funds 
1968 87179 90658 195641 99315 (5668) '105851 
1969 87452 91748 204533 121661 8876 114727 
1970 89311 95148 225047 124256 (5643) 109084 
--
1971 90579 96084 247586 150737 (765) 108319 
---- -N-·~- -·- --·--·----
1972 88156 94981 253302 150492 (7829) 100490 
- ·--·----
1973 85738 98289 319668 233631 12252 112742 
1974 87023 104987 321642 219809 3154 115896 
1975 91586 109467 332752 223962 677 116573 
1976 80279 95749 340361 224350 (20262) 96311 
1977 99183 109196 370591 272487 11092 107403 
1978 12833 152707 376010 261799 38496 145899 
1979 126758 186405 417308 246055 15152 161051 
1980 166848 211157 521343 299128 (11058) 149993 
1981 103127 189987 541911 345366 (6558) 143435 
1982 158993 323325 661441 340297 2181 145616 
1983 181994 351971 755374 420232 16829 162445 
1984 240567 352094 657172 461875 156797 319242 
1985 205341 491544 854181 470070 107433 426675 
1986 180105 399696 795739 450901 54858 481533 
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The financial status of the industriac council (as 
reflected in Table 1) indicates that the response to a 
loss is largely one of increasing the "Administration 
Fee". There also appears to be an attempt from 1982 
to build up "Accumulated Funds". The "Administration 
Fee" is made up from fees charged against funds 
administered by the Industrial Council on-behalf of 
the parties· to the Agreement. The administration fee 
is never less than 50% of council expenses and gets as 
high as 74% in 1977. 
The Industrial Council Funds 
6.2.2.1 The Provident Fund 
The provident fund was introduced in 1957 as a 
condition of employment having been initiated in 1951 
as a voluntary fund and with an initial donation of 
Rl00,000 from the (T.C.M.A). In 1986 the accumulated 
assets of the fund totalled R24,453,162. Table 2 
ws the growth of accumulated Assets and changes in the 
contribution rates. The fund, like its counterparts 
i~ the Cape and the Transvaal, is regularly submitted 
for (independent) actuarial evaluat~on and no critical 
reports on the Fund were to be found in the records of 
the Council. 
A 'machinist' in 1972 contributed lOc per week to the 
provident fund and the employer 54c (total 64c). By 
1986 the machinist's contribution is calculated as 
Rl.80 with a like amount being contributed by the 
employer (Total R3.60). If inflation were taken into 
account the_ total contribution should be R3.86 to 
remain equivalent. Inflating the 1972 employers 
contribution by the inflation rate indicates that had 
such contribution kept pace with inflation their 1986 
contribution would have been R3.25 per employee per 
week. It has then been the employees who have 
increased their contributions in an attempt to keep 
pace with inflation. 
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In the 1969 Diary of the I.C.T. mention is made of 
bonuses declared, thus 1962 = 3.5%, 1965 = 17.5% to 
all members with 10 years servi·ce and 1967 = 17. 5% to 
35% depending on length of service. 1967 also "saw 
the introduction of continuous membership", this being 
a benefit available to those with 10 or more years 
service who wish to maintain their membership whilst 
· being unemployed, such an optio~ would be available at 
a reduced rate of contribution. 
6.2.2.2-The Medical Aid (Later Benefit) Society 
While the first effort to establish an industrial 
council for the Transv~al collapsed, the 'Medical Aid 
Society' (M.A~S.) was maintained and thus celebrated 
its 50th year in 1978, by which time it had become 
known as the 'Medical Benefit Society' (M.B.S.) as in 
1971 the M.A.S. had split into the M.B.S. and the 
'sick Pay Fund'. The financial history is provided in 
Table 3 and Tables 4a & b reflect the contribution 
rates over that period. 
(To read Table 3 take 'Income' minus 'Benefits Paid', 
minus 'Expenditure' to arrive at 'Surplus/(Loss)' 
which is then added to or subtracted from the previous 
year's 'Accumulated Funds' to arrive at the current 
years 'Accumulated Funds') 
In 1968 a female worker contributed either 2lc or 26c 
(see Table 4a) and in 1986 the rate was 99c. Had the 
contribution kept pace with inflation the 1986 
equivalents would have been Rl.45 and Rl.80 
respectively. The employers contribution in 1968 was 
the same as the employees (see Table 4b) and in 1986 
was 73c, so falling behind the rate of inflation. 
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TABLE 2 
PROVIDENT FUND - ACCUMULATED ASSETS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Year Accumulated Employer Employee 
Assets(Rs) Contrib. (p.w.) Con tr ib. ( p. w. ) 
1986 24,453,162 For wage <R32, 70c deducted. Increase 
deduction by lOc for every R4 · (or part ) 
for wages >R32.00 
lOc for every R4 (or part) for wages 
>R32.00 
1985 21,766,209 Same as 1986 
1984 17,971,545 Same as 1986 
1983 13,903,805 Same as 1986 
1982 11,212,649 (up to)30.6.82 Wage rate 11. 90-15. 99 = 27c 
40c per worker Wage rate >Rl6.00 = 54c 
1981 10,124,758 From l. 7. 80 to 30.,6. 81=37c Same as 1982 
From l. 7. 81 to 30.6.82=40c 
1980 8,998,955 From l.7.79 to 30.6.80=35c Same as -1982 
From l. 7. 80 to 30.6.81=37c 
From l. 7. 81 to 30.6.82=40c 
1979 8,076,477 30c per worker p.w. Same as 1982 
1978 7,694,557 30c per worker p.w. Same as 1982 
1977 7,209,398 Same as 1976 Same as 1972 
1976 7,201,406 Same as 1975 Same as 1972 
1975 lSc per worker p.w. Same as 1972 
1974 N/A Same as 1972 Same as 1972 
1973 Same as 1972 Same as 1972 
-
1972 N/A lOc per worker p.w. From 7.50 to 12.49=27c 
From 12.50 up =54c 
1971 N/A Same as Same as·l970 
1970 3,905,186 7c per worker p.w. From 6.00 to-12.49=27c 
From 12.50 up =54c 
1969 3,593,659 Same as 1967 Same as 1967 
1968 3,302,452 Same as 1967 Same as 1967 
1967 N/A Sc per worker p.w. Wage 6.00=llc 
Wage 6.00 to ll.50=27c 
Wage ll.50=54c 
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TABLE 4a 
MEDICAL AID/BENEFIT SOCIETY (EMPLOYEES SCALE OF DEDUCTIONS) 
Year Male Female 
1967 Wage RS to RlO.SO = 2lc Wage RS to RlO.SO = 2lc 
RlO.Sl to Rl8.09 - 2Sc RlO.Sl up = 26c 
Rl8.10 up ··- 36c 
1968 Same as 1967 Same as 1967 
~ 
1969 .Same as 1967 Same as 1967 
-· 
1970 Wage R6 to Rl.1. SO = 2lc Wage R6 to Rll. SO = 2lc 
Rll.Sl to Rl9.00 = 26c Rll. Sl IJ::_'.) = 26c 
Rl9.0l up = 36c 
1971 Same as 1970 Same as 1970 
1972 Wage R7.SO to Rl3.49=13c Male and female rate 
Rl3.SO up =14c Male and female rate 
1973 Same as 1972 Same as 1972 
1974 Same as 1972 Same as 1972 
1975 Wage. R7 .. SO to Rl3.49=17c Male and female 
Rl3.50 up =18c Male and female 
1976 Wage R7.50 to Rl3.49=20c Male and female 
Rl3.50 up =2lc Male and female 
1977 Same as 1976 Same as 1976 
1978 Wage R7.50 to Rl5.99=32c Male and female 
Rl6.00 up =33c Male and female 
1979 Same .as 1978 Same as 1978 
1980 Wage R7.50 to Rl5.99=43c Male and female 
Rl6.00 up =52c Male and female 
1981 Same as Rl980 Same as 1980 
1982 Wage Rll. 90 to Rl5.99=43 Male and female 
Rl6.00 up =52 Male and female 
1983 All pay 52c irrespective of sex or wage category 
1984 All pay 77c irrespective of sex or wage category 
1985 All pay 77c irrespective of sex or wage category 
1986 All pay 99c irrespective of sex or wage category 
1987 All pay 99c irrespective of sex or wage category 
1988 All pay 99c irrespective of sex or wage category 
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TABLE 4b 
EMPLOYERS CONTRIBUTION 
1967 16c per employee p.w. other than African males (llc each) 
1968 20c per employee p.w. - African males stay llc each 
1969 Same as 1968 
1970 Same as 1968 
1971 Same as 1968 
1972 Amount equal to Employees contribution 
1973 Same as 1972 
1974 Same as 1972 
197S Equal contribution 
197~ Same as 197S 
1977 Same as 197S 
1978 Same as 197S 
1979 Same as 197S 
1980 Wage than Rl6.00 = 34c 
- Wage than Rl6.00 = 36c 
1981 Same as 1980 
1982 Same as 1980 
1983 36c per employee 
1984 SSc per employee 
198S SSc per employee p.w. irrespe~tive of sex, race or wage 
category 
1986 73c per employee·p.w. irrespective of sex, race or wage 
category 
/ 
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6.2.2.3 Sick Pay Fund 
TABLE 5 
Year 
1986 
1985 
1984 
1983 
1982 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1978 
1977 
1976 
1975 
1974 
1973 
1972 
1971 
The medical aid society split in 1971 to introduce a 
separate Fund to ensure payment of a proportion of the 
employees wages when off sick. The sick fund was 
established as a separate fund on the 1st July 1971, 
with the transfer of R213,939 from the accumulated 
funds of the medical aid society. Table 5 reflects 
the financial status of the fund for the period 1971 
to 1986 and Table 6 records the ~mployer/employee 
contributions. 
To read Table 5, two points should be noted, 
(i) Contributions and interest do not necessarily 
equal income, (minor amounts adjust the 
figures). 
(ii) .Both 'Benefits Paid' and 'Expenditure' must be 
deducted from 'Income' to arrive at a figure 
which adjusts the previous years 'Accumulated 
Funds' to arrive at the 'Accumulated Funds' 
figure for the year under examination. 
SICK PAY FUND 
Cont- Int- Income Benefits Ex- Excess Accumu-
rib. ere st Paid pend. Exp over lated 
income Funds 
126558 209460 336656 343738 50900 (57982) 1522599 
216808 299288 518234 335368 50830 132036 1580581 
253626 208641 462267 341430 52414 68423 1448545 
268417 175233 446000 342529 46200 57271 1380122 
400125 139418 567177 346522 37476 183179 1322851 
398910 92731 500723 275948 72348 152427 1139672 
349981 70218 423581 260518 54800 108263 987245 
434959 67069 504182 212104 45800 246278 878982 
538976 41904 585228 194997 73993 316238 632704 
484694 19581 507690 374081 61234 72375 316466 
442374 20355 463529 418555 50020 (5046) 244091 
425531 20301 448017 410311 50203 (12497) 249137 
341531 20866 363217 354066 49058 (39907) 261634 
224731 21766 247670 173429 51272 22969 301541 
214327 11818 230557 152325 37364 40868 278572 
114822 5626 122878 80381 18732 23765 237704 
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TABLE 6 
SICK PAY FUND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Year Employees Employers 
1972 Wage R7.50 - Rl3.49 = 8c (M & F)* Wage=< Rl3.50 = 7c 
Wage Rl3.50 - R20.99 = 14c (M & F) Wage > Rl3.50 = 8c 
Wage R20.99 = 24c (male only) 
Wage R20.99 = 14c (female only) 
1973 Same as 1972 Same as 1972 
1974 Wage R7.50 - Rl3.49 = 13c (M & F) Same as 1972 
Wage Rl3.50 - R20.99 = 2lc (M) 
Wage R21. 00 = 3lc (M) 
Wage Rl3.50 = 2lc (F only} 
1975 Wage R7.50 - Rl3.49 = 17c (M & F} Wage=< Rl3.50 = llc 
Wage Rl3.50 - R20.99 = 25c ( M} Wage > Rl3.50 = 12c 
Wage R20.99 = 35c ( M} 
Wage Rl3.50 = 25c ( F} 
-
1976 Same as 1975 but add 3c to contribution across the board 
1977 Same as 1975 (without any additions} 
1978 Wage R7.50 - Rl5.99 = 3lc (M & F) Wage=< Rl6.00 = 22c 
Wage Rl6.00 and up = 39c ( F} Wage > Rl6.00 = 23c 
Wage Rl6.00 - R23.99 = 39c (M} 
Wage R24.00 up = 49c ( M} 
1979 Same as 1978 Same as 1978 
1980 All classes pay 20c each Equal contribution 
1981 Same as 1980 Same as 1980 
1982 Same as 1980 Same as 1980-
1983 Same as 1980 Same as 1980 
1984 All classes pay lSc each Equal contribution 
1985 Same as 1984 Same _as 1984 
1986 All classes pay lOc each Equal contribution 
*(M & F = Male and Female} 
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In terms of 'benefits paid' this fund has seen payouts 
stay much the same - in nominal terms - since 1974, 
and at the same time 'Accumulated Funds' have (from 
19?6 to 1986) outpaced the rate of inflation, i.e. the 
1976 inflation adjusted 1986 equivalent would be R993 
-206,00. This real growth in accumulated funds allows 
for three strategies 
1) A decrease in subscription rates 
2) An increase in benefits 
\ 
3) A combination of (1) and (2) 
An examination of Table 5 and 6 and the knowledge of a 
decline (generally) in total employment suggest that 
the third strategy was opted for with an emphasis on 
decreasing contributions. 
In 1972 the average benefit to employees was R6.32; 
by 1980 this was Rl2.47 and in 1986 it was R25.04. 
Equally, contributions whilst initially increasing· 
have been reduced. 
6.2.2.4 Slack Pay Fund 
The slack pay fund was started in 1954, "due to the 
then end of the post war boom'' (I.C.T. Diary 1983), 
and due also to the "Loss of wages from the 
introduction of short-time· in factories, which 
regrettably is an unavoidable evil in the clothing 
industry" (I.C.T. Diary 1967). Benefits to employees 
were paid "in respect of five complete days of 
short-time, continuous or occasional falling within a 
period of three months calculated from the first day 
of short-time". (I.C.T. Diary 1967) 
The fund was able to "accumulate substantial funds" 
due to "the more favourable conditions that existed in 
the 1960's" (I.C.T. Diary 1983). The fund's financial 
history for 1968 to 1986 is provided in Table 7, and 
contributions to the fund are recorded in Table 8. 
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1.b...BLE 7 
SLACK PAY FUND 
Year Contr. Con tr Int- Bene- Expend Income Acc. 
Rec'd by ere st fits over Funds 
EmRs Paid Expend.· 
1986 126371 42457 114149 241913 40256 808 774700 
1985 1091 None 164531 404846 40156 (279380) 773892 
1984 1440 None 137550 238199 40156 (139365) 1053272 
1983 91037 5700 157584 517051 36528 (299258) 1192637 
1982 2036 35525 161123 128060 31920 38704 1493096 
1981 1678 17341 152525 39429 33451 98664 1453191 
1980 1677 7925 97777 71518 26240 9621 1354527 
1979 1518 4705 112848 108621 39733 (29283) 1344906 
1978 1569 4925 130461 157962 21904 (42911) 1374189 
1977 1611 10950 129547 1-88338 21904 (68134) 1417100 
1976 1746 18450 128301 53240 18016 77241 1485234 
1975 2130 13720 115466 54988 18016 58312 1407993 
1974 24807 9275 103212 20504 17642 99148 1349681 
1973 46486 10425 91146 39957 17792 90308 1250533 
1972 48974 11721 83059 54083 14096 75575 1160225 
1971 61580 13925 73175 21469 14096 113115 1084650 
1970 71529 16630 60643 17809 11636 119357 971535. 
1969 136720 17045 47473 36754 11786 152698 852178 
1968 149380 13095 41952 27497 10530 . '167000 699480 
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TABLE 8 
CONTRIBUTION RATES 
Year Employee Employer 
1968 Wage Rl3.42 = 6c 
Wage Rl3.42 = 8c Equal contribution 
1969 Wage Rl3.42 = Sc ) le decrease goes Same as 1968 rate 
Wage Rl3.42 = 7c ) to Training Fund 
1970 Same as 1969. 
1971 Same as 1969 
1972 All classes pay 2c per week Equal contribution 
-
1973 Same as 1972 
1974 Same as 1972 
197S Contributions done away with. 
(Not reinstated during remainder of review period. 
But note that in 1972 Employees Contribution drops 
between 3c and Sc but Training Fund ~ontributions 
increase by 3c) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
255. 
6.2.2.5 _The Training Fund 
TABLE 9 
1969 
1972 
1975 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1968 a training fund was established to provide monies 
for the development of a training centre at which 
workers could receive training. However, "It was soon 
realised that one Province alone could not afford the 
training" (I.C.T. Diary 1983). In 1978 "the purely 
Transvaal effort was taken over by the nationally 
constituted Training Board for the Clothing Industry" 
(I.C.T. Diary 1983). No financial or training 
activity data was available but Table 9 below reflects 
the contribution rates to the fund. (Note Training 
College opened 17th April 1969) 
TRAINING FUND CONTRIBUTIONS 
to 1971 Both parties contribute le per worker p.w. 
to 1974 Contributions increase to 4c each 
to 1977 Contributions increase to 6c each 
lOc per employee per week (employer only) 
ti 
" " 
II II 
" 
" " " 
II II 
" 
" 
II 
" " " " 
15c per employee per week " 
II II II 
" " " 
" " 
II 
" 
II 
" 
25c per employee per week " 
II 
" 
II • 
" 
II 
" 
6.2.2.6 Stabilisation Fund 
Following on the establishment of the training ·fund, 
the 'Stabilisation Insurance Fund' and the 'Holiday 
Pay Fund 1 were established. The purpose of both funds 
was to protect wages, holiday pay and contributions to 
Council funds in cases of insolvency. For the 
stabilisation fund employers who were not members of 
the T.C.M.A. had to pay 25c per employee or must 
"piovide an acceptable guarantee" (Various I.C.T. 
Diaries). The holiday pay fund required the employer 
to pay 8% of wages each week out of which year end 
holiday bonuses could be paid. Interest accruing to 
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this account was split as follows, 75% thereof wa~ 
{proportionately) distribµted to employers and 25% 
went to the council as a contribution to the costs of 
administering the funds. Table 10 below provides 
financial data on this fund. 
STABILISATION FUND 
Year Benefits Contr. Rec'd Interest Expen- Income Accum. 
Paid Rec'd from Received diture over Funds 
Insol- {Expen) 
vent 
Estates 
1986 116 215 29677 2693 2"693 29776 70551 
1985 119980 160131 - 18319 17695 40775 40775 
1984 75542 54401 - 2012 1062 {20191) Nil 
1983 44453 26553 - 4794 4794 {17900) 20191 
1982 25181 25815 - 5525 5525 634 38091 
1981 16704 25656 - 2383 2383 8952 37457 
1980 8644 16853 - 933 933 8209 28505 
197'9 7435 10441 f - 968 968 3006 20296 
1978 9478 10572 - 1296 960 1094 17290 
1977 9060 12779 - 1296 960 3719 16196 
1976 9966 9206 - 1238 1238 (760) 12477 
1975 4759 8181 - 851 851 3422 13237 
1974 4315 5827 - 802 802 1512 9815 
1973 6048 5790 679 525 525 421 8303 
1972 2507 4795 - 371 371 2288 7882 
1971 207 3311 - 208 208 3104 5594 
1970 476 3041 - 90 90 2565 2490 
1969 3659 3584 - 15 15 {75) { 7 5) 
1968 No figure 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
257. 
6.2.3 THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT 
6.2.3.1 The Garment Workers Union of South Africa (G.W.U. -
S. A. ) 
The table below (Table 11) presents financial data 
over the period 1968 to 31st July 1985, the date at 
which the G.W.U.-S.A. became the National Union of 
Clothing Workers. The following points can be made 
(1) The data as of 31st July, 1985, is for 6 
months. The other data reflects an accounting 
period of 12 months. 
(2) The financial data lends support to the 
contention that the Union {and the industry) 
present a picture of changing (declining) 
economic fortunes. 
(3) The financial data presented represents a 
consolidation of the various branches and head 
office of the union. These branches are given 
as follows . 
Head.Office 
12 Transvaal Combined Branches 
Germiston No. 1 
East Rand- No. 1 
East London 
Kimberley 
Kingwilliamstown 
Kroonstad 
· Port Elizabeth 
(4) After the merger with the N.U.C.W. only the 
Port Elizabeth branch retains the G.W.U.-S.A. 
name. 
(5) Subscription rate changes occurred in 1970, 
1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 
1982, 1983 and 1985. (Detail can be found in 
Table 13). 
It is only through these subscription rate changes 
that the union can continue to function given the 
decline in its membership as reflected in Table 11. 
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TABLE 11 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Notes 
* 
** 
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA OF G.W.U.-S.A. 
(as at 31st December. Figures are rounded} 
Income Subscrip- Expen- (Deficit} Gratuity Accumulated 
tions diture /Surplus & Service Funds 
Fund 
130043 100584 130904 861 - 277735 
130462 102327 136149 (5687} 548 271500 
148392 116810 147677 715 1984 269931* 
139467 103834 135996 3471 1844 271558 
152226 111774 140107 12119 1688 281990 
158252 111458 162964 (4712) 1547 269095 
172860 118659 150315 22545 798 290841 
200042 123869 147058 52984 - 343826 
191317 121957 166955 24362 - 368188 
181740 110830 163959 17781 678 385291 
174814 101998 184909 (10095} - 375196 
177841 112732 161912 15929 1440 400429** 
209237 125681 188523 20714 - 421143 
224430 129375 195711 -28720 - 449863 
271319 149932 235782 3553e 3484 481917 
307596 128524 242034 65563 - 547479 
287281 133780 787801 (500519} - 494976*** 
133520 76018 163072 (29551) - 425425**** 
A payment of R300 to "Garment Workers -Loan Fund" is 
recorded on the Balance Sheet. 
Rl0,000 is added to Acc. Funds and represents a refund 
of a loan_ made by the Union to the "Garment Workers · 
Training College" and previously written off. Also an 
amount of R744 is added and is from the "Knitted 
Fabric Workers Union". 
*** The 1984 Reports are of interest as they reflect 
decisions of the G.W.U.-S.A. relative to their merger 
with the N.U.C.W. The difference between income and 
expenditure is some R500,000 which is accounted for on 
the income statement by (essentially) two items, 
(i) 'Employees Pension Fund contributions' - this 
item accounts for R353,804.34 (No such item on 
the 1983 income statement) and 
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(ii) An increase in "Salaries and Bonuses" of 
Rl61,958.29 (from Rll7,515.76 to R279,474.05). 
This represents an increase of more than double 
the 1983 figure. 
The above two items suggest that on taking the 
decision to merge with the N.U.C.W. it was also 
decided to utilise most of the Accumulated Funds of 
the G.W.U.-S.A. to provide Pension and Bonus benefits 
to employees of the G:w.u.-S.A. 
It will also be noted that the 1984 ~Accumulated Fund' 
figure stands in at R494,976 and this (given the 
above) is due to an injection of R450,000 from the 
National Union of Clothing Workers. This amount is 
reflected on the Balance Sheet as "Funds receivable re 
pending amalgamation with the National Union of 
Clothing Workers (S.A.)". 
The 1985 Balance Sheet indicates a transfer of R40,000 
from Accumulated Funds to an item titled "Lump sum 
payment to Legal Fund". Taken in ~onjunction with the 
1984 deficit, thi-s effectively wipes out the 
"Accumulated Funds" o~ the G.W.U.-S.A. built up over a 
period of 60 years. 
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TABLE 12 
' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION OF S.A. - DEDUCTIONS 
1968 Wage < R6.00 = 19c ) Male and Female 
·Wage > R6.00 = 26c ) 
1969 Sarne as 1968 ' 
1970 All members 3lc 
1-971 Sarne as 1970 
1972 All members = 42c. - Note: White members of East 
Rand pay extra 3c, White members of Gerrnis.ton pay 
·extra Sc 
1973 Sarne as 1972 
1974 Sarne as 1972 - Now Coloured members of East Rand 
and _Gerrniston also pay extra . 3c.per week 
1975 All members = 57c - An extra.Sc and 3c respective-
ly for Gerrni~ton and East Rand members. 
1976 All members = 59c 
. ' 1977 All members = 68c 
1978 ·- All members 83c ·Only Coloured members of = 
Gerrniston and East. Rand pay_ extra 3c 
1979 ·Gerrniston and East Rand Coloured members = 89c 
Rustenberg, Klerksqorp and Middleburg (all<rnembers 
= 72c 
All members in other areas = 86c 
-
1980 Classes same as 1979, rates = l.13c, 95c and l.lOc 
1981 Sarne as 1980 but also collect for N. U. C .. W. = 7lc 
per member. 
1982 Classes same as 1979, rates = 1.43, 1.25 and 1.40; 
N-.u.c.w. = Rl.20 
' 
' 1983 Classes same as 1·979·, rates = 1. 53, 1.35 and 1.50; 
N.U.C.W. = Rl.20 
1984 Sarne classes and rates as 1979 
1985 Classes same as 1979, rates = 1.67, 1.49 and 1.64 
N.U.C.W. = Rl. 30 
. 
1986 Sarne as 1985 
----------- ~--·~ ~ 
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"Overseas Conference Expenses" prior to 1981. No 
"Overseas Conference" expenses were recorded for 1977, 
but this is more likely due to depressed economic 
conditions. With the exception of 19~0 (and 1984/85 
previously referred to) Salaries and Wages increase 
from one year to the next at 10% or less. The 1980 
percentage increase was 14.8%. 
6.2.3.2 The National Union of Garment Workers(S.A.)(N.U.G.W.) 
The N.U.G.W. was for much of the review period unable 
to_participate (legally) in the negotiations of 
agreements even though in 1968 african employment was 
some 56% of ·the total employment (moving up to 89% by 
1986). Financial data·on the N.U.G.W. is presented in 
Table 13 below. 
TABLE 13 
NATIONAL UNION OF CLOTHING WORKERS (S.A.) 
Year Total Total Net Accumulated Subscription. 
Income Expenses Income Funds income 
1968 N/A N/A N/A 48013 N/A 
1969 55936 50678 5258 53271 52945 
1970 71576 59737 11839 65110 66636 
1971 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
lo972 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1973 127911 102407 25504 143925 
1974 154420 121922 32498 176423 122727 
1975 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1976 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1977 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1978 228809 197132 31677 290999 151542 
1979 229839 231410 (1571) 289428 146746 
1980 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1981 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1982 555889 387716 168173 508991 385911 
1983 543989 473430 70559 579550 329414 
1984 578196 511387 66809 646359 309944 
1985 662498 530783 131715 778074 418912 
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6.2.3.3 The Employers Association 
6.2.4 
TABLE 14 
The Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers Association 
(T.C.M.A.) is the organisation which represents 
employers on the Industrial Council. Their annual 
general meeting, and 'Presidential Reports' were 
examined but no financial detail was reported in any 
of those report. It is therefore not possible to 
present a similar financial picture of the 
organisation as that (previously) done for the Union. 
Employment Form 
INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL FOR THE CLOTHING INDUSTRY (TVL) 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES/EMPLOYERS 
No. of Europeans Coloureds Africans 
Employers Date M F M F M F TOTAL 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
409 
379 
365 
358 
387 
399 
383 
Jan)386 
-
Jun)372 
Aug)337 
Feb 1968 232 1830 504 7991 3094 10405 24056 
May 1969 212 1677 522 7806 3194 11471 24882 
Nov 1970 200 1104 493 6134 3116 13859 24906 
Aug 1971 202 1005 487 5947 3192 14840 25673 
Jul 1972 209 910 459 5115 3082 14207 23982 
Jul 1973 217 783 453 4813 2921 14503 23690 
Jul 1974 215 762 466 4476 3053. 16671 25643 
Jul 1975 211 697 431 3846 2T43 16674 24602 
Jul 1976 188 620 445 3455 2532 16318 23558 
Jul 1977 161 503 414 3273 2425 14314 21090 
Jul 1978 142 458 366 3004 2257 13547 19774. 
Jul 1979 131 389 329 2686 2093 13869 19497 
Aug 1980 125 350 328 2279 2036 15766 20884 
Aug 1981 100 322 283 2188 2081 19090 24066 
Aµg 1982 96 232 246 1693 1806 17161 21234 
Aug 1983 100 267 246 1764 1675 16830 20882 
Aug 1984 88 245 232 1637 1629 15836 19667 
Aug 1985 68 206 196 1395 1401 12854 15738 
Aug 1986 56 159 155 1199 1194 10969 13730 
Table 14 shows that the clothing industry in the 
Transvaal is essentially a shrinking industry. There 
were some fluctuations in the total employed between 
1968 and 1974 but from then on - with the exception of 
the boom conditions of 1980/81 the industry has been 
in decline. Employment peaked at 25,643 in 1974, 
declined steadily till 1980/81 and then reflects a 
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sharp drop to 13,730 in 1986. In racial terms the 
composition of the labour force is such that european 
employment (female) drops over 10 times, coloured 
female some 7 times and their places (together with 
any employment growth) are taken by female blacks. It 
can be noted at this stage that the black labour force 
had no (direct) representation as a bargaining unit on 
the industrial council. Only the white union was 
legally allowed to negotiate until the amendment of 
the (then) Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. 
(Note: A request from the National Union of Clothing 
Workers for admission as a 'Party to the Council' is 
to be fouqd in the council minutes of 21st May 1981, 
and they were admitted but with an initiation clause. 
It was only on the 24th January 1985 that the 
Constitution of the Council was amended to accept the 
N.u.t.w. as a part to the Council). 
It can also be pointed out that the introduction of 
the Physical Planning and Resources Act on the lst 
~anuary 1968 also impacted on the potential growth of 
the industry. This act severely re_stricted an 
employers ability to replace white and coloured 
workers with black employees. This, together with the 
rise of "Border Areas", decentralisation benefits and 
"indepe dent territories/homelands" contributed to t~e 
~ecline of the Transvaal industry. 
Table 15 (drawn from a sample of provident fund record 
cards) provides an indication of the age pattern of 
employees (by sex) over the period 1968 to 1986. The 
figures suggest that there is a growing segment of the 
workforce that continues to ~ork after 40 years of 
age. In 1968 some 4.2% of the sample were over 40 
years of age (Note: 26.1% of sample were of unknown 
age) and by 1986 this had increased to 28.2% (with 
only 4.2% of unknown age). The increase in the age 
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of the work force and the decline in the numbers 
employed_ suggest that manufacturers are able to keep 
the more experienced work force in employment. This 
is supported by the relatively few young (trainee) 
workers to be found (in the later years) in the 
industry. There is a large increase in the category 
"20 < 30" in 1986 and given the low proportion of 
"<20" in all the previous years, it could be argued 
that the entry age of female workers in the Transvaal 
industry is higher than that of the Cape and Natal 
industries. The male age profile provides a similar 
picture of an aging workforce. 
TABLE 15 
AGE DISTRIBUTION 
FEMALE 
Year Age= <20 % 21- % 31- % 41- % >50 % Total 
Unknown <30 <40 <50 
1968 42 7 5.7 40 32.5 28 22.8 5 4.1 1 0.1 123 
1971 61 9 5.6 49 30.4 30 18.6 11 6.8 1 0.1 161 
1974 64 4 2.2 53 29.4 39 21. 7 18 10.0 2 1. 0 180 
1977 53 6 3.8 30 18.8 43 26.9 24 15.0 4 2.5 . 160 
1980 36 7 3.6 55 28.1 56 28.6 29 14.8 13 6.6 196 
1983 24 13 4.6 98 34.9 73 26.0 49 17.4 24 8.5 281 
1986 16 3 0.8 154 40.2 102 26.6 64 16.7 44 11.5 383 
(Figs~ rounded to one decimal point} 
Year Age= <20 % 21- % 31- % 41- % >50 % Total 
Unknown <30 <40 <50 
1968 9 1 5.6 2 11.l 3 16.7 3 16.7 0 - 18 
1971 9 0 - 2 10.5 2 10.5 3 15.8 3 15.8 19 
1974 10 0 - 3 14.3 2 9.5 3 14.3 3 14.3 21 
1977 10 1 4.5 2 9.0 4 18.2 2 9.0 3 13.6 22 
1980 6 1 4.3 13.0 4 17.4 2 8.6 7 13.6 23 
1983 7. 1 2.9 11 31.4 5 14.3 4 11.4 7 20.0 35 
1986 6 5 7.7 21 32.3 13 20.0 8 12.3 12 18.5 65 
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Table 16 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
266. 
Table 16 provides data on employment by sex in the 
Transvaal industry, showing the industry to be 
overwhelmingly female. The male/female ratio is also 
quite stable over time. Machinists represent the 
greatest single job category followed by that of 
'General Worker'. There is, however, a change in the 
employment pattern as over the review period the 
percentage of 'General Workers' (of total provident 
fund sample) increases from 20.6% (1968) to 32.1% 
(1986) and conversely the relative percentages for -the 
machinist category are 42.6% and 33.3%. 
EMPLOYMENT PATTERN BY SEX 
Female % of Sample Male % of Sample Sample 
Total 
123 87.2 18 12.8 141 
134 88.2 18 11.8 152 
158 89.3 19 10.7 177 
161 89.4 19 10.6 180 
155 88.1 21 11.9 176 
159 86.9 24 13.1 183 
180 89.6 21 10.4 201 
176 88.4 23 11. 6 199 
166 89.7 19 10.3 185 
160 87.9 22 12.1 182 
151 87.8 21 12.2 172 
170 89.0 21 11.0 191. 
196 89.5 23 10.5 219 
223 91.0 22 9.0 245 
254 90.4 27 9.6 281 
281 88.9 35 11.1 316 
329 88.4 43 11.6 372 
341 86.8 52 13.2 393 
383 85.5 65 14.5 448 
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The Transvaal Industrial Council did not record total 
'Entrants' and 'Exits' to the provident fund in a 
manner similar to the Cape provident fund and it is 
therefore not possible to reflect similar patterns. 
However, an analysis of the number of 'Entrances' is 
presented in Table 17 below. By 'Entrances' is meant 
the number· of times· a worker in the industry was 
employed, provided that there was at least a month's 
gap between leaving employment and being re-employed 
in the industry. It would appear that a significantly 
increasing proportion of the labour force reflect 4 or 
more 'Entrances' (i.e. In 1968 this segment represents 
17.1% of the sample and in 1986 the comparable figure 
was 28.6%) which supports the idea of an aging 
workforce. 
TABLE 17 
Tot 
141 
180 
201 
182 
219 
316 
448 
NO. OF ENTRANCES TO INDUSTRY 
Year 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % >5 
1968 58 ( 41.1) 40 (28.4) 19 (13.5) 9 ( 6 . 4 ) 9 ( 6 . 4 ) 6 
1971 67 (37.2) 48 (26.7) 28 (15.6) 18 (10.0)' 9 ( 5. 0) 10 
1974 67 (33.3) 50 (24.9) 35 (17.4) 17 ( 8 . 5 ) 13 ( 6 . 5 ) 19 
1977 54 (29.7) 41 (22.5) 40 (22.0) 18 ( 9 . 9 ) 10 ( 5 . 5 ) 19 
1980 66 (30.1) 49 (22.4) 33 (15.1) 26 (11.9) 15 ( 6. 8) 30 
1983 109 (34.5) 66 (20.9) 36 (11.4) 41 (13.0) 21 (6.6) 43 
1986 186 (41.5) 77 (17.2) 57 (12.7) 48 (10.7) 24 ( 5. 4) 56 
SUMMARY 
The Transvaal work force is essentially 'Black', 
female more likely to be less than 40 years of age 
(although an increasing proportion of the labour force 
is over 40 years), is employed either as a machinist 
. or general worker and reflects a high degree of 
·entrance~ and exits from the industry. 
% 
( 4 . 3 ) 
( 5 . 6 ) 
( 9 . 5 ) 
(10.4) 
(13.7) 
(13.6) 
(12.5) 
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The Wage Form 
Table 18 provides a picture of negotiated wages for 
job categories at various points of the revie_w period. 
The wage structure in the Transvaal review period 
reflects similar issues to that of the Cape in that 
Gazetted Agreements reflect the addition and deletion 
of job categories as well as the de-sexing of jobs. 
In 1974 the Gazette reflects 4 classes of machinists. 
The distinction is made by job function and then by 
sex, thus both male and female workers have the same 
job descriptions but with diff~rent minimum wages. 
This distinction falls away in 1982 and the gazette 
(merely) reflects two classes of machinists. Sex as a 
classificatory mechanism has been dropped. By 1986 
- this distinction has be~n changed to ref Lect only one 
class of machinist. This then complicates the 
comparison of wages (for machinists) over the review 
period. In an attempt to compare the changes in wage 
rates to the rate of inflation, the agreement of 1974 
has been selected as the starting point. The 
following figures apply 
Date 
(Male)A 
(Male)B 
(Female)A 
(Female)B 
1/1/75 
27.50 
22.00 
22.00 
18.50 
1/1/80 
53.60 
39.50 
33.90 
26.35 
1/1/83 
69.50 
49.00 
* Single rate - i.e. for all machinists 
31/12/86* 
74.00 
Using the Standard Bank Data Base Inflation Index it 
can be seen that 
R27.50 on 1/1/75 equalled Rl27.05 on 31/12/86 
1/1/75 equalled RlOl.64 on 31/12/86 on R22.00 
Rl8.50 on 1/1/75 equalled R85.47 on 31/12/86 
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Irrespective of the initial category of machinist, all 
have not had minimum wages keep pace with inflation. 
Whilst there have been changes to this job category 
which may make the comparison suspect, the following 
jobs have remained consistent (in terms of their 
gazetted description) and therefore more readily 
comparable, 
Wage Wage Inflation Gain 
1/1/75 31/12/86 adjusted (Loss) 
1. Artisan 70.00 244.20 323.40 (79.20) 
2. Foreman 50.00 219.60 231.00 (11.40) 
3. Clothing Mach 
Mechanic 35.00 125.80 161.70 (35.90) 
4. Supervisor 29.00 115.70 133.98 (18.28) 
5. Watchman 15.00 74.00 09.30 (4.70) 
6. General worker 14.25 56.60 65.84 (9.24) 
7 . Driver(up to 
6000 lbs) 18.00 82.80 83.16 (0.36) 
8. Factory clerk 23.00 97.20 106.26 (9.06) 
Table 18 also presents a hierarchical arrangement of 
the-wages paid at five points of the review period, 
and the graph on page 222 presents a pictorial 
representation. (Note - to read Table 18 the reader 
will find a job number next to (abbreviated) job 
titles, these job numbers will be found in each column 
with the appropriate wage next to it, in this way the 
reader can trace - over time - any changes to a 
particular job. ) 
(i) The simplification of the hierarchy of job 
titles - i.e. a decrease in the number thereof 
(ii} The introduction and elimination of certain job 
titles (from 1968 to 1986) 
(iii). A ranking of wages as an indication of 
importance of the jobs to the negotiators. 
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The artisan consistently is paid the most and likewise 
the general worker the least, and whilst some jobs 
change their hierarchical position from point to' 
point, the graph overpage indicates that the shape of 
the pay curve has remained similar over the review 
period. 
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Graph I - Transvaal Gazetted Rates 
(Minimum Wages) 
Rand per week 
250 -·--··--------·---·---··-------·-·-----··-- ---·-----···--·-· .. ---·--··----·······-···--·----·------
200 ----\··-------· -- ------ --- --- ---- ---- - -- ---------- ---- -------------------------
\ 
l 5 0 ---· .. -·----·-··-··-·--··---·····-----·---·····----····-·--···-·----·--·--·-·---····---···-······-·-··-··--·-·-·· .. ···-·--·-···---·---··----·-----··-·-··----·· .. --. 
100 
50 
Job Title 
This graph shows comparison of the 
gazetted rates for Tvl workers 1970-86. 
For ABCDEF see Table 18. 
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6.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME 
The Negotiations and their Meaning Content 
The Transvaal negotiations are similar to the Cape in their 
meaning content in that the themes of employers maintaining 
their competitive position and the employees arguing economic 
hardship are consistent over the years. The Transvaal, 
however, differs from the Cape in that the minutes of 
negotiations reflect a number of 'political' issues entering 
into debate between the parties. The union begins to feel 
that it should be more militant and employers believe that 
their relationship (with the union} is changing detrimentally. 
The negotiations are further complicated by an essentially 
minority union negotiating "on behalf of" the majority of 
workers. This is certainly true up until the 21st May, 1981, 
when the (black} N.U.C.W. is admitted to the council, albeit 
not as a full party to negotiations. 
Unlike the Cape the Transvaal reflects a number of 
negotiations which were "informal" and as such no minutes were 
kept. The industry in the Transvaal was affected to a larger 
extent by various Acts of legislation, particularly the 
Physical Planning and Resources Act. Attempts by the State to 
promote the decentralization of industries and Job 
Reservation; these n turn affect the ability of employers to 
(in their eyes} remain competitive. 
The meetings reported on here cover the period 14th March, 
1968, to 23rd October, 1985. The total number of lines 
analysed are 10,122 which obviously excludes the 'informal' 
meetings. 
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6.3.l 1968 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. l - l4TH MARCH, 1968 - 834 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
29/31 
32/33 
783/85 
787/89 
UNION 
Line 
61/63 
63/64 
Note: 
Quote 
"Any agreement arrived at could not be in the 
interests of the employee only: it had to be in the 
interests of the Industry". 
"Any agreement had to be based on what the Industry 
could stand". 
"They were in competition with the other three 
Provinces, the uncontrolled areas and with Rhodesia 
and this had tb limit them". 
It was accepted that it was the Union's duty to 
keep the miniumum as high as possible but any such 
minimum must allow the employers to stay in 
business". 
Quote 
"asked the employers to sincerely believe that the 
Union had never been unmindful of the interests of 
the industry". 
"Although they were opposing parties their 
interests were the same". 
This meeting reflects little or no bargaining as 
Employers are unprepared and the meeting is largely 
used to detail the Union's proposals. 
MEETING NO. 2 - 2ND APRIL 1968 - 1145 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
344/47 
Quote 
"He appealed to the Union not to make refugees of 
the Tvl. employers, asking the Union not to make 
life intolerable for the manufacturers in the 
Tvl.". 
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EMPLOYERS 
Line 
267/71 
UNION 
Line 
804/8 
. 644/6 
437/441 
275. 
Quote 
"He said it had to be realised that the clothing 
~ndustry was not working in a vacuum on an island. 
Clothing was an easily mobile commodity and if one 
had to go into any ~large store, one could find 
clothing from all four corners of the Republic and 
outside". 
Quote 
"At that time employers and the workers stood 
together to help the industry remain in the Tvl., 
but now that the industry had pulled out of its 
decline, the workers were entitled to improvements 
in their wages and w~rking conditions" . 
"The C.O.L. was continua],ly going up and when 
workers bu~ their requirements they realise how 
difficult it is to make ends meet". 
"The industry could not exist and at the same time 
pay wages which would enable workers to buy only 
the bare necessities of life. (pn. Rep.) said that 
. -
if this position was to be maintained, the workers 
would just have to find other jobs where they could 
earn a decent living". 
MEETING N.O. 3 - 9TH APRIL, 1968 - 923 LINES 
No quotes. 
Supporting Statements 
Employers 
At a General Meeting of the 25th April, 1968, the Ch~irman 
reports back to the membership on the negotiations and states, 
"The _T.C.M.A. delegates had started negotiations with the 
Cape wage of Rl2.00 in mind". 
In the Presidential Address of the 42nd Annual General Meeting 
of the T.C.M.A. (d.d. 21/11/68), the following comments can be 
found 
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(1) Referring to the Wage Determination No. 297 it is 
stated '' .... the prescribed levels of wages, while 
showing an improvement, fall far short, I feel, of 
requirements for the removal of competitive wage 
advantage against the established clothing 
industry". 
(2) Referring to the Physical Planning and Resources 
Act it is noted that exemption from the provisions 
in respect of "Bantu females and juveniles" has 
been applied for, but such requests "have not been 
answered". 
No documentation on any Union meetings could be found. 
6.3.2 1971 NEGOTIATIONS 
-
MEETING NO. 1 - 22ND FEBRUARY 1971 - 561 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line Quote 
495/98 "The manufacturers had invested a tremendous amount 
of capital in the Industry and they were entitled 
to some return on this capital investment". 
493/94 
472/74 
They fully appreciated the difficulties of.the 
living conditions of the workers and they would do 
their utmost to try and alleviate this position". 
"It was obvious that both the employers and 
employees wanted to reach a wage that would keep 
employees in the industry". 
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Line 
435/6 
382/4 
333/4 
236/7 
' 169/72 
153/55 
122/4 
277. 
Quote 
"In the Leather Industry specialist machinists were 
paid Rl7.75 p.w. plus a 2.5% special bonus p.w". 
"In Cape Town the wages for pattern makers and 
graders would be R39.53 in 1972. The present wage 
in the Tvl. was R30.85". 
"In Cape Town the employers were paying a much 
higher contribution to the Prov. Fuhd". 
"The Union realised that goals could not be 
achieved at one throw but advances could only be 
made step by step". 
"Prof. v.d. Horst had said 'The sectional interests 
of organised labour and capital came to terms at 
the expense of powerless Africans'. Such an 
accusation will never be levelled against the G.W. 
Union". 
"It was clear from statistics that the Africans 
were not getting a fair share of the wealth of the 
natic;m". 
~'The real drop in wages. which workers will suffer 
by the time the new Agreement comes into operation 
will at least be 16.1%". 
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MEETING NO. 2 - 17TH MARCH 1971 - 601 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
20/21 
26/27 
29/35 
84/7 
UNION 
Line 
141/2 
142/3 
158/60 
189/91 
Quote 
"Both Cape and Natal have a 42~ hr. week as against 
40 hrs. in the Tvl.". 
"In the Cape a maximum of 30c p.w. was paid, Natal 
19c and in the Tvl. 39c" [This refers to employers 
contributions in respect of I.C. Med. Fund., Prov. 
Fund etc.] 
-
"If the wages were reduced to hourly rates it would 
be found that •... the Cape rate would be 13.60 
p.h., in Natal 13.17 an hour. The employers 
original proposal for the Tvl. was 13.20." 
"He felt that at the outset there was one illusion 
that the Union must not suffer from and that was 
that the Transvaal was not in competition with any 
other area". 
Quote 
"The increase in food alone had been 10.44% this 
year". 
"The rents· for coloured housing had increased very 
substantially". 
"workers ... did not have the money to buy 
luxuries. Their main budget went into food, 
clothing and transport". 
"The Union had done more to try to narrow the gap 
of competition between the coastal areas and the 
Transvaal than the employers". 
MEETING NO. 3 - 18TH MARCH 1971 - 926 LINES 
This ~eeting is taken up with discussion of employers 
proposals, the substantive detail is dealt with on a proposal 
- accept/reject - compromise - accept pattern with little in 
the way of explicit construct supporting statements. 
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Supporting Statements 
In the presidential address of the T.C.M.A. dated 20th 
November, 1969, the following points are made 
( 1) II 1969 proved to be another frustrating year 
for industrialists, what with the abolition of 
resale price maintenance, the Physical Planning and 
Resources Utilisation Act of 1967 and impending 
legisl~tion for simplification of customs tariff 
and much feared possible additional increases in 
customs duty ... " 
(2) Dissatisfaction with the Union is expressed for 
taking advantage of "full employment and manpower 
shortage" to approach employers offering to find 
them qualified workers provided they (the 
employers) "indicate in writing their willingness 
to employ the Union's· skilled members at higher 
wages than recently agreed". The President states 
that such behaviour by the Union, " ... breached the 
spirit if not the letter of the agreement and must 
be condemned in the strongest terms". 
In his presidential address on the 19th November 1970, 
he states 
(1) The year has been "another frustrating one for 
industrialists - this time because they have been 
faced by serious labour problems arising from a 
general shortage of workers in our industry. This 
position has been aggravated in no small measure by 
restrictions placed on the employment of additional 
Bantu labour if only to fill the vacancies left by 
non-replaceable European and Coloured employees and 
without even meeting the expanding needs of our 
Industry". 
(2) "The denial of the use of Bantu labour ... puts a 
scarcity value on the employment of our existing 
labour and artificially causes an increase in 
wages" which the Unions are "not slow to exploit". 
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In the T.C.M.A. Annual Report for 1971 (dated 4/11/71) it is 
stated by the Chairman "we must face the fact that we are 
competing in a labour market against other industries and 
commerce for the critically short White and Coloured labour. 
I would venture to suggest that any further increases in wages 
which are not coupled with a corresponding increase in 
productivity would signal a mass migration of our factories to 
sites more economically viable". Furthermore, the Chairman 
notes "The Union, I regret to say, appear unable to see beyond 
the question of increased wages for its members without 
thought of a quid pro quo for the manufacturers". 
Union 
No Union documentation on meetings around this period could be 
found. 
6.3.3 1974 NEGOTIATIONS 
There are no minutes to these negotiations and therefore 
construct supporting statements cannot be pre~ented. 
At the time of these negotiations, council minutes record a 
disagreement between the secretary of the council and the 
Department of Labour (D.o.L.) representative (20/3/74). The 
issue revolved around the contention of the Department of 
- Labour representative that the secretary had not acted 
properly in reporting what th~t representative saw as "a 
dispute involving Bantu workers". The secretary of the 
council had not viewed the issue in such light. The 
Department of Labour representative is reported to have 
(a) "indicated that no agreement of this Council would be 
published unless he (D.o.L. Repr.) approved of this 
agreement". 
(b) "accused him (Council Sec.) of undermining his (D.o.L. 
Rep's>.authority and the Government policy". 
(c) "threatened to report him (Council Sec.) to the Minister 
of Labour for lack of co-operation in not reporting 
disputes to him (D.o.L. Rep.) .. 
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This event generated the following observations by members of 
the Council 
(i) "Negotiations would be considerably complicated if 
after agreement was reached there were further demands 
from the Bantu Labour Board". 
(ii) Union Repr. "said that Mr. (Council Sec.) had acted 
' regularly and in terms of the Industrial Concilliation 
Act". 
(iii) (Employers Repr.) "said that he agreed with (Employees 
Repr.)". 
(iv) (Employers Repr., referring to the D. o. L. Repr.) "had 
no right to interfere in any shape or form of the 
int~rnal affairs of the industry". 
(v) (Employers Repr.) "that no agreement which was to be 
concluded between the G.W.U. and the T.C.M.A. would be 
published before Mr. (D.o.L Rep) consented to it, puts 
the T.C.M.A. in an impossible osition". 
This event is presented to show the solidarity of the parties 
to the agreement and to what they both see as undue 
interference. At a subsequent meeting (4/4/74) the members of 
the Council are advised that in response to the Council's 
letter to the Central Bantu Labour Board detailing the 
Council's position, the duties of the Bantu Labour Officers 
have been spelt out. The result is that negotiations will 
proceed as before. 
The negotiations then proceed informally although in the 
minutes it is recorded that a (different) representative of 
the Central Bantu Labour Board indicated that the Government 
wanted a minimum wage of Rl4 for "the lowest category of 
worker". The minutes reflect some debate about whether this 
is a "qualified rate" or not. No finality about this is 
recorded in these or subsequent minutes. 
At a council meeting on the 16th May 1974 it is reported that 
agreement has been reached and the employers' representative 
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states "Although the negotiations were tough, he had, at all 
times, found the Union to be most co-operative. He recorded 
his personal thanks for their understanding of the 
manufacturers' position". 
In turn the union representative is quoted as follows 
"She reiterated that although the negotiations were tough, a 
good atmosphere prevailed throughout, and she was grateful 
that the Union had been able to get reasonable concessions 
from the employers". In debate about the Rl4 minimum wage, 
the Union Representative points out that concessions of 30-40% 
had been got, and while the unqualified starting rate (for 
some job categories) was RlO "it could not be expected of the 
Union to press the employers for further substantial increases 
as they would also move to Babalegi" (i.~. a Border area 
where the wage rate was considerably less than those in the 
Transvaal) . 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
In the presid~ntial address of 22/11/73 the president states, 
"We in the Transvaal are in a cleft stick. White machinists 
have long since left the industry; Coloured machinists are 
fast being tempted away by commerc·e who will eventually 
denude our industry of coloureds, while the Physical Planning 
Act does not allow us to replace this lost labour with female 
Bantu labour available and legally in this area". 
In the following year's presidential address the president 
mentions "cordial" discussions with the N.U.C.W. and states, 
"I can only state that our discussions with both White and 
Black Unions presented absolutely no problem to us; in fact, 
they were mainly respon~ible for the cordial and co-operative 
manner in which our actual negotiations were conducted". 
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Union 
No minutes to any meetings could be found. 
EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS - 31ST JULY 1975 
A request for an interim increase is minuted on the above date 
with the G.W.U.-S.A. motivating such request by arguing that 
the previous "20% increase" did not "cover the increase in the 
Cost of Living allowance over the three years". The 
G.W.U.-S.A. present figures of what the wages ''should have 
been" had the 'cost of LiVing' been taken into account. They 
argue "Africans paid the highest prices for food items in view 
of the fact that they did not have supermarket~ in their 
areas". 
The employers response makes reference to competition from 
Natal and Cape industries and that employment in those areas 
is increasing, but declining in the Transvaal, suggesting that 
"it was the economic factor that must be considered". The 
minutes of 21st August 1975 record an offer from the T.C.M.A. 
for what amounts to a Rl.00 attendance bonus, arguing that the 
economic situation is such that any increase must be tied to 
productivity. 
6.3.4 1977 NEGOTIATIONS 
These negotiations were again largely ''informal", i.e. not 
minuted. In the minutes of 17th March 1977 it is noted that 
the parties "had, had a great deal of informal negotiations", 
and whilst the Agreement was all but finalised, "the employers 
were not able to accede to the last SOc extra in respect of 
category (c) which the Union had asked for" and therefore 
request a postponement until "a mandate had been ~btained from 
the general meeting" (of the T.C.M.A.). 
One m~eting of the council is held at which negotiations were 
recorded, this on the 31st March 1977. 
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MEETING NO. 1. - 31ST MARCH 1977 - 309 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
94/6 
104/6 
134/6 
230/2 
UNION 
Line 
64/65 
55/57 
46/48 
242/3 
Quote 
"With economic and bad business conditions they 
were finding it difficult to pay the present wages, 
besides what had been offered in the T.C.M.A. 's 
original proposals ... " 
"For the first 2 months of this year alone the 
Industry had paid over R30,000 in slack pay". 
"the employers were begging the Union please to 
accept their proposals and have an industry, 
otherwise 20,000 workers would be faced with 
unemployment". 
"In his opinion, with (sic) the workers there would 
be no industry and from the workers side - without 
the employers there would b  no industry". 
Quote 
The workers standard of living today was worse than 
it was in 1952, which was a very ~orry reflection 
on the industry". 
'' ... the Clothing Industry's wages were very sad 
and was lagging far behind industries like tobacco, 
furniture,. leather, etc.". 
"All these increases were affecting the workers and 
instead of the position improving it was becoming 
worse". 
"It was therefore better for them to starve and not 
work than to work and starve". 
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SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
In the Presidential Address of 17/11/77 the in~ustry's 
problems are related and these revolve around essentially 
non-labour matters. Referring to the wage negotiations, the 
President notes, ."I am pleased to say that the negotiations 
were conducted in a spirit of amity and understanding". 
Union 
At a joint (i.e. all races) annual general meeting, the 
secretary of the G.W.U.-S.A. says that "never in her 39 years 
in the industry" had the economy been so bad, and compares 
wages in the clothing industry to other sectors of the 
economy; "The leather workers only got an increase of 7~%, 
therefore the garment workers were better off than most other 
workers". 
The secretary, furthermore, quotes "The Star'' (daily 
newspaper) which reports, "the number of unemployed is 1.5 
million". 
6.3.5 1979 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 27TH FEBRUARY, 1979 - 245 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
193/7 
206/8 
' 
213/14 
Quote 
" ... he found no reference was made to the choatic 
(sic) state in which the clothing industry in the· 
Tvl. f6und itself. This meeting would have to come 
down to the principle understanding that the 
industry could only afford a certain amount if an 
increase were.granted in wages". 
" ... , but this industry must not be compared with 
other industries. This industry could only be 
compared with the clothing industry in the Cape and 
Natal". 
" on productivity, the workers in the Transvaal 
were lagging behind that of the workers in Cape 
Town and Durban". 
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Lines 
40/41 
119/22 
139/41 
286. 
Quote 
"The Union had always argued and wished to 
reiterate that the cost of living was higher for 
the lower income group than that ... ". 
"The Union's plea for a substantial increase in 
wages was due to the fact that 
(a) Workers could not manage to exist on their 
present wages. 
(b) Their standard of living instead of improving 
had deteriorated". 
" ... she informed the employers that her Union 
would not accept less than what the Cape had as a 
starting wage and the qualified wages must be much 
higher". 
MEETING NO. 2. - 17TH APRIL 1979 - 372 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
35/38 
48/52 
67/68 
77/80 
Quote 
"Over the last year, the Industry had a loss of 
7197 employees. Coupled with this there were 17 
factories who had gone insolvent yet barely any in 
the Cape and Natal" .. 
"He consequently appealed to the Union's 
representatives to understand this position as he 
was aware and realised that wages had to be 
increased but any further increase would, from an 
economic point of view, kill the industry in the 
Transvaal". 
"In fact, the wage paid in the Tvl. was more than 
that being paid in all other areas". 
" if one looked at the hourly rate paid in other 
areas, what incentive was there for employers to 
remain in business in the Transvaal Clothing 
Industry? The employers had now reached a stage 
where they must look at the economics". 
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UNION 
Lines 
97/100 
202/3 
Note: 
287. 
"He said that it was the economic fact of life that 
in spite of the cost of living, the Transvaal at 
present was going through a tight squeeze more than 
other areas". 
Quote 
"The workers cost of living was rising all the time 
and if they did not keep up with the increase in 
the cost of living, garment workers already have 
never been able to maintain improved standard of 
living". (sic) 
"Because of the unequality of the wage compared 
with the cost of living, most of the garment 
workers were still on or below the Poverty Datum 
Line". 
This meeting is also characterised by the Union's 
threat/suggestion that a deadlock existed and that 
in terms of ·the Industrial Conciliation Act, 
arbitration or a strike are the only options. The 
Union prefers arbitration to strike action but 
would go on trike if employers "persist with their 
unreasonable offer". 
MEETING NO. 3 - 13TH APRIL 1979 - 145 LINES 
This meeting taken up largely around provident fund 
contributions, which employers will take back to a general 
meeting of the T.C.M.A. and discussion around definitions of 
'lateness' and its determination of receipt of attendance 
bonuses or not. These issues are resolved at the 4th meeting 
which took place on the 8th May 1979 and covered 127 lines. 
In terms of these negotiations it should be noted that the 
minutes of 29/8/79 record that the Central Black [changed from 
'BANTU'] Labour Board (C.B.L.B.) had expressed dissatisfaction 
with the wage levels of two job categories and flowing from 
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this a T.C.M.A. deputation had met with the chairman of the 
C.B.L.B. resulting in the wage being increased from Rl2.00 per 
week to Rl3.00. The T.C.M.A. had rejected suggestions of 
back-pay, agreeing only to the new wage in the first week 
after the publication of the Agreement. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
In the president's address of 22/11/79 it is reported that the 
union had started with "a request ... for increases in wages 
of the order of 25% across the board". However, "The Union 
with due regard to the difficult economic conditions in our 
industry proved to be receptive to our pleas for a responsible 
approach to wage demands and in a spirit of co-operation 
agreed to accept " 
Union 
The union A.G.M. of 1979 only records the publication of the 
Agreement, no discussion minuted. 
6.3.6 1980 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS 
At a meeting of the industrial council on the 24th June 1980, 
it is reported that on the 17th June informal discussions had 
taken place to discuss a request for 5% 'now' and a further 5% 
in 1981. 
In a meeting that takes up 250 lines of minutes, the union 
takes the first 103 lines to present its case and the argument 
revolves around the issue of economic hardship. The cost of 
living has increased and workers "cannot come out". Various 
authorities such as the Rand Daily Mail's 'Consumer Mail' and 
government statistics are referred to in their presentation. 
In ad.dition, the union observe, "the mood of the workers was 
not good and the strikes in other industries appear to be 
contageous and as a result some of these strikes have been 
successful in obtaining increases". 
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Employers are warned that they will loose their white workers 
and "almost all· their Coloured workers showing leadership 
qualities'', and while they still had "the cream of Black 
workers" these too could be lost to the industry. 
The union also points out that the "workers wanted 20%" and 
that it "had been a battle" to get 12~% accepted (as a 
request/demand) which if the employers did not accept then the 
matter would be referred to the Industrial Court. 
The employers response revolves around the impact on their 
ability to compete and offer 2~% now and 5% in 1981. 
At a further meeting (1st July) similar arguments are put 
forward with the union emphasizing its inability to "keep 
industrial peace". Agreement is eventually reached on 5% now 
.and 5% in 1981. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
No reference to the above negotiations could be found in the 
presidential address of 13/11/1980. 
Union 
At a general meeting of the union (30/6/80) and referring to 
the 1979 n~gotiations, the secretary says that whilst she was 
not happy with the increases and whilst "the employers agreed 
that she had fully pFoved the workers' case they stated that 
they did not have the money to pay out extra increases". 
The minutes also record debate about the union's letter to 
employers requesting a 12~% increase and that members "felt 
that if the employers refuse t:~1ey would go on_ strike". The 
minutes also record members being cautioned (by the secretary) 
"they would have to make sacrifices and it would not be easy''. 
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6.3.7 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS 1981 
A request for a special increase was minuted on the 19/2/1981 
based on the (economic) hardship that the workers·experience. 
There is at this stage no threat of strike action and the 
Employer delegates agree to present and discuss the letter at 
a meeting of the T.C.M.A. 
The debate on this issue continues in council on the 5th 
March, with employers unwilling to negotiate whilst workers 
are on strike at a particular factory. The union in stating 
its case add "there were people who were working amongst the 
workers of all industries. Their appeals were more militant 
and more revolutionary and ~erhaps that was where the union 
had missed out as far as the workers were c ncerned - the 
union was not militant enough to fight their case .... 
Perhaps she should have been more militant then the workers 
would have had more confidence in her today .... the militant 
people were getting the ears of the workers more than the 
union". 
The meeting continued the following day at which the Uniop 
reported that it had got the workers back to work and then 
presents its "hardship" case by reference to the consumer 
price index, university of the Witwatersrand figures and 
various specific item increases. Agreement on a special 
increase is arrived at on the 12th March, 1981, with all wages 
increasing by 11.5% with the exception of beginners, whose 
minimum wage is increased from Rl2.00 to Rl7.00 per week. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
The president does not refer to these negotiations but does 
note that, "our Transvaal Industry enjoys exemption in respect 
of the employment of Black women workers". 
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Union 
On the 31st March, 1981, the president of the union addressed 
a meeting of shop stewards about the interim wage increase. 
The union is to ask for "a substantial increase in wages and 
fringe benefits". She points out that if 'deadlock' is 
reached the options are either a strike or arbitration, and 
suggests that the union might do well on wages under those 
conditions (i.e. arbitration) but "would loose (the) 40 hr. 
week". In addition she refers to "severe competition" from 
Babalegi and "Thaba-Nchu (where) workers earn between R3.00 
and Rl0.00 p~r week". 
6.3.8 1982 NEGOTIATIONS 
Prior to the start of these negotiations there is a great deal 
of dissatisfaction expres~ed at a council meeting dated 4th 
February, 1982. The issue revolves around the starting date 
for negotiations and an advert placed by the union in their 
paper dealing with the starting date of negotiations.-
The employers do not want the negotiations publicised but the 
union rejects this saying that it has instructed its officials 
to keep members informed. A union delegate·"advised employers 
that the workers wer  this time more militant and more 
determined than ever and even threatened to strike or go to 
the industrial council for arbitration. The worker's moods 
were in that state because one just had to look at the 
newspaper and see what the radical unions were getting". 
The employers also do not wish to change the date on which to 
begin negotiations as they had to start up their own factories 
before doing T.C.M.A. work. In addition it is recorded, "the 
T.C.M.A. was there to negotiate with and was available to 
negotiate as from 1/4/82 to conclude an agreement for the 
first pay day of July 1982. If this was not acceptable as a 
prior condition to the negotiations, then he did not see much 
hope in even sitting ar_ound a negotiating table". 
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Agreement is event~ally arrived at for negotiations to begin 
on the 29th March, 1982, and the union are requested to 
publish such and it was "requested that it should be 
without any emotive qualifications". 
The union agrees to the employers request but pointed out that 
strikes were news and that workers read other papers in 
addition to the union's newspaper. "She said that the mood of 
the workers were completely different". 
MEETING NO. 1 - 25TH MARCH 1982 - 497 LINES 
EMPLOYER 
Lines 
403/5 
408/9 
UNION 
Lines 
183/4 
189/90 
203/5 
223/4 
235/7 
302 
Quote 
"However when one looked at wages throughout the 
country it should be the same, even though in some 
areas the cost of living was higher than in 
others". 
" ... they had to take into account wages paid at 
the coastal areas". 
Quote 
"The workers had barely managed to keep body and 
soul together". 
"As we all know over the past year rents in Soweto 
increased 3 times". 
"There is a big campaign amoungst the workers that 
the minimum rate for Black workers should be 
R2.00 p.h. which means this is the amount fixed in 
workers minds for labourers". 
"Most workers in the clothing industry are living 
in poverty, they struggle to provide the basic 
necessities of life". 
"Workers wages should be linked to the Consumer 
Price Index and annually there should be a real 
wage increase adjustment". 
"The Cape Town wages are above.ours II . . . . 
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MEETING NO. 2 - 26TH MARCH 1982 - 428 LINES 
EMPLOYER 
Lines 
248/9 
231/5 
224 
UNION 
Lines. 
72/75 
93/5 
137/8 
153/5 
Quote· 
" ... appealed to the Union to give the Employers in 
the Tvl. a chance to remain in Johannesburg". 
" ... said that of the 120 000 workers in South 
Africa only 26 600 enjoyed a 40 hr. week. In 
Atlantis the employers enjoyed the incentives (of 
decentralisation) and were refunded 50% of the 
weekly wage bill back from the Industrial 
Development Corporation". 
" ... but the Transvaal employers were paying more, 
yet they were one of only 2 industries that worked 
a 40 hr. week". 
Quote 
"after work they had a duty to perform to their 
families, and the only bright light to them was 
that they stopped work before the other industries 
which gave them the opportunity to get home 
earlier". 
"Although she was not averse to strike action she 
was averse to wild cat strikes". 
"The Unions wanted an increase across the board for 
each and every worker that was a member of the 
Union". 
" .. she then quoted the comparison between the Cape 
wages and that of the Transvaal". 
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MEETING No: 3 - 30TH MARCH 1982 - 332 LINES 
EMPLOYER 
Lines 
46/47 
52 
UNION 
Lines 
44/5 
188/90 
Quote 
" ... said that a bonus depended on the productivity 
and financial position of the firm". 
"those workers who worked hard would receive a 
bonus". 
Quote 
"said that 45% of the employers paid a bonus at the 
end of the year". 
"The Unions would definitely need this time in view 
of the fact that FOSATO had their eyes on the 
clothing industry .. ". 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
In the presidential address f 11/11/82 it is observed that, 
"Negotiations were hampered by certain members who were forced 
to give increases through illegal strikes". 
Union 
No documentatio  for this year could be found. 
6.3.9 1983 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 5TH SEPTEMBER 1983 - 256 LINES 
EMPLOYER 
Lines 
100/2 
Quote 
" said that if a person opened a business and 
read all the by-laws attached, h~ would say that 
more money could be made by investing it in a 
building society". 
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199/200 
UNIONS 
Lines 
78/80 
92/3 
94/96 
295. 
"The main reason for this [businesses closing down] 
was that conditions in the Transvaal just made it 
impossible for any employer to run a business 
successfully". 
"continuing (the employers repr.) said that the 
Unions must keep the employers competitive in order 
to give the members employment". 
Quote 
"A definite rule should be made otherwise a great 
deal of problems would be encountered as to what 
constituted ordinary dismissal and retrenchment". 
"Failure to notify the Union concerned and to 
negotiate would be construed as an unfair labour 
practice". 
"Continuing (the employees repr.) gave a lengthy 
report on how garment workers were suffering as a 
result ·of the low wages earned in the Clothing 
Industry". 
MEETING NO. 2 - 7TH SEPTEMBER 1983 - 204 LINES 
EMPLOYER 
Lines 
171/2 
UNION 
Lines 
50/1 
Quote 
"Said that these wages had been offered in an 
endeavour to try and remain competitive". 
Quote 
"the Unions felt the workers must be safeguarded". 
(this is a reference to retrenchment) 
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MEETING NO. 3 - 21ST SEPTEMBER 1~83 - 203 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
99/102 
178/79 
UNION 
Lines 
116/7 
168/9 
170/2. 
Quote 
"Manufacturers were finding it extremely difficult 
to compete internationally, unless the 
manufacturers become export oriented they were 
going to find themselves faced with the problem 
that they would be killing themselves off". 
"If the Unions expected greater increases then they 
would certainly speed up the closure of a lot of 
factories". 
Quote 
"The Clothing Industry was vulnerable all the time 
as it had strong opposition from Durban and Cape 
Town". [this used to support argument for older 
workers getting a long service bonus as they had 
made many sacrifices in terms of building up 
various funds and accepting lower wage increases 
when Tvl. wages were greater than Cape and Natal] 
" ... as it was the Unions were vulnerable to 
attacks all the time". [i.e. by others who may be 
more radical/aggressive, reference is made to 
articles in "The Sowetan"] 
"The Unions have not been able to build up a decent 
standard of living for the garment workers; and 
they were furthermore not in a position to meet the 
inflation rate ... it would be impossible to sell 
the wage offered". 
MEETING NO. 4 - STH OCTOBER 1983 - 103 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
88/89 
Quote 
" ... the Government was making it more and more 
difficult to operate economically ... ". 
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297. 
II it was not a viable proposition for employers 
to work in Johannesburg". 
No quotes. 
MEETING NO. 5 - 21ST OCTOBER 1983 - 309 LINES 
No quotes. 
In the meeting of the 21st October part of the meeting (lines 
14 to 139, i.e. about 40%) is devoted to 'Unfair Labour 
Practices' (U.L.P.) (as specified in the Labour Relations Act) 
and whether the National Union of Clothing Workers was 
operating within the framework of the agreement. 
The T.C.M.A. is very upset with the N.U.C.W's action involving 
U.L.P's and says that it has a mandate not to sign any new 
agreement "unless it was sure which direction the National 
Union was going". The T.C.M.A. representative addressed the 
G.W.U. representative saying that "this was a serious 
matter". The G.W.U. representative theti "appealed to the 
National Union to assist in building up the industry and not 
to destroy it". The employers representative noted "the 
atmosphere at Council meetings ~ere no longer the same ... in 
his opinion the parties were no longer working as a Council 
but were working separately". The debate finishes with "The 
National Union, he said, would respect the Agreement. 
However, if a complaint of unfair labour practice was received 
they would certainly raise it at Council level". 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
At a.special general meetirig of the T.C.M.A. on 20/10/83 to 
ratify the new agreement the chairman notes, 
"members should take note of the increased militancy of the 
N.U.C.W." 
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In his presidential address to the T.C.M.A. on the 21st 
November, 1983, the President says 
" ... I have to mention though that it was a most difficult 
round of negotiations. The extravagent claims made by the 
N.U.C.W. did not facilitate the speedy conclusion of the 
negotiations". 
Union 
No relevant documentation could be found. 
6.3.10 1985 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 2ND OCTOBER 1985 - 619 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
146/7 
~60/4 
473/5 
479/80 
UNION 
Lines 
301/3. 
Quote 
" ... the average wage was [for the Cape] close to 
the base line [i.e. the prescribed wage] whereas in 
the Transvaal the reverse applied". 
"The employers had a major problem in trying to 
sell their merchandise, expanding th.eir businesses 
and employing more people. They want to be equal 
with all other geographical areas in S.A. 
manufacturing clothing and failed to see why they · 
should pay premium wages". 
"The employers had appealed to the Union to take 
into account the competitive nature of the 
industry. 
"said that the general public was buying garments 
made in other areas because they were cheaper". 
Quote 
"the petrol price had also gone up .... which would 
result in a general increase". 
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"If one looked at other industries it would be 
found that there was a move to provide for the 
future of workers .in those particular industries. 
He actually.felt tha~ the contributions should be 
increased to 5%". 
"said that possibly the employers were not aware of 
the atmosphere prevailing in the townships". 
"She asked the employers what the Union should tell 
the workers as the cost of living had increase by 
18% this year. If the employers wanted the workers 
to produce, then they mu~t let them earn a living 
wage". 
MEETING NO. 2 - 16TH OCTOBER 1985 - 612 LINES 
.EMPLOYER 
Lines 
94/6 
107/111 
183/5 
196/9 
Quote 
" ... that they want to improve the Transvaal 
Clothing Industry to be more competitive and ensure 
jobs for all". 
"All the employers were asking was to be 
competitive with Durban and Cape Town employers. He 
therefore felt it very wrong for the Eastern 
Province Univ. too have presented analysis on wage 
structures for various industries and still 
compared it with that of the Clothing Industry". 
"He asked the -Union if they wanted a bigger 
industry in the Transvaal at a reasonable rate or 
no industry at a higher rate". 
"The employers were already 5.6% less competitive 
and if they entertained the increase now requested 
they would be 10% less competitive". 
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73/4 
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Quote 
"The workers were up in arms, they [National 
Exe~utive Committee] themselves had mentioned the 
increase in the price of bread, the Putco busf ares 
that were going to be increased by 20% ... ". 
"In the Transvaal Clothing Industry the real wage 
had declined by 25.2%". 
"The children of today had to be educated and with 
that came the school fees, expensive uniforms 
etc.". 
MEETING NO. 3 - 22ND OCTOBER 1985 - 240 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Lines 
109/10 
66/67 
49/51 
UNION 
Lines 
87/88 
70/71 . 
52/6 
Quote 
" ... the employers were not sufficiently 
competitive with the other areas ... ". 
"the sleeve setter in the Transvaal earned 40% more 
than its counterpart in the Cape". 
" they had warned that the Industry would find 
itself in trouble as it could not afford the 
current wages, let alone an increase in the wages". 
Quote 
" ... but those that were highly skilled were now 
being employed in the furniture industry making 
curtains". 
"if (name of factory) closed down it would 
certainly not be because of one or two sleeve 
setters". 
" ... the Union could not be held responsibl~ for 
the situation in the industry, particularly the 
closing down of so many factories. Factories were 
closing down when the starting wage was as little 
as R6.00 per week". 
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36/37 II she was compelled to report that there had 
been a further increase in the price of bread". 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
In the annual report of the T.C.M.A. for 1985/6 it is reported 
that "Although production output declined by 45% during the 
past four years, employment only decline_d by 20% which shows 
the extent to which employers have been resisting retrenchment 
of employees". The report notes that, "This downward trend 
has been arrested and employment levels are again ri~ing but 
not yet in the Transvaal". 
In the presidential address at the 60th annual general meeting 
of the association (20/il/86) it is noted that the Union 
(N.U.C.W.) is about to affiliate with the National Union of 
Textile Workers and this, the President believes; will mean, 
"that employers should prepare themselves for a more militant 
approach by the Union". 
Union 
No documentation could be found. 
SUMMARY 
Table 19 (next page) provides an overall picture of the 
percentage of total lines (by Walton & McKersie's bargaining 
theory) of each meeting taken by the parties to the 
negotiations. This in turn has been presented in graph form 
to indicate the consistency of the behavioural patterns. 
A review of Table 19 indicates that the 'first meetings' (up 
to 1979) are characterised by unions presenting their position 
and trying to persuade employers of its correctness 
(attitudinal structuring). The 'first meetings' of 1983 and 
1985 indicate both sides attempting to persuade the other side 
of the 'rightness' of their position. There is an attempt 
also to develop integrative solutions. 
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TABLE19 Percentages of Bargaining Behahviour - Transvaal 
Percenta2e of Total Lines I 
Meet Emo lover Union [ 
-ing Total Chair 
Date No Lines Ml M2 M3 M4 Nl N2 N3 N4 man 
14 3 68 1 834 0 0 9 0 0 35 43 0 13 100 
22 2 71 1 561 0 0 9 0 0 0 87 0 4 100 
31 3 77 1 309 0 2 36 0 0 14 32 0 17 100 
27 2 79 1 245 0 0 11 0 0 13 53 ~I 23 100 OS 9 83 1 256 0 9 30 1 0 3 29 27 100 
0210 85 1 619 3 9 32 a· 0 5 20 0 32 100 
02 468 2 1145 11 0 24 0 0 0 56 0 10 100 
17 3 71 2 601 0 3 27 0 0 14 35 0 20 100 
11479 2 372 0 10 37 0 0 11 19 0 23 100 
25 3 82 2 497 0 5 12 0 0 10 43 0 29 100 
07 9 83 2 204 0 2 20 0 0 19 38 0 22 100 
1610 85 2 612 0 6 23 0 0 10 24 0 36 100 
09 468 3 923 2 s 14 0 3 10 39 0 27 100 
18 3 71 3 926 1 20 14 0 0 20 21 0 24 100 
18 4 79 3 145 0 12 10 0 3 26 23 0 27 100 
26 3 82 3 428 0 0 30 0 0 13 
' 
55 0 3 100 
21 9 83 3 203 0 2 22 0 0 4 40 0 33 100. 
2210 85 3 240 0 4 23 0 0 3 30 0 40 100 
08 5 79 4 127 6 21 9 0 0 13 12 0 39 100 
30 3 82 4 332 0 20 25 0 0 37 10 0 8 100 
OS 10 83 4 1-03 0 s 35 0 0 15 34 0 12 100 
2210 85 4 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 
2110 83 s 309 0 8 10 0 0 1 12 0 69 100 
2310 85 s 97 0 9 41 0 0 11 21 0 18 100 
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The 'second meetings' of negotiations are similar but with 
more Employer usage of attitudinal structuring. The 'third 
meetings' for 1968 and 1971 are the last meetings for those 
negotiations and reflect some integrative bargaining. The 
balance of the 'third meetings' continue to reflect a greater 
usage of 'attitudinal structuring'. Integrative bargaining 
appears in both the 'third' and '·fourth' meetings of 1979. 
The 'fourth meetings' of 1979 and 1982 are marked by increased 
usage of distribut~ve bargaining, and the dominant role of the 
chairman in the 'fourth meeting' of 1985. 
Generally, the first two meetings are utilised by both parties· 
for 'attitudinal structuring' and thereafter increasing usage 
of distributive bargaining. 
A review of the bargaining behaviour shows that in the 
Transvaal the 'first' and 'second' meetings are dominated by 
attitudinal structuring by both parties. The 'third meetings' 
present a mixed picture, but if the negotiations move into a 
fourth meeting, the proportion of distributive bargaining is 
likely to increase. The 'fifth meetings' reflect an _increased 
utilisation of attitudinal structuring on the part of the 
unions and similarly the employers in the fifth meeting also 
exhibits extensive attitudinal structuring behaviours. 
The Transvaal negotiations ref l~ct some attempts at 
integrative bargaining, particularly in the early years 
bargaining (1968/77/79) and generally this occurs in the 
'third meeting' of a particular year's negotiations. 
Table 19 also indicates that the 1982 negotiations were 
started (i.e. the first meeting) informally and the 
proceedings were not recorded in the minutes of ~he Council. 
Also of interest is the 'fourth meeting' of 1985 in which the 
Chai~man dominated . 
The behavioural patterns in Table 19 are presented in graphs 2 
to 6. 
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Graph 2 - TVL Industrial Council 
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Graph 3 - TVL Industrial Council 
Percentages - Second Meeting 
% of Lines 
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Graph 6 - TVL Industrial Council 
Percentages - Fifth Meeting 
% of Lines 
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Graph 5 - TVL Industrial Council 
Percentages - Fourth Meeting 
% of Lines 
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Graph 4 - TVL Industrial Council 
Percentages - Third Meeting 
% of Lin es 
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6.4 CONSTRUCTS 
The Transvaal Industrial Council reflects the knowledgeability 
of· the ,negotiating collectivities. Employers stress the need 
for wage and benefit levels (i.e. employment costs) which will 
allow them to compete against other regions and imports. 
Reasonable wage levels for employers also means the 
continuation of, and growth of, the Transvaal industry. 
The unions reflect a concern for the (economic) hardship of 
their members and, at least initially, accept the linkage of 
wages to the continuation of the industry. The core 
constructs can then be identified as 
(a) Em12loy:ers 
Inability to compete - collapse of industry 
(b) Union 
Low wages - membership hardship 
The minutes of the Transvaal negotiations also indicate a 
deterioration in the relationships between Employers and the 
Union. One of the issues highlighting this ~eterioration is 
the issue of "dismissals and Unfair Labour Practices" (see 
Meeting No. l - 1983 - Negotiations). The issue raises two 
points 
(1) I~ can be seen to be directed at an aspect of 
negotiations that have (traditionally) been the sole 
preserve of management, and 
(2) The possibility of (conflict) issues being removed 
from the domain of industrial council negotiations, 
i.e. by referring such issues to the Industrial Court 
as founded through the Labour Relations Act. 
Employer reaction is marked and the degree of reaction is to 
be seen in the minutes of the 5th meeting of the 1983 
negotiations. Subsequent statements by employers reflect 
their perception of a deteriorating relationship specifically 
with the N.U.C.W. 
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6.5 THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE TRANSVAAL 
GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The prime rule of signification is initially jointly held by 
the parties to the Transvaal agreement. This rule can be 
described as being contained in the notion of 'ability to 
compete'. associated with this rule will be the need to have 
employment apporturiities and a source of labour. Implicated 
in this prime rule are associated rules of signification 
relating to the fairness of minimum conditions of employment 
and the ability to attract labour. Legitimation is identified 
in the implications of likely events if the ability to compete 
is weakened. The industrial council, the funds it administers 
and the activities engaged upon through these facilities 
' represent mechanisms of domination through which control over 
allocative and authoritative resources is exeicised. By 
identifying the duality of structure an explanation of social 
practices in the Transvaal region is generated. 
The decline of the industry, events in the wider industrial 
relations context and the emergence of different actors ,leads 
to an adjustment to the joint acceptance of the prime rule of 
signification, and by the end of the review period there is 
evidence of the union being more concerned with the 
improvement of conditions of employment than with attempts to 
secure long term employment. In addition, initially both 
parties accept - as a rule of signification - the relevance of 
the industrial council as the appropriate vehicle through 
which to manage certain labour/management affairs. This 
acceptance is under pressure - for similar reasons - by the 
end of the review period. 
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6.5.2 Structure 
The control of employment costs in the Transvaal region can 
readily be seen in the movement of (i) contributions to the. 
industrial council, (ii} contributions to the funds controlled 
by the industrial council and (iii) minimum (negotiated) wage 
rates. It will be shown that all these cost aspects have not 
kept pace with inflation (i.e. the consumer price index). 
Contributions to the industrial council move from 4c and llc 
for employee and employer (respectively) in 1968 to 14c each 
in 1986. Over the review period employers are able to 
decrease their (initially disproportionate) contribution rate, 
whilst the employees' contribution does not decrease. Had the 
4c contribution kept pace with inflation the 1986 contribution 
would have been 27.7c, and whilst it could be argued that 
economies of scale could account for the containment of these 
contributions, the Transvaal industry is essentially an 
industry in decline (i.e. of employment). 
Contributions to the provident fund provide further evidence 
of the containment of employment costs. Employers 
contribution rate in 1986 is just over half of what it would 
have been had it kept pace with inflation. Whilst the overall 
contributions to the fund have not entirely kept pace with 
inflation, it is the increase in employee contributions that 
have increased disproportionately. It needs to be noted that 
the contribution rates were different in 1968 - employers 
making a higher contribution - and the equalizing of the 
contribution rates could be interpreted as a ~rule of 
signification', i.e. equal contributions is seen as equitable 
by the parties to the agreement. 
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Contributions to the medical aid/benefit society have also not 
kept pace with inflation, and in addition employer 
contributions have decreased to below those of employees, i.e. 
employees contribute more than 50% of the total contribution. 
This contradicts the rule of equal contributions as suggested 
by contribution movements in the provident fund. Contribution 
rates to the sick pay fund have also not kept pace with 
inflation, and in fact have decreased in nominal terms. Had 
the average benefit received kept pace with inflation - and 
given the volume and kind of usage of the fund had stayed the 
same, then the 1986 average benefit should have been some 
R38.ll as opposed to R25.04. A further complicating issue in 
this calculation is that the sick pay benefit is based on the 
wage earned which also did not keep pace with inflation. 
The training fund contributions are initially similar for both 
parties and have more than kept pace with the rate of 
inflation, this being the one and only fund to reflect such 
changes. It is reasonable to argue that the ability of 
employers to continue their operations new employees are 
required and as such will be willing to incur training costs 
in an attempt to secure a stream of applicants. The 
stabilisation fund is the only fund to which only employers 
make a contribution.· This is not an additional employment 
cost but rather represents a spreading of a cost to be 
incurred. 
The above analysis of changes to contribution rates together 
with the previously provided analysis of changes to minimum 
wage rates - i.e. that they have not kept pace with the rate 
of inflation, supports the contention of the prime rule of 
signification in the Transvaal industry is that of containing 
employment costs and the maintenance of the competitive 
. 
position of Transvaal manufacturers. 
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This rule of Signif icatiori is focused by way of the industrial 
council which is therefore a facility of domination. Norms of 
legitimation are implicitly identifiable, i.e. higher 
employment costs affect levels of employment in the industry. 
In the Transvaal the decreasing levels of employment can be 
seen as confirmation (in the eyes of the parties to the 
negotiation) of the link between employment costs, competitive 
ability and levels of employment. This aspect will become 
more readily identifiable in the analysis of the actors' 
'interpretive schemes'~ 
An analysis of the statements made by the parties to the 
Transvaal negotiations supports. the contention that the prime 
rule of signification is that of keeping employers 
competitive, by controlling employment costs. This structure 
is maintained largely intact though with a deteriorating 
relationship until the 1985 negotiations. when some evidence 
emerges of the Union rejecting the wage restraint/employment 
linkage. 
The President's address of 22/11/79 to employers reflects the 
relationship between the T.C.M.A. and the union up to that 
date, i.e. the union "proved receptive to our pleas for. a 
responsible approach to wage demands and in a spirit of 
co-operation agreed to accept ... " This date also marks the 
beginning of a deterioration of the relationship, because of a 
break in the acceptance of the wage rate/employment linkage. 
The threat of strike action is raised in the 1980 
extra-ordinary negotiations, an actual strike impedes the 1981 
extra-ordinary negotiations and subsequent negotiations 
contain statements of the "changing mood" of the workforce. 
In addition, the Union representatives are continually aware 
of strikes in other industries and the wage increases these 
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are seen to have achieved. The addition of the N.U.C.W. (i.e. 
the black union) to the industri'al council also contributes to 
the change in relationships. At the 5th meeting of the 1983 
negotiations the G.w:u. "appealed to the National Union to 
assist in building up the industry and not to destroy it". At 
the same meeting an employer's representative notes the change 
in relationships, "the parties were no longer working as a 
council but working separately". 
The 1983 negotiations are also important as they reflect for 
the first time an attempt by Unions to effect the ability of 
management to manage as they wish. The N.U.C.W. is reproached 
for its desire to utilise the Industrial Court in cases where 
it suspects an unfair labour practice. Such action removes 
control from industrial councils to a body independent of 
council, and therefore away from_the (at least) potential 
influence of employers. The intentiops of the N.U.C.W. are 
rejected by both employers and by the G.W.U., thus the implied 
sanction (of destroying the industry) indicates a rule of 
signification, i.e. that the industry finds solutions to 
industry issues. 
The 1985 negotiations provide further evidence of the union's 
(N.U.C.W.) breaking of the wage/employment linkage (see 
meeting No. 3, 22nd October, 1985) when the union argues that 
it cannot "be held responsible for the situation in the 
industry, particularly the closing down of so many factories. 
Factories were closing down when the starting wage was as 
little as R6.00 per week". In this statement is the rejection 
of the employer position of the necessity for wages to be 
competitive to be able to stay in business and have increasing 
levels of employment. It can be suggested that the G.W.U. 
accepted a long term role of increasing wages and employment, 
where the N.U.C.W. is focussed on immediate improvements to 
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employment rewards. The demise of the G.W.U., the ascendance 
of the N.u.c.w. and the maintenance by employers of a 'high 
wage - uncompetitive' frame of reference must inevitably lead 
to deteriorating relationships_ between the parties, and the 
possible emergence of different structure to the industrial 
relations system in the Transvaal. Given the review p~riod 
(1968 -- 1986) of this thesis, it is not possible to identify 
with any certainty the quality ·of any new structure, should 
such occur, in the Transvaal industry. Such change as might 
occur must await further research prior to establishing any 
certain~y of its description. 
Action in the Transvaal industrial relations system also, as 
with other regions, provides support for other aspects of 
structuration theory. 
Structuration theory argues that the production of action is 
at the same time one of reproduction, in that.the conditions 
which allow for a particular kind of action are reproduced. 
Negotiations (formal) at council took place 7 times over the 
review pe~iod and this excludes informal (unrecorded) 
negotiations as well as "extra-ordinary'' negotiations. The 
content of these negotiations all revolve around allocative 
resources with the exception of the 1983 negotiations at which 
the Union attempts to introduce some control over managerial 
decision making as to what "constituted ordinary dismissal and 
retrenchment". Nevertheless, the substance of -negotiation 
itams is restricted to allocative resources. Apart from 
agreeing the substance of particular job categories, there is 
no evidence of negotiations dealing w1th the exercise of 
managerial authority in the work place. This in turn can be 
taken as a rule of signification and closely associated with 
the prime rule of employers' ability to compete. 
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Reference to the analysis of bargaining behaviour utilising 
the Walton and McKersie model suggests the similarity of 
behaviour from one negotiation to the next. Thus, 
negotiations are procedurally and substantively similar over 
the review period, given the beginnings of the deterioration 
in employer/employee body relationships. 
In arguing that action reproduces the conditions of action, 
the impression may be gained that structuration theory is 
deterministic and static. Such a view is to be rejected 
because the theory incorporates 
(i) the notion of 'reflexive monitoring' 
(ii) the issue of .unintended consequences of intentional 
acts 
(iii)the influence df 'significantly pl~ced' actors 
(iv) events in other action contexts which may 
constrain/enable action in the action context under 
consideration 
Evid~nce of 'reflexive monitoring' is abundant in the minutes 
of the negotiations. All parties are aware of economic 
conditions and argue its impact on the ability to compete and 
the hardship employees experience. All parties reflect an 
awareness of the state of rewards in other garment 
manufacturing regions as well as in other industries. 
Employers are also aware of wages paid in areas falling under 
the Wage Act - see President's address 21/11/1968. 
From 1980 onwards the Union(s) are particularly aware of the 
activities of other unions, especially strike activity and 
benefits which they perceive to have flowed from such strikes. 
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The Transvaal manufacturers express the intention of 
constraining employment costs so as to remain competitive. 
This act then, together with the impact of the Physical 
Planning Act of 1968, leads to recruitment problems for the 
manufacturers. The employment statistics for coloureds and 
whites show a rapid decline as these workers leave employment. 
The constraint of the Physical Planning Act which restricts 
the employment of blacks then leads to an inability of 
manufacturers to acquire labour. The response of employers is 
to start a Training Fund and it is noted in the President's 
(T.C.M.A.) address of 19th November, 1970, that "The denial of 
the use of Bantu labour ... puts a scarcity value on 
employment" which the Unions are "not slow to exploit"; both 
events are likely to increase employment costs. 
The pattern of entrances and exits exhibited in the industry 
also suggest high levels of labour turnover, and whilst a 
proportion of such turnover might be employer initiateq, the 
degree of entrances and exits suggest an instrumentality of , 
employment for the workforce. This instability of employment 
in turn influences the cost of employment. 
The events which are reflexively monitored are again evidence 
of rules of signification, that which is monitored and drawn 
on in interaction must be taken as having meaning for the 
actors concerned, and are in turn linked to the prime rule of 
significat,ion, i.e. the ability to compete. 
In an analysis of 'significantly' placed actors, further rules 
can be identified. Prior to the amendment to the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956, the relationship between the 
T.C.M.A. and the G.W.U. of S.A. was - in the opinion of the 
T.C.~.A. - "most co-operative" (see council meeting 16th May, 
1974). 
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The role of ~he Union leadership in developing and maintaining 
this relations~ip is important. In th~ 1971 negotiations, the 
Union negotiator accepts that the Union's "goals could not be 
achieved in one throw but advances could only be made step by 
step". At the May 16th, 1974, Council meeting the Union 
representative notes, "it could not be expected of the Union 
to press the employers for further substantial increases as 
they would also move to Babelegi". 
At a joint annual general meeting of the G.W.U. of S.A.(1977) 
the secretary says ''never in her 39 years in the industryh had 
the economy been worse. Comparisons with "the leather 
workers" are also used to get acceptance of that year's 
agreement. 
The amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 sees 
the Secretary of the G.W.U. of S.A. playing a cautionary role 
in the face of increasing militancy. At the 1980 annual 
general meeting the secretary says that if strike action 
results from the employers rejection of their demand, "they-
would have to make sacrifices and it would not be easy". At a 
meeting of shop stewards on 31st March, 1981, the union 
pr~sident argues that rejection of their demands could lead to 
either arbitration or strike action. She suggests that" whilst 
they might improve wages, it is possible that the union "would 
loose (the) 40 hour week". In addition she warns of increased 
competition from lower wage areas. 
The inclusion of the National Union of Clothing Workers 
(N.U.C.W.) to the bargaining process is seen as marking the 
changing relationships between ~he parties. Council minutes 
are such that it appears that the G.W.U. of S.A. continued to 
be the Union spokesperson even though in terms of 
representation, the N.U.C.W. was the stronger. It must be 
addeq, however, that the N.U.C.W. was not a full member of 
council until the 24th January, -1985, when council's 
constitution is amended to read "7 delegates from each side, 
the Union delegation is made up of 3 from the G.W.U. of S.A. 
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and 4 from the N.U.C.W.". The G.W.U. withdraws from council 
as from the 1st August, 1985, when their amalgamation with the 
N.U.C.W. becomes official. 
The change in relationships is essentially due to the 
N.U.C.W's action in relation to 'Unfair Labour Practices' and 
the Industrial Court and their rejection of the 
'wage/competitive ability' linkage which employers hold and 
which was accepted by the G.W.U. of S.A. The leadership of 
the N.U~C.W. are then in structuration theory ''significantly 
placed actors" who can change things - or keep things as they 
are. 
The industrial relations system in the Transvaal is integrated 
through relations of autonomy and dependence with other action 
contexts in the South African social system. This in turn 
.leads to the understanding of the constrairiing and enabling 
aspects of action in other contexts on the garment 
manufacturing industrial relations system - specifically the 
Transvaal system. The promulgation of the Physical Planning 
and Resources Act of 1968, limited the number of blacks 
employed in factories to the number employed on the 1st 
January, 1968 (i.e. in white areas). This action severely 
limited the ability of manufacturers in· the Transvaal region 
(essentially the Witwatersrand area). At the same time the 
state announced benefits (to employers) to relocate to 
"Border" ~reas in an attempt to control the influx of blacks 
to urban industrial areas. In 1981 the president of the 
T.C.M.A. notes that the Transvaa.1 region now "enjoys exemption 
in respect of the employment of black women workers". 
In less 'distant contexts' the negotiations in the other 
regions of the garment industry act as both a constraint and 
facilitator of action, thus both parties use events in other 
regions to support their points of view. This also reinforces 
the structuration theory notion of 'reflexive monitoring'. 
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6.6 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE TRANSVAAL REGION 
The previous analysis provides an understanding of the 
nature of collective bargaining in the Transvaal 
region, which in structuration theory terms can be 
argued to favour the sectional interests of employers, 
which in turn goes some way to explaining the 
perceived lack of militancy in the industry. How this 
was perpetuated - even with the entry of the N.U.G.W. 
to the bargaining forum needs to be dealt with. The 
analyses of Gool, Toerien, Maree and Nicol directed 
specifically at the Cape industry are arguably just as 
pertinent to the Transvaal industry, just as that of 
Morris's (1) analysis of NUMSA's change of policy 
toward industrial council membership, albeit that the 
Transvaal region does reflect differences. 
The employment figures of the Transvaal region reflect 
a declining industry. Emden identifies the effect of 
the "Physical Planning and Resources Act" (1967) as a 
m.~jor contributor to this decline, thus "The main 
victims of the Act have been numerous small and middle 
sized clothing firms in the Witwatersrand, Pretoria 
and Vereeniging complex" (2). This Act restricted the 
number of African employees in any one firm to the 
number employed as at the 1st January, 1968. The 
withdrawal of white and coloured workers from the 
industry meant that they could not be replaced by 
African workers and thus affecting employers' ability 
to iremain the same' let alone grow. In addition the 
Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1946) 
restricted those legally allowed to live in white 
areas to a particular magisterial district and the 
definition of who could legally live in such areas had 
the intention of restricting the size of the black 
population in whole areas. This legislation - apart 
from other Apartheid legislation had particular 
consequences for the industry. It should also be 
noted that the creation of 'Border Areas' and the 
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incentives to relocate have particular pertinence in 
the Transvaal as, for example, factories in 
Johannesburg could easily be relocated to Babalegi 
without the relocation of (white) owners/managers. 
Table 14 indicates the decline in the number of 
employers and the numbers employed. Both parties to 
the agreements will be well aware of the decline of 
the industry. 
Legislative constraints sourced in the I.C. Act will 
have a further impact on the ability of the G.W.U. -
· S.A. to operate and Gaol's (3) argument of the 
"atomisation'' of the production process all have 
implications for union democracy. The Transvaal 
region operated for a large part of the review period, 
-
with a 'parallel' union, the National Union of Garment 
Workers, who only in 1985 became a fully fledged party 
to the Council. The I.e. Act restricted the ability 
of the- G~w.u. of S.A. to have multi-racial meetings 
(and_membership) and (as .with the Cape) required the 
Secretary to be white. This resulted in the ludicrous 
situation of a minor segment of the employees 
negotiating on behalf of the majority, which had 
little or no say in the formulation and 
acceptance/rejection of demands submitted to 
negotiation. Furthermore, the geographical 
distribution of factories would further complicate the 
ability of the Union secretariat to consult regularly 
with the rank-and-file membership as well as shop 
stewards. 
The Union Secretary will also play a significant role 
in influencing the expectations of the membership of 
both the G.W.U. of S.A. and the N.U.G.W., certainly up 
to the point where the N.U.G.W. has - at least - a 
voice on the Council (i.e. 1981). The statements 
quoted earlier reflect an understanding of the role of 
the Union as one concerned with economic benefits for 
the membership. Again, this is a narrow view of both 
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benefits and strategies to acquire these ends. The 
(economic) concerns relate to wages, the benefits in 
the funds controlled by council and the provision 6f 
employment; if anything, the idea of keeping the 
workforce employed is a dominant construct which will 
contribute to constraining the range and substance of 
demands made to employers. 
The suggestion that employment - as an issue - is in 
the forefront of the Secretary's mind can be seen in 
statements made at both Council meetings and to 
members (e.g. '1974 Negotiations' and 'Extra-ordinary 
Negotiations 1981'). The decline in the importance of 
this construct in the post-Wiehahn negotiations can be 
seen in the continuing threat of the G.W.U. of S.A. to 
become more 'militant'. The Secretary suggests to the 
employers that Union demands need to be met or - by 
implication - more militant (in the form of strikes} 
behaviour will be the order of the day. The evidence 
of .the movement in wages suggest that employers did 
not believe in the possibility of such action, i.e. 
the continual decline (in real terms) of minimum 
wages. 
The unwillingness of the Union to exhibit militant 
behaviour is also related to the desire to maintain 
the relationship, and the benefits, of industrial 
council bargaining discussed in the Cape region are no 
less applicable for the Transvaal region. As with the 
Cape region it can be suggested that on balance there 
was greater benefit to the Union in its membership 
than to employers and that an awareness of that would 
act as a further constraint on the Union's willingness 
to engage in 'distributive' tactics. The emergence of 
the N.U.G.W. ·as the dominant (later only) bargaining 
partner changes the relationship between employers and 
employees to the express dissa:tisf action of 
employers. It appears essentially that a change in 
the leadership of the employees delegation to the 
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bargaining encounter is what generates the somewhat 
more militant behaviour amongst employees. 
Nevertheless, the issues bargained over do not change 
and the state of the managerial prerogative is 
maintained over the review period. Thus, there may 
well be something of an increase in the 'militancy' 
with which issues are addressed, but not in terms of a 
change in the range of issues addressed. 
The importance of the relationship to both parties and 
the economic character of the issues negotiated over 
should not give the impression that the bargaining 
itself was not experienced as intense~ The number of 
meetings, their duration and the analysis of them by 
way of Walton and McKersie's model show intense effort 
on the part of both parties to achieve their ends. As 
with the Cape region, the dominant behaviours 
exhibited are those of Attitudinal structuring and 
Distributive bargaining, thus what was bargained over 
was bargained intensively. 
As with the Cape region, a contributory factor 
explaining the lack of 'militancy' - certainly up to 
the 1980's - must be the employment patterns, i.e. the 
number of 'entrances' (and exits) to the industry. 
Table 17 indicates that an increasing proportion of 
the labour force had 3 or more 'entrances'. In 1968 
the proportion was 30.6% and by 1986 this figure was 
43.3%, with a peak of 47.8% being evidenced in 1977. 
As with the Cape discussion it is difficult to see 
this pattern of employment providing any upward 
pressure on the Union executive to behave any 
differently from the way they did. It can be argued 
that it was more an awareness of other 'militant' 
unions' activities which contributed to a change of 
bargaining tactic (i.e. the observed success of 
strikes - militancy - amongst 'emerging' unions was 
used in an attempt to persuade employers on the 
equitableness of demands). In combination with an 
' 
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awareness of emerging unions activities and the rise 
of the N.U.G.W. further contributed to the change in 
the employer/Union relationship in which the dominance 
of employer interests was challenged albeit on a 
limited range of issues, thus largely maintaining the 
employers far reaching managerial prerogative. The 
debate around the N.U.G.W's use of the Industrial 
Court generates a great deal of antipathy on the part 
of employers (see Meeting No. 5 - 1983 Negotiations), 
and whilst the Union backed down, subse~uent comments 
by the Chairman of the T.C.M.A. identifies their 
perception of a rapidly deteriorating relationship. 
The emergence of the N.U.G.W. as a major force (albeit 
not officially until 1985)' will also account, 
partially, for the change in the employer/Union 
relationship; it can be suggested that just as Morris 
(4) argues that 'emerging' unions had to establish 
themselves, so the N.U.G.W. would need to be seen - by 
its membership and the wider union movement - to be 
doing 'something'. The 1983 negotiations and debate 
around the Union's treatment of 'Unfair Labour 
Practices' can be seen as an attempt to limit the 
\_ 
managerial prerogatives of employers in the clothing 
industry. It nevertheless is the only evidence of 
broadening the negotiating issues from solely (narrow) 
eqonomic issues. 
In summary, the observed lack of militancy (though not 
at the level of the Cape region), can be identified in 
the understanding of the benefits of the relationship 
to both parties albeit more so for the union side. 
Contributing to the maintenance of this relationship 
will be the objective of maintaining employment in a 
declining industry, the thr~at of relocation, aspects 
.of Apartheid legislation, the geographical 
distribution of employment and the role of the 
Secretary and the Union executive, as well as the 
pattern of entrances (exits) of labour to the 
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industry. The deterioration of the relationship sees 
signs of militancy increase as well as the threat of 
increased militancy and the emergence of the N.U.G.W. 
However, whilst the potential for conflict increases 
in the 1980's, there is little by way of inroads on 
employer interests to be observed. Costs of 
employment (i.e. in terms of minimum wages and 
contributions to the various funds) have not kept pace 
with inflation and nor has managerial-authority over 
the workforce in the factory been affected. 
CONCLUSION 
Structure in the Transvaal region is identified in 
section 6.5 of this chapter, and is characterised as 
favouring the sectional interests of employers. 
Structure, in structuration theory, is drawn upon by 
knowledgeable actors in the production and 
reproduction of action. The Garment .Workers Union of 
South Africa (G.W.U. of S.A.) in their collective 
bargaining encounter will draw upon the structure as 
identified earlier, and actions will therefore not be 
militant and will fit into Lambert and Webster's 
classification of "orthodox" unions (5). 
The explanation for the continuity of this lack of 
militancy as provided in section 6.6 leads to a 
similar conclusion as that made about the similar 
phenomena in the Cape region. All the factors 
identified by Gaol, Maree, Toerien and Morris as well 
as the argument tentatively presented concerning the 
probable lack of upward pressure on th~ union 
leadership all support the contention that the 
leadership was able, through its own actions or 
because its 'reflexive monitoring' establish no 
reasons to change, to keep its 'interpretive scheme' 
much the same over the review period. Furthermore, 
the leadership of the G.W.U of S.A. does not change 
over the review period although their position as the 
bargaining representative of workforce does change. 
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The change in representation comes right at the end of 
the review period, and whilst the beginnings of 
changes to the 'structure' of bargaining are seen 
(e.g. the issue of the use of the industrial court), 
these dissipate in the face of employer resistance and 
the threat of the collapse of the industrial council 
system. The union appears to revert back to the less 
militant posture of the G.W.U. of S.A. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
IN THE NATAL GARMENT MANUFACTURING REGION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
7.2 
7.2.1 
7.2.2 
7.2.3 
7.2.4 
7.2.5 
7.3 
7.4 
7.5 
7.6 
7.7 
Evidence of the duality of structure in the Natal 
region will be presented along similar lines to that 
of the Cape and Transvaal. It must be reiterated that 
the administrative arrangements in each region varies, 
which means that certain information whilst available 
in one region, is not available in another. In the 
Cape region the provident fund could provide data on 
(total) labour turnover. Similar data was not 
available in Natal and sampling was utilised to 
provide an indication of the phenomena. 
PART A - FORM 
The Industrial Council 
The Funds of Council 
The Parties to the Agreement 
Employment Form 
The Wage Form 
PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME 
Bargaining Behaviour 
Constructs 
The Structure of Industrial Relations in the Natal 
Garment Manufacturing Industry 
Collective Bargaining in the Natal Region 
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PART A - FORM 
The Industrial Council 
August 2, 1934, saw the birth of the Natal Garment 
Worker's Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) and one of its 
first activities. was to give evidence at a Wage Board 
investigation conducted in December 1934. A 
publication to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the 
Union reports, (Golden Jubilee Report - 1984) -
"The Union presented a strong case for improvement 
in the conditions of employmen:t"· 
1935 saw the registration of the Natal Clothing 
Manufacturer's Association (N.C.M.A.) thus laying the 
foundations for the establishment of an Industrial 
Council. The 50th Anniversary publication notes that 
the formation of the N.C.M.A., " resulted in a 
spirit of co~operation betwe~n Union and the 
Association". It is further reported that "the 
reputable employers" (i.e. the Association) assisted 
in cleaning up "the clothing industry of its 
unscrupulous employers". 
Negotiations between the union and the N.C.M.A. were 
begun "towards the end of 1935" and "following months 
of negotiations the industrial council was registered 
and an agreement reached 
published in 1936. 
" The first agreement was 
The Industry had grown from "around 2000 employees" 
(Golden Jubilee Report, 1984) to 37,833 in October of 
1986, having peaked at 48,010 in December 1984. 
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TABLE 1 
NATAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENTS 1967 - 1986 
Year Accum. · Gross Levies Expend~ Excess/ Employment 
Funds Income (deficit) Levels 
1986 69986 591829 232994 638032 (46203) 37833 
1985 116189 539369 261077 581473 (42104) 45581 
1984 158293 510738 313313 480801 29937 48010 
1983 128356 463474 290633 388474 75000 42383 
1982 53356. 328286 182288 349500 (21214) 43819 
1981 74570 280591 168842 270853 9738 44676 
1980 64832 242739 151861 202904 39835 37475 
1979 24997 177601 91267 186147 (8546) 34788 
1978 33543 144061 60831 157651 (13590) 32506 
1977 47133 137309 62647 143249 (5940) 30823 
1976 53073 136373 65547 135464 909 33365 
1975 52164 113698 58787 115732 (2034) 30785 
1974 54198 101347 55140 103954 (2607) 29632 
1973 56805 100360 54277 90855 9505 27934 
1972 45922 91442 48249 83637 7805 25281 
1971 38117 81254 43207 73970 7284 25286 
1970 30832 68620 35573 62652 5968 23096 
1969 24864 33772 22763 35948 (2176) 20531 
1968 27041 28179 16712 35137 (6958) 17396 
1967 33999 25646 15138 33343 (7697) 
TABLE 2 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 
Cents 
EmR Erne 
1968 Wages <= 11.44 1 1 
> 11.44 . 2 2 
1969 (from Dec) < 11. 45 1 1 
>=11.45 3 3 
1970-73 No change 
1974 All classes 2 2 
1975-78 No change 
1979 (from September) 4 4 
1980-81 No change 
1982-86 (from Dec) 7 7 
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It can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that ,(direct) 
contributions to the industrial council were increased 
in 1969, 1979 and 1982 and that 'deficits' were 
recorded in 1967/69, 1974/75 (proportionately very 
small), again in 1977/78/79 and again in 1982 and 
finally in 1985/86. The response by both parties is 
such as to protect the (administrative) functioning of 
the council, by increasing contributions. 
Industrial Council Funds 
7.2.2.1 Sick Fund 
The "Golden Jubilee Souvenir Brochure" (1984) records 
the Union in 1938 securing "the establishment of a 
joint contributory sick fund. Contribution was on the 
basis of 3d ("tickey") per week from each worker and 
the employers contributing the same amount for each of 
its workers". While at the same time noting the 
changes in c·ontributions, "to keep abreast of 
inflation" the article states "But one thing for sure, 
this union has one of the most efficient and stable 
.sick funds in the country". Table 3 reflects 
contribution rates over the review period. Us~ng 6.92 
(C.P.I. multiplier) to inflate the (end) 1968 
contribution rate of 3c indicates that the real figure 
for 1986 should be 20.76c. 
Table 4a provides financial detail of the sick fund 
over the review period. As would be expected, income 
has risen substantially as has expenditure. 
The Natal council also operated a clinic, but data 
similar to that given for the Cape region was not 
available. However, Table 4b provides some data on 
the services provided through the medical aid fund, 
some of which would have been through the clinic. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
TABLE 3 
332. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SICK FUND 
Cents 
EmR Erne 
1968 Wages < 5.99 3 3 
6.00 to 11.44 5 5 
> 11. 44 8 8 
-· 
1969 (from Dec) < 11.45 7 7 
> 11. 45 13 13 
1970-73 No change 
1974 All classes 10 10 
1975-79 No change 
1980 All classes 15 15 
1981 No change 
1982-86 (from Dec) < or = R55 30 30 
> R55 50 50 
The Natal sick benefit fund recorded deficits in 1968 
and 1969, 1978 and 1979, 1981 and 1982 and again in 
1986. Contributions to the fund were increased at the 
end of 1969, again in 1980 and lastly in December 
1982, suggesting a protective response by employers 
and employees. 
Unlike the Cape, it was not possible to establish the 
"days sick benefit" and therefore it is not possible 
to calculate the 'cash per day' (average) benefit, nor 
(obviously) to compare that to the rate of inflation 
over the review period (see Cape Section Table 4). 
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TABLE 4a 
Year Accum. 
Funds 
1986 746357 
1985 900463 
1984 634074 
1983 441655 
1982 135345 
1981 281569 
1980 282208 
1979 236128 
1978 288093 
1977 299178 
1976 292172 
1975 283394 
1974 264018 
1973 259944 
1972 224068 
1971 186206 
1970 131830 
1969 88924 
1968 120493 
1967 127968 
333. 
NATAL SICK BENEFIT FUND 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENTS 
Income Levies (Sick Pay 
Grant) 
Expend. 
-
1,518,880 1,449,951 (6~0984) 
1,672,986 
1,798,287 1,724,528 (539896) 
1,531,898 
J.,588,768 .l,5371665 (496451) 
1,396,349. 
1,354,356 1,339,668 (366155) 
1,048,046 
694,836 677,337 (322996) 
841060 
651,122 629,595 (249082) 
651761 
577,748 558,852 (214372) 
531668 
361,675 338,263 (156605) 
413640 
325,752 300,578 (121592) 
336837 
336,885 311,068 (110533) 
329878 
353,605 324,230 (136223) 
344827 
311,122 290,469 (113459) 
29174.6 
295,823 277,617 (122849) 
291751 
274,977 259,074 (87445) 
239101 
250,617 237,390 (81035) 
2127.55 
235,133 225,226 (61645) 
180757 
209,050 201,946 (55072) 
166145 
123,715 115,957 (60691) 
155283 
111,139 102,271 (39330) 
118614 
l·OO I 406 92,511 (28681) 
92904 
Excess/ 
(deficit) 
(154106) 
266389 
192419 
306310 
(146224) 
(639) 
46080 
(51965) 
(11085) 
7007 
8778 
19376 
4072 
35876 
37862 
54376 
42905 
(31568) 
(7475) 
7502 
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7.2.2.2 Provident Fund 
TABLE S 
The 1970/71 Annual Report of the G.W.I.U. states, "The 
Industrial Council Provident Fund which was negotiated 
in 19S9 by the Trade Union for the benefit of its 
members now has assets standing at Rl,239,S9S". 
Contribution rates to the fund are reflected in Table 
S below. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROVIDENT FUND 
Cents 
EmR Erne 
1968 Wages < 11. 44 . 'S s 
> 11.44 8 13 
1969 No change 
1970 No change 
1971 < 13.lS s s 
- >-13.lS 13 13 
1972-79 No change 
1980 All classes 20 20 
1981 2S 2S 
1982 No change 
1983 40 40 
1984-86 50 so 
Contributions to the provident fund have increased 
from Sc or 8c from the employer or Sc/13c from the 
employee depending on the wage category, i.e. > or < 
than 11.44. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
7.2.3 
336. 
Those paying Sc in 1968 would, had their contributions 
(only) kept pace with inflation, pay 34.60c in 198~. 
Likewise, 8c translates into SS.36c and 13c becomes 
89.96 cents. The actual payment of SOc in 1986 m~ans 
that higher wage earners' contributions have not kept 
pace with inflation. 
Evaluation of the provident fund is beyond the scope 
of this thesis as a full actuarial evaluation would be 
required prior to any conclusions being drawn. 
However, it can be observed that 
(i) "Accummulated Assets' have increased nearly 20 
times since 1968. 
(ii) Contributions have increased 10 times and 
(iii) Employment 2.1 times (1986). At peak 
emp-loyment 1984) the increase was 2. 76 times. 
(iv) Actuarial evaluations were done from time to 
time and no record could be found of any 
dissatisfaction with the fund's performance. 
Table 6 provides a financial history of the provident 
fund. 
The Parties to the Agreement 
7.2.3.1 Natal Garment Workers Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) 
The Garment Workeis Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) was 
registered on the 20th September, 1934, and according 
to-the Minister of Manpower (P.C. du Plessis) writing 
in the "Golden Jubilee - Souvenir Brochure'' (1984) it 
was founded "during one of the worst economici 
depressions, when hope for the future seemed bleak". 
By 1984 the union had grown "to the second largest in 
th~ clothing industry ... with a membership of some 
S9,000 workers" (Souvenir Brochure - 1984). The union 
subscriptio~ of 9c in 1968 is the 1986 equivalent of 
62.3c, some 12.7c below the actual contribution of 
7Sc. The higher contribution, vi2. lSc converts to 
about Rl.04 (see Table 7). 
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338. 
In January of 1984 the Union set up an additional fund 
- the 'Help-U-Fund'. The Union's 1984/85 annual 
report states "our unemployed members will be assisted 
by the Garment Workers Help-U-Fund which will provide 
25% of the member's wage and the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (U.I.F.) will provide 45% of the 
members wage for a period of 6(six) months. In other· 
words, our members will receive 70% of their wages for 
the first 2(two) months of unemployment". 
This fund, the 'Help-U-Fund', it is reported (1985/86 
Annual Report) had to close "because the payments were 
higher than the income". 
Table 7 below reflects the membership dues for the 
review period. 
MEMBERSHIP DUES 
1968 Wage < R6.00 = 9c p.w. (male and female) 
1969-73 
1974 
1975-76 
1977 
1978-80 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Wage = or > R6.00 = 15c 
No change 
All members = 15c p.w. 
No change 
All members = 2lc p.w. 
No change 
All members = 30c p.w. 
No change 
All members = 65c p.w. 
All members = Rl.00 p.w. 
p.w. 
All members additional 20c for 6 months to 
assist unemployed members 
1986(20/1) Special levy (i.e. 20c) extended for further 
6 months 
1986(1/6) Special levy stopped, fees reduced to R0.75. 
Table 8a provides some financial data on the union 
over the review period. 
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TABLE 8a 
Year 
End 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
BALANCE SHEET & INCOME STATEMENTS - NATAL UNION 
Income Subscrip- Transfer to Expend. Excess of Accum. 
(Gross) tions Funeral & (Gross) Income Assets 
(Gross) Welfare A/C over Exp. 
, 
137386 136591 31709 55168 36768 72590 
158512 157914 56758 64872 36892 248102 
199428 148751 50601 93556 55271 544959 
219788 168879 45267 115424 54097 599101 
227796 180068 46272 134281 47242 646343 
221705 189451 43127 136859 41718 615649 
233111 1962;36 45311 143500 44300 622701 
260967 230128 -88891 152013 20063 617051 
310855 273436 102271 163382 45201 640878 
313457 285429 113258 182905 17295 658583 
383517 362229 155342 227765 410 658583 
619559 616204 188246 303745 127558 786141 
877574 849432 232901 658270 (13605) 772536 
1682270 1649352 287228 1389735 5307 777844 
2157941 2112355 560260= 1384656 116073 778089 
Help U Fund Neg. 
895972 
2135328 2_070025 747765= 1169590 (48683) 729406 
Help U Fund 
1014420 
Reviewing the Income Statements of the union over the 
review period the following year on year observations 
can be made of the expenditure patterns. (Note: 
balance sheets and income statements were only 
available from 1971). 
1971 
Salaries at Rl8,745.69 represent the largest single 
item of expenditure (34%) (this of Net income i.e. 
after Transfers) 
Conference and Organising Expenses (R9,182.60) were 
16.6% of expenditure 
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Affiliation Fees (T.U.C.S.A.) were R6,707.99 or 12% of 
expenditure 
Attendance Fees (R5,775.71) were 10.5% of expenditure 
Also it should be noted that the amounts of R31,709.40 
(Funeral Benefits Account) and Rl3,740.74 ("Ex Gratia" 
Grant Account) were transfered (deducted) from Gross 
Income to arrive at (after adding "Entrance Fees" and 
"Interest") Net income 
1972 
Salaries are the largest item of expenditure at R24,416 
·an increase of 30% over 1971 and some 38% of total 
expenditure 
Affiliation fees (to T.U.C.S.A. and I.T.G and L.W.F.) 
are the next bigg'est item at R7, 025, about the same as 
1971 
Honoraria payments show a 177% increase on 1971 to 
R2,785 
Transfers to the Funeral Benefits and Welfare grant 
accounts amounted to R39,599 and Rl7,159 respectively, 
increases over 1971 of 25% each. 
1973 
The· major increase in expenditure in 1973 (as an 
increase over 1972 expenditure) was that of "Conference 
and Orga ising Expenses" which increased 365% to 
Rl0,498 
Motor car ~Allowancea and Licences" more than doubled 
· to R3, 819 
Salaries increased 57% to R38,375 
Total 'Transfers' were R50,601, R35,303 and Rl5,298 to 
Funeral Benefits and Welfare Grant accounts 
respectively 
Affiliation fees increased 32% to R9,249.00 
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1974 
Salaries rise by 18.7% to R45,549 
Attendance fees rise by some R5,500 to Rl0,014 
Conference and Organising Expenses decrease some 
R3,000 to R7,426 
A new item "Bonuses and Honoraria" amounts to R5,472; 
'Honoraria' in 1973 was Rl,028 
Transfers to 'Funeral Benefit' account and 'Welfare 
Benefit' account amounted to R45,267 - R31,582 and 
Rl3,685 respectively. 
1975 
Transfers to 'Funeral' and 'Welfare' accounts decrease 
to R46,272 (R31;954 and Rl4,318) 
Salaries rise to R50,413 - 10.7% 
Attendance fees rise to Rl2,750 - from Rl0,014 
'Bonuses' and 'Gratuities' amount to Rl2,045 (R4045 
and R8000) - an increase of 120% 
1976 
The amounts transferred to "Funeral" and "Welfare" 
accounts decreases to R43,127, R30,805 and Rl2,322 
respectively 
Salaries increase by about 9% to R54,920 
Other than 'Motor Car Allowances' (which increases 
plus/minus 25% to R5,285) the other accounts show 
either a decrease or a marginal increase over the 
previous year 
1977 
The Transfer to "Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts was 
much the same as 1976 - R3,265 and R19,945 
respectively 
Salaries increased by about 11% to R61,187 
Conference and Organising Expenses dropped some R6,000 
to R7,834 
Motor Car Allowances increased some 50% to R5,945 
Affiliation fees increased (in total) to Rl4,056 - an 
increase in the order of 21% 
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1978 
Affiliation fees decrease to (in total) Rll,960 as no 
fee is paid to the I.T.G and L.W.F., but the Union 
does join the Institute for Industrial Relations 
(R300.00) 
Salaries increase some 10% to R67,782 
All other expenses show a marginal increase 
Transfers to "Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts show a 
substantial increa~e to (in·total) R88,891 - R38,223 
and R50,667 respectively. This represents a virtual 
doubling of this item 
The "Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts again 
substantially increase in 1979 to a total of Rl02,271 
or R42,112 and R60,159 respectively 
Salaries only increase by some R250 
'Affiliation fees now reflect.the I.T.G. and L.W~F. 
fees and the total moves up to Rl6,381 (37%) 
Conference and Organising Expenses increase 74% to 
Rl4,871 
Attendance fees decrease about Rl,000 to Rl0,855 
'Bonuses' and 'Honoraria' increase around 20% to 
R8,493 and R3,105 respectively 
1980 
Salaries increase plus/minus 14% to R77,438 
"Funeral" and "Welfare" transfers are increased to 
R46,636 and R66,622 respectively 
Conference and Organising Expenses increase about 37% 
to R20,032 
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1981_ 
Total Affiliation fess are now recorded as R22,160 
i.e. up 43% - largely due to an increase in fees to 
I.T.G. and L.W.F. and that such fees are paid every 
second year 
Organising and Conference fees increase over 50% to 
R32,103 
Attendance fee~ increase by some 61% to Rl8,668 
Salaries increase some 5% 
"Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts increase to R57,995 
and R82,849 respectively and an additional amount of 
Rl4,498 is transferred to "G.W.I.U. Fund from 1962" 
"Funeral", "Welfare" and -"1962 Fund" were increased to 
"R69,105 1 R98,622 and R20,419 respectively representing 
an average increase of some 21% 
Affiliation fees now total R24,572 and the I.T.G. and 
L.W.F. are now paid annually. This is about a 10% 
increase on 1981 
Salaries jump to Rl21,341 - an increase of some 49% 
Conference and Organising Expenses grow by around 1~% 
to R37,074 
Attendance Fees now amount to R24,148, a 29% increase 
Bonuses and Honoraria amount to just under Rl6,000 and 
increased by 57.7% 
Transfers to "Funeral", "Welfare" and "1962 Fund" were 
R44,996, Rl37,506 and R50,405 respectively 
representing an average increase of 23.7% 
Affiliation Fees were R31,972 (No figures for the 
I.T.G. and L.W.F.), a 30% increase 
Conference and Organising Expenses rose to R68,149,. 
being an increase of 84% 
Bonuses and Honoraria increased some 22% to Rl9,531 
A new expense is encountered in the form of "Insurance 
Premiums - Metropolitan Homes Trust Life" to the 
amount of Rl83,731 
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Salaries increase to Rl66,679 - an increase of 37% 
A Pension Fund for Union Staff was introduced and 
represents an expense of some R29,000 
Voucher Grants increase from R7,500 to Rl8,285 
1984 
Affiliation fees are about R4,700 higher at R36,775 
Attendance fees rise to R63,350 representing an 
increase of 65% 
Bonuses decrease by some R6,800 to R7,076, and no 
Honoraria fees were paid 
Conference and Organising fees amounted to R90,668 up 
some 33% 
Ex Gratia Grants rise from R6,610 to Rl7,763 
Insurance Premiums were paid to two companies on 
behalf of the membership and amounted to R743,812, an 
increase of R560,081 over 1983 
The maintenance of Off ice Equipment nearly doubled to 
R29,551 
i 
Printing and Stationery increased just over R9,000 to 
R32,820 
Salaries moved from Rl66,679 to R219,634, an increase 
of 32% 
Voucher Grants more than doubled to R37,460 
There were no transfers to the ~Funeral Benefit' 
account but R287,228 was transferred to "Welfare" and 
"1962 Fund" (Rl91,485 and R95,743 respectively), an 
increase of 23% 
1985 
Transfers of R223,808, Rlll,904 and R560,260 were made 
to the "Welfare", "1962 Fund" and the (new) 
"Help-U-Fund" respectively 
Affiliation fees of R5,151 (I.T.G. and L.W.F.) R540 
(Inst. of Industrial Relations) and R50,823 
(T.U.C.~.A.) represented an increase of 54% 
Attendance fees increased some R20,000 to R83,733 
Bonuses were not paid but Honoraria represented R8,150 
and had not been paid in 1984 
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Legal expenses increased from R2,400 to Rl0,468 
Salaries increased 49% to R327,098 
Pension Fund contributions increased some R27,000 to 
R66,945 (plus/minus 68%) 
Voucher grants stayed much the same (R37,037) 
Conference and Organising Expenses decrease some 
R35,000 to R54,843 
1986 
A total of Rl,014,420 was transferred to 'Welfare', 
'1962 Fund' and the 'Help-U' Funds representing an 
increase of 13% 
The disbanding of T.U.C.S.A. results in affiliation 
fees dropping to Rl9,971, a decrease of some R36,500 
Attendance fees in turn decrease some R33,500 to 
R.49,555 
Computer expenses go from zero to Rl2,000 
Conference and Organising Expenses increase by less 
than R4,000 to R58,652 
Insurance premiums (to Metropolitan Homes Trust) 
decrease nearly Rl00,000 to R467,571 
Legal expenses virtually double to R20,278 
Salaries decrease some R26,000 to R310,459 
Voucher grants amounted to R40,123 
When reviewing the G.W.I.U. it was noted that 
transfers to various funds were made. These funds 
were established to provide various benefits to their 
membership. Table 7b below provides a summary of the 
transfers into the funds, the payments made and the 
accumulated funds. 
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Table 8b reflects services provided by the union to 
its membership; the Welfare Account is interesting in 
that - up to 1982 - it paid out as grants most of what 
came into the Fund. In fact, the fund had to be 
supplemented by transfers of funds from the union~s 
accumulated funds in the years 1976, 1977, 1978 and 
1979, a period of low economic activity. 
The Funeral Benefit Fund also reflects the poor 
eco~omic conditions of 1977/78/79 as in those years it 
is forced to draw upon reserves to supply benefits. 
This service/benefit is later taken over by a 
commercial organisation - Metropolitan Homes Trust. 
7.2.3.2 Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association (N.C.M.A.) 
TABLE 9 
7.2.4 
1968-79 
1980 
1982(from 
1982(from 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
MEMBERSH'IP DUES 
3c per week per employee 
le per week per employee plus lOc per 
week per employee for Training Fund 
17/5) Training Fund = 15c p.w. per 
employee 
Dec) N.C.M.A. membersh·ip = 2c 
N.C.M.A. membership = 3c 
No change 
Training Fund = 25c 
Membership = No change 
No change 
No further financial detail on the N.C.M.A. was 
available. 
Employment Form 
The industrial council in Natal was formed in 1935 and 
"comprised approximately 2000 workers" (Garment 
Workers Industrial Union's Souvenir Brochure 1984) and 
the first agreement was ~ublished in 1936. 
1986 total employment had grown to 37 833. 
provides further detail. 
By October 
Table 10 
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White male and female employment drops around 10 
times, coloured employment is effectively static as 
are the figures for asiatic males. Growth in the 
employment of asiatic females has increased some 2.7 
times. In 1968 black female employees represented 
just more than 1% of total employment. By 1986 this 
figure was 21.8%, with 1980 and 1981 being the years 
reflecting the greater intake of female black labour. 
Total employment from 1968 reflects a pattern of 
growth that until 19&6 seems fairly resistant t6 
economic downturns, thus the 1976/77/78 downturn is 
evidenced in a relatively small drop in employment of 
some 2 500 workers. Table 11 supports this proposal 
in that N.C.M.A. factories drop from 102 (Dec. 1976) 
to 88 (Oec. 1978). Non-N.C.M.A. factories conversely 
show an increase in numbers of factories and 
employment. Labour in Natal is largely (by 1986) 
female with about a 2:1 ratio between asian females 
artd black females; asian males representing just less 
than 14% of total employment. 
Table 12 was compiled from the sample drawn from the 
Natal provident fund records and indicates the 
changing male/female ratio as well as the rising 
percentage of the labour force taken up by female 
machinists. Likewise male machinists represent a 
declining proportion of the labour force. Machinists 
represent (generally) between 45 and 50 percent of_ the 
total labour force. 
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TABLE 11 
N.C.M.A. MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS 
Year N.C.M.A. Non-N.C.M.A. Total 
Factories Empl. Factories Empl. Employment 
Nov 68 75 13396 70 4000 17396 
Nov 69 80 16330 76 4201 20531 
Nov 70 83 17782 86 5288 23096 
Dec 71 91 19129 90 6157 25286 
Dec 72 88 - 18805 93 6476 25281 
Dec 73 90 19675 1),3 8259 27934 
Dec 74 89 21268 132 8364 29632 
Dec 75 103 22898 122 7887 30785 
Dec 76 102 24562 141 8803 33365 
Dec 77 94 21352 142 9471 30823 
Dec 78 88 .22357 153 10149 32506 
Dec 79 96 24119 162 10669 34788 
Dec 80 115 26539 187 11936 37475 
Dec 81 116 28411 246 16265 44676 
Dec 82 141 27340 259 16479 43819 
Dec 83 151 27037 2-59 15346 42383 
Dec 84 166 31345 275 16665 48010 
Dec 85 187 29703 270 i5878 45581 
Oct 86 132 21455 277 16378 37833 
TABLE 12 
MACHINISTS AS A % OF THE LABOUR FORCE 
Year Female Male Female Male Total 
Machinists Machinists sample Machinists 
as % of total 
Act. % Act. % Act. % of Act. % of Sample 
Total Total 
1968 42 51 40 49 25 30 13 16 82 46.3 
1969 53 57 40 43 31 . 33 12 13 93 46.2 
1970 64 60 42 40 33 31 12 11 106 42.5 
1971 72 62 45 38 39 33 16 '14 117 47.0 
1972 79 66 41 34 35 29 11 9 120 38.3 
1973 78 63 46 37 37 30 12 10 124 39.5 
1974 88 67 44 33 51 39 15 11 132 50.0 
1975 95 69 43 31 49 36 13 9 138 45.6 
1976 103 68 49 32 58 38 16 11 152 48.7 
1977 86 66 45 34 55 42 13 10 131 51.9 
19713 92 68 44 32 56 41 12 9 136 50.0 
1979 100 65 54 35 62 40 14 9 154 49.4 
1980 114 70 48 30 66 41 11 7 162 47.5 
1981 136 76 43 24 70 39 9 5 179 44.1 
1982 145 81 33 l~ 78 44 7 4 178 47.8 
1983 134 80 33 20 75 45 8 5 167 49.7 
1984 154 80 38 20 82 43 7 .. 4 192 46.4 
1985 126 79 34 21 70 44 5 3 160 46.9 
1986 109 80 27 20 59 43 6 4 136 47.8 
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Table 13 overpage provides an age distribution over 
the review period which suggests a number of features 
of employment in the Natal industry: 
(l)The pattern of employment for those who are less 
than 20 years of age can be seen as a reflection of 
economic cycles, with employment of (young) 
"learners" at a low in 1977 and 1986. The increase 
reflected in 1983 can be"interpreted as following 
the more buoyant economic conditions of 1980/81/82. 
(2)The age group '20-30' declines from a high of 45.5% 
of the labour force in 1974 to a low of 32.1% in 
1986. This together with the age group '30-40' 
remaining a relatively static proportion of the 
labour force and the increasing proportion of 40-50 
year olds (and over 50's) indicates continuing 
membership of the industry and an ageing of the 
work force. 
(3)In 1968 nearly 62% of the labour force was less 
than 30 years old. By 1986 that figure was just 
less than 38%. In 1968 33.3% were older than 40, 
by 1986, 60.6% were older than 40. 
(4)The age distribution for males is reasonably spread 
across all age groups and presents much the same 
distribution over time. With the economic downturn 
of 1986 presenting a slightly different 
distribution. 
(5)With an ageing but nevertheless expanding level of 
employment in the industry comes the implication 
that an increasing number of (young) entrants must 
stay in the industry. 
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TABLE 13 
Year 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
Year 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
Unknown <20 % 
Age 
2 9 21.4 
3 12 16.7 
2 12 13.6 
, 8 9.3 .J.. 
2 11 9.6 
2 15 11. 2 
2 6· 5.5 
Unknown <20 % 
Age 
- s 12.5 
1 5 11.1 
1 4 9.1 
1 5 11.1 
1 8 16.7 
1 4 12.1 
1 1 3.7 
NATAL AGE PATTERN 
FEMALE 
20- % 30- % 40-
<30 <40 <50 
17 40.5 10 23.8 4 
27 37.5 21 29.2 9 
40 45.5 21 23.9 11 
38 44.2 25 •29 .1 8 
39 34.2 37 32.5 20 
44 32.8 40 29.9 24 
. 35 32.1 29 26.6 28 
20- % 30- % 40-
<30 <40 <50 
19 47.5 8 20.0 6 
-20 44.4 12 26.7 4 
16 36.4 12 27.3 8 
15 33.3 10 22.2 11 
18 37.5 9 18.8 9 
9 27.3 10 30.3 6 
10 37.0 7 25.9 4 
% >50 % Total 
Sample 
9.5 0 - 42 
12.5 0 - 72 
12.5 2 2.2 88 
9.3 6 7.0 86 
17.5 5 4.4 114 
17.9 9 6.7 134 
25.7 9 8.3 109 
% >50 % Total 
15.0 2 5.0 40 
8.9 3 6.7 45 
18.2 3 6.8 44 
24.4 3 6.7 45 
18.8 3 6.3 48 
18.2 3 9.1 33 
14.8 4 14.8 27 
Table 14 over page provides a longitudinal analysis of 
the 'entrance patterns·-. The following can be noted 
The proportion of new entrants.has declined 
substantially 
- ·with the exception of 1986, the proportion with '2' 
entrances is relatively stable at between 20-25% 
The proportion of the sample with '3• entrances has 
increased substantially 
The proportion of '4' and '5' entrances is 
reasonably stable 
As is the '>5' entrance category with the exception 
of 1983 and 1986 which sugg~sts a rising trend 
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TABLE 14 
Year 
1968 
1971 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1 
32 
43 
42 
39 
47 
33 
25 
INDUSTRY ENTRANCE PATTERNS 
No. of Entrances 
Sample 
% 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % >5 % Total 
39.0 19 23.2 8 9.8 5 6.1 4 4.9 14 17.1 82 
36.8 24 20.5 14 12.0 8 6.8 11 9.4 17 14.5 117 
31. 8 33 25.0 18 13.6 11 8.3 9 6.8 19 14.4 132 
29.8 29 22.1 21 16.0 13. 9.9 9 6.9 20 15.3 131 
29.0 33 20.3 24 14.8 16 9.9 14 8.6 28 17.3 162 
19.8 43 25.7 31 18.6 11 6.6 14 8.4 35 21.0 167 
18.4 21 15.4 27 19.9 14 10.3 8 5.9 41 30.1 136 
Taken in conjunction with the age patterns reflected 
previously in Table 13, it can (broadly) be said that 
the labour pool is aging and the work force shows an 
(increasing) tendency ~o move in and out of the 
·industry. The industry also seems unable (or 
unwilling) to attract younger workers into the 
industry. 
7.2.5 ·Wage Form 
• As with the other geographical areas, the Natal 
industry negotiated wages (and other benefits) 
regularly over the review period. As with the other 
regions, the agreements after 1981 reflect a 
'de-sexing' of jobs and there are jobs added and 
deleted from the agreement, thus the job title of 
"general worker" only appears in 1984 - the deletions 
are all a result of job de-sexing. 
Tables 15a and 15b provide 
(a)A review of the usage of job titles. 
(b)A record of changes in hierarchical rankings 
enjoyed by each job title. A comparison of 
District I and II is provided as Table 16. 
(c)Changes (nominal) to the minimum wages as 
negotiated and as applied on the last day of 
December for the years stated. 
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TABLE 17 
357. 
I 
From 1968 to 1981 the 'Head cutter', 'Mechanic' and 
'Male Traveller' have the highest wage. This changes 
by 1984 with the 'Head Cutter' now the 2nd highest 
minimum wage. Likewise a 'Driver' (>10,000 lbs.) 
reflected the 4th highest wage until 1981, and by 1984 
had moved up the rankings to third highest. This was 
due to the de-sexing of the 'Travellers' job title. 
The de-sexing of 'Clerical Employee' is unlike that of 
other jobs that were de-sexed. It will be noted that 
the Male Clerical staff had a large differential 
compared to their female counterpart and that they 
(male) had a higher minimum wage to a 'Driver' (6,000 
to 10,000 lbs.), but that after de-sexing that 
relationship changes. 
Similarly, the 'Foreman/~oman' had minimum wages that 
were less than that of a 'Driver' (6,000 to 10,000 
lbs) from 1968 to 1981. By 1984 that relationship had 
changed. 
The following positions have been selected to assess 
how minimum wages have changed in relation to the 
Consumer Price Index. 
(Actual) (Actual) 1986 
1968 Wage 1986 Wage (Real) +(-) 
Headcutter 30.00 160.00 207.60 (47.60) 
Mechanic 30.00 174.00 207.60 (33.60) 
Driver(l000-6000lbs) 13.45 82.00 93.07 (11.07) 
6,000-10,000 18.65 101.00 129.06 (28.06) 
>10,000 lbs 21.65 126.00 149.82 (23.82) 
Grade I (Female) 11.45 74.50 79.23 (4.73) 
Grade I (Male) 15.00 74.50 103.80 (29.30) 
Grade II Employee 9.25 61.00 64.01 (3.01) 
Traveller Male 30.00 174.00 207.60 (33.60) 
Female 25.00 174.00 173.00 ( 1. 00) 
Foreman 18.00 120.00 124.56 (4.56) 
Forewoman 16.50 120.00 114.18 5.82 
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The above shows that minimum wages in the Natal 
industry have not (with the exception of 'Forewoman') 
kept pace with inflation. 
Machinists in Natal were referred to as "Grade l Male" 
or "Grade l Female" employees. The de-sexing .of this 
job category led to a single job title of "Grade 1 
Employee". It can be seen from Table 17 above that 
the bulk of the workforce (i.e. female machinists) 
have not kept up with the rate of inflation. 
The Natal region also reflects a geographical wage 
distinction which is finally done away with in 1982. 
Over the review period the wage differential between 
District I and II starts at around 11% and decreases 
to about &% at the end of 1981. 
The following graphs depict the wage curves over time 
for both districts I and II and indicate that the 
overall shape of the curve stays (much) the same 
~lthough there might be changes in the rank order of 
particular jobs. 
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Graph 2 - Natal District 2 
(Minimum wages) 
Rand per week 
60 
40--· 
20 
Job Title 
This graph shows comparison of the 
garet ted rates for Nat al Dist 2 1968-81. 
For ABCDE See Table 15b. 
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Graph I - Natal District 1 
(Minimum wages) 
Rand per week 
100 
Job Title 
Th is graph shows comparison of the 
gazetted rates for Natal Dist 1 1972-86. 
For ABCDEFG See Table 15a 
....._ ____ G 
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7.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME 
The Negotiations and their Meaning Content 
The Natal negotiations are characterised by many short 
meetings - short in the sense of the number of lines to the 
minutes of the negotiations. In addition, the brevity of the 
minutes means that there are fewer quotes (than Tvl. and Cape) 
to substantiate argument identifying the constructs utilised 
by the parties to the negotiations: 
This region also reflects different events to the Cape and 
Tvl. regions, thus after the amendment to the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956 which allowed for multi-racial unions 
the Garment Workers Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) finds itself 
under attack from a 'new' union and looks to employers (and 
the industrial council) to support it against the Textile 
Workers Union. 
In addition, Natal wage structures have two districts which 
are treated differently (in terms of wages) in the early part 
of the review period. Like the Transvaal, the Natal employers 
are also very aware of competition from factories covered by a 
wage determination or in 'Homelands', both of which have lower 
wage structures than the Natal industrial council. 
The constructs utilised in the negotiations are nevertheless 
(particularly) similar to those of the Cape. Like the Cape 
region, the Natal region indicates concerns by employers of 
their ability to compete, and the union is concerned with the 
effect of what are seen to be inadequate compensation levels 
for their membership. Again there is, dominantly, the 
acceptance of the need to grow the industry, or at very least 
maintain employment levels. The linkage between growth 
(especially employment), remuneration levels and competitive 
. . 
ability then repres~nts (as in the Cape region) a core 
characteristic of the Natal region. 
Support for this contention starts with the i974 negotiations 
as no minutes for negotiations prior to 1974 could be found. 
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7.3.l 1974 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 13TH FEBRUARY 1974 - 187 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
41/43 
51/54 
UNION 
Quote 
"Employers found it difficult to work and control 
wages on a Consumer Price Index which could lead to 
uncertainty in their pri'cing". 
"Employers could not agree t~ a reduction in the 
hours of work. Employers felt that if the Garment 
Workers Industrial Union wished to assist the 
employer in productivity then a reduction of 
working hours was definitely unacceptable (sic)". 
No quotes. The meeting is recorded to indicate employers 
dealing point by point with the Union proposals and then 
presenting their counter proposals, therefore little in the 
way of construct evidence. 
MEETING NO. 2 - 28TH FEBRUARY 1974 - 113 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
No quotes. The minutes record employers wanting to introduce 
an attendance bonus to minimise absenteeism and which would be 
(to them) a "major move" towards increased productivity. In 
response to the Union proposal that males and females received 
equal pay if in the same job category, employers argue that 
the higher rate of female absenteeism was the reason for wage 
scale differentiation. 
UNION 
. 
Line 
62/63 
Quote 
"Female employees now asked for their scale also to 
be the same as for male employees". 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
363. 
MEETING NO. 3 - 19TH MARCH 1974 - 68 LINES 
Proposals are presented by the N.C.M.A., the Union makes 
additional proposals (increased days leave and equal pay 
scales for male and female workers), which are rejected by 
employers. A Department of Labour representative addresses 
the Council on what the Department feels "Bantu labourers" 
should be paid, and is thanked by the chairman for his 
"guidance". Both parties are to consider the others 
proposals. No construct supporting quotations. 
- MEETING NO. 4 - 4TH APRIL 1974 - 80 LINES 
No con~truct supporting evidence. The meeting records the 
Union rejecting the employers wage offer and proposing a 
different percentage increase which after ~djourning, the 
employers accept. The union wants 15 paid days leave a year 
which is rejected by employers. 
At a further meeting on 24th April 1974 the Agreement is 
formally detailed and agreed, both parties having received a 
mandate to do so by their members. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
No documentation appropriate to these negotiations could be 
found. 
Union 
The minutes of a Shop Steward ~eeting dated 24/9/1973 record 
the stewards being advised of the start of negotiations and 
also "requesting that members submit their suggestions to the 
Secretary". The same-meeting records the comments of two shop 
stewards, 
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1) asks for an immediate increase "as it would be at least 7 
months before the New Agreement is published". 
2) a second wants, "not less than R25.00 for Grade 1, Males 
and Females". 
At a Shop Steward meeting on the 26/3/74 debate is recorded on 
what is seen as a lack of protest from the Trade Union Council 
of S.A. (TUCSA} after the detention of 4 Unionists. A 
suggestion of disaffiliation is dis·cussed and TUCSA officials 
argue that it (T.U.C.S.A.} is made up of 67 affiliated unions 
and that it must "go with majority decisions". An executive 
committee proposal to stay in TUCSA is then "unanimously 
carried". 
The same meeting records.discussion of the percentage increase 
to be settled on with employers (i.e. proposals at this 
_stage}. Two proposals are voted on, the amendment to the 
Executive proposal looses and the counting is disputed, the 
minutes record, "At this stage the meeting became extremely 
unruly with the majority of shop stewards and stewardesses 
walking out of the meeting". 
The minutes of the industrial council .of 10/12/74 record a 
union official reporting "certain agitation against the 
Garment Workers Industrial Union", he believed that "certain 
clergymen and politically motivated persons were visiting 
factories and addressing garment workers with the objective of 
undermining the G.W.I.U., operating unregistered benefit funds 
and to foster ideas regarding the G.W.I.U(s) restricted 
membership etc .... ". The union then asks employers to 
"assist by preventing such agitators entering their factories 
to address employees". The employers agree to a "circul_ar 
letter be sent to all employers regarding this allegation and 
request that they report any incidents" to the secretary of 
the G.W.I.U. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
365. 
7.3.2 1975 - EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS 
In the minutes of the industrial council (d.d. 3/4/75) the 
union requests employers to bring forward the increase in 
wages due on 24/11/75 as "employees were finding.hardships due 
to the rise in the cost of living". The N.C.M.A. agree to 
"consider the matter". 
In the minutes of 29/5/75 the union refers to a council 
circular quoting the Prime Minister's appeal for wage 
restraint (for the whole economy) and suggests that inflation 
is the fault of Government which "had not taken adequate steps 
to curtail it". The union still wanted the November increase 
brought forward. The N.C.M.A. however "regretted it was 
unable to accede to the G.W.I.U's request" as they too were 
experiencing infla~ion related problems. Orders were down, 
material prices up and some factories had put "workers on 
short-time". 
7.3.3 1976 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS 
A request from the Union is recorded in the council minutes of 
8/7/76 for the N.C.M.A. to "consider an allowance of one Rand 
qr more ... until such time as a new Agreement was 
negotiated", this because "employees were feeling the pinch of 
ever increasing costs". 
The minutes of 17/8/76 record the N.C.M.A's rejection of the 
request, "Assoc. could not accede to the reque~t to give a 
C.O.L. allowance ... due to conditions pertaining to the 
industry at present which was aggravated by increasing 
absenteeism". 
In the minutes of the N.C.M.A's annual general meeting of 1976 
a letter from the executive director of the Natal Chamber of 
Industries makes comparisons of wages as covered by the ~Wage 
Determination 345 Certain Areas' and those of the Natal 
Industrial Council. Table 1 below presents these comparisons. 
To read the table the following must be born in mind, 
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( 1 )_, The industrial council (I.e. ) covers employers and. 
employees in Durban (with a minor exclusion), Inanda, 
Pinetown, Pietermaritzburg and Lower Tugela. 
(2) The Wage Determination (W.D.) covers t~e rest of Natal. 
(3) The I.e. is made up of two districts. 
District I = Dur~an, Pinetown and Inanda. 
District II = Pietermaritzburg and Lower Tugela. 
TABLE 18 
Year GRADE I - MALE GRADE II - MALE LABOURER - MALE 
r.e. W.D. WD,xlOO I.e. W.D. WDxlOO I.e. W.D. WDxlOO 
1972 17.10 11.92 70% 10.55 7.26 69% 10.55 6.16 58% 
1975 24.38 12.89 64% 15.55 7.92 51% 15.55 6.71 43% 
GRADE I - FEMALE GRADE II - FEMALE LABOURER - FEMALE 
1972 13.05 9.87 76% 10.55 ·7. 26 69% 10.55 4.92 47% 
1975 18.95 10.74 57% 15.55 7.92 51% 15.55 5.36 34% 
The following quotations have been extracted from the letter. 
(1) "It will be seen that the differential between rates 
paid to Grade I and Grade II to employees in terms of 
the W.D. and I.e. respectively, which was of the order 
of 67/76% has declined to 51/57% by 1975. In fact 
during this period the e.P.I. had risen by 39.3% but 
minimum wages in terms of the W.D. had advanced by no 
more than 9%. Minimum wages in terms of the I.e. on the 
other hand increased by 42-47%". 
(2) ''The Board [Wage Board] will surely appreciate the very 
major change being wrought in the competitive position 
of the two sectors ... and the Assoc. should ... appeal 
to the Board to effect a substantial adjustment in the 
new Wage Determination II . . . . 
In the minutes of the executive committee (Exco) of. the 
N.e.M.A. (d.d.3/6/76) debate on the forthcoming sitting of the 
Wage Board and the following quotes appertain, 
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(1) "Mr .... said that one had to concede the productivity 
of Africans in the outlying areas was lower. The 
differential in wages should be 20% and this is what the 
Assoc. should press for". 
(2) "Mr .... observed that no-one paid anything like the 
wages laid down in the Determination. Everyone paid far 
in excess". 
(3) "The Chairman replied that one factory paid exactly the 
wages laid down". 
The N.C.M.A. then agrees to make the following points to the 
Wage Board: 
(1) Five area differentials were not necessary, two would 
suffice. 
'(2) The wage determination should not be more than 20% less 
than wages paid under the I.C. agreement. 
(3) Should the wage board reject the 'linkage' suggested in 
the 2nd point, the board would then be urged to review 
wages every 12 months for at least the next 3 years. 
7.3.4 1977 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 15TH MARCH 1977 - 61 LINES 
No quotations, but lines 39 to 52 read, 
"Discussion took place on the following matters 
(1) N.C.M.A. suggest Union reconsider its proposals 
(2) G.W.I.U. request N.C.M.A. to present counter proposals 
(3) "Differential wages .for male and female employees" 
(4) "Absenteeism. The effect of production, costing and the 
part it plays in these negotiations. Also what steps to 
be taken to combat it" 
(5) "Increase in the Consumer Price Index since May 1974 
(35.4%)" 
( 6) "Wage rates in other provinces" 
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MEETING NO. 2 - 17TH MARCH 1977 - 64 LINES 
No quotations, merely a listing of the different parties 
proposals which revolve around wages, paid holidays and longer 
breaks. 
MEETING NO. 3 - 14TH APRIL 1977 - 104 LINES 
The minutes of the meeting state t~at the ''following are some 
of the points which were reiterated and made by the parties". 
These points are presented below as they were recorded by the 
secreta~y of the I.e. but have been put under headings to 
identify the party making such points: 
(a) EMPLOYERS 
(i) "offer of increase was already beyond the means of 
employers 0 
(ii) "recent budget had made economic position even more 
serious" 
(iii) "other industries had granted increases of less than 
10%" 
(iv) "time had come to perhaps write in clause in Agreement 
whereby overtime should only be paid after an employee 
had completed his 42.5 hours a week" 
(v) "The 35% increase granted at last negotiations was 
because of the good economic climate prevailing at the 
time, but today's conditions are perhaps the worst South 
Africa has ever faced" 
(vi) "Employers have a moral obligation to workers to keep 
factories going to help workers have employment" 
(vii) "Higher wages will close many factories" 
(viii)"Manufacturers were running scared' of the future of 
the industry" 
(ix) "orders are being cancelled" 
(x). "any profits made at present or in the past are 
necessary to tie over a firm under present conditions 
and are also to protect the worker in his employment" 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
369. 
(xi) "Lower rates of pay have always been paid in Natal as 
there is no market in Natal. Competition is strong from 
other provinces" 
(xii) ".Some factories have stopped overtime completely" 
(xiii)"Short time is today most common" 
(b) UNION 
(i) "Workers cannot live on present wages due to cost of 
living". 
(ii) "No Asiatic male can live and keep a family on RlOO per 
month". 
(iii) "Only a living wage is asked for to cover food, 
transport and shelter". 
(iv) "There is no unemployment of highly skilled workers". 
( v) "Contended workers bring good production". 
(vi) "C.O.L. index -had risen 49 points since last wage 
increase". 
(vii) "There was no evidence of factories closing down. In 
fact new factories were being regi~tered". 
(~iii)"A 30% increase would be considered even though such an 
~ncrease was still not sufficient to satisfy the 
workers.· However, representatives would try and 
persuade workers to accept any such offer from N.C.M.A." 
(ix) "Lower paid employees needed higher percentage wage 
increases to those earning good salaries". 
( x) "A shorter period of an Agreement" . 
(xi) "There is no guarantee that there will be no reduction 
in staff and short time in the future". 
(xii) "It was not the wish of the Union to call mass general 
meetings of the workers to discuss these wage 
negotiations. It was considered preferable to come to a 
satisfactory conclusion through a smaller body such as 
shop stewards who represented.the workers". 
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BANTU REGIONAL COMMITTEE FOR BANTU LABOUR REPRESENTATIVES 
(i) "Committees not satisfied with increase offered by 
N.C.M.A." 
(ii) "If absenteeism was major problem facing employers then 
perhaps the introduction of 'Attendance Bonuses' might 
be the answer". 
(iii) "Factories were closing and there is more and more 
unemployment". 
DEPT. OF LABOUR REPRESENTATIVES 
(i) "A minimum wage of at least Rl8 per week for Labourers 
and Watchmen". 
(ii) "Learner period to be done away with and all labourers 
and watchmen over 18 years of age be paid basic wage of 
at least Rl8 per week". 
MEETING NO. 4 - lOTH MAY 1977 - 77 LINES 
No quotation. 
MEETING NO. 5 - 27TH MAY 1977 - 59 LINES 
The minutes record agreement on substantive issues ''after 
lengthy discussion" but does not provide any description of 
such 'discussion' and therefore construct related quotat~ons 
are not in evidence. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
At the Exco meeting dated 18/1/77 the Union's proposals are 
discussed essentially on an accept/reject basis. Three 
quotations are, however, appropriate 
(1) "Mr .... said that the proposals under this head were 
most unreasonable as they did not come close ~o what was 
possible. For Grade I employees they were asking for 
R35 p.week. The Tvl. Union was asking for only R27.50 
p.week. Should employers not just press for 
arbitration". 
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(2) "Mr .... said that employers should not be overawed by 
the proposals. The G.W.I.U. had a Provident Fund and 
they would not wish to jeopardise this through a 
breakdown in negotiations". 
(3) "Mr .... said that the economic position was in favour 
of the employer party and that this should.• be played 
up". 
In the annual report of the N.C.M.K's executive committee 
(d.d. 22/8/77) the chairman expresses the hope that following 
the N.C.M.A's submission to the industrial tribunal which met 
in Durban on the 21st of June, that job reservation 
determinations protecting white and coloured workers will be 
withdrawn. 
The chairman also reports on poor economic -conditions, 
suggests that employers have a responsibility to improve race 
relations and is critical of 'race' legislation in S.A. The 
chairman says, 
"The law of separation of race groups within our factories is 
in microcosm a perpetuation and extension of most of our 
political problems and irritations, to say nothing of the cost 
of maintaining such facilities". 
The Exco minutes of 19/9/77 report, 
(i) Differential rates for district II to be repealed. 
(ii) A-proposal to include Umbumbulu, Umzinto and Port 
Union 
Shepstone in the scope of the agreement and that the 
"assistance of the Trade Union would be sought in the 
recruitment of employers in these areas". 
At a shop steward/ess meeting on the 22nd of March, 1977, 
discussion revolves around the percentage increase the 
negotiation committee should aim for. It is noted that the 
"Secretary ur_ged shop stewards to have confidence in the 
Negotiation Committee and to give them full powers to 
negotiate. This was unanimously agreed to". 
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A special meeting of shop stewards/esses was called on the 5th 
May 1977 "to report on the outcome of our negotiations and the 
following statements are recorded in the minutes, 
(i) ~the economic position in our country is so bad that we 
have to accept what the employers offer us". 
(ii) "He stated that members are aware of the situation in 
our country but our industry can boom at any time". 
The union's annual report of 1976/77 makes further reference 
to the 1977 negotiations. In the president's address he notes 
(i) "the employers were very stubborn", and 
(ii) "we managed to convince them that our members need a 
living wage to cope with the ever increasing cost of 
living". 
(iii) "I would like to urge members to try and save as much as 
possible as our country is heading for a severe crisis. 
We must all live within our means". 
7.3.5 1979 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 30TH AUGUST 1979 - 148 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line Quote 
36/37 "It was inevitable that wages had to be increased but 
.they had to be realistic". 
38/39 "For the past 3 years the manufacturers had absorbed 
rising costs of materials and production etc. but could 
not do so any longer". 
55/56 "In return for better wages the employer expected better 
productivity and less absenteeism". 
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UNION 
Line Quote 
44/45 " ... members were looking forward to a living wage''. 
46/47 "He asked for fair and reasonable consideratLon". 
48/51 "He gave examples of employees difficulties due to 
increased transport costs and the general cost of 
living. He saw a bright future for the clothing 
industry as there was at present no unemployment and 
every month new factories wer~ opening''. 
57/60 " ... said that due to spiralling cost increases, the 
workers had suffered a monetary loss. He gave 
statistics and figures of subsistance living levels for 
Indian and Coloured people which were far higher than 
the income of Garment Workers". 
70/2 "There was no attraction to the school leaver to join 
the Clothing Industry with its present wage rates". 
In addition this meeting records input from the Durban 
Regional Black Labour Committee which lists its 
requests/demands for black workers in the industry and uses 
similar cost of living arguments to support their proposals. 
MEETING NO. 2 - 4TH OCTOBER 1979 - 104 LINES 
No quotations. 
MEETING NO. 3 - 16TH OCTOBER 1979 - 153 LINES 
No quotations. 
The minutes record, "After lengthy discussions and 
adjournm~nts for N.C.M.A. negotiations to consider matters the 
following agreements and rejections of the Proposals put 
forward in the G~W.I.U. Memorandum were made". A list of 
substantive issues then follows. 
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' SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
At the annual general meeting of 27/9/79 the chair~an makes 
the following statements, 
(1) "As you know, we are in the throes of a wage negotiation 
at present and I believe there is a real need for an 
immediate and fair increase oh current wages and further 
increments to follow in June and again -in January 1981. 
Continuing increases' are inevitable and indeed 
justifiable. Let us gear ourselves to this reality and 
stop 'skrimping and scraping' and let us be more 
realistic in our pricin9". 
(2) "Wage earners have to earn a 'living' and it is our 
responsibility to see that they earn it and indeed 
deserve it for honest, hard endeavour, by our providing 
better opportunities in our industry". 
At a special general meeting (d.d. 27/9/79) a mandate was 
sought from N.C.M.A.'members for the wage negotiations. It is 
recorded that one of those present'' ... said what the T.U. was 
suggesting was irresponsible. Natal should not go higher than 
the Cape and Transvaal". 
After further discussion the chairman summarises, and the 
minutes record "The Chairman said that the Committee would 
then work on a maximum mandate of 20% in January possibly 
structured as 15% + 5% bonus. If the Committee were pushed he 
felt that they might have to accept 20%, with a second year 
increase of 10% plus bonus. There was no doubt that the 
workers were battling with heavy costs. AGREED". 
Union 
There are no records which reflect debate about the 1979 
negotiations. However, at a 'Special Shop Steward/ess 
Meeting' on 2-1/1/79, the following comments are made in 
introducing "our Honourable Brother Gibson of the I.T.G. and 
L.W.F" (International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers 
Federation) 
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Chairman of G.W.I.U. 
"He added that we would like the support of the outside world 
as we are not politicians but workers. He added further that 
changes are coming and we must be ready for them". 
Cape Union Secretary 
"we own our own building and we are earning good wages". 
and lastly 
"He added that we must send delegates when there are 
conference[s] to convince other countries of what is really 
going on in S.A.". "Mrs .... , Secretary of our Parallel 
Union, welcomed Mr. Gibson, ~dding that she is pleased that he 
has come to see for himself the true situation that exists in 
our country. Mrs .... thanked the G.W.I.U. for assisting in 
organising the black workers, and expressed the hope that they 
will be able to join our Union. in the near future". 
7.3.6 THE NATIONAL UNION OF TEXTILE WORKERS (N.U.T.W.) AND 
THE PARTIES TO THE NATAL INDUSTRlAL COUNCIL 
The Natal region reflects the emergence of a competing union 
after the amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 
1956, and as such reflects a different set of events to the 
Cape and Transvaal regions. The events surrounding this 
aspect of the Natal region are presented below as support not 
only of constructs utilised by the parties, but also to 
support such structuration concepts of 'regionalization' and 
'monitoring'. The relationship to the theoretical model will 
be focussed on more fully later in this section. 
THE N.U.T.W. AND THE PARTIES 
1980 
UNION 
At a shop steward/ess meeting on 7/12/80 the secretary 
comments on new organisations, "which are suddenly taking a 
keen interest in the workers". 
The chairman advises "workers must be very careful about which 
organisation they join as a lot of thes~ organisations have 
ulterior motives, i.e. political, the workers' money etc." 
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The secretary of the union, furthermore, advises the meeting 
that the N.U.T.W. has applied to "cover textile and knitted 
clothing, although most of them are aware that we have'to 
always take care of clothing workers". " ... we have lodged an 
objection to the registration of this Union in respect of 
their application for knitted clothing". 
EMPLOYERS 
No reference to the N.U.T.W. was fO'Und in employer minutes for 
the year 1980. 
1981 
UNION 
At a shop steward/ess meeting on th~ 28/6/81, ~he chairman 
advises that the union's objection to the registration of the 
N.U.T.W. is "ongoing''. In addition it is ~hnounced that ·4 
African members will be elected' (to the Executive) as the 
Registrar ·(i.e. State authority) had accepted a change in the 
union's constitution and thus "we are now a mixed Union". 
At a later (4/10/81) shop steward/ess meeting the chairman 
said, "He added that members must not listen to outside 
organisations but stand firm and show their solidarity to 
their organisation. He added that politics must not be 
embodied in the trade union movement and discrimination on 
race, colour or sex have been removed from the Act, and this 
is welcomed". 
EMPLOYERS 
In the chairman's report of the annual general meeting 
(10/8/81) it is suggested that the relationship of the 
N.C.M.A. with the G.W.I.U. is a long and valued relationship 
which should be maintained, "To this end the G.W.I.U. has been 
with us a long time; we have enjoyed amicable associations 
and it wouid be impossible to negotiate with more than one 
official body. It is for this reason therefore that that 
(sic) no other approaches from other organisations should be 
encouraged by members". 
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,1982 
Minutes for both Employers and Union record no debate about 
the N.U.T.W. 
1983 
UNION 
At a shop steward/ess meeting (2/10/83) there is a debate-
about 'rival' unions and the chairman is recorded as, "He 
appealed to shop steward/esses to t~ll members not to join the 
rival union, nor go to them with problems as the rival unions 
are trying very hard to win our members, especially the 
African people who are easily mislead". · 
Furthermore, "He added the bosses are back to their mischief 
of bringing in other Unions so that we will be divided and 
confused and they are back to the old policy of throwing a 
bone so that the Unions can fight over this bone while they 
sit back and get fat". 
Lastly, "Therefore, we must all stand together more united as 
a stronger force to fight all this " "Shop Stewards 
applauded". 
EMPLOYERS 
At a meeting of Exco on the 17/5/83 concern is expressed about 
the possible breakdown of the industrial council system as 
'non-party' trade unions are making approaches to "non members 
of the Association and establishing a situation of strength". 
It is then agreed to make a presentation on the matter to the 
forthcoming A.G.M. 
The Exco minutes of 21/6/83 records discussion on an 
application to Party status by the N.U.~.W. It is agreed that 
a 5 ~an delegation should meet with the N.U.T.W. "to discuss 
their aims, objectives, Constitution, representativeness of 
the industry in order to assist the Association making its 
decision". 
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Further debate on the N.U.T.W's application is recorded in the 
Exco minutes of 17/10/83 and it was noted that ~he N.U.T.W. 
only had 252 members in an industry of 42 000 employees. 
This, it was felt, was not "reaso.nable representativeness". 
It was further noted that all parties to the Agreement had to 
agree to any new party and that it w~s unlikely that the Union 
would agree to the N.U.T.W's application. 
This rejection of the N.U.T.W's application is in fact 
recorded in the minutes of the following Exco meeting (d.d. 
17/11/83). 
1984 
In 1984 the Union held two shop steward/ess meetings (1/4/84 
and 27/5/84} at which the history and achievements of the 
union are detailed. The N.U.T.W. is seen as a threat and 
unity and solidarity are called for. 
On Monday 11th June the union called for a mass meeting (at 
Curries Fountain) and feels that the turnout of "more than 
30,000 clothing workers" means it was a successful event 
expressing the unity of the union (Annual Report 1984/85). 
There is no further mention of inter-union rivalry in the shop 
steward meetings. 
EMPLOYERS 
On the 1st February 1984, the Exco minutes record a union 
(G.W.I.U.} change of rules, i.e. members cannot belong to more 
than one union. The Closed Shop arrangement then implies that 
a member who had dual membership either had to give up 
membership of the other union or accept being unemployed (at 
least by N.C.M.A. members}. 
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It is also recorded that a secret ballot would be held at a 
particular Durban firm to determine support levels for the 
N.U.T.W. and the G.W.I.U. Should the N.U.T.W. have majority 
support then the firm (it is noted) was likely to resign from 
the Association. Were that to happen the N.C.M.A. would 
"press the Union" at council to grant exemption to that firm. 
The issue of resignation or exemption is of importance to the 
N.C.M.A. as the industrial counc~l ~ystem is based on the 
representativeness of the parties to the Agreement. It will 
be seen later on that representativeness of the N.C.M.A. is 
called into question by the State. 
At the Exco m~eting of 4/4/84 it is reported that the 
Industrial Council had to appear before the Industrial Court 
"to explain why it had not granted the exemption requested by 
the N.U.T.W.". It was noted that the current state of affairs 
was such that if the N.U.T.W. had majority representation in a 
particular firm, the only option for the N.C.M.A. member was 
to resign, "thereby threatening the representativeness of the 
Association" and leading to "the possible collapse of the 
I.C.". 
Members were warned, "against precipitate action with the 
N.U.T.W." and, "it was also thought that the G.W.I.U. be made 
more aware of the developing situation". 
1985 
At the Exco meeting of the N.C.M.A. (d.d. 29/5/85) their 
policy toward the N.U.T.W. is finalised. 
(1) Association agrees to philosophy of "freedom of 
association". 
(2) ~ssociation would support exemptions from closed shop 
and stop order provisions - once N.U.T.W. shows majority 
representation. 
(3) Signed stop orders not enough proof - but will be the 
start to a secret ballot. 
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(4) Both Unions get "reasonable access". 
(5) Ballots conducted by independent auditors. Unions 
permitted to nominate scrutineers to observe voting and 
counting - all three sign document saying voting fair. 
(6) If N.U.T.W. lose they won't be eligible for recognition 
there for at least 12 months. 
At the same meeting the union (G.W.I.U.) had submitted a 
proposed agreement which would "int·eralia recognise the 
G.W.I.U. as the sole representative of employees in the 
industry, grant access to the union to meet its members on the 
factory premises, meet with the employer and shop stewards on 
a monthly basis, grant maternity leave to female employees and 
accept the disciplinary and grievance procedures laid down by 
the Union". 
The meeting, however, agreed that "the Union be informed with 
regret that the Association was not repared to enter into 
such an agreement". 
No further mention of the N.U.T.W. is made over the balance of 
the review period. 
7.3.7 1982 NEGOTIATIONS 
At the A.G.M. of the N.C.M.A. the Chairman's report for 1981 
(d.d. 10/8/81), it is observed that "the increasing wage 
scales have been encouraging. However, I must note at 
this stage that we must be prepared to increase wages even 
further by the middle of next year in order to hold the very 
strong and skilled Asiatic labour force". 
The chairman states that asians are leaving the clothing 
industry for other - better paying - industries, and that a 
growing urban black population demands "urgent training and 
absorbtion into intensive labour operations such as ours". 
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MEETING NO. 1 - l7TH AUGUST 1982 - 85 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line Quote 
34/35 "He said care should be taken to keep the industry alive 
in Natal, and not iet it ~ove to boarder (sic). 
industry". 
UNION 
Line Q1.lote 
39/40 "He would not like to see the good labour in the 
clothing industry going to other industries because of 
wages". 
50/51 " ... spoke and said that a dissatisfied employee would 
never give of his best productivity". 
MEETINGS 2,3,4 AND 5 
Dates and lines respectively - 30th September 1982 (53 lines) 
5th October 1982 (54 lines) 
14th October 1982 (81 lines) 
2nd November 1982 (148 lines) 
The record of the detail of the discussions is done in such a 
way that quotations supporting constructs cannot be 
identified. Thus, for example, the minutes state 
"Discussions then followed on the advantages and disadvantages 
of an agreement lasting less than 2 years". 
The minutes of these meetings do however record that the 
Unions focus was.on "a living wage" and that cost of living 
figures were quoted. The employers in turn are reported to 
suggest that if wages were too high they would not be 
competitive which would result in workers being discharged. 
It is recorded that the workers are to receive a 40% increase 
in 1983 and a further 10% in 1984, and this should be seen in 
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relation to the chairman of the N.C.M.A's earlier (1981) 
state.ment and the activities of the N.U.T.W., although neither 
party is recorded as directly referring to these events in the 
1982 minutes of negotiation. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
A special general meeting was held un 1/11/82 and by show of 
hands agreement is got from members to conclude the agreement. 
No debate recorded. 
Union 
At a shop steward/ess meeting held on the 28/3/82 it is 
minuted that, "The Secretary said an important point to bear 
in mind is that he) as Secretary of the Union can promise a 
lot and make wages sky high but we must be careful when we 
negotiate as we look at many things. We must make sure that 
our members are WORKING AND EARNING A FAIR WAGE because if. we 
make wages sky high some employers may close their factories, 
and we may find that workers and their families can starve 
through unemployment. Have we as a Union done any good for 
our members if this situation arises? ... " "shop stewards 
applauded". 
At a further meeting (d.d. 3/10/82) debate takes place on the 
current wage negotiations, the following statements are 
recorded, 
(1) "He added that workers will call for a strike and the 
workers in his factory will support this and the 
Executive Council will have a rough time controlling 
them". 
(2) "She added that factories can close but the workers want 
their money". 
(3) "He asked all shop stewards to follow him and call for 
strike action in their plants". 
(4) "She is proud to be a worker of ... but tomorrow she 
. could lose her job, and she is prepared to stand to the 
bitter erid with her fellow workers". 
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Addressing the shop steward/esses the chairman says "He 
appealed to shop stewards to have confidence and trust in 
their leaders and leave these matters in the hands of the 
Negotiating Committee and the Executive Council who are there 
to look after the interests of the organisation and workers". 
Support (from the floor) for the union officials is recorded 
"He added, the workers want more money and they leave this 
matter to the Executive Council an~ Negotiations Committee as 
they know what they are doing". "Mrs .... of ... said shop 
stewards and workers have confidence in the Chairman, 
Secre~ary, Organisers and Executive Council and the officials 
must not think otherwise". 
At the last meeting of shop steward/esses in 1982 (5/12/82) 
the Chairman notes "that despite all these problems the 
negotiating team had done a good job". 
No further debate on the 1982 negotiations is recorded. 
7.3.8 1984 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. 1 - 30TH AUGUST 1984 - 69 LINES 
The minutes of this meeting, again, do not provide verbatum 
quotations but are rather a summary of what was said and 
recorded as such by the Secretary of the Council. The minutes 
do record the following which (at least) give an indication of 
the content of the debate. 
(1) "Comparisons were made with other provinces and 
neighbouring states, etc." [N.C.M.A. speaker] 
(2) It is recorded that the Union representative "replied 
and gave a very detailed description of the needs of the 
workers in support of the increase in wages asked for". 
(3) "After lengthy discussion" both parties agreed 
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(i) Union would not "consider and prepare another 
schedule of wage rates" until N.C.M.A. counter 
proposals were received. 
(ii)N.C.M.A. "to prepare a schedule of new wage rates 
which it was prepared to offer". 
"Agree date of next meeting and adjourn". 
MEETING NO. 2 - 30TH SEPTEMBER 198~ - 52 LINES 
Again the meeting records no verbatim discussion, thus lines 
38-40 state "Lengthy discussions were again held and speakers 
from both parties expressed their views. No progress was made 
in coming to any agreement on new wage rates". 
The N.C.M.A. do, however, table a letter at the meeting which 
provides an indication of the constructs utilised by their 
negotiating team. 
The ietter states "we would like to recap salient and 
pertinent remarks made by the members of our negotiating 
committee at such meeting " [i.e. the 1st meeting of these 
negotiations] 
(1) Union proposals have not "taken into consideration 
present economic factors and realities". 
(2) Nor have they taken into account proposals made by 
"other Unions in South Africa". If they had they would 
have found such proposals "far more realistic" than 
those made by the Union. 
(3) The leaders of industry and commerce expect "a 
production depression worse than we have ever seen in 
this country". The number of jobs will be slashed. 
(4) Down-turn in trade affecting manufacturers throughout 
country and "budgets of major chains have been cut 
dramatically". 
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(5) Business faced with massive increase in lending rates 
and many clothing manufacturers "anticipate showing 
sizeable trading losses for the period 1984/85". 
(6) "many of our members are of the opinion that a freeze in 
wages would be most appropriate". 
MEETING NO. 3 - llTH SEPTEMBER 1984 - 61 LINES 
Again the minutes do not provide direct construct evidence -
proposals are put forward and rejected, the minutes (lines 
31-32) record "Speakers from both parties expressed their 
views and put forward arguments on the new proposals".· 
MEETINGS NO. 4, 5 AND 6 
Dates and lines .respectively - 17th September 1984 (109 lines) 
8th October 1984 (50 lines)· 
18th October 1984 (68 lines) 
Only substantive issues agreed, rejected or deferred. 
MEETING NO. 7 - 6TH NOVEMBER 1984 - 156 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
No quotations. 
UNION 
Line Quote 
14 "His Union wished to negotiate an increase in real 
wages ... " . 
16/19 " ... stated that Sick Benefit Fund and Provident Fund 
contributions were higher in the Cape than in Natal, and 
that Cape workers ~enjoyed 10 paid holidays compared to 
the 8 in Natal". 
43/44 wage rates between the Cape and Natal should not be 
significantly different". 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
386. 
MEETING NO. 8 - 29TH NOVEMBER 1984 - 65 LINES 
Again the Secretary summarises the discussions thus 
Line 
9/11 
30/36 
12/14 
Quote 
The Union "reiterated and referred to expected 
increases to (sic) electricity, transport and 
rent". 
The Union accept relucta'ntly with "extreme 
disappointment". 
"N.C.M.A. also reiterated and spoke on the present 
unfavourable financial climate, referring to press 
reports of unemployment and the closure of many 
factories". 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Employers 
The minutes of a special general meeting (d.d. 19/12/84) tell 
us that a comparative analysis of Cape and Natal wages were 
presented by the chairman (his analysis is not recorded) who 
"expressed the view that wage rates in this province had 
aligned themselves with Cape wages overall". 
Union 
At a shop steward/ess meeting held on the 30/9/84 to provide 
Union officials with bargaining guidelines, it is recorded 
that there was much debate about strike action. The following 
quotes clarify 
(1) "queried why can't we show our solidarity to the bosses 
by having a mass sit in at work or don't even go to work 
for 1 day". "Shop stewards applauded". 
(2) "She added if employers are not prepared to give us 
better wages, each and every worker must be prepared to 
strike". "Shop stewards applauded". 
The meeting concludes with the chairman saying "we have made a 
note of all that has been said and we will tell this to the 
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N.C.M.A. spokesman. He asked shop stewards to leave this in 
the hands of the negotiating team and the executive council 
who will do the best they can". 
The shop steward/ess meeting of 2/12/84 has little debate 
recorded on the negotiations other than a comment from the 
floor, "she congratulated the negotiating team and stated that 
at least they had achieved something". 
7.3.9 1986 NEGOTIATIONS 
MEETING NO. l - 8TH SEPTEMBER- 1986 - 47 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
7/10 
11/12 
UNION 
Line 
16/17 
Quote 
Union demands "were unrealistic in the present 
economic climate". 
Employers believe "that the basis of life was to 
give and to take". 
Quote 
"productivity was taken into account". 
MEETING NO. 2 - 15TH SEPTEMBER 1986 - 133 LINES 
No quotations. 
MEETING NO. 3 - 16TH SEPTEMBER 1986 - 85 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
39/41 
Quote 
"The biggest competition facing the urban 
manufacturer comes from the rural areas where 
employees work up to 45 hours per week". 
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28 
30 
33/34 
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Quote 
"The shortening of working hours would thus be 
service to society". [this after arguing the 
travelling hardships experienced by workers] 
"children are neglected as both parents usually 
work". 
"A worker spends plus/minus 2 hours per day 
travelling to and from W'Ork". 
"They arrive at work tired and hungry". 
MEETING NO. 4 - 22ND SEPTEMBER 1986 - 138 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
29/30 
24/25 
UNION 
Line 
12/15 
18/20 
36/38 
Quote 
"The viability and profitability of the urban 
manufacturer must be taken into account". 
" ... the biggest competition facing the urban 
manufacturers comes from the decentralised areas". 
Quote 
"The N.C.M.A. offer of 7~ percent increase in wages 
does not take into account the losses sustained by 
workers as a result of inflation". 
" pointed out that a machinist on a rate of 
R74.50 per week fell below these [H. Subs. level 
and H. Effective level] levels". 
"He asked the N.C.M.A. to assist the G.W.I.U. in 
penetrating these areas". [i.e. ='Homelands'] 
MEETING NO. 5 - lST OCTOBER 1986 - 106 LINES 
EMPLOYERS 
Line 
50/51 
Quote 
"Mr. poin_ted out· that the manufacturers are 
also affected by all price increases. He added 
that nobody's wages kept pace with inflation". 
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Quote 
"Mr .... pointed out that added to the current 
inflation rate, the price of bread has increased 
drastically from 1/10/86. These factors would add 
to the plight of the workers". 
"The real wage of the machinist is now R32.00 per 
week". 
MEETING.NQ .. 6 ~ 9TH OCTOBER 1986 - 79 LINES 
The meeting records, "after further discussion the N.C.M.A's 
wage offer was accepted". The meeting then confirms various 
elements of the new agreement. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENTS 
Union 
No reference to these negotiations could be found in the 
·minutes of the shop steward/ess meetings of 1986. 
Employers 
In the minutes of Exco (d.d. 24/11/86) the chairman reports 
that the industrial council is experiencing difficulties in 
getting the Minister of Manpower to publish the agreement 
because of the issue of ~representativeness'. 
The N.C.M.A. had had discussions with the union on the 
possibility of excluding from the provisions of the agreement 
those manufacturers with less than 20 employees. This would 
eliminate 131 employers with a total work force of some 1200 
workers and then of the balance of employers (278) the 
N.C.M.A. would have a 46% representation, i~e. 127. It is 
agreed to actively pursue the recruitment of new members. 
No Exco annual report for 1986 was available for analysis. 
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7.4 BARGAINING BEHAVIOUR 
Table 19 overpage provides an analysis of .bargaining in terms 
of Walton & McKursie's theory of bargaining. It is presented 
to highlight the routinization of bargaining behaviour. 
Table 19 allows for a number of observations on bargaining 
behaviour in the Natal region: 
{i) The appar~nt high degree of involvement of the chairman 
in the negotiations. This is a little misleading as the 
"Chairman" category is utilised to classify a variety of 
non-negotiating behaviours e.g. the 'fifth meeting' of 
the 1984 negotiations (d.d. 8/10/1984)(total lines = 50) 
the "Chairman·" category is as follows 
Line 
1-3 
27 
Summary 
Chairman introduces/brings the meeting to order 
the minutes report "lengthy discussion followed on 
new wage rates" 
32-50 Chairman suggests closing the meeting as N.C.M.A. 
delegates want to consult their Executive to get a 
further increase to their mandate and various 
Administrative issues are dealt with 
The above is a fairly typical description of the 
chairman's role as well as the style of minute keeping 
which complicates the process of establishing 'the 
bargaining constructs employed by the parties to the 
negotiations. 
(ii) A pattern of bargaining behaviour can be discerned over 
the bargaining meetings, thus the 'first' meetings tend 
to be utilised by each side to "structure attitudes" 
and, in addition, employers utilise 'distributive 
bargaining' . 
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TABLE19 Percentages of Bargaining Behahviour - Natal 
Percentage of Total Lines 
Meet Employer Union 
·ing Total Chair 
Date No Lines Ml M2 M3 M4 Nl N2 N3 N4 man 
13/02/74 1 187 0 40 21 0 0 0 12 0 28 101 
15/03/77 1 61 0 13 7 0 0 0 s 0 15 100 
30/08/79 1 148 0 0 28 0 0 4 28 0 40 100 
17/08/82 1 85 0 7 34 0 0 0 32 0 27 100 
30/08/84 1 69 0 4 6 0 0 0 3 0 87 100 
08109186 1 47 0 17 19 0 0 11 38 0 15 100 
28/02174 2 113 0 0 27 0 0 19 17 0 37 100 
17/03/77 2 64 0 23 17 0 0 16 3 0 41 100 
04/10/79 ·2 104 0 21 18 0 0 21 6 0 34 100 
30/09/82 2 53 0 26 17 0 0 - 0 4 0 53 100 
30/09/84 2 52 0 12 23 .0 0 8 0 0 58 101 
15/09/86 2 133 0 23 17 0 0 5 26 0 29 100 
19/03/74 3 68 0 25 6 0 0 12 4 0 53 100 
14/04/77 3 104 O· 14 27 0 0 s 3 0 51- 100 
16/10/79 3 153 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 96 100 
05/10/82 3 54 0 24 20 0 0 15 6 0 35 100 
11/09/84 3 61 0 23 8 0 0 0 13 0 56 100 
16/09/86 3 85 0 5 18 0 0 8 47 0 22 100 
04/04/74 4 80 0 5 0 0 0 11 6 o· 78 100 
10/05/77 4 77 0 13 25 0 0 17 17 0 29 101 
14/10/82 4 81 0 15 10 0 0 11 9 0 56 101 
17/09/84 4 109 0 4 16 0 0 20 4 0 57 101 
22/09/86 4 138 0 0 22 0 3 6 20 o· 50 101 
27/05/77 5 59 0 34 0 0 o· 0 0 0 66 100 
21/10/82 5 148 0 8 14' 0 0 10 14 0 55 101 
08/10/84 5 50 0 2 12 0 0 8 29 0 49 100 
01/10/86 5 106 ·o 17 29 0 0 11 22 0 21 100 
18/10/84 6 68 0 24 12 0 0 25 16 0 24 101 
09/10/86 6 79 0 28 9 0 0 11 8 0 44 100 
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The 'second meetings' indicate employers using 
distributive bargaining and attitudinal structuring in 
(virtually) equal parts. The union on the other hand 
reflects a predominance of distributive bargaining. 
The 'third meeting' is similar to the 'second meeting'. 
The .. fourth meetings' are characterised by an increase 
in attitudinal structuring on the part of employers (and 
a decrease in distributive bargaining) and an increase 
on the part of the union in a reliance on distributive 
bargaining. 
The 'fifth meetings' see both parties utilising 
distributive bargaining but with a greater reliance on 
attitudinal structuring. 
The two 'sixth meetings' do not provide an adequate data 
base from which to draw conclusions, but it does appear 
as if there is a return to a dominance of distributive 
bargaining. 
(iii) The data in Table 19 is presented in graphical form in 
Graphs 3 to 8. 
7.5 THE CONSTRUCTS 
The analysis of the statements of Part B of the Natal. region 
identifies the constructs held in the interpretive schemes of 
the actors. 
Employers like their counterparts in the Cape and Transvaal 
regions reflect a prime concern with an ability to compete 
which implies also that if unable to compete then they are 
unwilling to continue their membership of the Natal industry 
and that potential investors/participants in the Natal 
industry will not be attracted. Consequently a stagnant or 
declining industry is likely to result. 
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Graph 3 - Nat al Industrial Council 
Percentages - First Meeting 
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Graph 4 - Nat al Industrial Council 
Percentages ..: Second Meeting 
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Graph 5 - Natal Industrial Council 
Percentages - Third Meeting 
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Graph 6 - Nat al Industrial Council 
Percentages - Fourth Meeting 
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Graph 7 - Natal Industrial Council 
Percentages - Fifth Meeting 
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Graph 8 - Natal Industrial Council 
Percentages - Sixth Meeting 
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Implicated in the prime construct is the desire to have a 
growing industry and the necessity to have attractive 
conditions of employment. Without fair wages labour will not 
be attracted, which will then restrict the growth of the 
industry. Employers also accept the importance of the 
industrial council as the appropriate vehicle through which 
equal (minimum) conditions can be administered. Further, in 
terms of the issues over which bargaining and non-bargaining 
takes, or does not, take place, constructs can be identified . 
. Bargaining issues are essentially material rewards, and issues 
of job control do not enter the bargaining arena, thus the 
construct encapsulating this position can be depicted as 
'Managerial workplace control - inability to manage', which 
again will be linked to employers' views on their ability to 
compete. 
The Union is primarily concerned with the improvement of 
material benefits for its membership, .and accepts the wage 
level-ability to compete linkage. It too values a growing (in 
terms of employment) industry and the importance of the 
industrial council as a governance mechanism. The Union 
specifies its 'non-political 1 character, and does not focus on 
job control issues by implication, accepting the need for 
managerial fre.edom in issues other than those involved in 
conditions of employment bargaining as found in the negotiated 
agreements. 
7.6 THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE 
NATAL GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Structure "as recursively organised sets of rules and 
resources, is out of time and space, save in its 
instantiations and co-ordination and memory traces" (1). This 
conception of structure is readily identifiable from the 
interpretation of the data already provided. 
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Structure in the Natal region can be described as rules and 
resources which have the effect of securing a facet of the 
competitive ability of the employer group (i.e. employment 
costs). This contention will be supported by reference to the 
data provided earlier. The duality of structure will be 
evidenced both in its "instantiations" and the "interpretive 
schemes" held.by the actors. 
The Natal industrial· relations system haq as its centre piece 
the industrial council which negotiates agreements between the 
employer group and employee representatives. The council then 
represents a facility of domination in that through the 
negotiated agreements it exercises control over allocative and 
authoritative resources. 
Rules of signification are identifiable in action as relating 
to the control over employment costs. Contributions to the 
funds managed by the council indicate firstly that both 
employers and employees contribute to these funds and that, 
secondly, these contributions have not kept pace with 
inflation for the largest employee category, i.e. female 
machinists who, together with male machinists, make up about 
50% of the workforce. 
Minimum wages negotiated also indicate the containment of 
employment costs. The comparison of minimum wages as given in 
Table 17 (p. 300) indicate the decline in real wages from 1968 
to 1986. Whilst it was not possible to trace actual wages 
paid, it is still possible to argue that the payment .of higher 
than minimum levels is a factory level decision which 
management would review in relation to their ability to remain 
competitive. The Natal region initially reflects two 
districts with different wage structures. These are merged in 
1982, which is further evidence of employers controlling 
inter-firm (and inter-region) competition. The initial 
acceptance by the employer group of these regional wage 
differentials is based on the perception of lower levels of 
productivity, a further indication of employer concern with 
employment costs and their ability to compete. 
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The negotiated agreements are restricted to a narrow range of 
conditions of employment. No evidence was found that dealt 
with the managerial ability to "hire and fire;', or 
reduncancy. There is evidence that job descriptions were 
changed, i.e. some are done away with and others added, 
however the agreements show no restrictions on factory 
management to fluctuate employment levels. This freedom of 
action is further evidence of the significance to employers of 
the ability to contain labour costs· and in so doing remain 
competitive. 
The nature of the funds associated wtih the agreement are 
further evidence of rules of signification. Thus the purpose 
served by such funds can be taken to have meaning to the 
parties of the agreement. Rules of legitimation can be 
interpreted on the basis of what it would mean, to the parties 
if such funds did not exist. Again, these funds can be viewed 
as facilities of domination in that through them control over 
allocative (specifically) and authoritative resources are 
exercised. 
An analysis of the union's financial statements reflect a 
continuity of certain classes of action which are possible 
only because of the union's position in the industry (i.e. the 
representative body) and the flow of subscriptions (and 
interest). The cash flow of the union is directly related to 
the level of employment and thus union activity is greatly 
dependent on growth in the industry. Thus the continuation of 
union activity would be jeopardized if high wages led to 
stagnant or lower levels of employment, and whilst higher 
subscriptions might be called for, the likelihood exists that 
member dissatisfaction would arise from such action. Flowing 
from the above it is possible to view union activities as a 
further factor in the explanation of the quality of structure 
in the Natal region. 
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Rules of legitimation will be identifiable in action more by 
implication than by being directly observable, such rules 
however will be explicitly identified when the 'interpretive 
schemes' 9f the actors are analysed. The degree of 
distributive bargaining reflected in the analysis of 
bargaining behaviour by way of the Walton and McKursie model 
is taken to be evidence of sanctions exercised and an 
expression in interaction of rules of legitimation. In 
addition the growth in employment in the industry can be seen 
to be evidence of the 'correctness' of wage agreements and 
deviation from such methods and objectives would be 
detrimental to the continued growth - in employment - of the 
industry. 
Structuration theory makes the poi~t that action produces and 
reproduces the "conditions that make such action possible" 
(2). Over the review period (1968 - 1986} records of minutes 
of formal negotiations indicate that six negotiations took 
place (note - no minutes prior to 1974} and, in addition, 
informal approaches for wage adjustments were made (by the 
union} in 1975 and 1976. The action involved over this period 
of time is discernably similar and its continuity and 
repetition are a reflection of the systems stru6tural 
properties (signification, domination and legitimation} 
binding action over time and space. It is these properties 
which identify the system of industrial relations in Natal. 
Further evidence that supports the description of the · 
structural properties of the Natal industrial relations system 
is to be found in the 'interpretive schemes' of the actors. 
An analysis of the minutes of negotiations and the minutes of 
meetings held by the bargaining collectivities identif i~s the 
constructs held by the actors. These constructs (rules} are 
the same as the rules identified in the earlier analysis of 
action. 
0 
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Employers continually refer to the necessity to ensure 
manufacturers' ability to compete. Reference is made-to 
employment cost levels in other regions as well as comparisons 
with employers covered by wage determinations (see N.C.M.A. 
annual general meeting 1976). The sanction to this rule lies 
in the explicit view that the industry, and hence employment, 
will decline if wages make the industry uncompetitive. This 
view of the need to compete seems to be accepted by the 
union. The special general meeting on the 5th May, 1977, is 
representative. Again, the shop steward/ess meeting of 28th 
March, 1982, reflects acceptance of the rule that high wages 
can lead to unemployment which is not in the interests of the 
membership. 
Awareness of economic conditions is -evident in the statements 
of both parties·and issues monitored support the 
identification of the prime rule of signification. The 
extra-ordinary negotiations of 1975 and 1976 indicate the 
union's concern with the impact of inflation on wages and the 
employers rejection of interim adjustments is related to the 
maintenance of their ability to compete. 
The monitoring of general economic conditions is accompanied 
by a continuin9 awareness by both parties of employment 
conditions in other regions. The union, apart from referring 
to wages in other regions, also identifies benefits received 
in other regions - see meeting No. 7, 6th November, 1984. 
Employers in turn compare demands made by the Union to rates 
of pay in other regions - see N.C.M.A. executive committee 
meeting of 18th January, 1977. Again, at a special general 
meeting of the employer body on the 19th December, 1984, the 
chairman "expressed the view that wage rates in this province 
had aligned themselves with Cape wages overall". 
The prime rule of signification in the Natal industrial 
relations system is that of an ability to compete, which is 
contrasted with the rule of legitimation (i.e. sanction) that 
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lower levels of employment will be experienced if the ability 
of manufacturers to compete is affected. These rules find 
/ 
expression in the facility of the industrial council through 
which control over allocative and authoritative resources is 
exercised. 
Structuration theory argues that the moment of action is also 
one of reproduction and is related to the repetitive nature of 
much of social action. Procedural and substantive issues 
involved in the Natal bargaining re~ains essentially the same 
over the review period which also needs to be seen in relation 
to bargaining activities that have gone before. The 
repetitive nature of social action needs to be seen in 
conjunction with 
(1) The idea of unintended consequences of intentional acts. 
(2) The role of 'significantly placed' actors ·who can 
influence conditions to either remain as they are or can 
(influence) change those conditions. 
(3) Events in other action contexts which can constrain/enable 
action in the system under investigation. 
In the Natal region it is reasonable to argue that the 
unintended consequences of employment cost restraint lies in 
levels of absenteeism, labour turnover and the ability of 
employers to attract and retain skilled labour. 
The minutes of industrial council negotiations reflect · 
managerial concern with labour turnover, absenteeism and 
productivity. Employers argue that the ma+e/female wage gap 
is because females exhibit higher rates of absenteeism 
(meeting No. 2, 1974). A review of Table 14 (of the Natal 
section) shows that between 28% and 46% of the sample had 4 or 
more entrances to the industry, which together with the 
(female) age profile (i.e. an aging labour force - see Table 
12), suggests increasing employer difficulties in attracting 
and holding the workforce. This observation is reinforced by 
reference to the N.C.M.A. chairman's comments made at the 1981 
annual general meeting, where he notes that ''we must be 
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prepared to increase wages even further" so as to "hold the 
very strong and skilled Asiatic labour force". At the same 
meeting the need to train and absorb the "growing urban black 
population" is expressed by the chairman. The changing racial 
composition of the labour force is reflected in Table 10, and 
shows the surge in employment to be sourced in the growth in 
the black component. This represents further evidence of the 
prime rule of signification and by implication that of 
legitimation. 
At the individual level of analysis the emproyment patterns 
referred to previously can also be seen as a reflection of how 
those thought to be in a subordinate position can influence 
the action of their putative superiors. Again, the 
constraining aspects of industrial council agreements can also 
be viewed as enabling in that an instrumental approach to 
employment in the industry can be interpreted from the 
employ,ment pattern data. 
The minutes of various meetings of the collectivities provide 
insights into the influence of 'significantly placed' actors, 
specifically the chairman of the parties to industrial council 
agreements. The chairman of the employer group is influencial 
in persuading members to accept the need for wage increases as 
argued at the A.G.M. of 1979 and 1981. The union chairman is 
influential in convincing shop steward/esses of the need to 
balance high wages_and employment for the union's membership 
(see 'Supporting Statements' to 1977 and 1982 negotiations). 
The chairman is also influential in keeping the Union from 
political activity (see the shop steward/ess meeting of 
26/3/74); in addition the minutes of the industrial council 
of 10/12/74 requesting employers not to let "certain clergymen 
and politically motivated persons" address the workforce, and 
in so doing "undermining the G.W.I.U". Furthermore, the 
chairman in introducing "our Honourable Brother Gibson of the 
I.T.G. and L.W.F" (see 1979 negotiations) comments "we would 
like the support of the outside world as we are not 
politicians but workers".This represents further evidence of 
rules of signification and legitimation. 
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The events surrounding the attempt by the National Union of 
Textile Workers is further evidence of influence of 
'significantly placed' actors. The Union's action is to 
protect its position by excluding the N.U.T.W. from the 
bargaining process and seeks (but fails to get) employer 
support, whilst at the same time influencing·the membership of 
the union to accept the rejection strategy. 
Action in more distant contexts is reflexively moqitored and 
will ·constrain and facilitate action in the Natal region. 
Again, responses to action in distant contexts is instructive 
of structure in the Natal system of industrial relations. The 
awareness of events in the Cape and Transvaal regions of the 
industry play an important role in Natal relations, both 
parties utilising such action to serve their particular ends. 
Similarly, reference is made to conditions of employment in 
other industries suggesting a rule of signification which 
could be identified as 'comparable equity'. 
Action, at the political level, is specifically identifiable 
in the legislative change to the Industrial Concilliation Act 
which allows for the inclusion of black unions in the formal 
negotiating process and the freeing of unions in terms of 
their racial composition. The Garment Workers Industrial 
Union of Natal welcomes the abili_ty to represent all workers'· 
and announced at a shop steward/ess meeting held on 28th June, 
1981, that four African members will be elected to the union 
executive. The legislative change does, however, also 
represent a threat to the G.W.I.U. in the emergence of ~ 
competing union (the N.U.T.W.). Action on the part of the 
G.W.I.U. is directed at maintaining its position. 
SUMMARY 
· Structure in the Natal system of industrial relations has been 
identified through analysis of action and the 'interpretive 
schemes' or 'memory traces' of the actors and such structure 
has been encapsulated in the idea of the maintenance of 
control over employment costs. 
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7.7 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NATAL REGION 
Collective bargaining in the Natal ~egion has been 
shown to favour the sectional interests of employers 
. . 
by utilising structuration theory. As with the Cape 
and Transvaal region, the perpetuation of this 
position is closely related to the is~ue of the lack 
of militancy which needs explanation. 
The employer/union relationship had been in existence 
at the start of the review period for some 34 years, 
and the 50th Anniversary Publication of the Council 
suggests that the relationship got off to a good start 
in that the Employers Association (Natal Clothing 
Manufacturers Association - N.C.M.A.) helped to clean 
up "the clothing industry of its unscrupulous 
employers". Whilst it can be shown that unions had 
little alternative in their dealings with employers 
than to opt for operating in terms of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, it is equally relevant to observe 
that by 1968 (and the end of the review period) both 
parties had good reason to retain their bargaining 
relationship as developed through the industrial 
council mechanism. As with the Cape and Transvaal 
regions the attraction of collective bargaining at 
industrial councils, as identified by Morris (3) are 
(at least) equally applicable to the Natal clothing 
industry. 
The attraction to employers lies firstly in the 
management/control of labour costs and their relation 
to inter-firm and inter-regional competition and 
secondly, in the ability to control the substantive 
and procedural issues over which bargaining takes 
place, i.e. the protection of their 'right to manage' 
(managerial prerogative). Employers have been very 
successful in the control of employment costs. The 
preceding analysis of contributions to the various 
funds managed by the council and the negotiated 
minimum wages reflects the containment of these costs 
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to below the rate of inflation as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index. There are instances of where 
the ~.C.M.A. appears to be willing to accede to 
increases beyond the C.P.I. rate (for that year), but 
this apparent altruistic intent needs to be tempered 
by the observation by the Chairman of the N.C.M.A. 
that these increases will bring Natal into line with 
the Cape and Transvaal. In other words, 
inter-regional competition will not be adversely 
affected. 
Contributions to the-Funds indicate the importance of 
cost control (and therefore competitive ability), but 
are further significant - just as in the Cape and 
Transvaal - in that by implication they are a 
statement of the acceptable (to employers) role of the 
union. The Natal region, as with the Cape and 
Transvaal, reflects a position in which the range of 
managerial decision making which affects labour is to 
a very large extent unaffected by collective 
~argaining. The only constraint on employers is in 
the area of material rewards, and these are restricted 
to minimum wages and contributions to funds. Even 
after the 1979 changes to the I.e. Act there is no 
evidence of any attempt to limit the authority of 
employers, something evident in the emerging unions. 
The relatively unfettered ability to manage is likely 
to be of value to employers, and having a forum.at 
which control over the perpetuation of that ability 
must in turn be of value. The role of the I.C. Act 
which limits bargaining to wages and conditions of 
employment, which had historically been interpreted as 
referring to material issues (as opposed to 
"authoritative" (4) issues), needs to be emphasized in 
that the type of behaviour observed in councils became 
routinized. 
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The relationship is in·turn of value to the union, 
certainly the most obvious value relates to the 
administration of benefits negotiated and affecting 
union activities. Gool's (5) observation of the 
widely dispersed (geographically) factories means that 
the collection of dues and the maintenance of funds is 
more effectively ensured by way of the industrial 
council. Without the cash flow the activities of the 
union could be severely hampered, and whilst in the 
post 1979 era of South African industrial relations 
this was not the only possible collection mechanism it 
had been the only option for some decades and had 
proved to be efficient. This benefit is further 
evidenced when the union introduced the "Help-U" fund, 
which though it did not last very long could more 
readily be implemented because of the council. 
The union's ability to negotiate wages and conditions 
of employment across the industry has benefits in that 
if such negotiations were only carried out at plant 
level the resources that it applied to other 
activities would not be available for such 
activities. The 'Welfare Grant' and the 'Funeral 
Benefits Account' and the '1962 Fund' (see_ Table 8b), 
reflect some of these activities as well as being 
indicative of the union's view of its role as a 
union. This is re-inforced by examining entries on 
the union's 'Profit and Loss' account. Thus its 
'Affiliation Fees' (to T.U.C.S.A. and the 
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers 
Federation - I.T.G. & L.W.F.), the attendance at 
'Conferences' both local and international, the 
payments made to shop steward/esses to attend 
me~tings, and so on. The continuing growth of 
employment means not only the continuity of these 
activities but also the possibility of expanding 
existing activities and the introduction of new 
services to their membership. 
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The emergence of the National Union of Textile Workers 
(N.U.T.W.) is further evidence of the unions view of 
its role, its relationship with employers and the 
importance of operating procedures of the council. 
The union's reaction to the possibility of a competing 
union (the N. U .·T. W.) shows that it rejects the 
N.U.T.W. as they have "ulterior motives, i.e. 
political, the workers money etc." (see 7.3.6, 1980). 
The following year the union (G.W.I.U.) announces the 
merging of the G.W.I.U. and the african union, "we are 
now a mixed union'', (see "Supporting Statements" -
1981 Negotiations). This could be seen as 
circumventing a criticism of the racial character of 
the G.W.I.U. Employers are also approached to assist 
in keeping out the N.U.T.W. and when this is rejected 
by the employers, the G.W.I.U. uses it as a further 
means to ensure the solidarity of its membership. The 
procedural regulations for membership of the council 
are such that all parties on council have to agree to 
any new membership arrangement, and thus the union can 
block the possibility of the N.U.T.W. bn council. 
This is further evidence of the importance of the 
council to the functioning of the G.W.I.U. 
The growth and stability of employment in the region 
is a matter which takes precedence.in the 
consciousness of the union officials. It is often 
stated as such at union meetings (see 'Supporting 
Statements' - 1977 Negotiations, also 'Supporting 
Statements' - 1982 Negotiations). It can also be 
argued that such arguments presented by ·the union 
leadership are designed to temper the expectations of 
shop steward/esses and thereby making easier the task 
of the union's bargaining delegation, which has 
implications in terms of union democracy. 
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Union officials can also be seen to be inf luencial in 
terms of the union's 'political' activities. There 
are a number of instances in which a 'political' role 
for the union is rejected by the executive (see 
'Supporting Statements' - 1974 Negotiations, also 
'Supporting Statements' - 1979 Negotiations). rt 
needs to be kept in mind that the State's security 
apparatus had been utilised to suppress African 
unionism because of its "political" activity. The 
context of collective bargaining was not conducive to 
survival if such bargaining was viewed as 'political'. 
Table 20 below reflects the number of meetings and the 
numb~r of shop steward/esses. present at these 
meetings; it is evident that the union holds 
quarterly meetings which appear to be well attended 
and reflect a growing number of shop steward/esses as 
a reflection of growing employment at these meetings. 
There is evidence that Union officials call ~or 
suggestions as to the quality and kind of demands at 
these meetings (they are nevertheless 'material' i.e. 
economic, in nature) and at least one meeting (see 
'Supporting Statements - 1974 Negotiations) reflects a 
degree of unhappiness with the union position. From 
the available documentation it would, however, appear 
that the decision making in terms of reaching a 
settlement with the N.C.M.A. is left in the hands of 
the bargaining delegation and that - over the 
review period - there is at least acceptance of their 
bargaining achievements. 
This characterisation of the bargaining relationship 
in the Natal region should not be taken as implying 
that there is little conviction on the part of the 
'; 
G.W.I.U .. Fox (6) notes that unionists invest an 
"intensity of conviction, effort and feeling;' in 
negotiating pay claims and this observation is lent 
credence by reference 'to the degree of 'Attitudinal 
Structuring' and 'Distributive' behaviour provided 
earlier (see Table 19). 
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TABLE 20 
SHOP STEWARD MEETINGS & NO. OF SHOP STEWARDS 
1968 20.3.68(144) 19.6.68(150) 18.9.68(153) 4.12.68(157) 
1969 19.3.69(132) 18.6.69(147) 17.9.69(149) 3.12.69(140) 
1970 25.3.70(131) 30.6.70(138) 20.9.70(141) 1.12. 70(155) 
1971 30.3.71(158) 22.6.71(168) 28.9.71(157) 7.12.71(167) 
1972 28.3.72(171) 20.6.72(103) 26.9.72(179) 5.12.72(195) 
1973 27.3.73(196) 26.6.73(193) 24.9.73(191) 4.12.73(218) 
1974 26.3.74(231) 23.7.74(230) ,8.10.74(214) 3.12.74(206) 
1975 25.3.75(208) 17.6.'75(166) 30.9.75(216) 2.12.75(204) 
1976 16.3.76(230) 27.6.76(175) 28.9.76(212) 12.12.76(172) 
*1977 22.3.77(211) 5.5.77(220) 
*1978 
1979 21.1.79(?) 
1980 7.12.80(198) 
1981 12.4.81(174) 28.6.81(171) 4.10.81(186) 
1982 28.3.82(166) 27.6.82(201) 3.10.82(210) 5 . 12 . 8 2 ( 2 8'6 ) 
1983 27.3.83(255) 3.7.83(258) 2.10.83(267) 4.12.83(300) 
1984 1.4.84(345) 8.8.84(485) 30.9.84(472) 2.12.a4<381> 
1985 24.3.85(417) 30.6.85(323) 29.9.85(388) 8.12.85(375) 
1986 6.4.86(375) 6.6.86(369) 28.9.86(330) 
* Balance of 1977 and whole of 1978 records were untraceable. 
Whilst there is some evidence of a willingness by shop 
steward/esses to go on strike (see 'Supporting 
Statements' - 1978 Negotiations) ther~ is little to 
show any intention of the executive to exercise the 
option. This is true in terms of in·dustrial council 
minutes, but might be because of the manner of 
recording the debate. However, there is also nothing 
in the N.C.M.A. minutes to suggest that bargaining 
even got close to arbitration let alone a strike .. 
In attempting to provide an understanding of the lack 
, of militancy in the Natal industrial council, there ~s 
support for the arguments of Gool, Toerien, Nicol and 
Maree which revolve around the issue of union 
democracy. However, it will be argued - as in the 
Cape and Transvaal regions - that a contributing 
,factor is an instrumental orientation on the part of 
the rank and file workforce. 
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Table 13 and 14 provide a profile of the worker as 
female and with multiple entrances (and exits) to the 
industry. In 1968, 38% reflected 3 or more entrances 
to the inqustry. By 1986 this figure almost doubled 
to 66%. These figures, taken with the age profile 
show (unlike the Cape) an aging labour force. This 
pattern suggests that employment is more a strategy to 
supplement household income than career oriented. 
Further, older females are likely to be more 
·conservative (than younger females) in their dealings 
with 'authority', given their experiences as 
disadvantaged persons in an apartheid society. The 
labour profile shows a marked decline in '1st time' 
entrants and an increase in the age of the workforce 
shown shown in Table 13, and thus fewer young entrants 
will also contribute to the conservative nature of the 
workforce. In combination (i.e. age and entrances) 
the profile supports the 'instrumental' argument, but 
a~ identified in the Cape region, it is not suggested 
as conclusive. Finality on the question could be 
approached by further research to provide subjective 
data in support of the interpretation of employment 
patterns. Given this limitation it is ieas6nable to 
suggest that there is likely to be little upward 
pressure on shop stewards or union officials to change 
their behaviours/tactics in terms of collective 
bargaining. This then, together with the issues of 
the role of union leadership, the acceptance of the 
importance of the N.C.M.A./G.W.I.U. relationship, the 
view of the union of their role as a union and the 
political and economic context in which.bargaining 
takes place provide.an understanding of the observed 
lack of militancy and the perpetuation of such 
behaviour over the review period. 
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CONCLUSION 
Like the Cape and Transvaal unions, the Garment 
Workers Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) in Natal also 
draws on 'structure' in the production· and 
reproduction of collective bargaining action. As with 
the Cape and Transvaal, the structure of collective 
bargaining in Natal has been identified as favouring 
the sectional interests of employers (see Section 7.6 
of this chapter)-and as with the Cape and Transvaal 
regions it is to be expected that the G.W.I.U's action 
will reflect a lack of militancy. 
The arguments presented in the Cape and Transvaal 
chapters dealing with the explanation of the 
continuity of the lack of militancy are just as 
applicable to the Natal region, and will not be 
repeated here. It is suffice to say that the 
'interpretive scheme' of the union leadership did not 
change and therefore the perpetuation of the structure 
utilised in action and the observed continuity of the 
bargaining action which produces and reproduces the 
structure of collective ,bargaining in the Natal 
region. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 
IN THE S.A. GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
1968 - 1986 
8.1 INTRODU~TIO~ 
The garment industry in South Africa has three major 
centres of activity, namely Johannesburg, Cape Town 
and Durban. These centres have administrative 
arrangements known as industrial councils which were 
legislative creatures of political policy. It is the 
social practices of these Industrial Councils - with 
specific focus on Labour/Management relations - as 
ordered across time-space that is the focus of this 
section of the thesis. These units then provide the 
vehicle for the application of structuration theory to 
industrial relations. 
8.2 INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS AS SYSTEMS 
The labour/management relations observed at the level 
of industrial councils revolve ess~ntially under the 
rubric of 'Conditions of Employment'. rt is at 
industrial councils that minimum conditions of 
employment are bargained and then by way of 
publication in a government gazette become law. Each 
region negotiates its own conditions of employment and 
thus there will be regional differences to be found in 
these Agreements. The published conditions are 
applicable to all manufacturers of the relevant region 
whether or not they are a member of the 
(representative) manufacturers association. A "closed 
shop" condition was to be found in all three centres 
for most of the review period i.e. 1968 to 1986. 
The industrial councils in the clothing (garment) 
manufacturing industry in South Africa are part of the 
system of industrial relations in South Africa. The 
relations between management, labour and the state 
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have been organised through the creation of industrial 
councils. Bargaining at this level has been in 
evidence since the introduction of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (I.e. Act) in the 1920's. In the 
clothing industry the councils were formed in 1935, 
1934 and 1933 for the Cape, Natal and Transvaal 
respectively, and discernably similar bargaining 
behaviour between managemeht and unions has taken 
place over the 50 or so years which end the review 
period of this thesis. Collective bargaining at the 
industrial council level reflects a continuity of 
reproduced relations which 'stretch' across time and 
space and as such can be viewed as an institution. 
Whilst industrial councils can be viewed as the 
product of the national political system, this must 
not be interpreted along the lines of strudtural 
determinism. Events in distant contexts are not just 
potential constraints on action but can also be seen 
as facilitators. Thus the Councils are integrated 
into the wider social system and such integration is 
marked by relations of autonomy and dependence. The 
industrial councils can be viewed as subordinate to 
the national political system but will be able to 
influence that system (i.e. the political). In the 
clothing industry such influence can be seen in the 
various commissions of enquiry to which it has 
supplied evidence, thus the Wiehahn and Rickert 
Commissions into labour received submissions from 
clothing manufacturers and unions. Equally, after the 
change in the I.C. Act in 1956, the ability of black 
unions to bargain formally at industrial councils was 
removed. This was accommodated by recognised unions 
negotiating on their behalf. Whilst not an ideal 
position it repres~nts a strategy aimed (at least) as 
a partial circumvention of discriminatory 
legislation. Furthermore, no racial characteristics 
(formally) defined the conditions of employment 
gazetted into law; negotiations revolved around job 
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titles irrespective of the incumbent's race. This was 
not the case with sex discrimination which w·as only 
abolished in 1981 following state intervention through 
legislation. 
Political action at the national level, specifically 
in the form of the Physical Planning and Resources Act 
(P.P.R. Act) and the Group Areas Act influenced 
relat~ons at the industrial councils. The Transvaal 
industrial council records the concern of the 
management representatives. The Act is seen as a 
severe limitation on their ability to expand, in that 
coloured and white workers were not as available as in 
the past and government restrictions on the number of 
black employees consequently affected not only their 
ability ·to expand but also to maintain levels of 
production. This constraint on operations was used by 
management to argue wage restraint on the part of the 
union. Similarly, the creation of "Independent 
States", through the policy of separate development, 
-and restrictions on the mobility of 'Non-White' 
workers operates as a const~aint on action but is 
utilised in arguing against labour cost increases on 
the basis that such increases make relocation more 
attractive to manufacturers which would not serve the 
workforce. 
The Group Areas Act had its greatest impact in the 
Cape with forced removals of much of the workfo~ce, 
which in turn was ut~lised by the union to argue the 
fairness of a transport allowance and is also used to 
present reasons for lateness, absenteeism and an 
unwillingness to work overtime on Saturdays. 
Giddens's notion of the 'Dialectic of Control' is also 
to be viewed in terms of 'networks' established by the 
parties to the negotiations. Through membership of 
Chambers of Industry and the Trade Union Council of 
South Africa the respective parties are able to exert 
some influence on (political) policy level decisions. 
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Bargaining relations between management and unions at 
industrial councils can also be viewed as 
institutionalised. Between the years 1968 and 1986, 
the Cape recorded 13 meetings to negotiate conditions 
of employment, the Transvaal recorded 11 and 8 were 
recorded in Natal from 1974 to 1986. Some of these 
meetings are classified as "Extra-Ordinary Meetings" 
as they are negotiations for interim adjustments to 
the prevailing agreement rather than the negotiations-
of a new agreement. Each agreement has a specified 
(and negotiated) period of time for which it is 
applicable. The Transvaal reflects three such 
extra-ordinary meetings, one each in 1975, 1980 and 
1981. Natal shows two such meeting in 1975 and 1976 
(one each year) and the Cape five, one each in 1973, 
1974, 1979, 1980 and 1981. Again, these interim 
negotiations represent strategi s adopted by one 
party, to the relationship to influence the other 
party and to change existing conditions. In addition 
the content and the process of negotiations reflects a 
continuity of discernably similar behaviour 
reinforcing the observation of their institutionalised 
character. 
In summary, industrial councils can be seen as part of 
the natio al system of industrial relations and as 
institutions. Equally the reproduced bargaining 
relationships within the industrial council represent 
regional systems of industrial relations and such 
behaviour is regular, organised and discernably 
similar over time and space. As such it is 
intitutionalised. 
THE AGENT 
Monitoring 
The minutes of the bargaining activity reflect a 
constant monitoring of a wide range of events by 
representatives of both parties. 
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In the Cape in virtually every negotiation, the Union 
deals with increases in the cost of living. This 
issue in turn is much in evidence in the Transvaal and 
Natal regions. The unions are then knowledgeable 
about economic issues which are seen to be of 
importance to maintaining and developing the standard 
of living of their membership. Not only do union 
representatives monitor the wider economic context but 
they are very aware of developments in other regions 
of the South African garment industry. There is, for 
example, continual reference in the Cape to higher 
wages paid iri the Transvaal. 
Equally, in the Transvaal reference is made to the 
Cape's 42 hour week versus their 40 hour week, by both 
management and the unions. 
After the change to the Industrial Conciliation Act 
and the introduction of the Labour Relations Act of 
1981 which legalised black union negotiations, the 
wider South African industrial relations context saw 
much activity in the formation and exercise of 
authority by black unions. Strike activity was 
particularly marked in the Transvaal and largely 
sourced in what have been termed "Emerging Unions". 
These activities were monitored by the Transvaal 
unions, thus, a union delegate stated in 1982 
(4/2/82), "The workers' moods were in that state [i.e. 
militant] because one just had to look at the 
newspaper and see what the radical unions were 
getting" (see Transvaal Section, Part B, p.241). 
Not only did the Transvaal unions monitor other 
unions' achievements in terms of improved benefits but 
the union was aware of the possibility that it may be 
a take-over target for one of the ~radical' unions 
(see Transvaal section, Part B, p.244). Similarly, in 
Natal the union closely monitored the activities of 
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the challenge from the National Union of Textile 
Workers and developed strategies designed to maintain 
their control over the workforce (see Natal Section 
I 
Part B - page 375). 
There is further evidence of 'monitoring' acti~ity 
when examining contributions to the various funds 
administered by the respective councils as well as the 
provision of additional services/benefits. Thus home 
loans from provident f~nds, increa~ed sick pay 
benefits, additional clinics and improved medical aid 
benefits are all strategies implemented to meet 
perceived needs. Equally, trade union 
subscriptions/dues increased, and new activities 
entered into, be they the start of a Union 
'Newsletter' ("Clothesline" in the Cape) or the 
"Help-U" fund in Natal; these then are the results 
(some of) of monitoring behaviour on the part of 
specific actors. 
Employers are equally adept at monitoring behaviour. 
The threat of competition and productivity are 
continually raised in negotiations by employers in all 
three centres. Competition from the other centres from 
'uncontrolled' areas (i.e. "Independent States", 
"Homelands", and areas falling under wage board 
determinations), "Rhodesia" and imports are given as 
reasons for not meeting union demands. Labour 
turnover and absenteeism also represent a continuing 
issue for employers and thus represents monitoring 
. activity. In the Transvaal, employers express concern 
with what they see as a deteriorating relationship 
with (specifically) the National Union of Clothing 
Workers. In the chairman's address to the T.C.M.A. 
(20/10/83) he advises members to "take note of the 
increased militancy of the N.U.C.W.". 
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In Natal and the Cape there is evidence of employers 
monitoring ~he "Cost of Living'' in that they ekpress a 
sympathy for the position of the workforce, (Natal: 
N.C.M.A. annual general meeting 27/9/79, also the 
annual general meeting of 10/8/81. In the Cape, 
~Report of the C.C.M.A. 1972/73', special general 
meeting of 5/3/74, extra-ordinary negotiations of 
1979. 
Monitoring activity by the actors is self-evident and 
covers a wide range of issues deemed to be relevant to 
their relationships with each other, and is more 
immediate to the system of industrial relations. The 
state's monitoring activity appears to be more 
indirect in that it appears to monitor the national 
system more specifically although there is some direct 
intervention by state agents in one Transvaal 
negotiation (see Tvl. Section, 1974 Negotiations, page 
231). Prior to the Labour Relations Act, state 
representatives are recorded to have made 
presentations on behalf of black workers to the 
respective councils for which they were thanked and 
then removed themselves from the proceedings. In the 
1979 Transvaal negotiations (for example) the Central 
Black Labour Board ( C. B. L.B.) representativ.e expressed 
dissatisfaction with the wage levels of two job 
categories. This led to a meeting between the 
T.C.M.A. and the C.B.L.B. and resulted in wage level 
changes. 
Knowledgeability/Rationalisation 
By rationalisation is meant the continuing 
("theoretical") understanding of the reasons for the 
activities undertaken by social actors. The 
constructs that actors draw on in day-to-day 
activities represent that "knowledgeability" the core 
of which is an awareness of social rules which will be 
more specifically referred to under the heading of 
"Structure" in this section of the thesis. 
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The bargaining activities of the parties to the 
Agreements in the Cape, Transvaal and Natal are 
underpinned by the constructs held by the respectf ve 
collectivities. 
Employers' core construct is one of "Ability to 
Compete - Withdraw from industry". In all 
negotiations the point is made that employers face 
competition from a number of sources and the 
implication - often left unstated - is that if 
employment costs increase too excessively either 
bankruptcy or relocation to lower labour cost areas 
will occur. Flowing from this construct is the idea 
that the industry (of a region) will collapse and 
unemployment of the Union's membership will occur. 
The unions' core construct is that of "Fair Wages (in 
the broadest sense) - member hardship". The unions 
understanding of its activities centre on obtaining 
improved conditions of employment. Specifically this 
w~ll be achieved through increased wages, the creation 
of new funds, the improvement .of existing funds and 
the increase in benefits from those funds. The 
emphasis of u~ion argument at negotiations is on the 
economic hardship experienced by its membership, the 
implication being that if such 'hardship' is not 
addressed by employers, the industry will wither and 
die as firstly current employees will look for 
alternative employment and replacements and additional 
workers will not be found. 
In the Cape and Natal regions the unions also express 
' 
agreement with employers that maintaining the industry 
is a desirable objective. As such this notion is 
bound up in the construct of "Fair Wages - member 
hardship" in that the continued development of the 
industry is seen as a source of employment and not 
just one of many alternatives~ The contradiction for 
the union lies in accepting the logic of a growing 
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industry needing to be competitive: Part of the 
factors that will influence competitive ability lies 
in the 'wage' factor of product pricing given certain 
levels of profitability. The contradiction for 
employers lies in their ability to attract and hold 
labour at wage levels which are believed not to 
adversely affect desired levels of profitability. The 
bargaining process allows a form of accommodation of 
these contradictions, where such constructs as have 
been described are held by the parties to the 
negotiations. 
In the Transvaal this situation holds for most of the 
review period but the union by 1985 had changed and 
rejected the link of wages to the closing of factories 
(see Transvaal ~ection, Part B, p.360). 
A review of the minutes to the negotiations identifies 
the grounds for the activities engaged upon by the 
parties to the negotiations. This knowledge is then 
drawn upon in interaction and evidenced in the 
strategies employed by the negotiators. The core 
constructs specifically in the .Cape and Natal are 
resistant to change. The monitoring of events in 
those regions is such that no reason for changing the 
const~ucts is evident, whilst in the Transvaal there 
is eviderice of a change by the union which no longer 
seems to place as great a value on the survival and 
growth of the industry. The events in the Transvaal 
(monitored) which were likely to have led to this 
change can be sourced - at least partially - in the 
emergence of the N.U.C.W. as the major union bargainer 
(the only one after the take-over of the G.W.U. of 
S.A.), the perceived success of 'radical' unions and 
the actual decline of clothing industry activity in 
the region. The Transvaal negotiatioris from 1979 
exhibit a 'hardening' on the'part of the union in the 
sense that the past joint concern for the industry is 
of waning inferest to the union, to the extent that 
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the 1979 negotiations record for the first time (in 
the review period) a willingness to declare a 
'deadlock' in the negotiations and a consequent 
preparedness to seek arbitration in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. 
One other construct held by both parties to agreements 
revdlves around the acceptability of the industrial 
councils (I.C.) as the most appropriate forum for 
bargaining, the construct can be conceived of as 
I.e. level bargaining - dissimilar conditions of 
employment 
Employers can be seen to view I.C. agreements as 
useful in that the minimum conditions are applicable 
to all manufacturers which (partially) orders 
competitive conditions. Unions in turn see that all 
workers in the industry have the same minimum 
conditions and in addition union administration -
specifically the collection of dues - is considerably 
eased and Union activities are more easily initiated 
because of a smooth flow of funds. 
The core construct identified can be seen in the 
substantive issues raised at negotiations. Unions 
have knowledge (and constantly monitor the 
environment) of a wide variety of issues ranging from 
actual wages to provident fund benefits, housing and 
transport problems and so on. Employers in turn act 
similarly and are aware of competition from many 
points, are concerned/aware of productivity, 
absenteeism and so on. Both parties monitor wider 
environments as well as can be seen by many references 
to other industries (their 'wages'), other ~'radical') 
unions, to wage board determinations and so on. The 
actors in the garment industry then, are knowledgeable 
and continuously monitor their action context. 
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Furthermore, in those issues which are not part of 
bargaining constructs can also be identified. The 
emphasis in bargaining is on material rewards, and 
managerial action is left unconstrained in terms of 
decisions involved in such ~ssues as -hiring/firing', 
_redundancy, promotion and the allocation of rewards 
beyond negotiated minimum levels; managerial freedom 
of action stays relatively unscathed and can also be 
seen in the light of the core construct "ability to 
compete". 
8.4 ROUTINIZATION 
Structuration theory contends that much of social 
action is routine/recursive. The routinization of 
action is important as this helps to construct the 
conditions for reproduced social action. 
Bargaining at all three centres can be seen as 
recursive behaviour both procedurally and 
substantively. The procedure for formal bargaining 
begins some months prior to the expiry of an 
agreement. A series of meetings are held to negotiate 
over -conditions of Employment', agreement is reached, 
submitted to the relevant state department and 
gazetted into law. On those occasions when the union. 
wanted a  adjustment to a current agreement (i.e. 
-extra-ordinary' negotiations), the agreed 
(implicitly) procedure was for the Union to write a 
letter which would be considered by t~e Employers' 
Association, possibly debated at Council and the 
decision would be gazetted or a "Gentleman's" 
agreement made whereby the decision though not 
immediately gazetted was implemented. 
A feature of negotiations was that often bargaining 
continued after the expiry of the agreement that was 
being re-negotiated. Technically, at these time 
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points no rules bound unions or employers. This 
"technicality" was overcome by a "Gentleman's" 
agreement or by an application for an extension of the 
expiring agreement. 
Substantive issues display a great deal of stability 
over the review period, if anything it is only the 
quantity of the issue that changes rather than any 
shift in the quality of issues negotiated over. The 
issues are nearly exclusively what structuration 
theory deems "allocative resources" about which more 
will be said when dealing with 'structure' later in 
this section. 
At a different leve~ of analysis, r utinisation can be 
discerned by reviewing the financial statements of the 
councils, the funds they administer and those of the· 
unions. The financial statements provide a method of 
classifying action and such action is recursively 
reported over the review period reinforcing the idea 
of a duree or continuity of (this kind of) social 
action. Equally, employment figures_ for the different 
regions give a picture of large numbers of people 
"going to work" each day, data provided on the form of 
employment (i.e. Age, Sex, Entrances and Absenteeism) 
also indicates not only 'form' changes but also the 
continuity of practice. 
Routinization should not be viewed as in some way 
representing a fixed state. The very nature of the 
social agent as being 'knowledgeable' and maintaining 
a (reflexive) monitoring activity negates such a 
view. Again, the changes to the financial statements 
can be seen to represent decisions taken. These will 
be based on the knowledgeability of the decision maker 
as well as monitoring activity conducted. 
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Structuration theory also-emphasizes the importance of 
'significantly placed actors' who influence conditions 
such that they remain much the same or who attempt to 
change conditions. A review of minutes from meetings 
of employers and meetings of unions indicates the 
influence chairmen and secretaries play in presenting 
information and argument which will influence the 
knowledge content of their members. In Natal (for 
example) the employers' chairman argues the need for 
substantial wage increa·ses, equally the secretary for 
the union argues the poor state of the economy to get 
membership ratification o-f a new agreement which does 
not meet with expectations, both succeed in persuading 
their membership of the correctness of their 
proposals. 
8.5 STRUCTURE 
8.5.1 
Structure in structuration theory refers to both (i) 
rules and resources and (ii) sets of transformative 
relations. Structure then, is to be viewed in terms 
o~·the structuring properties "which make it possible 
for discernably similar social practices to exist 
across varying spans of time and space and which lend 
them 'systematic' form" (1). 
Transformative Relations 
The industrial relations system in the garment 
industry abounds with 'sets of transformative 
relations'. The industrial councils are a property of 
the system of industriai relations representing a set 
-of transformative relations. The industrial council 
(in all regions) 'describes' the transformative 
relations between employers and union and the results 
of these relationships impact on the 'Conditions of 
Employment' as they affect those whom the parties 
represent. Industrial council relations 'transform' 
wages benefits/costs derived from membership of the 
industry, evidence of which can be seen in the changes 
to the minimum wages paid, to changes in contribution 
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to funds and to changes in benefits available from 
funds. The funds, like the industrial councils; are 
managed by employer and union representatives through 
a full-time council employee and can be characterised 
as sets of transformative relations. 
Employers and unions in turn have what may be termed 
'internal' transformative relations.- Employers call 
annual general meetings and elect an executive 
committee to represent that body. There are, ih 
addition, ordinary ge_neral meetings held at which 
decisions are taken which will transform members 
relationships with employees (it should be noted that 
'labour' is one of a number of possibl~ issues that 
are dealt with at such meetings and thus such 
practices are (p~tentially) 'transfcirmative' in 
respect of a number of collectivities other than 
labour). 
Unions regularly hold shop steward meetings as well as 
annual general meetings. These too are sets of 
transformative relations organised as properties of 
the union seen as a system, which (like the employers 
associations) is integrated through relations of 
autonomy and dependence with the wider - garment 
manufacturing ~ industrial relations system. 
Transformative relations, as organised properties of 
the industrial relations system, with the state seem 
to be few, there are representations to wage boards 
when such boards are convened. Equally, when the 
state initiates commissions of enquiries, 
representations are made by both employers and unions 
but the occurrence of such relations are more a 
function of state initiative than either unions or 
employers. Nevertheless, it must be added that unions 
and employers through their national associations do 
have relations with the state which can be viewed as 
at least, potentially, transformative. 
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Both unions and employers have relationships between 
their respective regional organisations. The unions 
have a "Consultative Committee" at which information 
and experiences are shared. For employers the 
National Clothing Federation of S.A. serves a similar 
purpose. 
The transformative relations then represent part of 
the properties of the industrial relations system 
through which "discernably similar social practices" 
are seen to exist over time and space and in so doing 
giving systematic form. It must, however, be 
emphasized that "structure exists as time-space 
presence, only in its instantiations in such practices 
and as memory traces orienting the conduct of 
knowledgeable human agents" (2). 
Rules and Resources 
8.5.2.1 Rules 
'Rules' are to be viewed as "techniques or 
generalizable procedures applied in the 
enactment/reproduction of social practices" (3), and 
an awareness of rules "is the very core of that 
'knowledgeability' which specifically characterizes 
human agents" (4). Rules, however, present somethini 
of an analytical problem. 
Formulated rules are those which refer to those given 
"verbal expression as canons of law, bureaucratic 
rules, rules of games and so on" (5). They are as 
such codified interpretations of rules and are not to 
be taken as "exemplifying rules in general" (6). Most 
rules are only "tacitly grasped by actors" (7) and 
· this then requires some interpretive licence on the 
part of the analyst. It becomes necessary to infer 
rules from what is recursively said and done by actors 
in the production and reproduction of social action. 
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Industrial relations in the garment industry readily 
reflects formulated rules. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act, Group Areas Act and the Physical 
Planning and Resources Act are just a few of the 
'canons of law'. Bureaucratic rules abound in the 
administration of the various funds and the 
administration of agreements between employers and 
unions, e.g. sick fund benefits and closed shop rules. 
Rules are also to be viewed as having close 
connections with sanctions and this can be viewed as 
an aid in identifying the 'tacitly grasped' rules. 
The minutes of industrial council meetings that record 
the proceedings of negotiations for a new agreement or 
interim adjustments can be interpreted to reflect 
rules drawn upon by the actors in the production and 
reproduction of these relations. The agreements 
essentially deal with allocati~e resources and with 
the exception of the 'closed shop', the negotiated 
ag,reements reflect no attempt on the part of the 
unions to influence managerial cont~ol over 
authoritative resources. There is no evidence of 
unions attempting to negotiate conditions of 
redundancy, or any attempt to control definitions of 
job requirements. The 'managerial prerogative' of 
'hiring and firing' is essentially left unaddressed 
with the exception of the Closed Shop rule - which 
only prescribes Union membership after employment. 
The unions do attempt to get qualification periods 
(i.e. from trainee to qualified) reduced but its 
intent is the faster acquisition of higher levels of 
wages. 
It is then possible to argue that a tacitly held rule 
of negotiations is that 'job control' issues (see as 
an 'extreme' example the British Typographical Union 
of the early 1980's) do not form part of negotiations. 
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This will be commonly held and it is likely that 
strong sanctions would be invoked by employers should 
unions int~oduce such issues to the negotiations. 
The often stated support, particularly in the Cape and 
Natal, for the council as the appropriate means of 
negotiating conditions of employment is also bound up 
with the notion that the industrial council is the 
-appropriate vehicle for conflict handling. Employers 
in the Transvaal express a great deal of 
dissatisfaction with the N.U.C.W. when that union is 
seen to resort to utilising the Industrial Court as 
set up by the Labour Relations Act. This action is 1 
seen to be an -attempt to resolve issues outside the 
industrial council and draws a negative response from 
employers. Employers invoke sanctions saying that it 
had a mandate not to sign any new agreement "until it 
was sure which direction the National Union was going'' 
(see Transvaal section, Part B, p.297). The unstated 
rule being that labour issues in the industry are to 
be hahdled/resolved by the council. 
Over the years 1968-1986 there is not one case of 
negotiations breaking down to the extent of the 
parties going to arbitration (in terms of the I.e. 
Act), or of official strike action being taken. 
Whilst the threat of 'deadlock' is raised in Transvaal 
negotiations, there appears to be a general reluctance 
to engage in such a strategy (see Transvaal section, 
Part B, p.287)(see also Cape section, Part B, p.183). 
Rules of conflict resolution appear to suggest that 
the council is deemed (by both parties) to be the 
appropriate vehicle. 'Illegal' strikes which occur in 
the Cape and Transvaal are illustrative when employers 
sanctioning behaviour is studied (see Cape section, 
Part B, p.194-95). 
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In addition, the constructs identified earlier suggest 
'rules'; there are many references to, firstly, the 
need to maintain and grow the industry (particularly 
in the Cape and Natal and pre-1980 Transvaal); 
secondly, unions (specifically Natal and Cape) 
continually emphasize to their members the union's 
role in developing their industries. Interpreting 
these statements suggests that there exists some tacit 
rule of not pushing demands to the point where the 
existence and ~rowth of the industry is threatened. 
Three points flow from this. Firstly, such an 
argument (in all three centres) is very much a 
strategy of employers. Secondly, the union bargainers 
have control of both allocative and authoritative 
resources associated with the administration of their 
union and experience benefits from such control (see 
the various income statements in respect of 
salaries/wages, motor cars, overseas trips, payment 
foi shop steward meetings, provident/pension fund 
contributions, honoraria, etc.). Thirdly, there are 
also numerous references to the positive working 
relationship between employers and the union, largely 
an employers statement and to be found in the Cape and 
Natal with the T.C.M.A. reflecting a (perceived) -sharp 
decline in their level of satisfaction with their 
(union) relations. These expressions, in turn, can be 
interpreted to suggest that Employers value the 
maintenance of 'good' relations with their union and 
as such there will be 'rules' which would avoid 
extreme confrontation leading to a deterioration in 
relations and to (perceived) disruptive behaviour on 
the part of their union. Flowing from this 
observation it can be argued that whilst the union 
might be seen in a subordinate position to employers 
(in terms of control over resources at the I.e. 
level),- they possess the ability to influence 
employers' actions, i.e. those thought to be in a 
superior position. This is illustratrive of the 
notion of the 'Dialectic of Control', of relations of 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
434. 
autbnomy and dependence and consequent system 
integration. It also helps to clarify the concept of 
'Power' in structuration theory as in these relations 
power is identified in·interaction in 'resources' 
which act as its media. 
It is self-evident that closely bound up in the 
'rules' as portrayed above, will be the notion of 
'sanction'. The threat of relocation and the decline 
of the industry act as breaks on Union action, whilst 
that of employee dissatisfaction and their 
unwillingness to accept employment can be seen as 
potential sanctions on employer action, which in turn 
can be 'used' by the parties to legitimate their 
action to their members. 
It is also possible to speculate (albeit tentatively) 
that individual workers are aware (tacitly) of rules; 
the pattern of entrances, the largely female labour 
force, the age distributions all suggest an 
'instrumental' approach to employment in the 
industry. Generally speaking, the industry is made up 
of female machinists who reflect.multiple entrances 
into the industry and who (generally) leave the 
industry after reaching 40 years of age. These 
behaviour patterns suggest a particular 
'knowledgeability' allowing the tentative conclusion 
that individuals view the prime purpose of empioyment 
as that of dealing with (relatively) short-term 
economic circumstances which they find themselves in. 
It is difficult to argue that the mass of the 
workforce have career aspirations associated with 
employment in the clothing industry. This 
characterisation of the labour force also holds 
important implications for understanding shop steward 
and union action. 
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It is likely, given this characterisation of the 
labour force, that unions will be more concerned about 
the remuneration of its membership rather than the 
longterm employment (career) prospects of the 
membership. Furthermore, because of the short-term 
perspective of the labour force (implied in the above 
characterisation) there is likely to be little in the 
way of upward pressure, i.e. from the rank-and-f'ile to 
shop stewards to Union executive. The minutes bf 
Union general meetings and shop steward meetings are 
essentially supportive of the action of their union 
executive's action. However, evidence for this 
interpretation is not substantial and represents a 
research avenue for future study. 
8.5.2.2 Resources 
Resources in structuration theory are classified as 
either allocative - those generating command over 
"objects, goods or material phenomena", or 
authoritative "generating command over persons or 
actors" (8). Resources can be viewed as forms of 
transformative.capacity. 
The industrial councils in their administration of an 
agreement exercises (delegated) control over both 
types of resources. Mechanisms in the form of 
'Inspectors' monitor employer compliance of the wage 
and benefits negotiated by the parties and in their 
administration of the various funds ensure compliance 
to the (bureaucratic) rules and law. Equally, 
employers have control over allocative and 
authoritative resources (in the workplace) whilst the 
union essentially has authoritative control over its 
membership in so far that it is possible for the union 
to get its membership to pursue a range of activities, 
e.g. 'go slows', 'work-to-rule', 'strikes'. 
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Employers negotiate the distribution of allocative 
resources and are expected to ensure that their 
members abide by the agreed distribution. Employers 
also have control over the work force in the sense 
that they can 'hire-and-fire', promote, select, train 
and so on. As mentioned earlier a major facet of 
industrial relations in the clothing industry is the 
concentration of negotiating issues on allocative 
issues to the virtual exclusion of authoritative 
issues. 'Man' management practices are_left to the 
discretion of Employers and are not dealt with by 
council. 
Collective bargaining in industrial councils can be 
seen to be institutionalised and has a transformative 
capacity generating command essentially over 'objects, 
goods or material phenomena' as well as generating 
command over actors to comply with the agreements 
which in turn focus exclusively on objects, goods or 
material phenomena. 
Structure can be viewed in the encapsulating notion of 
the prime rule of signification as 'an ability to 
compete'. The rule of legitimation associated 
therewith can in turn be encapsulated in the notion of 
'collapse of the industry', and both are focused 
through the facility of respective industrial 
counciis, i.e. the structural feature of domination. 
8.6 STRUCTURATION 
Structuration refers to the "Conditions governing the 
continuity or transmutation of structure and therefore 
the reproduction of social systems" (9). 
In the analysis of industrial relations in the garment 
industry a syntagmatic dimension is to be 
distinguished from the paradigmatic. A 
cross-sectional analysis will identify patterns of 
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action· at a point in £ime and whilst of importance 1 a 
longitudinal analysis that provides understanding of 
the dynamic involved in the production and 
reproduction of social systems must also command 
attention. 
In the analysis of the industrial relations system 1 
entry at a particular moment will identify a 
particular structure. In this structure it is 
possible to identify three structural dimensions, 
those of signification, domination and legitimation, 
which in turn can only be separated for purposes of 
analysis. Signification and legitimation deal 
specifically with the notion of rules, and domination 
refers to resources. In introducing 'movement' into 
the analysis, the modalities of production and 
reproduction need to be identified. These (in 
structuration theory) are respectively, "interpretive 
schemes", "norms" and "facilities". Giddens's 
diagram clarifies, 
Structure Signification ~ ~ Domination '- .... Legitimation 
r - _.J,._ - - i r - _...,_ - -, r - .J. - 1 
Modality Interpretive4-
.... 
Facility 
+- -. 
Norm 
Scheme 
L - -.,- - - J L -~ - J L - ""t - J 
sit ~ ~ 
Interaction I Communication 14- ~ Power 1~ ~ Sanction 
(10) 
The actors in the garment industry are 'knowledgeable' 
and monitor their action context. At the industrial 
council negotiations their 'interpretive schemes' have 
been identified using construct theory and it is 
evident how closely 'cost of living' factors are 
monitore_d, how the notion of employers' ability to 
'compete' is an integral part of the employers 
interpretive scheme, how the Transvaal union is aware 
of 'more militant' workers, how the Natal union (and 
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. the Cape) specif-ically reject· .. politic al' issues from 
the concerns of the Union. How the Cape and Natal 
unions (and initially the Transvaal union) value the 
continuation and development of their industry. How 
the change in the Industrial Conciliation Act is 
monitored and together with the (proportional) decline 
of white and coloured workers in the Transvaal and the 
registration of the N.U.C.W. changes the relationships 
between the parties to the Transvaal union. In Natal 
the Labour Relations Act sees the union facing a 
challenge to its bargaining status which is 
.. monitored' by the union and strategies to fend off 
the challenge are initiated. The agents are 
knowledgeable and monitor their action context. 
The rules associated with this knowledgeability have 
an additional characteristic intimately involved in 
the actors' interpretive schemes, and there are 
.. norms' which in interaction can be identified through 
sanctions applied. Sanctions at the industrial 
council level of analysis are more specifically a 
potential threat rather than actually implemented. 
However, in the Transvaal employers refuse to bargain 
until "illegal" strikes are stopped, but this is the 
only exercise of a sanction, but this in no way 
diminishes the parties respective knowledgeability of 
potential sanctions bound up in the relations between 
them. 
The .. facilities' through which domination is exercised 
will be the industrial council and the funds which it 
administers on behalf of the parties. 
Negotiations at the industrial council represent 
adjustments to resources controlled by employers and 
unions. Employers have control over both allocative 
and authoritative resources in terms of both the 
production units they represent and the control 
delegated by the membership of that collectivity. The 
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unions, in turn, are thought to have authoritative 
control in respect of their membership. This control 
in the garment industry is essentially related to the 
-withholding of labour (a potential sanction). As 
already pointed out no union holds authoritative 
resources in terms of factory specific activity (i.e. 
job control). Such resources are held exclusively by 
employers. 
The negotiations represent a specific kind of 
interaction and power-being inherent in all 
interaction - will be evidenced in these 
interactions. The industrial council is the facility 
by which domination,(i.e. the mobilisation of 
resources is expressed ·through power in interaction) 
is evidenced. The agreements reached by the parties 
can be viewed as the outcome of the interaction and 
will reflect the asymmetries of signification, 
domination and legitimation at the same time producing 
the conditions for reproduced relations between the 
collectivities. 
The asymmetries of distribution of signification, 
domination and legitimation can be characterised as 
being biased towards the achievement of the 
(sectional) interests of employers. The structure of 
industrial relations in the garment industry thus 
cannot be characterised as corporatist (with the State 
as a 'sleeping' partner) nor is there any basis for 
suggesting a form of "joint 'management" of the 
industry. Control over allocative and authoritative 
resources lies in the hands of employers and the 
union's 'knowledgeability' excludes the possibility of 
action which might detract from the stability and 
growth of the industry. This is specifically true for 
the Cape and Natal region whilst there is some 
evidence of .the link between union activity and the 
'well-being' of the industry being at least severely 
strained in·the Transvaal region. 
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8.7 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE S.A. CLOTHING 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
A review of the analyses of collective bargaining in 
the Cape, Transvaal and Natal industrial councils 
leads necessarily to the conclusion that the sectional 
interests of employers dominate proceedings. In all 
three provinces employers have been abie to control 
labour costs such that wages and contributions to 
funds have been kept below the increase rate of the 
Consumer Price Index (C.P.I.). In addition, employers 
have at least kept the inter-provincial minimum wage 
rate differentials the same or, as in the case of 
Natal, allowed minimum wages to approach that of other 
regional competitors. Furthermore, bargaining in all 
three provinces has ensured the continuity of the 
practice of negotiating solely over 'material' 
rewards. 
The achievements of employers contributes to the 
characterisation of the provincial unions as 
'conservative' or 'lacking militancy'. A further 
element relating to their 'political' activity further 
classifies them as conservative; all three unions 
were affiliated td T.U.C.S.A. described by Nattrass 
and Ardington (12) as a "middle of the road" 
grouping. All three unions disavow any political role 
and in Natal's case are actively hostile toward the 
National Union of Textile Wo~kers attempt to represent 
clothing workers, warning their membership to beware 
of the N.U.T.W's political nature. A further factor 
adding to this description of the three unions relates 
to their never (over the review period) having pushed 
their demands either to the point of arbitration, or 
to the extent of a legal strike which, whilst 
difficult in terms of the I.C. Act, both before and 
after .amendments to the I.e. Act, was possible. 
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This characterisation of the unions is not to be taken 
as suggesting that the unions did not display an 
"intensity of conviction, effort and feeling" (13) in 
bargaining. The analyses utilising Walton and 
McKersie's (14) model indicates the overwhelming 
reliance on 'distributive' and 'attitudinal 
structuring' behaviour, and whilst there might be some 
suggestion of posturing this must be doubted given the 
number and duration of meetings required prior to an 
agreement being reached. The available evidence (i.e. 
the minutes to the negotiations as well as Union and 
employer documentation reflecting feedback to their 
constituencies) suggests high levels of union 
commitment to their, albeit narrow, material 
objectives. There is no evidence of 'encroaching 
control'' referred to by Hyman (15) to describe a 
union's role in limiting the power of employers. 
Hyman (16) does, however, recognise that the role of 
unions is shaped significantly by the historical 
conditions in which it operates. It can then be 
argued that the political economy of South Africa was 
such that it limited the role of unions to a 
restricted range of activities. The conditions of 
interaction as stipulated under the I.C. Act, 
certainly up to 1979, was such that the Minister of 
Labour was empowered to decide whether or not to 
publish the· (negotiated) Agreement and could thus 
refuse publication if elements of the Agreement 
conflicted with State political ideology. The threat 
by the State's representative at the T_ransvaal 
negotiations of 1974 is indicative of.this 
possibility. Furthermore, the range of security 
legislation which had been utilised against African 
unionists and an awareness thereof would act as a 
further constraint on the activities of clothing 
unions. 
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The change) industrial relations legislation begun 
in 1979 doe~nJhange - partially - the historical 
' 
conditions uniaer which collective bargaining could 
take place, and did introduce the phenomena of plant 
level bargaining, recognition agreements, grievance 
and disciplinary procedures, redundancy agreements, 
the concept of unfair labour practices, the Industrial 
Court and other features associated ~ith this time 
period. However, there is essentially no evidence of 
these aspects in any of the industrial councils 
reviewed in this thesis. The possibility of 
incorporating at least some of these features did 
exist in terms of the leg~l arrangements prescribed by 
the amended I.C. Act (later the Labour Relations 
Act). The minutes of the Transvaal Council indicate 
strong resistance from employers at any suggestion of 
the use of the Industrial Court, whilst in Natal the 
G.W.I.U. resists the activities of an emerging union, 
the conservative nature of bargaining and the 'lack of 
militancy' is a continuing feature of all three 
regions even though contextual changes allowed the 
possibility of more militant action on the part of the 
three unions. 
In addressing the reasons for the character of 
collective bargaining in all three regions, a number 
of factors will be identified as contributing to the 
understanding of the 'lack of militancy'. Firstly, 
over many decades and under .constraining historical 
conditions, relationships were built around the 
regions respective industrial councils which were 
valued by the parties but which carried greater 
benefits to the union than employers. Secondly, there 
is the issue of the respective unions' relationship 
with their membership. These two -factors are 
interwoven and neither can be said to be more 
significant than the other. 
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All three industrial councils had been in operation 
since at least the mid- 1930's, and had over a period 
of time established a number of funds, the nature of 
which provides some understanding of how the unions 
viewed their role as unions. Provident funds, Medical 
benefit/aid schemes and employee wage protection 
against 'slack time' (Transvaal orily) and protection 
from insolvencies are common benefit mechanisms, 
flowing from these funds various other (associated) 
benefits are evident, thus the Provident funds 
provided loans for housing and in the Cape and Natal 
medical clinics were started to provide services to 
employees. The Training Fund in the Cape and 
Transvaal drew contributions from both employer and 
employee and can be taken as evidence of the Unions' 
concern ·for stable and growing employment. 
The funds can be viewed as symbolic in that they 
identify aspects of conditions of employment 
considered important to the union, and if not 
~~portant to employers (which is not suggested), they 
do at least represent an employer's view of their (the 
funds) reasonableness as a feature of conditions of 
employment. The bargaining relationship will have 
been influenced in turn by the perceived successes or 
failures in achieving objectives in regard to 
contributions and benefits. All three unions and 
employer bodies state a satisfaction with their 
relationship with each other over the greater part of 
the review period. It is only in the ~ransvaal that 
the relationship begins to deteriorate with the 
arrival of the National Union of Garment Workers, as 
initially a bargaining partner with the G.W.U. of S.A. 
and later as the only worker representative body. 
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As has been shown in the Cape region discussion on 
collective bargaining, the benefits of negotiating at 
the industrial council to employers revolve around 
their ability to control and predict labour costs and 
the maintenance of not just their regional inter-firm 
competition but also inter-regional competition. For 
all three unions (and the parallel unions in the 
Transvaal and Natal) their ability to effect those 
activities which are taken as important to the unions 
is very dependent on the 'guaranteed' cash flow; the 
industrial council also provides a vehicle for 
ensuring minimum levels of wages and conditions of 
employment across the whole industry. The absence of 
such an arrangement would have major organising 
implications for any union (see Morris's (17) 
reasoning for the N.U.M.S.A. policy change). Again, 
without the industrial council the unions' resources 
which are applied to non-organising activities would 
have to be applied to organising activities, thus 
impacting on their ability to conduct different 
activities (e.g. the G.W.I.U's Help-U Fund, the union 
newspapers in the Cape and Transvaal). 
Gools' (18) observation of the "atomisation" of the 
productive process is also of relevance in 
understanding the 'value' of t~e council' to union 
_functioning. All three regions have many employers 
spread over a wide geographical area. In Natal the 
chairman of the N.C.M~A. observes in 1986 that some 
131 out of 409 employers had less than 20 employees 
covered by the agreement. Morris's (19) reasons for 
the N.U.M.S.A. policy change (as reported in the Cape 
section) also include the.difficulties generated by 
many employers spread over a wide geographical area. 
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The benefits derived by the union through the 
industrial councils can be seen to influence their 
willingness to maintain its existence. This can be 
seen not only in terms of the above mentioned 
benefits, but also in action taken, thus the unions 
(and employers) are willing to adjust contribution 
rates when industrial councils show recurring deficits 
from funding the councils administration of 
agreements. In addition, union secretaries make 
frequent reference to the high value they place on the 
industrial councils. 
The value placed on the efficient functioning of 
industrial councils will act as a further constraint 
on unions in terms of the degree of conflict they are 
willing to endure in pursuit of their demands, as the 
implied threat of the collapse of the councils is 
evident in what would happen if no agreement was 
negotiated; and even if an agreement was negotiated,' 
the possibility existed that the council system might 
collapse because of the re~ocation by employers to so 
called 'border' areas. 
The constructs utilised in bargaining by the regional 
unions show a great concern for growing and stable 
employment. Relocation of factories because of an 
unsatisfactory agreement would not only affect the 
unions activities, but would negatively impact on 
employment levels in the region. It is only in the 
Transvaal in the later part of the review period where 
there is evidence of the diminishing influence of this 
objective of the union, and this in a region showing a 
long term decline in employment levels. The Natal and 
Cape unions use the growing and stable employment to 
justify their bargaining outcomes. 
Maree (20) and Nicol (21) highlight the role of union 
leadership in relation to issues of union democracy 
and the lack of militancy. There is evidence drawn 
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from the minutes of union meetings of how the union 
officials do temper expectations particularly of shop 
stewards. This.is particularly evident in Natal and 
the Cape union minutes, although Natal minutes do 
record the union officials calling for proposals (to 
be negotiated over) from shop stewards. What is 
particularly evident from the minutes is the support 
expressed by shop stewards for the efforts of the 
negotiating team, especially as in the Cape when an 
interim increase was negotiated. Of significance also 
is that there is no evidence of any attempt by the 
shop stewards to either widen the issues to be 
negotiated over or to insist on a strike in order to 
achieve their objectives. If anything, these 
meetings are characterised by the quote from a general 
meeting of the G.W.U. of the 12th June, 1972. After 
presenting what were to be the union demands to 
employers in the forthcoming negotiations, a mandate 
is given to the executive to "obtain the best possible 
offer for the workers" (see Cape Supporting Statements 
- 1972 Negotiations). 
In addressing the question of the continuity of the 
bargaining behaviour of union representatives, it can 
be seen from the regional data that there is little or 
no pressure by rank and file members on shop stewards, 
and consequently on the leadership of the unions. 
Kaplan (22) in an interview conducted with the Deputy 
General Secretary of the N.U.G.W. shows that shop 
stewards were elected on the basis of one per a 
maximum of fifty workers, or one to a minimum of ten 
workers. There is no evidence from the other unions 
to suggest a different electoral format, and given the 
regional similarities it is likely that the other 
unions had similar election rules. This ratio is 
similar to that identified by Maree in his discussion 
on the rise of shop steward influence in British 
industrial relations of the 1960's and argues that, 
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"The pressure on shop stewards to be rep.resentative of 
a small number of members was therefore much higher 
than the pressure could be on more remote officials" 
(23). The ability of shop stewards to action their 
representativeness will take place through meetings 
with union officials. The evidence available to this 
research suggests that such meetings were n~t 
frequent. Table 20 of the Natal region indicates that 
shop stewards and union officials met some four times 
a year. Whilst data on the Cape and Transvaal regions 
was not available, it is likely that a similar pattern 
existed. It is unlikely, then, that-the frequency of 
meetings was conducive to wide ranging and continuous 
debate about bargaining issues. It must, however, ·be 
pointed out that the union structure in the Cape and 
Transvaal indicates a number of branches which are 
likely to have had meetings. Again, the legal 
constraints of the I.C. Act would limit the ability of 
union officials to conduct frequent meetings with the 
membership, i.e. the restrictions in terms of the 
racial character of such meetings. 
The lack of pressure on shop stewards to widen the 
bargaining issues is likely to be sourced in the 
suggestion of the "instrumental orientation" (24) 
identified in all three regions. The pattern of 
entrances to the different regional industries can be 
interp'reted as representative of a 'short term' 
attitude toward employment, and as such is unlikely to 
result in pressure on the shop stewards to pursue a 
programme designed to encroach on managerial control 
in the workplace, provided the short term objectives 
of the workforce are met. In addition to the likely 
results of the workforce's entrance/exit patterns on 
shop steward behaviour,-must be the issue of labour 
turnover. In all three regions labour turnover is 
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suggested to be unacceptably high (from the employer's 
perspective), but it is only in the Cape region that 
data was available to indicate the degree of such 
turnover and only for the industry as a whole. 
Table 11 (Cape region) shows the level of labour 
turnover to range from a low of 61.3% to a high of 
93.7% in any one year. This volume of inter-factory 
movement (and withdrawals from the industry) are not 
likely to develop long term relationships with shop 
stewards and will influence to degree of pressure 
experienced by shop stewards. In addition, if the 
shop stewards in turn reflect similar labour turnover, 
the continuity of representation is also likely to be 
adversely affected. Whilst empirical data is only 
available for the Cape region, the issue of labour 
turnover is to be found in the other regions arid if 
their turnover iJ similar, the logic of the lack of 
pressure on shop stewards in the Cape region will be 
just as applicable in Natal and Transvaal. 
The issue of labour turnover provides the possibility 
of a further interpretation in understanding of the 
lack of militancy. The rank and file membership may 
well believe that their material (wage) objectives 
cannot readily be achieved by the union (for whatever 
reason) and have 'discovered' that moving from one 
factory to another can raise their wages. The rate of 
turnover in the Cape region is closely related to the 
economic cycle, and the possibility exists that this 
serves as a mechanism to raise their wage rate. There 
is also evidence that the minimum wage rate as 
negotiated is not the actual wage paid (see Meeting 
No. 1, 1975, Cape Negotiations, "Supporting 
Statements" 1971, Transvaal Negotiations, Meeting No. 
1, 1985, Transvaal Negotiations 1976, Extra-ordinary 
Negotiations Natal). The extent of this, however, is 
unknown as data kept by the industrial councils was 
inadequate to arrive at any f inali~y about actual 
wages paid. 
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The interpretations placed on the regional patterns of 
entrances/exits from employment in the industry and 
the labour turnover data need to be treated with care 
in arriving at conclusions. The data can be viewed as 
objective empirical data which requires subjective 
data - drawn from the respective labour forces -
before any finality of conclusion can be established. 
However, these (tentative) conclusions, together with 
the &rguments concerning the relationships established 
through the industrial councils and their value to the 
negotiating parties, the role of the leadership of the 
unions, the 'atomisation' of production and the 
contextual factors provide a convincing explanation of 
the lack of miiitancy in the clothing manufacturing 
industry of South Africa. 
CONCLUSION 
The observed lack of militancy in the regional unions 
of the garment manufacturing industry can be 
understood in terms of the earlier discussion in this 
chapter on the 'structure' of collective bargaining in 
the industry, which was encapsulated in the idea of 
the maintenance of the managerial prerogative, i.e. 
favouring the sectional interests of employers. It is 
in structuration theory's conceptualisation of 
'system' that the inevitability of the lack of 
militancy is to be evidenced. 
Systems, in structuration theory, are characterised by 
a number of features; firstly, it is the continuity 
and durability of identifiably similar behaviour which 
allows the description of certain social practices as 
a 'system' to be arrived at, Secondly, systems have 
'st~ucture' which is drawn upon by knowledgeable 
actors for the production and reproduction of social 
practices (collective bargaining in this thesis). 
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Knowledgeable actors 'reflexively monitor' their 
environment which may constrain or facilitate their 
activities. Thirdly, systems reflect mechanisms of 
integration, i.e. reciprocity of practices of autonomy 
and dependence between actors or collectivities. 
Lastly, the boun·daries of systems are not rigidly 
demarcated, thus 'distant contexts' can also constrain 
or facilitate action. 
Collective bargaining in the South African garment 
industry can readily be described as a system (this 
has been shown in section 8.2 of this chapter) and the 
'structure' of the system has been identified and 
argued to favour the sectional interests of employers 
(see section 8.5 of this chapter). It will be this 
structure which is drawn on in the production and 
reproduction of collective bargaining action, and not 
just by one party to the bargaining encounter. Thus 
the unions in their action will draw on the rules of 
signification and legitimation and the resources of 
domination, all of which have been shown to favour the 
sectional interests of employers. It follows 
therefore that their actions will lack militancy, 
given that militancy in this thesis is conceived of as 
not in the interest of employers (as clarified in 
Chapter 2, section 2.2). 
The continuity of the lack of militancy over the 
review period is readily addressed by structuration 
theory's conception of change; structure exists as 
'memory traces' in the interpretive scheme of 
knowledgeable actors who monitor the behaviour of 
others (and expect the same of their behaviour), and 
it is in this monitoring that changes may occur. It 
has also been argued in this thesis that construct 
theory can be util~sed to understand particular 
'interpretive schemes'. What is important is that 
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core constructs are difficult to change (see Chapter 
3, .section 3.i). The union leadership will monitor 
its environment as shown earlier in this chapter, and 
this introduces the possibility of change. Again, in 
structuration theory 'significantly placed actors' 
(for our purpose, union leadership) can keep things as 
they are or can introduce changa. 
With the exception of the later part of the Transvaal 
region, all unions had the same secretary although the 
various executives may have reflected membership 
changes, and furthermore, the analysis presented in 
this-thesis suggest that a core construct (a rule of 
signification) embraces the 1mportance placed by the 
Union leadership on the industrial council as the 
appropriate bargaining mechanism. The industrial 
council is also symbolic of what behaviours are 
considered reasonable, i.e. the structure of 
collective bargaining and will repres~nt core 
constructs. 
The preceeding discussion argues that for a change in 
the 'structure' of collective bargaining a change of 
either (or both) the current leadership or a change in 
their 'interpretive scheme' is required, neither 
occurs in the industry over the review period. 
The arguments Gool, Maree and Morris (see section 8.7 
of this chapter) all can be understood in 
structuratioh theory's observation that 'significantly 
placed actors' (i.e. the leadership) can try and keep 
things as they are. Effectively this means the 
maintenance of the leaderships interpretive scheme and 
thus the continuity of drawing on structure (in the 
production and reproduction of action), which is 
characterised as favouring the sectional interests of 
employers. The argument added to those above which 
suggests a lack of pressure from rank-and-file 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
/ 
452. 
membership on the various union leaderships means that 
in the leaderships' 'reflexive monitoring' activities 
no reason for change in their 'interpretive schemes' 
will be encountered. In both cases the leadership 
will continue to draw on the 'rules and resources' 
(i.e. structure) of collective bargaining of their 
region and in so doing perpetuate the continuity of 
behaviours identified as lacking in militancy. 
Structuration theory then provides a plausible 
explanation of the system of collective bargaining in 
the South African garment manufacturing industry and 
can draw together a variety of arguments to establish 
an equally plausable explanation of the continuity of 
action in the industry for the period 1968 - 1986. 
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PRIMARY RESEARCH MATERIAL 
Cape Region 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Minutes of 
Minutes of 
Minutes of 
Industrial 
Report. 
the Cape Industrial Council. 
the Cape Clothing Manufacturers Association. 
Shop Steward and Union Exco. Meetings. 
Council for Clothing Industry (Cape) - Annual 
(v) Financial Reports of the Industrial Council (Cape). 
(vi) Financial Reports of Funds Administered by the 
Industrial Council for the Cape. 
(vii) Financial Reports of the Garment Workers Union (Cape). 
(viii)Pension Fund Records of Industrial Council of the Cape. 
(ix) Government Gazettes - Clothing Industry of the Cape, 
Main Agreement. · 
Transvaal Region 
(i) Minutes of the Transvaal Industrial Council. 
(ii) Minutes of the Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers 
Association. 
(iii) Transvaal Clothing Industry Diary. 
(iv) Industrial Council for Clothing Industry (Tvl) - Annual 
Report. 
(v) Financial Reports of the Industrial Council (Tvl). 
(vi) Financial Reports of Funds Administered by the 
Industrial Council for the Transvaal. 
(vii) Financial Reports of the Garment Workers Union (Tvl). 
(viii)Pension Fund Records of Industrial Council of the 
Transvaal. 
(ix) Government Gazettes - Clothing Industry of the 
Transvaal, Main Agreement. 
Natal -Region 
( i ) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Minutes of the Natal Industrial Council. 
Minutes of the Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association. 
Natal Clothing Industry Diary. 
Garment Workers Industrial Union (Natal) - Annual 
Reports. 
(v) Financial Reports of the Industrial Council (Natal). 
(vi) Financial Reports of Funds Administered by the 
Industrial Council for Natal. 
(vii) Financial Reports of the Garment Workers Union (Natal). 
(viii)Pension Fund Records of Industrial Council of Natal . 
(ix) Government Gazettes - Clothing Industry of Natal, Main 
Agreement. 
